Scattered Supremacies: Locating Whiteness In Modernist Fiction by Del Rosario, Micah Kuuini
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 
2020 
Scattered Supremacies: Locating Whiteness In Modernist Fiction 
Micah Kuuini Del Rosario 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations 
Recommended Citation 
Del Rosario, Micah Kuuini, "Scattered Supremacies: Locating Whiteness In Modernist Fiction" (2020). 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 4114. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4114 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4114 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Scattered Supremacies: Locating Whiteness In Modernist Fiction 
Abstract 
Intervening in modernist literary studies and critical whiteness studies, this dissertation argues that 
modernist novels featuring largely white casts of characters and few themes or plotlines of overtly racial 
content are key sites for understanding how white people manifest their racial identities in subtle, indirect, 
and often unwitting ways. While it is taken for granted that race is a key factor in texts by writers of color, 
critics still tend to consider the racial dynamics of texts by white writers only when they involve 
primitivism, Orientalism, or scenes of interracial violence. This narrow framework exempts large swathes 
of white literary production from racial analysis simply because they do not feature overt racism or overtly 
racist representational forms. Through readings of novels by Jean Rhys, William Faulkner, F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, and Willa Cather, “Scattered Supremacies” uncovers forms of white supremacy more subtle 
and oblique than either white people’s stigmatizations of people or color or overt proclamations of white 
racial superiority. I focus on novels that feature little to no interracial conflict between white and nonwhite 
people, novels where white characters are not consciously thinking about their own whiteness. Within 
these texts, I argue, whiteness emerges out of conflicts between different classes of white people trying 
to distinguish themselves from other whites. These intra-racial class conflicts involve moralistic 
identification with a range of economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral virtues, such as hard 
work, independence, discipline, and the austere capacity to endure hardship. In clinging to a sense of 
themselves as embodying these virtues, white characters and their white authors are constantly 
managing the boundaries and connotations of whiteness, even if they are not consciously doing so and 
even if the people disparaged for lacking these virtues are other whites. The stakes of being able to 
recognize the kinds of economically coded racial discourse identified in these texts are especially high, 
for claims about the possession or lack of classically liberal, seemingly “race-neutral” virtues like 
industriousness, discipline, and self-reliance are an increasingly crucial part of how white supremacy is 
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helped me survive grad-school burnout, and I can only hope that I’ve been as good a 
friend to them as they’ve been to me. Of course, there are countless other past and present 
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and scholarship: Daniel Davies, Evelyn Soto, Riley McGuire, Natalie Amleshi, Eleni 
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Ava Kim, Shona Adler, Kirsten Lee, Davy Knittle, Zach Fruit, Keyana Parks, Mariah 
Min, Howie Tam, Brooke Stanley, Alex Eisenthal, Orchid Tierney, Alex Millen, Aaron 
Bartels-Swindells, Jazmín Delgado, Mayelin Perez, Martin Premoli, Matty Hemming, 
Najnin Islam, and Clare Mullaney. A special shout out to my mentor, Travis Chi Wing 
Lau (hey, girl). 
 The idea for this dissertation came to me out of my own experience. Its originality 
I claim as a product of my own background and interests, but it would never have 
attained the rigor and robustness it did without the brilliant insights and caring 
mentorship of Penn English faculty. I owe more than I can express to my stellar 
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dissertation committee, Jed Esty, Heather Love, Paul Saint-Amour, and Ania Loomba, 
who lifted me up and challenged me from the time of my third-year field exams all the 
way to the finish line. Heather Love brought a combination of rigor, warmth and 
understanding, and pragmatically targeted and prioritized feedback that was always 
immensely helpful. I am convinced that Paul Saint-Amour is the most calming person I 
will ever meet. He helped me navigate myriad intellectual, professional, and bureaucratic 
mazes over the past seven years and played a key role in both of the publications I 
produced during grad school. This dissertation really got off the ground with the chapter 
on Rhys, and Ania Loomba’s incisive feedback made that chapter what it is. She is one of 
the fiercest intellects I have ever met, and this dissertation handles questions of race, 
class, gender, and intersectionality with a nuance and complexity that owes much to her 
brilliant mind. Jed Esty was the best advisor I could ever have hoped for. His ability to 
see the big picture in terms of concepts, arguments, and interventions constantly pushed 
this project to more ambitious, self-aware heights. He tirelessly shepherded me through 
the end stages of dissertation life, buoying me up in my exhaustion, accepting and 
working within my limitations, and giving me roadmaps and encouragement to finish and 
defend a dissertation in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic. Perhaps more 
than anything, I am grateful for the positivity with which he received and supported my 
decision not to pursue an academic career (an encouragement that all of my committee 
provided) and the lengths to which he then went to help me apply for and land a teaching 
job outside the tenure track. 
 Aside from these four amazing scholars and mentors, I was supported 
intellectually and emotionally by numerous other Penn English faculty. Jim English 
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offered helpful comments on this dissertation in meetings of the Mods Reading Group, 
and though playing less of a direct role in my dissertation, many faculty contributed to 
other areas of my grad-school life in ways that helped me juggle commitments and free 
up time and energy for dissertation writing. Jo Park was an immensely knowledgeable 
and generous mentor for me as a teacher. Dagmawi Woubshet was a godsend during the 
trials of the academic job market. Melissa Sanchez, Margo Crawford, Pearl Brilmyer, 
Suvir Kaul, Rahul Mukherjee, and Simone White gave me many enjoyable chats in the 
hallways, sometimes helping me to think about scholarly questions, other times helping 
to take them off my mind. I would be remiss not to thank Jennifer Egan for the interest 
she took in me after I TAed for her course when she was an Artist-in-Residence at Penn. 
Her tireless advocacy of my teaching and her willingness to serve as a reference and 
letter writer for a professionally lost and nervous soul was a crucial part of how I ended 
up with a job after grad school, despite a coronavirus-induced economic recession. 
 I am immensely grateful to the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation 
for a Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Dissertation Grant that funded an entire 
year of work on this project. I also thank the Social Science Research Council for a 
Mellon-SSRC Graduate Studies Enhancement Grant that likewise provided funds 
supporting this research. I also thank, of course, the University of Pennsylvania for five 
years of Benjamin Franklin/Fontaine Fellowships and for the resource-rich, intellectual 
climate that facilitated this dissertation. 
 It’s been a long time since my undergraduate years at Cornell, but I would not 
have become a PhD student (or been accepted to Penn) without the teaching and 
mentorship of many Cornell English faculty, some of whom are still there, others not. My 
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retrospective thanks to Stuart Davis, Daniel Schwarz, Kate McCullough, Jeremy 
Braddock, Paul Fleming, and (again) Margo Crawford (before her move to Penn). 
 There are so many people who helped me through grad school without knowing 
they were doing it, non-English-PhD friends in Philadelphia, from Cornell, and back 
home in Hawaii whose companionship, memory, and spirit gave me joy in trying times. 
Abby and Eloise Squire were an endless source of positivity. I am grateful to Pax Ressler 
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providing company that allowed me to escape academia while retaining a political 
consciousness and cultural fluency that continued to challenge and stimulate me. Julia 
Cao has always been in my corner, looking out for me from freshman year at Cornell to 
the present. Jackson Randolph, Ranjay Krishna, Ben Liu, Can Akçevin, and Ray Wang 
gave me Zoom hangouts that recharged my batteries, and Hia Woollard was a constant 
source of encouragement during the final year of my program. To the Punaluu gang—
Cody Black, Nohea Hoopii, Ryan Olaguera, Megan Lum, Lauren Kim, Keola Tan, Kaipo 
Kekaula, Megan Araujo, and Josh Koko—I ran to your existence, to memories of you, of 
us, more than you can know. I don’t think anyone who hasn’t written a dissertation can 
understand how fundamental it is to a graduate student’s mental health to know and have 
access to a world outside of academia, one that provincializes the profession and keeps it 
in perspective. I am five thousand miles from Hawaii, but even from Philadelphia, I could 
always see the lighthouse, and thoughts of you all, keeping the home fires burning, kept 
me afloat at sea. 
 I shudder to think what the past few years would have been like without Justin 
Yoder, and given that my feelings, over the past few sentences, have whisked me out of 
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proper, third-person address anyway, I’ll just apostrophize to “you” and roll with it. 
You’ve saved me from myself, my dear, more than I care to admit. You’ve forced me, 
intentionally or not, to confront insecurities and habits that have been painful yet 
necessary to address, and I’ve grown as much in the three and a half years since I met 
you as I did in the 25 years before that. As Baldwin once put it, “Love takes off the 
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me laugh and tell me I’m incredible and keep me from feeling alone; that’s why I like 
you. But your circumspection, level-headedness, and self-awareness also challenge me to 
be more honest with myself and help me to identity the parts of my character that need 
improvement; that’s why I love you and why I want to build a life around you. 
 Lastly and most of all, I am indebted to the support of my family: my mother and 
father, Desiree and Thomas Del Rosario; my grandma and grandpa, Loretta and Clarence 
Ku; and my uncle, aunt, and cousin, Brian, Vicki, and Peyton. They have guided me 
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dissertation would not exist. Thank you, first, to Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, for the 
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SCATTERED SUPREMACIES: LOCATING WHITENESS IN MODERNIST 
FICTION 
Micah Del Rosario 
Jed Esty 
Intervening in modernist literary studies and critical whiteness studies, this 
dissertation argues that modernist novels featuring largely white casts of characters and 
few themes or plotlines of overtly racial content are key sites for understanding how 
white people manifest their racial identities in subtle, indirect, and often unwitting ways. 
While it is taken for granted that race is a key factor in texts by writers of color, critics 
still tend to consider the racial dynamics of texts by white writers only when they involve 
primitivism, Orientalism, or scenes of interracial violence. This narrow framework 
exempts large swathes of white literary production from racial analysis simply because 
they do not feature overt racism or overtly racist representational forms. Through 
readings of novels by Jean Rhys, William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Willa Cather, 
“Scattered Supremacies” uncovers forms of white supremacy more subtle and oblique 
than either white people’s stigmatizations of people or color or overt proclamations of 
white racial superiority. I focus on novels that feature little to no interracial conflict 
between white and nonwhite people, novels where white characters are not consciously 
thinking about their own whiteness. Within these texts, I argue, whiteness emerges out of 
conflicts between different classes of white people trying to distinguish themselves from 
other whites. These intra-racial class conflicts involve moralistic identification with a 
range of economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral virtues, such as hard work, 
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independence, discipline, and the austere capacity to endure hardship. In clinging to a 
sense of themselves as embodying these virtues, white characters and their white authors 
are constantly managing the boundaries and connotations of whiteness, even if they are 
not consciously doing so and even if the people disparaged for lacking these virtues are 
other whites. The stakes of being able to recognize the kinds of economically coded 
racial discourse identified in these texts are especially high, for claims about the 
possession or lack of classically liberal, seemingly “race-neutral” virtues like 
industriousness, discipline, and self-reliance are an increasingly crucial part of how white 
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Whiteness and the Modernist Imagination: Literary Studies and the Location of 
Race 
 
 In 1934, during a period of crushing financial and marital strife, F. Scott 
Fitzgerald published his fourth and final novel called Tender is the Night. It tells the story 
of the rise and fall of Doctor Richard “Dick” Diver, a promising young psychologist who 
marries one of his rich patients and gradually loses his work ethic and professional 
standing by travelling too much in her leisure-class social circles. The novel is in many 
ways a self-critical (and self-pitying) portrait of Fitzgerald’s own marital and career 
trajectory, which likewise began with immense professional promise and an extravagant 
lifestyle during the Jazz Age but devolved into financial scrimping by the Great 
Depression compounded by a marriage heavily strained by his wife Zelda’s 
institutionalization for schizophrenia. 
 Over the course of the novel, Fitzgerald signals his protagonist’s decline as well 
as the decline of many of his friends through an increasing number of social or romantic 
entanglements with a variety of nonwhite characters. Abe North, an American musician 
and friend of the Divers vacationing with them in France, prefigures Dick’s fall as he 
becomes resigned to a life of parties and drinking and loses his resolve to return to 
America and continue his career. Abe’s downward spiral is most starkly symptomatized 
when his alcoholism implicates him in an embarrassing racial scandal. While drunk in 
Montparnasse, he accuses an African-American bar patron of stealing his money, which 
leads to a bloody scuffle not so much between Abe and the man he accused but between 
the man he accused and another black man, named Jules Peterson, whom Abe had 
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enlisted as a legal witness to the charges he placed with the police. The whole fiasco 
culminates with the accused man and a few of his friends following Abe and Peterson to 
Dick’s hotel room, where Peterson is soon found dead on the bedspread a few minutes 
after Dick and Abe leave him unattended. After Abe meets an undignified end being 
beaten to death in a bar fight, his widow Mary remarries to a rich Italian count, the owner 
of large mineral deposits in southwestern Asia. But, we are told, “‘Conte di Minghetti,’” 
the name of Mary’s new husband, “was merely a papal title” stemming from his wealth 
(Fitzgerald, Tender 258). The man’s real name is Hosain, and he is not Italian so much as 
one “of the Kyble-Berber-Sabaean-Hindu strain that belts across north Africa and Asia,” 
a man “not quite light enough to travel in a pullman south of the Mason-Dixon” (259, 
258). Finally, as Dick’s own decline progresses throughout the novel, his wife Nicole’s 
disaffection with him is accompanied by her growing infatuation with a French-American 
soldier named Tommy Barban. While Tommy, as far as we know, is of fully European 
descent, traveling and fighting in distant wars has left him “dark, scarred and handsome,” 
and Nicole is erotically thrilled by his complexion colored “by unknown suns, his 
nourishment by strange soils, [and] his tongue awkward with the curl of many dialects” 
(294, 269). The language and imagery used to describe Tommy and Nicole’s romance is 
explicitly Orientalist: “Symbolically she lay across his saddle-bow as surely as he had 
wolfed her away from Damascus and they had come out upon the Mongolian plain” (297-
298). 
 Critical discussions of race in Tender is the Night have focused almost entirely on 
this set of characters, tropes, and plot lines. They have been read as reflecting 
Fitzgerald’s reactionary phobias about the breakdown of social distinctions and 
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hierarchies in the wake of the Jazz Age’s decadent moral climate. As Felipe Smith has 
pointed out, Fitzgerald’s biographical and fictional obsession with upward mobility and 
social climbing required inequality as a baseline reality: he was “troubled by trends 
which blurred the old lines of social distinction” because “his fantasies of social conquest 
… depended upon America remaining the America of his youth,” a “genteel America” 
whose “elitist social structure ma[de] that conquest all the more impressive” (Smith, The 
Dark Side of Paradise 21). In this light, Abe and Dick’s embroilment in a black-on-black 
murder scandal betrays Fitzgerald’s anxieties over “the encroachment of all forms of 
‘difference’ into the preserve of white male privilege” (Smith, “The Figure on the Bed” 
208). Likewise, the interracial romances between Mary and Hosain or Tommy and Nicole 
encode Fitzgerald’s insecurities about the “the Hollywood of ‘dark men’ such as Rudolph 
Valentino” that gained eroticized popularity among white women during his time 
(Messenger 161). 
 But does this novel only “become” racial when black characters, Orientalist 
tropes, or interracial romances enter the picture? After a thorough glimpse, in Book One, 
into the Divers’ marital dysfunction and Dick’s already ensuing decline, Fitzgerald 
circles back, in Book Two, to give us a portrait of our protagonist before his ill-fated 
marriage. As an “Oxford Rhodes Scholar” and a graduate of Johns Hopkins and Yale, 
Dick, embarking on his psychiatric career in 1917, had also managed to avoid service in 
World War I and is thus conscious of having had so much good fortune in his life that it 
actually makes him nervous. “In his last year at New Haven some one referred to him as 
‘lucky Dick’—the name lingered in his head” (Tender 116). “‘And Lucky Dick,’” he 
reflects (the words in quotation marks to emphasize them as lines Dick really thinks to 
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himself), “‘he must be less intact, even faintly destroyed. If life won’t do it for him it’s 
not a substitute to get a disease, or a broken heart, or an inferiority complex, though it’d 
be nice to build out some broken side till it was better than the original structure’” (116). 
The defining trait of Fitzgerald’s young protagonist is a gnawing fear of what a lifelong 
lack of adversity has done or might do to his character. Dick’s paradoxically humble yet 
self-aggrandizing desire to be “broken” in—to be “faintly destroyed” for the sake of 
building some character—disposes him to risky behaviors, like the professionally unwise 
move of marrying one of his patients. But having long enjoyed the wind behind his sails, 
Dick is determined to make something of himself, and beyond a desire to be the greatest 
psychologist that ever lived, he hopes to attain not only the cold, lonely heights of 
professional stardom but the warmth of personal admiration from the little people around 
him: “he wanted to be brave and wise, but it was all pretty difficult. He wanted to be 
loved, too, if he could fit it in” (133). By Book Two, readers have already seen what 
Dick’s desire to be loved actually looks like, for Book One illustrates Dick’s “power of 
arousing a fascinated and uncritical love” by portraying his charisma from the perspective 
of a young American actress and ingenue named Rosemary Hoyt (27). Rosemary meets 
the Divers while vacationing on the Riviera and falls in love with Dick’s irresistible 
charm: “to be included in Dick Diver’s world for a while was a remarkable experience: 
people believed he made special reservations about them, recognizing the proud 
uniqueness of their destinies, buried under the compromises of how many years. He won 
everyone quickly with an exquisite consideration and a politeness that moved so fast and 
intuitively that it could be examined only its effect” (27-28). If Dick pursues the self-
aggrandizing dream of being the greatest psychologist that ever lived, he also strives to 
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inhabit that position with an air of selfless solicitude, to enjoy the prestige of 
socioeconomic elite-ness without being resented for it or perceived as cold, callous, or 
condescending. 
  Are the scope of these aspirations and the nature of these anxieties race-neutral? 
Or is there something “white” about these professional insecurities and ambitions? Do we 
need Fitzgerald or his character to use the language of race or whiteness explicitly in 
order to draw this conclusion? And if we do conclude that whiteness structures the 
history, thinking, and self-presentation of Fitzgerald’s character, how do we produce an 
account of that whiteness more specific and nuanced than the appropriate but hackneyed 
term “privilege”? 
These are the kinds of questions this dissertation seeks to address. “Scattered 
Supremacies: Locating Whiteness in Modernist Fiction” aims to expand the range of texts 
and textual dynamics in which we look for race as an operative factor in fiction by and 
about white people. I argue that modernist novels featuring largely white casts of 
characters and few themes or plotlines of overtly racial content are key sites for thinking 
about how white people manifest their racial identities in subtle and circuitous ways. To 
do this, I read a number of novels by four white, modernist writers: Jean Rhys’ After 
Leaving Mr. Mackenzie (1931) and Good Morning, Midnight (1939); William Faulkner’s 
The Mansion (1959); F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night (1934); and Willa Cather’s 
O Pioneers! (1913), A Lost Lady (1923), Death Comes for the Archbishop (1927), and 
Shadows on the Rock (1931). What unites all of these texts and makes them optimal 
archives for this dissertation is that (with the exception of Death Comes for the 
Archbishop) none of them are “about” race in the sense of overtly thematizing topics like 
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slavery and colonialism or focusing on conflicts between white people and people of 
color. 
Any white-authored literary text that falls under this umbrella could, in theory, 
work as an archive for this dissertation given its theoretical and methodological 
objectives. The novels gathered in this study are particularly germane, however, because 
they not only revolve around relationships between white people but also portray these 
relationships in ways that specifically contrast the virtues of a particular white character 
or group of white people against the vices of other, less admirable or respectable whites. 
They are narratives, in other words, that draw (or, in Rhys’ case, interrogate) distinctions 
between “good” and “bad” white people and are thus texts where the boundaries and 
connotations of whiteness are constantly being worked out, even if the racial discourses 
in question play out in terms that are not (so to speak) black and white, that do not 
involve white people’s relationships with or ideas about Black, Asian, Latinx, or 
indigenous people. Additionally, Rhys, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and Cather are uniquely 
germane to this study because they are writers who shared what we might describe as a 
cynical or tragic view of social and historical progress. Their fiction tends to highlight the 
drawbacks and pitfalls of modernity: the degradation of moral values; the types of cruelty 
and callousness that accompany fast-paced, socially atomized, money- and commodity-
driven lives; the forms of community and humble rusticity being lost or already lost over 
time. These four novelists display a particular penchant for illuminating and 
foregrounding what they perceive to be the uglier qualities of themselves and/or their 
white contemporaries, and their fiction thus engages quite fervently in discourses of 
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virtue signaling or vice condemning through which the boundaries and meanings of 
whiteness are constantly (if not always consciously) being negotiated. 
In the past few decades, modernist studies’ encounters with critical race theory, 
ethnic studies, and postcolonial studies have galvanized analyses of race in modernist 
literature. While it is taken for granted that race is a key factor in texts by writers of color, 
critics tend to consider the racial dynamics of texts by white writers only when they 
involve primitivism, Orientalism, or scenes of interracial violence. This narrow 
framework exempts large swathes of white literary production from racial analysis 
simply because they do not feature overt racism or overtly racist representational forms. 
Such critical tendencies perpetuate a problem described by whiteness-studies scholar 
Richard Dyer, who observes that “to focus exclusively on those texts that are ‘about’ 
racial difference and interaction risks giving the impression that whiteness is only white, 
or only matters, when it is explicitly set against non-white, whereas whiteness reproduces 
itself as whiteness in all texts all of the time” (13). The challenge for more thorough 
analyses of white racial identity, Dyer contends, “is to the see the specificity of 
whiteness, even when the text itself is not trying to show it to you, doesn’t even know 
that it is there to be shown” (13-14). 
 This is certainly true of Tender is the Night. There is nothing in the novel or in 
Fitzgerald’s essays or epistolary correspondence to suggest that the book is in any sense 
“about” whiteness. Yet as people of color both in and outside the academy have long 
pointed out (and as academics in the more recent field of critical whiteness studies have 
repeatedly echoed), white supremacy thrives precisely because many white people do not 
consider their own behavior or the circumstances of their lives as meaningfully marked 
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by race. If we restrict our racial analyses only to the behaviors and circumstances that 
white people themselves explicitly flag as racial, we would be forever looking only at the 
tip of an iceberg. The same principle applies for analyses of whiteness in literary texts. 
There are some white authors whose work acknowledges and even foregrounds the 
histories and contours of white racial identity. I am thinking here of writers like Joseph 
Conrad in Heart of Darkness, E. M. Forster in A Passage to India, or William Faulkner in 
Go Down, Moses. Certainly, the critiques of colonialism and slavery embedded in these 
writers’ works are full of oversights and contradictions. Conrad could recognize that 
imperialist Europe was, morally, the real heart of darkness yet remained wedded to 
visions of Africa as a place of civilization-less savagery. Faulkner’s works express a 
horrified, haunted awareness of slavery as the curse of the South, yet in reckoning with 
its history, he perpetuated stereotypical tropes of blackness, and his white characters tend 
to wallow in cerebral, even suicidal despair rather than pursue material forms of 
economic or political reparation. These authors are far from perfect in the way they 
confront the acts and histories of violence that undergird white identity in America and 
Western Europe, but they do confront these things head on, and the racial discourses of 
these overtly racialized novels have received much scholarly attention. There are plenty 
of other white writers, however—or plenty of other works by the same writers—that are 
entirely oblivious to these topics, and even if a white writer’s work thematizes race at a 
certain point within or even throughout a novel, this does not mean that that writer 
recognizes the full extent of how race and, specifically, whiteness informs their text and 
the world it represents. Faulkner is a perfect case in point. No one could read The Sound 
and the Fury or Absalom! Absalom! and say that Faulkner was unaware of how race 
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plays a monumental role in the history and present of the American South. But as I argue 
in one of this dissertation’s chapters, most discussions of race in Faulkner’s work focus 
on a limited archive of canonical novels that revolve around tensions between black and 
white Southerners. There are other, less interracially structured Faulkner texts in which 
race is no less present a factor despite the relative absence of black characters, texts 
where whiteness manifests in ways that are not necessarily conscious or intentional on 
Faulkner’s behalf. In these novels, I argue, white racial identity assumes ideological and 
aesthetic forms that are subtle and indirect, ones that are especially relevant to critiques 
of white supremacy today precisely because of that subtlety and indirectness. 
This is the modus operandi, then, of “Scattered Supremacies”: reading novels by 
Rhys, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and Cather, each chapter of this dissertation focuses on a 
single white, modernist author, revealing forms of whiteness in their fiction “even when 
the text itself is not trying to show it to [us], doesn’t even know that it is there to be 
shown.” I uncover the white-supremacist stakes of ideas, practices, and structures of 
feeling that that do not appear racial because they play out in relationships between or 
among white people who are neither engaging with nor even thinking about people of 
color. One of the tricky things about this argument is that, with the exception of Jean 
Rhys (who, though by no means unproblematic, was the most racially perceptive writer 
in the bunch), I contend that the authors in this study had a largely unconscious 
relationship to the particular racial dynamics I am tracking in their texts. There may be 
localized moments, here and there, where Cather’s narrator comments on the whiteness 
of her heroine’s skin or where Fitzgerald’s protagonist muses on the tough, resilient 
nature of his Anglo-Saxon ancestors, but these are not the kinds of moments on which my 
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readings focus. I call attention, instead, to forms of whiteness inhering in discourses that 
are far more diffuse: the rhetoric of debt and finance that runs throughout one of 
Faulkner’s novels, for example, or Dick Diver’s ongoing obsession with reconciling his 
own history of social and economic privileges with a sense of himself as “good,” selfless 
person. These are features of these texts—entire dimensions of them, really—whose 
racial coloring is not on their authors’ radar. 
Of course, judgments about the relative “consciousness” of a novelist’s racial 
discourse are always complicated by questions of aesthetic irony and authorial intent, and 
I try to account for these factors throughout my readings. Particularly in the chapters on 
Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and Cather, part of how I do this is to draw heavily on these 
authors’ essays, interviews, or letters to provide a larger sense of their own racial views 
or the extent to which they thought about race at all (let alone whiteness, specifically) as 
a factor in their own lives and the world around them. Aside from using nonfiction 
writings to contextualize readings of race in these novels, however, I also ensure that my 
close readings themselves register, as much as possible, the various layers of irony and 
racial awareness that structure each author’s representation of their white characters. 
Take my chapter on Jean Rhys, for example, where I read two novels that portray the 
ways in which poor, white, itinerant English women are exploited, alienated, and 
stigmatized by middle-class English men. There is abundant textual evidence within these 
novels that Rhys was keenly aware of the racial stakes of the misogyny and classism 
endured by her protagonists. She knew that their non-bourgeois domestic and sexual 
arrangements jeopardized their relationship to “Englishness” as a racial category, and she 
called attention to this within her fiction in a number of ways. Her keen awareness of 
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how racial distinctions contribute to her protagonists’ oppression does not lead, however, 
to cross-racial forms of solidarity with people of color, and in fact, her protagonists often 
respond to their alienation not by rallying against “Englishness” as a classed and 
patriarchal category of racial exclusion but rather by trying to buy into it, acting more 
proper and bourgeois than their material circumstances actually allow. 
My chapter thus registers the layers of racial self-awareness, the ambivalences, 
and the limits of Rhys’ racial critique, and I strive to capture these nuances in the case of 
every author. There is a great deal of irony in Fitzgerald’s representation of Dick Diver 
because Tender is the Night is a semiautobiographical novel in which Fitzgerald was 
looking back on his Jazz-Age past and trying to pinpoint the decadent behaviors that led 
to a precipitous professional decline in the 1930s. There are multiple aspects of Dick’s 
character that Fitzgerald thus presents with an ironic bite, but the moment, for instance, 
where Dick contemplates his “Aryan” ancestry to pull himself out of a funk is not one of 
them. There is no ironization of this flicker of race pride, and the part of the novel that I 
identify as a locus of whiteness (Dick’s self-critical yet egotistical fixation on being 
perceived as a kind and generous person who has worked for the socioeconomic comforts 
and privileges he enjoys) is not in any way thematized by Fitzgerald as a racially charged 
matter. Faulkner was deeply aware of slavery and racial prejudice as sins that haunted 
Southern whites, yet despite this historical critique of whiteness as a troubled racial 
identity, he also held a fervent, unironic belief in the liberal virtue of self-reliant 
individualism, something he believed that white people embodied in particular and 
needed to “teach” black people so that the latter would be “ready” for freedom. 
Faulkner’s racial progressivism thus had its limits, and in The Mansion, which focuses on 
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the intra-racial conflict between a white tenant farmer and a white banker, his obsession 
with independence and self-enclosed individualism creeps into the text in the form of a 
white discourse of debt: a financially structured philosophy of conflict resolution that 
constantly looks forward to closure, to a “settlement” in which all moral debts are paid 
off and past acts of violence are compartmentalized to a no-longer-mentioned past, 
leaving all those involved debt-free with a sense of vindicated individualism. This 
financial discourse suffuses the novel’s plot and narration. That it is framework for 
thinking about justice and historical violence that derives from and privileges the 
emotional interests of white people is not a conscious object of critique on Faulkner’s 
behalf, even as the overtly racist comments or actions of white characters within the 
novel are clearly ironized. Cather is similar to Fitzgerald when it comes to questions of 
irony and intent. She was aware of the whiteness of her characters and sometimes 
remarked upon it in her texts, but she was not critical of that whiteness in any way. Her 
novels about bygone pioneers making austere livings on the unsettled frontier were 
informed by a keen disgust for the spoiled Philistinism of America’s modernized, early-
twentieth-century bourgeoisie. Cather never thought or said much, however, about the 
whiteness of either her bourgeois contemporaries or the settlers glorified in her fiction. 
Whiteness operated for her as an invisible norm. She was not inclined to dissect or 
interrogate it (the way that Rhys or Faulkner were), and she could not really imagine 
writing novels about people who were not white. In her portraits of pioneer life, it was 
not her intention to glorify whiteness by memorializing the humble rusticity and epic 
resilience of white settlers, but she managed to do this nonetheless because her aversion 
to the spoiled Philistinism of America’s modern bourgeoisie led her to engage in wholly 
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unironic homages to the romantic virtues of white pioneers. In their life and in their 
fiction, the authors in this study thus displayed varying degrees of awareness about 
whiteness as a category of identity and an object of critique. Through careful attention to 
language, irony, and tone and recourse to an author’s nonfiction, I attend to these 
idiosyncrasies throughout this dissertation’s chapters, giving the sharpest account 
possible of the “consciousness” or “unconsciousness” of each writer’s white racial 
discourse. 
In developing an eye and ear for whiteness’ myriad forms, then, “Scattered 
Supremacies” aims to step outside the box both in terms of the textual scenes and 
dynamics on which scholars typically rely for discussions of race and in terms of the 
racial content these novelists knowingly included in their work. What is ultimately at 
stake here is an expansion of racial optics—an broadening of the limited frameworks that 
structure the ways both literary critics and scholars of critical whiteness studies see race 
and expect it to look like. There are historical reasons for why the kinds of racial optics I 
am advancing here are especially urgent today, and I gesture toward some of those 
contemporary stakes later in this Introduction. For now, I would like to begin with a more 
detailed look at the state of existing scholarship in both modernist literary studies and 
critical whiteness studies, the two fields to which “Scattered Supremacies” contributes 
and on whose foundations it builds. The remainder of this Introduction proceeds in five 
parts. The first section offers a survey of how race has been treated as an object of 
analysis in modernist literary studies. The second provides a similar survey of critical 
whiteness studies, suggesting that even there, critics have been limited in their 
approaches to analyzing race as it manifests in the lives and cultural production of white 
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people. Section Three elaborates on the dissertation’s reading methods in greater detail as 
well as the historical context of modernist literary production. Section Four then turns to 
the dissertation’s contemporary historical context, outlining some structural specificities 
of white supremacy in the twenty first century and explaining how these contribute to a 
sense of the project’s stakes. Finally, the last section provides a roadmap to the 
dissertation, breaking down and summarizing its chapters. 
 
I. Race in Modernist Studies, Old and New 
 There is a certain set of topics around which scholarship on race in modernist 
literature has tended to revolve: immigration, nativism, and xenophobia; colonialism, 
primitivism, and orientalism; Jim Crow in postbellum America and the ongoing legacies 
of slavery. These topics speak to the historical contexts of American and British 
modernism, with Britain at the height of its imperial empire in the early twentieth century 
and the U.S. experiencing new waves of immigration from Asia and Eastern Europe, 
which stoked reactionary, eugenicist fears about the so-called “rising tide of color.” In 
exploring these topics, critics of literary modernism have made a great deal of headway 
illuminating both the spoken and unspoken racial fantasies and anxieties that informed 
modernist writing, especially insofar as these racial dynamics inhered in interracial 
relationships and conflicts, in white people’s thinking about non-white people or non-
European cultures or the actions of white people toward them. This has also meant, 
however, that the vast majority of modernism’s literary critics look for the same things 
when they are thinking about racial dynamics and that modernist studies has thus gotten 
very good, over the past few decades, at identifying certain kinds of racial topic matter 
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while neglecting others. To illustrate this long-standing tendency, I will offer a brief 
synopsis of four works of modernist studies in which race is a primary focus, if not the 
primary focus. Two of these studies deal with American modernism and the other two 
deal with British modernism, demonstrating that the patterns and limitations being 
identified are not linked to a geographically specific archive. The studies range from 
1995 to 2011, suggesting the longevity of the critical tendencies under consideration. 
 Case 1: Walter Benn Michaels’ Our America: Nativism, Modernism, Pluralism 
(1995). Michaels’ book examines the differences between forms of racist American 
nationalism in the Progressive Era and the 1920s. His study aims to sharpen our 
understanding of how American writers’ thinking about race and national identity 
changed over time. The difference between the nationalism of the Progressive Era versus 
that of the 1920s, Michaels argues, is that the former was not nativist: it was more 
concerned about the racial differences between black people and white people and was 
therefore, as far as new groups of immigrants were concerned, “prepared to welcome as 
exemplary candidates for American citizenship those ‘aliens’ who, twenty years later, 
would count as threats to the American family,” so long as those aliens could be 
culturally marshalled as a social force to keep down African Americans (Michaels 10). 
Thus, for American nationalists in the 1910s, non-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant immigrants 
could be assimilated, which points, Michaels argues, to another difference between 
Progressive-Era and 1920s nationalisms: the latter “essentialized racism” and, in doing 
so, became what Michaels describes as “pluralist” (64). Racist nationalism in the 
Progressive Era had no problem thinking in terms of inferior or superior races, but with 
regard to non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, it held out the hope that they could be racially 
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changed by Americanization. Racist nationalism in the 1920s was both nativist and 
pluralist: it did not conceptualize different races on a hierarchical scale, but it solidified 
the boundaries between races, conceived as a plurality of discrete entities, and repudiated 
any efforts at Americanizing immigrant others. Nativist, pluralist racism in the 1920s 
mobilized a new logic of racial identity, one that emphasized “not the inferiority of 
‘alien’ races but their ‘difference,’” disarticulating racism from “supremacism,” which is 
not to say that racial difference is no longer a basis for perpetrating violence and 
maintaining inequality but that 1920s nativism did not do this through the explicit 
pronouncements of racial inferiority (Michaels 13, 14). 
 This is the overall argument of Our America, and Michaels’ chapters work to 
illustrate these distinct racial paradigms through historically informed close readings of 
modernist literary texts. Michaels begins by reading The Great Gatsby and The Sun Also 
Rises to reveal discourses of heightened white racial consciousness in these texts, 
anxieties about the potential extinction of the white race due to the early-twentieth-
century influx of non-white immigrants and World War I having killed too many Anglo-
Saxon men (25-29). He then tracks the figure of the “Indian” in novels by Willa Cather, 
showing how “identification with the Indian could function … as the assertion of an 
American identity that could be understood as going beyond citizenship,” a white nativist 
counter to incoming immigrants (44). The next cluster of Michaels’ readings compares 
and contrasts treatments of miscegenation and the figure of the mulatto by African 
American writers from the 1910s and 1920s (52-63). Another section teases out the 
differences between American nativism and other international or regional variants, a 
process that proceeds through readings of D. H. Lawrence’s primitivism, Ezra Pound’s 
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uses of the Chinese ideogram, and E. M. Forster’s representations of the relationship 
between British colonists and colonized Indian subjects in A Passage to India (99-109). 
In these readings of modernist literature, Our America does an incredible job of 
taxonomizing subtly different forms of race- and nationality-based exclusion and stigma 
and shows how American modernist writers internalized and sometimes questioned their 
nation’s anxieties and cultural scripts about who does and does not belong. Throughout 
Michaels’ study, however, what counts as racial topic matter are moments in texts where 
white people are either consciously thinking about their own whiteness or assuming some 
kind of explicit relationship to people of color, whether it be social or ideational, 
identificatory or phobic. What Michaels’ approach misses in reading Fitzgerald or 
Faulkner or Cather are the forms of racial discourse that are not expressed through 
tensions between white, Anglo-Saxon characters and non-white racial others, through 
instances of the former fetishizing the latter, or through explicit displays of white race 
pride. Obviously, these overtly racialized and racist textual dynamics are incredibly 
important and need to be discussed, but as this case study and the ones that follow will 
show, there is no shortage of literary criticism doing this kind of work. 
 Case 2: Jane Marcus’ Hearts of Darkness: White Women Write Race (2004). 
Focusing on British modernism and white women writers specifically, Marcus examines 
the ways that the fall of empire and rise of fascism informed modernist literature in the 
years between the two World Wars. The book is a collection of essays loosely organized 
around this topic and does not really have a single, overarching argument. It does, 
however, have two literary stars: Virginia Woolf and Nancy Cunard. The works of these 
two women receive the bulk of Marcus’ attention, and they are set up as contrasting 
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models of what we might roughly describe as compromised and uncompromising 
feminist anti-racisms. Woolf’s writing serves as Marcus’ primary example of “how the 
empire was also written by the Liberals who opposed it,” while Cunard is positioned as a 
“model of another [and, clearly, better] way to act as an antiracist public intellectual” (6, 
7). Marcus’ first chapter focuses on A Room of One’s Own and dwells, specifically, on a 
single line from the text: “‘It is one of the great advantages of being a woman that one 
can pass even a very fine negress without wishing to make an Englishwoman of her’” 
(quoted in Marcus 24). From this starting point, the chapter embarks on an exhaustive 
analysis of how the figure of the black woman serves as both a condition of possibility 
and the limit of Woolf’s white, supposedly anti-imperialist feminism. Woolf 
“dissociat[es] herself from nationalism and imperialism,” Marcus argues, “by attributing 
the desire to possess the Other to specifically European male ‘instinct’” (40). At the same 
time, Marcus argues, while shifting the onus of racist imperialism onto British men, 
Woolf herself cannot conceive of black women either as artists or as fellow 
Englishwomen. Instead, A Room “reaches back to all the other emancipatory feminisms 
that compared English marriage to slavery” and ends up appropriating black women’s 
bodies as a metaphor for white women’s oppression (26). 
In a second chapter on Woolf, Marcus provides a more generous take on her 
politics, reading The Waves as an anti-imperialist text. This experimental modernist novel 
is comprised of the interior monologues of six characters, but Marcus’ reading focuses 
only on two: the heroic, manly Percival, who works and dies as a British colonial officer 
in India, and the aspiring poet Bernard, whose monologues idolize and elegize Percival’s 
colonial feats. Existing criticism on The Waves, Marcus argues, has failed to register 
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Woolf’s ironic presentation of these characters. Critics have read Bernard and Percival as 
Woolf’s endorsements of an imperialist, patriarchal nationalism, but for Marcus “[the 
novel’s] parody and irony mock the complicity of the hero and the poet in the creation of 
a collective national subject through an elegy for imperialism” (63). The central dynamic 
of the text in this reading—one that Marcus positions Woolf as critiquing—is the way in 
which her characters “inscribe their class and race superiority only by imagining a world 
of the savage Other in India …, where their representative, Percival … , secures their 
privilege by violent exertions of brute force” (66). The characters in The Waves “each 
fantasize India as dark, dirty, disordered, and directly threatening their own deaths. The 
language of their dreams of Percival in India is thoroughly racist and colonialist—
‘incompetent … natives in loincloths,’ ‘ strange sour smells,’ ‘remote provinces are 
fetched out of darkness,’ … ‘the dancing and drumming of naked men with assegais’” 
(Marcus 83-84). Through such language, Marcus contends, Woolf “exposes” her 
characters’ “complicity with imperialism” through their “mythologizing of Percival as a 
hero” (84). 
Whether framing Woolf’s politics as an object of critique or recuperation, Marcus 
homes in on moments where Woolf’s narrators or characters either refer to a person of 
color or envision relationships between white and non-white people. What race as an 
analytic category boils down to, here, is “the European view of people color” (to use a 
phrase from the Marcus’ Introduction), and this remains true when Marcus turns her 
attention to her book’s second literary star (2). Her chapter on Nancy Cunard champions 
Cunard’s unrecognized status as an important knowledge producer in the fields of black 
history and studies of the black diaspora, despite the fact that she was white (Marcus 
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122). Positioning Cunard as a model of white solidarity with black liberation, the 
chapter’s entire argument revolves around copious discussions of Cunard’s relationship 
to black people and black culture: accounts of her lifelong political activism, the 
influence of black art forms on her poetry, and, most importantly, her work organizing, 
editing, and publishing the monumental but now-forgotten Negro anthology, a 855-page 
volume of writing and illustrations compiled from an international array of 
contributors—two-thirds of whom were black—on the history and culture of black 
people in U.S., Africa, South America, and the Caribbean (Marcus 126-128, 132, 139-
144). Marcus’ Hearts of Darkness illuminates a key distinction that brings this 
dissertation’s interventions into sharper focus. The problem is not that scholars of race in 
modernist literature have only viewed race as having to do with writers of color and that 
they thus never talk about whiteness. The focus of Marcus’ book (as its subtitle makes 
clear) is how race informs the views and cultural productions of white people. The issue, 
rather, is that when critics examine whiteness, they tend—to recycle Richard Dyer’s 
excellent phrasing—“to focus exclusively on those texts [or moments in texts] that are 
‘about’ racial difference,” which “risks giving the impression that whiteness is only 
white, or only matters, when it is explicitly set against non-white” (Dyer 13). 
 Case 3: Urmila Seshagiri’s Race and the Modernist Imagination (2010). 
Seshagiri’s study focuses specifically on British modernism and offers an account of race 
as “a central organizing aesthetic category instead of merely a social problem” (6). Critics 
of British modernist literature, she contends, have primarily examined race as a 
“scientific and sociopolitical” category, one tied to the production of “imperialist 
‘knowledge’” facilitating the colonial domination of nonwhite races (7). From this critical 
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perspective, the types of racial thinking that informed modernism in Britain involved an 
understanding of race that was fixed, static, and stratified, one that connoted essentialist 
differences between various groups of human beings with certain groups inherently 
inferior or superior to others. Yet “modernism’s varied conceptions of race,” Seshagiri 
argues, “were often unrelated to the sociopolitical concerns raised by colonial contexts” 
(6). Without seeking to downplay the violent realities and cultural impacts of British 
colonialism, Seshagiri “challenge[s] the assumption that artistic treatments of race in 
early twentieth-century England were predominantly or univocally imperialist, 
demonstrating instead that modernism conceived of race as shifting rather than set, 
disordered rather than hierarchical” (6). Aesthetically rather than socio-politically 
speaking, modernists “transformed the outward signs of race into artistic content notable 
for its unreliability” (Seshagiri 9, original emphasis). They created an “aesthetics of race” 
that privileged “abstraction, decenteredness, … irresolution, and nonlinearity” (9). 
 As evidence for this argument, Seshagiri reads of number of British (and Irish) 
modernist writers, but in almost every case, what “race” entails is a white protagonist 
encountering people of color, consuming non-European cultures, or entering spaces 
coded as non-European. Reading race, in other words, again means looking for moments 
where white “is explicitly set against non-white” (Dyer 13). In her reading of Oscar 
Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, Seshagiri focuses on how Dorian’s decadent 
aestheticism is achieved through a “willful embrace of non-Western culture” (37). She 
observes how he accumulates “perfumes, jewels, embroideries, and textiles from India, 
China, Ceylon, Arabia, Indonesia, [and] Japan,” and tracks his movements through 
Chinese opium dens and his liaisons with a Malaysian prostitute (37). Her reading of 
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Conrad’s Heart of Darkness positions Mr. Kurtz as an embodiment of modernism who 
racially reinvents himself in Africa, “breaking away from the accumulated weight of 
European cultural practices,” with Marlow as his artist-apprentice “who transports the 
‘unsound method of Kurtz’s modernism back to Europe” (43). This reading fixates on 
Kurtz’s and Marlow’s identifications with Africa and African peoples (44-53). Her 
treatments of Wyndham Lewis and Rebecca West focus on the role of primitivism and 
black characters in their Vorticist literary productions (78-112). Seshagiri’s reading of 
Woolf’s To the Lighthouse looks at colonial commodities like tea and china in the 
Ramsay household and unpacks the trope of Lily Briscoe’s “Chinese eyes” (150-167). 
Finally, her reading of Orlando shows how the text’s destabilizing play with sex and 
gender is premised on a constant reinforcing of white, imperial English identity, an 
argument advanced through readings of the opening scene where Orlando “slic[es] at the 
head of a Moor,” Woolf’s use of a Turkish Gypsy named Rustum el Sadi as the 
antagonist of the novel, and the text’s constructions of the East (qua Turkey) as racially 
savage and culturally inferior to the West (qua England) (178-191). 
 Seshagiri’s discussion of Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier merits a special 
mention. Out of all the readings in her study, it is the least dependent on the appearance 
of non-European peoples or cultures for its discussions of race. However, in revealing the 
“deep—and ultimately impossible—desire for racial belonging” that permeates Ford’s 
novel, Seshagiri exemplifies a different kind of limitation on racial analysis that I will 
discuss further in the following section on critical whiteness studies (114). In the absence 
of characters of color, Seshagiri tracks The Good Soldier’s anxieties about racial identity 
by pinpointing moments where the novel’s narration or dialogue feature language and 
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imagery that explicitly signal concerns about whiteness or other forms of non-Anglo-
Saxon European identity. She notes, for instance, how “the designations ‘English,’ ‘Irish 
Catholic,’ and ‘American’ serve only to denote disparate, inconstant states of being” and 
examines moments where characters fret about belonging or not belonging to these 
categories (116). Later in her discussion, the appearance of a “Gypsy caravan” in Ford’s 
novel is interpreted as “underscor[ing] the racial motility that is modernity’s promise as 
well as its curse” (121). In other cases, Seshagiri focuses on language that blatantly 
signifies racial identity in physical terms: “Despite Edward’s ‘honest blue eyes’ and 
Leonora’s ‘extraordinarily fair’ complexion, Dowell deems the couple’s apparent racial 
authenticity ‘too good to be true’” (116). Thus, in cases where whiteness is not explicitly 
set against non-white, the discussion latches onto moments where white people are 
thinking explicitly about racial categories and white identity, moments signaled by the 
invocation of national and ethnic categories, such as “English,” “Irish,” “American,” or 
“Gypsy,” or by physical descriptions signaling racial whiteness (blue eyes, fair skin). As I 
will explain later in this introduction, many works of whiteness-studies scholarship 
operate in a similar way, and I am not arguing that there is anything wrong with those 
studies or with Seshagiri’s reading of Ford. I am suggesting, rather, that even this method 
of reading race in the lives and cultural productions of white people—where race can 
connote inter- or cross-racial identifications and conflicts or intra-racial dynamics where 
white characters explicitly reflect on their own racial status—still does not exhaust the 
range of possible forms that race can take and continues to rely on more or less overt 
markers of racial topic matter. “Scattered Supremacies” seeks to uncover even subtler, 
more tacit racial dynamics. 
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 Case 4: Greg Forter’s Gender, Race, and Mourning in American Modernism 
(2011). Forter’s book reads canonical modernism as “a response to changes in the 
sex/gender and racial systems that took place between 1880 and 1920,” changes that were 
experienced by the authors in his study as the loss of a “form of white manhood that had 
been dominant” in prior decades (1). From “about 1830 to 1880,” Forter contends, “to be 
a (white) man meant to ‘make oneself’ in the capitalist marketplace,” and “[t]he qualities 
that enabled such success were an aggressive assertiveness and competitive vigor thought 
of as innately male” (1). If this male competitiveness were not in some way checked 
outside the marketplace, however, it would constitute a threat to social order, so being a 
white man was also imagined to include “softer virtues” such as “moral compassion, self-
restraint, [and] emotional sensitivity,” all believed to be transmitted to men by women in 
the domestic sphere (2). Over the course of the nineteenth century, Forter explains, the 
growth of monopoly capitalism “reduced men to dependents in large bureaucratic 
structures” and thwarted the prospect of “autonomous self-making” (2). Increasing 
numbers of white men found themselves in positions of economic dependence viewed as 
feminized, and these changes in gender relations overlapped with changes in race 
relations, as emerging labor markets for non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants and African-
American freedmen further troubled “the link between selling one’s labor on the open 
market and experiencing oneself as white” (3). 
By the 1880s, white Americans began responding to these changes in the 
mainstream (i.e., non-high-modernist) sphere of the nation’s culture. This response took 
the reactionary form of an unambivalent embrace of those male traits previously coded as 
socially disruptive: “primal force, instinctual vitality, aggression, and bodily strength” 
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(3). The main argument of Forter’s study, however, is that the response of canonical 
modernists to the loss of nineteenth-century white masculinity differed from that of 
mainstream America. In readings of Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, Faulkner, and 
Cather, Forter shows that these writers “grieve[d] not just for the loss of the aggressively 
masculine component of nineteenth-century white manhood, but also for the loss of its 
compassionate interior – its ‘feminine’ capacity for sympathetic identification” (4). The 
latter was especially dear to these novelists because it symbolized a capacity for art, for 
“lyrical and sensuous responsiveness” (4). On the one hand, America’s canonical 
modernists “yearn[ed] for a masculinity less rigidly polarized against the feminine” (4). 
On the other hand, Forter maintains, they also could not “avoid internalizing the 
imperatives of the emergent gender order” and “came in part to identify with the hard, 
invulnerable, and dominative white manhood consolidated in this period,” thus 
“denigrat[ing] the feminine responsiveness” they “experienced as intimately linked to 
their creative powers” (4). This results in canonical American modernism being marked 
by an affective stance of blocked mourning: “the very qualities and capacities that these 
[authors] valued in the manhood they had lost were [ones] they felt impelled to disparage 
as unmanly” (4-5). Their books thus “‘resolve’ themselves into assertions that the 
manhood they value cannot be grieved,” and they “memorializ[e] blocked mourning as 
the most poignant and beautiful and manly response to socially induced loss” (5, original 
emphases). 
This blocked mourning over lost gender ideals also, Forter adds, had racial 
consequences. The modernist conflict between fondness and disdain for artistic 
femininity in men “resulted in these texts’ unleashing of melancholic aggression toward 
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… women, effeminate men, and racial minorities,” groups perceived to have access to 
forms of femininity that modernists ambivalently mourned (5). In attempting to resolve 
their white gender ambivalences, Forter argues, Fitzgerald, Hemingway, Faulkner, and 
Cather often resorted to primitivist “fantasies of the racial other,” but racial otherness 
figured here not as some “essence of primal maleness” but rather as “a set of de-binarized 
gender attributes that seemed to [these writers] enlivening yet lost and unavailable to 
white people” (6). In the end, Forter contends, the primitivist project was “one that each 
author came to reject as sentimental” because all of them, ultimately, “retained a 
naturalized, epidermal conception of race that proved at last insuperable” (6). Because 
they came to stand for coveted yet torturously inaccessible gender ideals, racial 
minorities become scapegoats for canonical modernists’ misplaced melancholic 
aggression. 
Forter’s argument, with its numerous moving parts, is the most complex of the 
four case studies provided here, and to summarize each of his chapters in a way that does 
justice to their nuance would take more space than this already lengthy survey of 
modernist-studies scholarship can afford. In the interest of concision, I am only going to 
engage closely with one of Forter’s chapters, his treatment of Fitzgerald, which—like 
Seshagiri’s reading of The Good Soldier—goes furthest in overcoming the 
methodological and archival limitations I am trying to identify. Forter’s Fitzgerald 
chapter focuses on The Great Gatsby, and when he reaches the part of his argument that 
has to do with race, he immediately notes that “of all the works discussed in [his] study, 
Gatsby is the least explicitly concerned with race, the one in which that category is least 
visibly inscribed” (42, original emphasis). His chapters on Hemingway, Faulkner, and 
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Cather hew more closely to the model of white-explicitly-set-against-nonwhite racial 
analysis I have been sketching above. The history of black-white race relations plays a 
key role in the Faulkner chapter, and primitivism is at the center of his discussions of race 
in Hemingway and Cather. In Gatsby, however race assumes less stark, interracial 
manifestations. After illuminating Gatsby’s simultaneously masculine and feminine 
elements and noting how the latter are at once celebrated and stigmatized, the chapter 
segues into an argument about race that builds on Richard Dyer’s claim that white 
identity suffers from a “paradox of embodiment”: whiteness “attaches to bodies infused 
with a ‘spirit’ whose condition is its invisibility, but which nonetheless is meant to 
distinguish the racially unmarked (white) body from the bodies of non-whites – i.e., from 
bodies lacking in ‘spirit,’ bereft of the energetic drive to colonize, order, give form, both 
to their own appetites and to the external world” (Forter 43). This tension revolves 
particularly around the issue of sexuality, where the “dark” temptations posed by the 
body’s sexual drives threaten to jeopardize the purity of the white body and its desired 
self-definition in terms of higher, more transcendent intellectual, aesthetic, and cultural 
properties. We can see this problem play out in Gatsby, Forter argues, in the tension 
between Gatsby prior to kissing Daisy, when he is a pure product of his own imagination 
(sprung from his Platonic conception of himself, as the famous line goes), and Gatsby 
after kiss Daisy, when he is physically “‘incarnated’” and subject to the “perils that come 
with the body’s entanglement in heterosexual desire” (Forter 43, 44). 
 This part of Forter’s argument, then, does not require the presence of nonwhite 
characters or non-European cultures in order to make a claim about race in Fitzgerald’s 
novel. As it stands, however, the argument remains quite metaphysical and abstract, and 
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almost as if Forter himself senses this, he goes on to flesh out his claims by citing various 
moments where race is broached more explicitly as a topic in the novel. This begins by 
pointing out how Fitzgerald codes Daisy “as both the ‘object-cause’ of Gatsby’s desire 
and as morally blackened to the point of being unworthy of it” (45). In her affair with 
Gatsby, “Daisy participates in a sexual licentiousness that threatens the myth of Southern 
white women’s purity [she hails, Forter notes, from Kentucky]. Indeed, this 
licentiousness is conventionally split off and ascribed to black women in that myth’s 
construction” (45). In this light, Daisy is morally and, in a figurative sense, racially 
“blackened,” a point Forter then reinforces through a scene where Tom Buchanan, in one 
of his overtly white-supremacist tirades, hesitates for a moment to claim Daisy as white 
(45). Daisy’s blackness thus jeopardizes Gatsby’s whiteness by entangling him in the 
perils of embodiment and sexual desire. Moreover, Forter adds, “if Gatsby’s whiteness is 
constructed in part through the assignation of darkness and sexual impurity to Daisy, the 
novel also alludes more than once to the ethno-racial residue of what his self-creation has 
sought to shed”—the vaguely Jewish James Gatz that is supposed to have been erased by 
Jay Gatsby (46). Forter gives two examples of such allusions to Gatsby’s racial residue. 
The first is the novel’s reference to Gatsby as “Trimalchio,” an allusion to a lavish, 
partying character in Petronius’ Satyricon who is also, Forter notes, “a freedman and has 
therefore once been a slave” (47, original emphasis). Though slavery in the Roman 
Empire did not necessarily connote blackness, it did in the United States, and the allusion 
would have been read, Forter argues, as “blackening” Gatsby’s character (47). That 
blackening is reiterated again in the scene when Gatsby and Nick Carraway drive across 
the Queensboro Bridge and see “three modish Negroes, two bucks and a girl,” partying in 
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a limo “driven by a white chauffeur” (Fitzgerald qtd in Forter 47). Nick’s comments on 
the scene, Forter contends, draw a similarity “between Jay Gatsby and the limousine’s 
black ‘bucks.’ The former’s class masquerade is homologous to the racial mimicry of 
whites by blacks” (47, original emphases). 
 The further we go into the chapter’s treatment of race, in other words, the more 
Forter’s claims become tied to tropes of blackness, whether these pertain to black or 
white characters. I do not want this to overshadow the fact that Forter’s discussion does 
still begin with an optic that illuminates a form of whiteness not tied to typical markers of 
racial content. Indeed, the chapter ends this way, too. The final maneuver of Forter’s 
reading is to argue that Fitzgerald preserves at the disembodied level of form the kind of 
lyrically and artistically feminine masculinity that could not be embodied at the level of 
plot. In terms of style, Nick Carraway’s narration is given to “lyrically expressive flights” 
of emotion, especially in moments where he is identifying with Gatsby (50). In these 
formal displays of “extraordinary lyricism,” Gatsby “memorialize[s] the manhood that 
the novel insists (at the level of content) can have no social incarnation” (Forter 16, 
original emphasis). Because Fitzgerald had also internalized turn-of-the-century 
America’s reactionary idolization of hard, aggressive masculinity, the “‘feminine’ (i.e., 
subjectively effusive) creativity” exuded by these flights of unmanly lyricism cannot be 
given free reign, so Fitzgerald further “supplements [them] with a more ruthlessly 
‘masculine’ formal project” (16). Outside these bursts of lyricism, Nick’s narration 
assumes a very detached, objective voice, a “‘hardness’ of masculine rigor and formal 
control” (49). Through this Eliotic “impersonality,” Nick maintains a “disembodied 
distance with respect to both Fitzgerald and Gatsby,” and “the cultivation of [this] 
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impersonal form is an effort to approximate the ‘subject without properties’ [the 
transcendent, invisible, non-corporeality] that is both the norm and exclusionary ideal of 
racial whiteness” (50, 16). Forter thus begins and ends with readings of white racial 
identity that do not require whiteness to be explicitly set against nonwhite. I want to 
acknowledge this while still insisting on a larger point: although we might be able to find 
a few readings of modernist literature that track the operations of whiteness beyond 
interracial violence or cross-racial/cross-cultural identification, finding such readings is 
like finding a needle in a haystack. Even in the one chapter of the one book in this survey 
where such a reading occurs, it is blended with and corroborated by forms of evidence 
where racial content implies tropes of blackness (blackened Daisy, Gatsby as Trimalchio, 
the Negro “bucks” in the limousine). 
In 2008, Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz belatedly declared the advent of 
“the New Modernist Studies” (belatedly because, according to Mao and Walkowitz, 
modernist studies assumed its newer form “on or about 1999,” well before the publication 
of their article) (737). Since the turn of the twenty-first century, they claim, the field of 
modernist studies has been expanding in three ways: 
As scholars demonstrate the fertility of questioning rigid temporal delimitations, 
periods seem inevitably to get bigger (one might think of “the long eighteenth 
century” or “the age of empire”). Meanwhile, interrogations of the politics, 
historical validity, and aesthetic value of exclusive focus on the literatures of 
Europe and North America have spurred the study (in the North American 
academy) of texts produced in other quarters of the world or by hitherto little-
recognized enclaves in the privileged areas. In addition to these temporal and 
spatial expansions, there has been what we are calling here a vertical one, in 
which once quite sharp boundaries between high art and popular forms of culture 




The New Modernist Studies, then, has been incorporating more and more material within 
its ambit: texts from before the 1870s or 1880s or from after 1939; texts from more 
geographically diverse (even “global”) locales; texts excluded from the “high modernist” 
canon. It is difficult not to infer from all this a sense, within the field, that these 
“expansions” are necessary because critics of modernist literature have said everything 
that could be and needs to be said about the texts and authors we have traditionally read. 
“Scattered Supremacies” suggests, however, that this is not true. Modernist 
studies still has unfinished business, specifically with regard to its analyses of whiteness. 
As Sean Latham and Gayle Rogers write in Modernism: Evolution of an Idea, the New 
Modernist Studies tends to approach race through optics that are both more transnational 
and more interdisciplinary than the field’s older incarnation (166-169). This is, of course, 
a good thing. Such innovations have produced wonderful works of scholarship that offer 
a fuller account of how race has shaped modernist cultural production in a broadening 
array of contexts. I am not suggesting, in other words, that we need to stop our field’s 
expansions into these new areas of inquiry (though we should be wary—particularly 
regarding this expansion’s geographical axis—of how moves to claim texts from outside 
of Europe and America as material for our field might carry culturally and intellectually 
“imperialist” valences). What I am suggesting is that there are clear oversights in the way 
we have read race and, specifically, whiteness in modernist studies, old and new—
limitations on where we look for race as an operative factor in the lives and cultural 
production of white people that are not necessarily fixed by adopting more transnational 
or interdisciplinary optics. It is worth reiterating here that the problem is not that scholars 
of modernist literature—before or after 1999—have failed to consider race as it pertains 
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to the work of white writers. The vast majority if not the entirety of Michaels’, Marcus’, 
Seshagiri’s, and Forter’s studies examine race as it informs writing by white people. The 
problem is that when critics have considered race in this context, they gravitate 
overwhelmingly toward moments in which white people consume non-European cultures 
or visualize, stigmatize, fetishize, or socialize with people of color. Such moments are 
obviously as if not more important to a comprehensive account of race as moments where 
white people interact with other white people, but we have mountains of scholarship on 
the former and almost none on the latter. One would think that the advent of critical 
whiteness studies in the 1990s, a field entirely dedicated to the examination of white 
racial identity, would provide insights and models for overcoming these constraints. As I 
suggest in what follows, however, whiteness studies has in fact displayed a similar set of 
limitations.  
 
II. Race in Critical Whiteness Studies 
 I have been drawing, throughout this Introduction, on the words of Richard Dyer, 
who writes, in his 1997 publication White, that to focus, when examining whiteness, 
“exclusively on those texts that are ‘about’ racial difference and interaction risks giving 
the impression that whiteness is only white, or only matters, when it is explicitly set 
against non-white” (13). The previous section has shown how an interracially focused 
approach to analyzing whiteness has yielded a host of invaluable insights into the racial 
dynamics of modernist literature while also placing limits on the types of textual material 
scholars marshal for their discussions. Dyer is a film critic, however, not a scholar of 
literary modernism, and his words, in context, describe analytic tendencies that affect the 
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field of critical whiteness studies. What this means, of course, is that the methodological 
and archival problems I have been detailing with regard to studies of modernism—the 
limited ways in which we read race and the limited places in which we look for it—have 
also restricted the interdisciplinary field entirely dedicated to explicating whiteness in all 
its forms. The fact that Dyer explicitly names and critiques these tendencies implies that 
his contribution to critical whiteness studies will go beyond them—and it does. But as I 
will discuss, in order to get beyond moments where whiteness is explicitly set against 
nonwhite, Dyer and other scholars have tended to shift their focus to what are still very 
“heavy-handed” forms of white racial identity: moments where white people forthrightly 
idealize their own race, proclaim the superiority of European cultures and civilizations, or 
equate the word “white” or images of whiteness with unparalleled beauty and 
intelligence. There is indeed attention, then, to practices in which white people manifest 
their racial identities in ways that do not require the presence of people of color, but the 
ways in which this albeit productive vein of analysis have been pursued still do not to 
account for many of the subtler forms that white racial identity can take. 
 Critical whiteness studies as a recognizable field was born in the 1990s, mainly 
through the publication of Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the 
Literary Imagination (1992) along with Dyer’s White (1997), the works of multiple 
historians, like David Roediger, Theodore Allen, and Noel Ignatiev, and Ruth 
Frankenberg’s White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness 
(1993). Let me provide a brief account of two of these field-defining studies, Morrison’s 
Playing in the Dark and Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the 
American Working Class (1991), to illustrate how whiteness studies, from its origins, has 
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marshaled a critical methodology that focuses, as Dyer argues, on moments where 
whiteness is explicitly set against nonwhite. Take what may be considered Morrison’s 
statement of purpose in her brief but landmark study of whiteness in American literature. 
Morrison argues that studies of race have been dominated by a “pattern of thinking about 
racialism in terms of its consequences on the victim—of always defining it … from the 
perspective of its impact on the object of racist policy and attitudes” (11). 
[T]hat well-established study should be joined with another, equally important 
one: the impact of racism on those who perpetuate it. … What I propose here is to 
examine the impact of notions of racial hierarchy, racial exclusion, and racial 
vulnerability and availability on nonblacks who held, resisted, explored, or altered 
these notions. The scholarship that looks into the mind, imagination, and behavior 
of slaves is valuable. But equally valuable is a serious intellectual effort to see 
what racial ideology does to the mind, imagination, and behavior of masters. 
(Morrison 11-12) 
 
With this as its raison d’être, Playing in the Dark goes on to examine, in works by Edgar 
Allen Poe, Herman Melville, Ernest Hemingway, and Willa Cather, what Morrison calls 
“American Africanism”: “the ways in which a nonwhite Africanlike or (Africanist) 
presence or persona was constructed in the United States, and the imaginative uses this 
fabricated presence served” (6). The book, in other words, is very explicitly and 
purposefully built around a methodological approach that examines literary whiteness in 
terms of the narrative, metaphorical, and affective uses served by black people and 
figures of blackness in white-authored American fiction. As Morrison herself describes 
this methodology and rationale, “What Africanism became for, and how it functioned in, 
the literary imagination is of paramount interest because it may be possible to discover, 




  David Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness adopts a similar approach to 
Morrison’s study, though working within the discipline of history rather than literary 
studies and thus illustrating how the critical limitations under consideration here stretch 
across whiteness studies as an inter-disciplinary field. As a labor historian, the question 
Roediger asks is “why the white working class settles for being white”—or, better, “why 
and how whites reach the conclusion that their whiteness is meaningful” (6). The answer, 
Wages argues, is that 
whiteness was a way in which white workers responded to a fear of dependency 
on wage labor and to the necessities of capitalist work discipline. … [T]he 
heritage of the [American] revolution made independence a powerful masculine 
personal ideal. But slave labor and “hireling” wage labor proliferated in the new 
nation. One way to make peace with the latter was to differentiate it sharply from 
the former. (13) 
 
Wages focuses, in other words, on how the “image of the Black population as ‘other,’” 
imagined as “embodying the preindustrial, erotic, careless style of life the white worker 
hated and longed for,” informed the self-image of white working-class Americans 
“disciplined and made anxious by fear of dependency” (14). As a historian, Roediger 
tracks how this sense of whiteness grew over time. Prior to the nineteenth century, he 
argues, white workers did not identify their status as workers with the racial concept of 
whiteness. This was because there still existed in early America, many forms of unfree, 
dependent labor among non-elite whites. Between “indentured servitude, impressment, 
apprenticeship, convict labor, farm tenancy,” and more, “[t]he many gradations of 
unfreedom among whites made it difficult to draw fast lines between any idealized free 
white worker and a pitied or scorned servile Black worker” (25). By the early nineteenth 
century, Roediger contends, white workers, from farm hands to domestics, incited a 
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conscious shift away from calling themselves or being called “servants” and toward being 
called, instead, “hired” or “help” because of the former term’s association with slaves and 
slave labor (47-50). Moving further into the nineteenth century, Roediger highlights the 
ambivalence with which white workers and labor radicals in the 1830s and 1840s 
resorted to comparisons between their situation and chattel slavery: while the comparison 
could help to make the case for the severity of the white working-class’ exploitation by 
employers, white laborers were also loathe to be associated with blackness and the 
demoralized qualities of weakness, resignation, and servility it connoted (66). By the 
1850s, Roediger notes, “free labor” or “free white labor” had become the preferred idiom 
around which labor radicals rallied (80-81). A later chapter examines white working-class 
cultures of blackface minstrelsy, arguing that blackface allowed working-class whites to 
project onto African Americans the leisurely, undisciplined habits and behaviors that 
white workers simultaneously longed for and repudiated as they themselves were 
increasingly subject, in the nineteenth century, to forms of industrial labor control (95-
110). 
 Neither Morrison nor Roediger are unique in focusing on whiteness’ construction 
through its relation to blackness or to other forms of nonwhite racial difference. Despite 
being published four years prior to Playing in the Dark, for instance, Aldon Lynn 
Nielsen’s Reading Race: White American Poets and the Racial Discourse in the 
Twentieth Century (1988) is essentially a study of American Africanism in twentieth-
century American poetry. The whole book traces the ways in which stereotyped images 
of blackness appear in texts by white poets and function in ways that shore up positive 
images of whiteness. For whiteness-studies scholarship in the disciplines of history, legal 
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studies, anthropology, and sociology, the prevailing task has been to detail the ways in 
which whiteness as a racial category has been historically and socially constructed. Over 
the years, this has yielded many excellent studies, but these studies all tend to discuss a 
similar set of topics: anti-abolitionism, westward expansion, frontier settlement, 
naturalization law, blackface minstrelsy, the exclusion of African Americans from 
organized labor, anti-immigrant hostility (particularly toward people of Asian or Mexican 
descent), redlining, housing covenants, reactionary backlash against Civil Rights 
initiatives like affirmative action, and the perpetuation of bigoted ideas about interracial 
marriage and parenting. All of these topics articulate the social and historical construction 
of whiteness in terms of the oppressive, exclusionary relationships that white people—or 
racially liminal people looking to “become” white—have maintained toward people of 
color. They are the focus of most of the field’s foundational and widely known 
publications, including not just Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness but also his Working 
toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White (2005), Ruth 
Frankenberg’s White Women, Race Matters, Noel Ignatiev’s How the Irish Became White 
(1995), Ian Haney López’s White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (1996), 
Matthew Frye Jacobson’s Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the 
Alchemy of Race (1998), and George Lipsitz’s The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: 
How White People Profit from Identity Politics (1998). These studies of the political 
movements, legislation, economic structures, and social habits on which whiteness rests 
join more aesthetically and culturally oriented approaches to studying white racial 
identity, like Morrison’s and Nielsen’s, in continuing to adopt an optic that locates 
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whiteness largely or solely in white people’s interactions with or representations of 
people of color. 
 This is the field into which Dyer intervenes when he warns about focusing 
exclusively on texts (or historical archives) where whiteness is explicitly set against 
nonwhite. His admonition speaks to the extent of the problem, yet his own study—along 
with those of a few other scholars in the field—illustrates how even the approaches taken 
to overcome these methodological and archival limitations still leave some unfinished 
business that newer scholars can pursue. Dyer’s White, along with studies like Valerie 
Babb’s Whiteness Visible: The Meaning of Whiteness in American Literature and Culture 
(1998) and Renée Curry’s White Women Write White: H.D., Elizabeth Bishop, Sylvia 
Plath, and Whiteness (2000), constitutes a smaller but growing vein of scholarship in the 
field that emphasizes how race permeates the thinking, practices, and cultural production 
of white people even where whiteness is not explicitly set against nonwhite. In order to 
do this, Dyer, Babb, and Curry track the countless ways in which white people, 
throughout history, have more or less forthrightly valorized themselves. Their studies 
demonstrate how the aesthetic features, moral and social values, and cultural 
achievements of white people—namely, upper- to middle-class Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants—have constantly been enshrined by fellow whites as universal ideals. In 
readings of film and visual culture, Dyer shows how whiteness is accorded connotations 
of heavenliness, cleanliness, intelligence, chastity, and a robust spirit of enterprise by 
looking at the use of light in European paintings (especially paintings of white women) or 
at harrowing representations of resourceful, perseverant, muscular white men in colonial 
adventure films (Dyer 82-183). Curry’s study tracks the ways in which poetry by white 
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women has consistently associated the color white and white imagery (like snowy 
mountaintops or white flowers) with “aesthetic beauty,” an “undebatable desirability,” or 
“innocence, clarity, mastery, and perfection” (54, 28, 107). Babb shows how large-scale 
institutions and discourses at the turn of the twentieth century, like World’s Fairs, 
etiquette books, and educational curricula of public schools and settlement houses, 
systematically idolized the values and accomplishments of upper- to middle-class Anglo-
Saxon Protestants (118-166). In examining how whiteness has mattered even when not 
set against nonwhite, the attention of these critics has thus been limited to cultural 
dynamics in which whiteness and white people are explicitly valorized (by white people 
themselves) as paragons of civilization and virtue. Although these studies provide an 
important supplement to the approaches taken by critics like Morrison and Roediger, it is 
also true that the pendulum simply swings here from one form of starkly racial content to 
another: from moments where white people overtly stigmatize or fetishize people of color 
to moments where white people overtly idolize whiteness and other white people. 
To be sure, there are a few works of whiteness-studies scholarship that follow 
neither of these approaches, and “Scattered Supremacies” takes some of these studies as 
models in terms of how it thinks about the ways in which whiteness can manifest. In 
order to make clear how these other works of scholarship provide points of departure for 






III. Race in “Scattered Supremacies”: Intra-racial Conflict and Economic 
Virtues 
 As my opening example from Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night suggests, the ideas, 
social habits, and structures of feeling that “Scattered Supremacies” illuminates as facets 
of white racial identity are defined by neither white people’s stigmatizations or 
fetishizations of people of color nor overt idolizations of whiteness or white racial 
superiority. This dissertation uncovers social and affective forms of whiteness that are 
both subtler and more oblique, and in order to do this, I focus on dynamics where the 
contours of whiteness emerge out of conflicts between different classes of white people—
on where, how, and why certain white people try to distinguish themselves from other 
whites. A key part of my argument about Tender is the Night concerns the ways in which 
Dick Diver seeks to contrast himself, as a hard-working “professional,” against the 
wealthy American leisure class to which his wife Nicole belongs. My chapter on Rhys 
shows how the class standing of Rhys’ impoverished female protagonists jeopardizes 
their English whiteness in the eyes of bourgeois English men and women. In my chapter 
on Faulkner, I show how whiteness is tied to critiques of debt and indebtedness that play 
out over the course of a plot centering on the conflict between a white tenant farmer and a 
white banker. Finally, my chapter on Cather elucidates her disdain for America’s 
(implicitly white) early-twentieth-century bourgeoisie and her construction of resilient, 
bygone white settlers eking out austere livings on the frontier as figures of a superior 
whiteness lost to the historical tides of modernization. In all of these cases, the 
boundaries and meanings of whiteness as a category are constructed through the efforts 
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of white authors or white characters to distance themselves from other whites whose 
values, character traits, or social behaviors are deemed suspect or degenerate. 
In order to flesh out this racial framework as well as place it in historical context, 
let me return, briefly, to Forter’s argument in Gender, Race, and Mourning in American 
Modernism. As Forter explains, over the course of the nineteenth century, changes in the 
structures of capitalism, like the rise of monopolies and big business, increasingly 
“reduced [white] men to dependents in large bureaucratic structures” and thwarted the 
prospect of “autonomous self-making” (Forter 2). As these changes rendered white 
masculinity less synonymous with self-made independence, both mainstream Americans 
and America’s canonical modernist writers responded via attempts to reprise or to mourn 
the forms of white masculinity that had been lost. “Scattered Supremacies” begins with a 
similar historical premise but takes the argument in a different direction. Forter is correct 
to observe that by the turn of the twentieth century, the escalating scale and pace of 
modernized capitalism had given rise to numerous social, economic, and cultural 
transformations that threatened a nineteenth-century ideal of morally and economically 
virtuous whiteness—a whiteness imagined, by default, as male. However, in addition to 
the rise of monopoly capitalism and the dwarfing of workers within increasingly large 
corporate and bureaucratic structures, we might also include amongst these changes a 
host of developments that played key roles in the writing and lives of the authors in this 
study.  
The postwar boom of the Roaring 20s brought about the rise of the wealthy 
American leisure class, a decadent and thoroughly white demographic who serves as the 
de facto antagonist of Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night. As I show through recourse to 
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Fitzgerald’s essays and letters, he himself, both through marriage and his own 
auspiciously timed literary success, was swept into the tides of Jazz-Age extravagance, 
and when his personal and professional life went into a tailspin in the 1930s (along with 
the nation’s economy), he tried to salvage himself by clinging to an implicitly racialized 
ideal of hard-working professionalism defined in contrast to the morally dissipating 
effects of leisure-class wealth and comfort. By the turn of the twentieth century, the 
creeping tentacles of modern business and finance had also begun to encroach even upon 
less modernized, rural areas of the nation like Faulkner’s South. These developments are 
the basis of Faulkner’s Snopes trilogy, which wrestles with the moral and cultural threats 
posed by predatory lending and other forms of ruthless, rationalized capitalism to 
Yoknapatawpha County’s humble, proudly independent community. In Europe, in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, imperialist discourses were rife with 
concerns about the specter of white racial degeneration in the colonies, fears about white 
colonists slumping (due to climate and exposure to the alleged dispositions of black and 
brown colonized subjects) into idleness and sexual licentiousness. Such colonial 
discourses provoked, in turn, concomitant fears about the racially liminal “savageness” of 
the working-class and poor whites in the imperial metropole, ideas about non-bourgeois 
white people as “a race apart.” This is the social and cultural milieu in which Rhys’ 
novels are set and which forms the backdrop for her sharp observations about how 
gendered classicism in against poor white Englishmen is tinged with racial implications. 
Finally, the early twentieth century also witnessed the rise of mass consumerism and (for 
white people) all but adversity-less modern lives steeped in technological conveniences 
and new forms of popular entertainment. Throughout her lectures, essays, and interviews, 
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Cather bemoaned the ways in which modernity had turned modern bourgeois Americans 
into utter Philistines and sapped them of any capacity to endure hardship. This disdain for 
a restless, spoiled, trifling modern bourgeoise constitutes a large part of the motivation 
behind her “escapist” frontier novels, chronicling the rustic simplicity and epic endurance 
of pioneer life. 
All of the aforementioned developments destabilized any easy equation of 
whiteness with a variety of economic and moral virtues, including, as Forter contends, 
self-reliance but also hard work, benevolence, and the rugged capacity to endure 
hardship. “Scattered Supremacies” shows how Rhys, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and Cather 
engaged in the racial discourses of their historical moment by exhibiting (or, in Rhys’ 
case, critiquing) reactionary forms of white racial identity defined by desperate 
identification with a range of economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral 
virtues. Rather than locating whiteness in textual displays of primitivism or Orientalism, 
in white people’s relationships and confrontations with people of color or non-European 
cultures, or in their self-aggrandizing idealizations of other white people, “Scattered 
Supremacies” locates it in a range of less obviously racial ideas and practices tethered to 
seemingly race-neutral virtues like industriousness, hardy austerity, and disciplined self-
reliance: in notions of professionalism (Fitzgerald); in stereotypes about the laziness and 
dishonesty of the white poor (Rhys); in the use of financial rhetoric as a way of 
conceptualizing wrongdoing and social justice (Faulkner); and in nostalgia for the 
rugged, supposedly non-materialistic austerity of America’s pioneers (Cather). 
In employing these methods of racial analysis, “Scattered Supremacies” echoes 
and builds upon a few works of whiteness-studies scholarship that have sought to call 
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attention to whiteness’ less stark and conventional forms. Chief among these is 
anthropologist John Hartigan Jr.’s Racial Situations: Class Predicaments of Whiteness in 
Detroit (1999), which emphasizes how “intraracial distinctions” serve as a primary 
means by which white people think about and enact their racial identities (17, original 
emphasis). The intraracial distinctions Hartigan explores are, specifically, class 
distinctions between whites, which, he argues, often function as discourses of 
“nonobvious racial significance” (17, 280). In this respect, Racial Situations is already a 
clear model for this dissertation, but “Scattered Supremacies” follows Hartigan’s study in 
yet another way as well. As the title of his book implies, Hartigan focuses on the ways in 
which the meaning and significance of race are highly “situational”: he emphasizes, that 
is, how racial identities are constantly constructed at the individual level of everyday 
social encounters in addition to the structural level of large-scale institutions. Through an 
ethnographic method involving interviews with different groups of working-class white 
people, Hartigan demonstrates how the legibility, meaning, and importance of race in any 
social situation depends on “the interpretive repertoires” people bring to it: the “‘terms, 
descriptions, and figures of speech’” used to make judgments that are often highly 
“provisional,” the backstories and concerns that shape perceptions of one’s own motives 
and actions as well as those of others (Hartigan 15). The point here is not to suggest that 
the significance of race in these unstructured and quotidian situations is “more primary, 
real, or authentic than in other settings (institutions and so on)” (Hartigan, Racial 281). 
But as I noted in the field surveys above, the meaning of race in the history and culture of 
white people has been overwhelmingly explicated in terms of “institutions,” movements, 
and other macroscopic (and interracially articulated) structures—anti-abolitionism, 
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naturalization law, the exclusion of black workers from organized labor, redlining, 
backlash against Civil Rights initiatives, etc. By calling attention not only to the ways in 
which whiteness manifests through intraracial class conflicts but also to its rootedness in 
the vicissitudes of everyday social encounters, Racial Situations expands the scope of 
what counts as “racial” in the social and psychic lives of white people, linking this term 
to ideas and practices quite different “from what may be assumed in its uses for 
describing institutional practices or the array of forms of discrimination or stereotyping” 
(Hartigan 281).  
“Scattered Supremacies” shares Hartigan’s focus on forms of whiteness that are 
intra-racially articulated and less institutional. I do historicize my readings with 
contextual discussions about large-scale socioeconomic structures and cultural 
dynamics—the professionalization of the American middle class at turn the of twentieth 
century in my chapter on Fitzgerald, for instance, or fears about white racial degeneration 
in European colonies and amongst the working classes of various imperial metropoles in 
my chapter on Rhys. The focus of my readings themselves, however, is the “interpretive 
repertoires” that white people use to make judgements about other whites: the terms, 
descriptions, and (in this literary rather than anthropological project) aesthetic tropes 
wielded to make sense of, evaluate, and criticize white people, whether these are used by 
white characters within the plot or in descriptions of white characters at the level of 
narration. 
On the matter of aesthetics, there are certain features of modernist narrative style 
that make modernist literature an especially rich archive for this dissertation. Modernism 
is known for a variety of aesthetic trademarks: fragmentary and non-chronological 
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narrative structures, non-mimetic representation, allusive density and difficulty, abundant 
use of interior monologue and stream of consciousness, and the intertwinement of 
conflicting narrative perspectives, just to name a few. Certainly, a number of these 
aesthetic techniques appear in some of chapters of this dissertation and play an important 
role in the way a certain text illuminates or exhibits a form of white racial discourse. 
Rhys’ extensive use of interior monologue and the unique narrative tone it creates are a 
key part of my analysis of whiteness in Chapter 1, and in Chapter 4, I argue that the 
fragmentary, elliptical form of Cather’s pioneer fictions are integral to the discourse of 
whiteness her novels exude.  
None of the specific modernist narrative techniques listed above, however, 
characterizes every novel examined in this dissertation. If there is one feature of literary 
modernism that unites the authors and texts in this study and makes them a particularly 
rich archive for this project, it is the more general feature of modernism’s atmosphere or 
mood of anxious disillusionment. From Heart of Darkness and The Waste Land to 
Quicksand and The Sound and the Fury, modernism has never been known for a cheery, 
carefree outlook on life. In both fiction and poetry, much of its representational content is 
comprised of responses to the downsides of modernity, brooding reflections on the 
cruelties and moral foundations of colonialism; on the reification of human beings and 
social relationships in the wake of rationalized, industrial capitalism; on the anomie and 
social atomization of metropolitan life; and on the traumas of World War I, which 
revealed mankind’s technological capacity to wipe itself out. Modernism’s fragmentary 
and disorienting representational forms work to convey the affective and psychological 
effects of these historical circumstances: confusion and worry about the breakdown of 
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long-standing social orders, about a loss of faith in previous moral values and ideals, and 
the forms of intense introspection to which the unwieldy developments of modernity give 
rise. What we see in much of literary modernism is white people witnessing and 
processing the moral and cultural degradation of themselves or other white people—
white people seeing things that they do not like happening to themselves or to their 
communities and trying to take actions or come up with rationalizations that allow them 
to salvage a sense of their own self-regard. Faulkner is an especially illustrative example 
of this. Many of his novels, like Absalom! Absalom! and the Snopes trilogy, take the 
disorienting, Heart-of-Darkness-style form of stories about people telling each other 
stories: characters dredging up one anecdote or another, chewing on it, fretting over it, 
trying to figure out what it says or does not say about the South and the Southern whites 
who are the primary protagonists of Faulkner’s fiction. In its ambience of worried self-
reflection, modernism is thus especially rife with white people taking stock of their own 
habits and values, critiquing those of other whites, clinging to a sense of their own 
virtuousness, and (whether they realize it or not) managing the boundaries and 
connotations of whiteness by parsing out the “good” white people from the “bad.” 
Having now positioned this dissertation within whiteness studies as a field, 
identifying the works of scholarship to which it is akin in addition to those whose 
unfinished business it seeks to address, I want to offer one point of clarification about the 
methods I adopt and the close readings in my chapters. As I hope by now to have made 
clear, “Scattered Supremacies” works by examining literary representations of white 
intraracial conflict and illuminating, within these, the racial content of the seemingly 
race-neutral qualities used by certain white people to criticize and differentiate 
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themselves from other whites. In doing so, I locate whiteness in ideas, practices, tropes, 
and structures of feeling that do not revolve around white people explicitly stigmatizing 
people of color or idolizing other whites. This being said, there are occasional moments 
in the course of these chapters, where my analysis turns to textual scenes defined by a 
white character’s interaction with or discussion of, say, a black person. There is one such 
moment in my chapter on Rhys, for instance, and two of them in my chapter on Faulkner. 
What I want to point out here is that, as I have tried to show at length, for most of the 
extant literary scholarship on whiteness, the appearance in a text of characters of color or 
tropes of blackness or Asian-ness or blatant pronouncements of white cultural superiority 
are the main point of the analysis, the predominant form of evidence cited to back the 
critic’s claims. This dissertation is not utterly and completely free of such moments as 
discussion topics, but they are extremely rare, and I use them only as occasional forms of 
racial “reassurance.” For example, my chapter on Faulkner, reads whiteness in terms of 
how Faulkner conceptualizes moral and material debt and how he uses metaphors of 
indebtedness and debt repayment to structure the plot and narration of a novel. Brief 
discussions of two moments where black characters use the language of debt in their 
encounters with white people serve as useful ways to “reassure” us that debt and 
indebtedness are racialized categories in Faulkner’s moral and aesthetic universe. The 
point of the chapter, however, is to read ideas about debt as facets of white racial identity 
throughout the novel in question. The scenes where black characters enter the picture are 
simply the parts of the text where racial identities are being more obviously constructed 
through financial rhetoric, but the entire novel is racialized in this way, and my chapter 
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reflects this by devoting almost all of its close-reading space to the novel’s intraracial 
plotlines. 
 
IV. Race in “Scattered Supremacies” Part II: Modernism and Neoliberalism 
I want to turn now to the final component of this dissertation’s racial framework, 
one that moves us to the question of contemporary relevance. In addition to expanding 
the limited racial optics of both modernist and whiteness studies, my focus on forms of 
whiteness coded through seemingly race-neutral economic and moral virtues allows 
“Scattered Supremacies” to achieve one other goal: illuminating white racial dynamics 
that resonate specifically with the forms of racialization dominant under contemporary 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has become, in recent decades, a buzzword in academic 
circles. It describes a political and economic ideology birthed, primarily, in the United 
States and Britain in the 1970s and 1980s and later dispersed, through economic 
imperialism, across the globe. As David Harvey writes, it “is in the first instance a theory 
of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. 
The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such practices” (2).1 Arguably, the two processes most characteristic of neoliberal reform 
are privatization and deregulation. Because neoliberal theory holds that a competitive free 
market is the most effective way to meet society’s needs and right its ills, “[s]ectors 
formerly run or regulated by the state must be turned over to the private sphere and be 
 
1 For an account of neoliberalism’s historical origins and its uneven uptake in different national and 
geographical contexts, see Harvey 5-63. 
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deregulated (freed from any state interference)” (Harvey 65). The rollback of the welfare 
state is thus a prime example of neoliberal governance. Under the alibi of financial 
efficiency and the need to discipline “lazy” individuals, the provisioning of welfare has 
become increasingly localized and marked by harsh work requirements forcing those 
seeking benefits to accept any and all work in a deregulated (and thus hyper-exploitative) 
labor market. Neoliberalism is also marked by a blinkered faith in individualism, one that 
consistently obscures structural forms of oppression as an explanation of inequality. 
“Individual success[es] or failure[s] are interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or 
personal failings (such as not investing significantly enough in one’s own human capital 
through education) rather than being attributed to any systemic property” (Harvey 65-66). 
As this brief summary suggests, neoliberal governance, in its concern for unregulated 
market enterprise and its willful ignorance of any sense of systemic oppression, has 
ultimately functioned, as Harvey argues, as a political project “to restore the power of 
economic elites,” a set of rules about how to govern that works for the haves and not for 
the have nots (19). Thus, one of the prevailing outcomes of neoliberal reforms in past 
decades has been an ever-widening income gap between the rich and the poor in 
countries across the globe (Harvey 16-18). 
For the purposes of “Scattered Supremacies,” what is most important about 
neoliberalism in the late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first centuries is the way it has 
affected the structures and expressions of white supremacy. Insofar as neoliberal politico-
economic structures have restored the power of economic elites, they have worked in 
favor of white racial dominance. However, because neoliberalism also seeks to deny the 
realities of systemic oppression, insisting that free markets and the societies built around 
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them are level playing fields, it has also been accompanied by cultural shifts in how racial 
inequality and white supremacy are talked about and explained, shifts that work, namely, 
to deny that race is a meaningful category for making sense of social disparities. 
“Neoliberalism was at its core a racial project as much as a capitalist accumulation 
project,” observe Michael Omi and Howard Winant, and “[i]ts central racial component 
was colorblind racial ideology” (211, emphasis added). In his definitive study on 
colorblind racism in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva describes it as a “new racial 
ideology” cohering “in the late 1960s” and consisting of explanations used by white 
people to rationalize and justify racial inequality through recourse to “market dynamics, 
naturally occurring phenomena, and blacks’ imputed cultural limitations” (2). As Bonilla-
Silva points out, colorblind racism has always—like neoliberalism—had a politically 
liberal persuasion: it “rearticulate[s] elements of traditional liberalism (work ethic, 
rewards by merit, equal opportunity, individualism, etc.)” in order “to rationalize racially 
unfair situations” (7, 56). In its colorblind form, American white supremacy is buttressed 
not by outmoded claims about the sheer biological inferiority of people of color but by 
claims about problematic aspects of the latter’s character as individuals or about the 
habits and values instilled by their own families and communities. If black Americans 
tend to be poorer than whites, this is because they have failed to work hard enough (the 
colorblind reasoning goes) in a country that, at least since the end of slavery and Jim 
Crow, really is a meritocracy (Bonilla-Silva 60-61). This is supposedly exacerbated by 
unstable family structures in black communities and a general lack of regard for 
disciplined work ethic in black culture (Bonilla-Silva 67-70).2 
 
2 These insights all come from Bonilla-Silva’s seminal study Racism without Racists: Color-blind Racism 
 
 52 
What I have been describing, above, as the “seemingly race-neutral economic and 
moral virtues” key to this dissertation’s analysis—virtues like industriousness, self-
discipline, austerity, and self-reliance—are thus crucial to the vocabularies and patterns 
of reasoning characteristic of the colorblind forms of white supremacy now rampant 
under neoliberalism. In addition, then, to providing new readings of modernist literature 
by tracking previously underexamined discourses of whiteness, this dissertation also 
bolsters contemporary anti-white-supremacist critique by developing our eye and ear for 
oblique forms of white supremacy akin to those pervading our historical present, ones 
channeled not through unabashed convictions of white racial superiority but through the 
espousal and valorization of classically liberal, meritocratic values. 
There are, as it turns out, a few historical reasons why modernist literature is 
especially well-suited for this task. First, “laissez-faire” approaches to economics and the 
Adam-Smith-based idea of “free markets” led by an “invisible hand” were very much 
regnant in the modernist period (along with the first signs of a worried critique of such 
thinking and practice) (Mickalites 16). These libertarian ideas of classical economics, 
 
and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America (2018), originally published in 2003 and now in its 
fifth edition. While Bonilla-Silva does not explicitly identify his book as a work of whiteness studies, I 
would argue that we could consider it as informally belonging to the field. As Bonilla-Silva explicitly 
states, “my focus is examining whites’ racial ideology,” and the observations throughout the book are based 
on an archive of sociological interviews with white people (10). I bring this up as a final opportunity to 
illustrate the extent of the oversights that have permeated scholarship on race as a factor in the lives of 
white people (whether formally part of whiteness studies or not). In Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6—the heart of 
Bonilla-Silva’s study, where he distills and anatomizes the key components of colorblind racial ideology—
Bonilla-Silva relies, as evidence for his claims, on the opinions white people expressed in interviews about 
a variety of explicitly racial topics, including but not limited to: affirmative action; de facto housing and 
school segregation; interracial friendship, dating, and marriage; differences experienced between white 
people and people of color when engaging with the U.S. court system and the police; reparations; 
government-aid programs that specifically cater to certain racial groups; and gaps in academic 
achievement, employment, income, and wealth between black and white Americans (59-141). In 
explicating colorblind racism as a key feature of white racial ideology, in other words, Bonilla-Silva’s 
study conforms to the patterns in modernist and whiteness studies in which observations about whiteness 
are constantly tied to white people’s relationships to or ideas about blackness. 
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very strong from the 1900s to the 1930s, are the historical basis on which neoliberals 
drew, beginning in the 1970s, to generate a consensus around the pursuit of market-based 
solutions to social problems. In terms of general politico-economic, ideological 
atmospheres, then, there is a historical resonance between the turn of the twentieth 
century and the turn of the twenty-first (separated by the mid-century ascendency of 
statist, New-Deal and Keynesian economic paradigms). More specifically, the early 
twentieth century also witnessed the rise of particular economic practices and institutions 
now considered characteristically neoliberal. Financial capitalism, for example, is a key 
component of neoliberal economics, but financialization first became a major part of 
modern capital accumulation in the late nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Faulkner’s Snopes trilogy registers this economic development by making its primary 
antagonist, Flem Snopes, a shady financier whose business machinations and predatory 
lending wreak havoc on a small community. The same historical moment also witnessed 
the “professionalization” of the American and British bourgeoisie: the rise of a special 
class of workers who claimed privileged positions in occupational and social hierarchies 
by garnering public recognition for credentialed expertise acquired through an elite 
education. In Tender is the Night and nonfiction writings contemporaneous with it, the 
language and values of professionalism are crucial to the way Fitzgerald attempts to 
distinguish himself from the American leisure class whose decadence he viewed as the 
source of both America’s decline in the 1930s and his own.  
In certain chapters of “Scattered Supremacies,” then, there are economic 
dynamics present as part of the fiction’s context and/or content that allow us to read these 
literary texts as cultural responses to early-twentieth-century socioeconomic discourses 
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that have since become even more prominent in our neoliberal present. This “proto-
neoliberal” connection is not equally present across all chapters. It is strongest in the case 
of Faulkner, followed by Fitzgerald. In my chapter on Rhys, it is not true that there is a 
specific, neoliberally resonant economic discourse shaping the context or storylines of 
Rhys’ texts. I do, however, suggest at the end of the chapter that the insights from my 
close readings—about how British imperial white supremacy is shored up by 
stigmatizing the nation’s white poor—are especially relevant to thinking about the racial 
dimensions of neoliberal reforms of the welfare state. The connection is weakest in my 
chapter on Cather, where I spend the least amount of time drawing links between 
Cather’s texts and any particular neoliberal discourse. Regardless, however, of whether 
the contemporary relevance of any given chapter’s racial analysis can be expressed in 
terms of a specific neoliberal discourse or institution, every chapter of “Scattered 
Supremacies” illustrates that in the modernist period no less than in our own, discourses 
about hard work, debt, discipline, and self-reliance generated vocabularies and logics that 
shored up white supremacy despite a lack of overtly racial content—not unlike the forms 
of colorblind racism supposedly unique to our post-Civil-Rights, neoliberal moment. My 
focus is on showing how whiteness can be constructed through seemingly nonracial ideas 
and practices. Where it is possible to do this in a way that crystallizes the stakes of a 
reading in terms of a discretely nameable economic discourse operative today, I do so. 
But even in chapters where this not quite possible, the forms of tacitly racial discourse I 
identify should be understood as timely objects of study given the broader, neoliberal 
reality of a colorblind racial order in which economic language and values are 
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increasingly utilized (whether consciously or not) as racially unmarked vehicles for 
conveying what are in fact racially charged judgments. 
Just to make one point clear: we should not mistake the advent of Trump and the 
blunter, more brazen forms of white supremacy he has enabled as signs that we are no 
longer living in a world structured by neoliberal political and economic imperatives and 
colorblind forms of racial discourse. Though Trump and his supporters are obviously not 
“liberals,” his administration still adopts a politically and economically neoliberal policy 
orientation while blending this with right-wing cultural and moral values. David Harvey 
calls this “neoconservatism.” Neoconservatives, like neoliberals, favor corporate power 
and private enterprise and are “entirely consistent with the neoliberal agenda of elite 
governance, mistrust of democracy, and the maintenance of market freedoms” (Harvey 
82). Hence, for instance, Trump’s settler-colonial fast tracking of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, a move marked by the neoliberal imperatives of privatization and deregulation. 
Likewise, neoconservatives “in no way depart from the neoliberal agenda of a 
construction or restoration of a dominant class power”; they “seek legitimacy for that 
power, as well as social control through construction of a climate of consent” centered 
around conservative moral values (Harvey 83-84). Thus, they “emphasize militarization 
as an antidote to the chaos of individual interests,” are “more likely to highlight threats, 
real or imagined, … to the integrity and stability of the nation,” and champion moral 
values centered on “cultural nationalism, … Christianity (of a certain evangelical sort), 
family values, … right-to-life issues, and on antagonism to the new social movements 
such as feminism, gay rights, affirmative action, and environmentalism” (82, 84). These 
are the contours of America under Trump’s Republican administration to a tee, and the 
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point, again, is that such conservatism exists alongside a neoliberal ideology that 
champions corporations, capitalist enterprise, and a religion of entrepreneurial 
individualism completely oblivious to history and systemic inequality. 
As far as the continuation of colorblind racism is concerned, I can do no better 
than quote Bonilla-Silva in his 2018 Preface to a revised edition of his definitive work on 
colorblindness, Racism without Racists. The Trump moment, Bonilla-Silva notes, does 
not represent the end of colorblind racism so much as illustrate how any system of racial 
oppression “articulate[s] various modes of domination” (xiv). There are, under Trump’s 
shadow, many overt white supremacists who now feel emboldened to crawl out of the 
woodwork. But these right-wing extremists exist alongside white moderates and less-far-
right conservatives who do not espouse ideas about white racial superiority yet maintain 
that “the past is past” and that racial inequality persists in America not because of 
systemic oppression but because of people of color and their allies, who “make” 
everything about race when it really isn’t. Colorblindness, in other words, remains a 
prominent feature of American white supremacy, even if “it is not the only way of 
maintaining racial order” (Bonilla-Silva xiv, original emphasis). 
 
V. Chapter Overviews 
“Scattered Supremacies” contains four chapters, each dealing with a single author. 
Chapter 1, “Devastatingly English: Locating Race in Jean Rhys’ Non-Caribbean Fiction,” 
illuminates the operations of whiteness in two novels critics tend to read as texts about 
gender rather than race: After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie and Good Morning Midnight. I 
argue that Rhys’ portrayals of the stigma faced by poor white Englishwomen in the 
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imperial metropole reveals the inextricability of these gendered forms of classism with 
the racial discourses of British colonial rule. Historically, anxieties about white racial 
degeneration in the European colonies led to forms of white intra-racial class policing 
that stigmatized poor whites, even in the metropole, as racially liminal. This intra-racial 
dynamic, I argue, structures the lives of Rhys’ white characters. I track the ways in which 
Rhys herself signals the racial dimensions of her protagonists’ marginalization at the 
level of plot, and I then turn to an extensive analysis of her form and style, showing how 
she encoded, within her tone and use of the second-person voice, discourses of resistance 
to the forms of white-supremacist, gendered classicism depicted in the story. The chapter 
concludes by identifying echoes of the intra-racial class discourses critiqued by Rhys’ 
fiction in the racial dynamics of British neoliberal welfare reform. 
Chapter 2, “‘Owing Nothing to Any Man’: Faulkner, White Debt, and the 
Language of Moral Finance,” examines the discourse of “moral debt” that frames ideas 
about wrongdoing and justice in The Mansion, a novel with almost black characters, 
centered around the class conflict between a white tenant farmer and a white banker. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, Faulkner was highly critical of the early-twentieth-century welfare 
state, which he viewed as detrimental to an ethos of self-made independence that he 
imagined as characteristic of white masculinity. Faulkner’s obsession with self-made 
individualism permeates The Mansion’s discourse of moral debt, a set of both plot- and 
narration-structuring ideas about what it means to “owe” atonement for past wrongs and 
what atonement and its aftermath might look like. I focus on two specific elements of 
Faulkner’s moral-debt rhetoric: a constant fixation on historical closure (on the settling 
past of injustices as “closed chapters” in history) and the anticipation of unencumbered 
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individualism as the automatic payoff of facing one’s moral dues. I argue that these two 
tendencies comprise a distinctly white way of thinking about moral indebtedness, one 
that caters to the historical and emotional interests of white people and that still lives on 
today in contemporary debates about “white debt” and reparations to African Americans 
and indigenous people. 
Chapter 3, “Your Own Worst Critic: Whiteness as Professionalism in Fitzgerald’s 
Tender is the Night,” contends that Fitzgerald’s semiautobiographical novel exhibits a 
distinctly white model of self-consciously “professional” identity, one distinguished by 
an anxious combination of insecurity about lifelong economic comforts that may have 
made one soft and a compensatory desire to be viewed as a hard-working individual 
devoted to a selfless career of service to others. This chapter’s thinking about whiteness 
is organized under the rubric of earnest yet imperfect auto-critique. In tracking the 
simultaneously self-critical yet self-aggrandizing tendencies of Fitzgerald’s professional 
anxieties, I illuminate a manifestation of whiteness defined neither by overt racism 
against people of color nor uncritical valorizations of white identity but rather by a self-
conscious fixation on reconciling one’s elite social and economic standing with fetishized 
notions of moral innocence and uprightness. I discuss this white professionalism in 
relation to the historical context of Jazz-Age abundance (where the spoiled American 
leisure class serves as Fitzgerald’s scapegoat for highlighting his beneficent, hard-
working protagonist’s virtues) and in relation to scholarship on professionalization as an 
economic process at the turn of the twentieth century and professionalism as a 
contemporary, neoliberal power structure. 
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Chapter 4, “‘Something that spoke of race’: Whiteness and Settler Moves to 
Innocence in the Novels of Willa Cather,” attends to the ways in which settler 
colonialism informs white racial identity. Reading a number of historical novels set on 
unsettled, North American frontiers, I show how Cather’s nostalgic representations of 
bygone white settlers work to showcase a variety of pioneer virtues, including a 
disinterested, humbly anti-materialistic relationship to property accumulation and an epic 
capacity to endure adversity and loss. I argue that Cather’s novelistic preoccupation with 
the embattled, resilient, austere lives of white pioneers stemmed from a desire to re-
associate whiteness with the admirable, gorgeously humble capacity to endure 
hardship—an economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral virtue from which 
whiteness was being increasingly severed by industrial and technological advances in the 
early twentieth century. To make this claim, I preface my reading of Cather’s novels with 
a detailed discussion of her nonfiction, which relentlessly criticized the forces of 
industrialism and commercialization for creating a modern bourgeoisie bereft of the 
refinement and substance of character that can only come from mettle-toughening 
exposure to hardship. Faced with a modern America whose middle-class whites had 
devolved into vessels of a spoiled, trifling, Philistine form of whiteness, Cather, I argue, 
retreated through her fiction to the spectacle of a bygone whiteness still marked by 
principled idealism and mental and spiritual fortitude. In doing so, she takes for granted 
settler access to the land on which these white, pioneer virtues play out and thus exhibits 




 Having laid out this dissertation’s framework and described its chapters, I want to 
close with one final clarification. In identifying oblique and often unwitting forms of 
white supremacy in the work of writers like Faulkner, Cather, and Fitzgerald, I want to be 
clear that it is not my intention to vilify these novelists as “bad” people. One of the more 
insidious effects of the Trump presidency is that it has given non-conservative white 
people something easy to point at and say, “I’m not that, so I’m not a racist.” The stakes 
of this dissertation are especially high, in other words, in a political climate where 
responsibility for white supremacy is increasingly shunted onto “Trump supporters” 
despite much of its perpetuation continuing to occur through the insufficiently self-
critical practices of white liberals. As whiteness-studies scholars like Matthew Hughey 
and Shannon Sullivan have argued, one of the biggest obstacles to dismantling white 
supremacy today is the all-too-easy and misleading “good white liberal”/“bad white 
racist” binary in which progressive whites mitigate or shield themselves from any sense 
of their ongoing complicity in structures of racial oppression by demonizing the actions 
and views of white conservatives. This does not help people of color in any way and in 
fact just contributes to their oppression by forcing them to stomach the blinkered self-
aggrandizing of supposed “allies.” It would be historically and biographically inaccurate 
to say that any of the authors in this study were trying to be better “allies” to people of 
color. They were not invested in disrupting systems of racial oppression so much as they 
were either (in Rhys’s case) trying to survive forms of stigma that accrue to some white 
people as a part of white-supremacist power structures or (in Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and 
Cather’s case) fretting over changing habits and values that threatened to jeopardize their 
own idealized self-image or that of the classes or communities to which they belonged. 
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These sociocultural situations are expressed and navigated, in these modernist novels, 
through white people criticizing other whites in ways that ultimately do not dismantle 
whiteness as a privileged racial category so much as police its boundaries and/or 
rehabilitate it where it is perceived to be in decline. Rather than holding figures like 
Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and Cather at a distance and vilifying their prejudices, I aim to hold 
their work up like a mirror and encourage us to recognize, in the shortcomings of their 
racial optics, ideological and affective tendencies that still plague white critiques of 
whiteness today (particularly those coming from the liberal bourgeoisie). By focusing on 
forms of whiteness distinguished less by racist ideas about people of color than by 
problematically structured critiques of other whites, “Scattered Supremacies” aims to 
disrupt any sense of a “good white liberal”/“bad white racist” binary, inviting us to see 
ourselves in these writers and learn from the example of their racialized affective and 
aesthetic reflexes rather than feel sententiously good about critiquing them. 
As John Hartigan Jr. observes at the end of Racial Situations, “The point of 
producing racial knowledge” is to detail “the process of racialization, whether whites or 
people of color are its immediate subjects,” and to create, in doing so, “a basis for 
comprehending when, how, and if certain dynamics are racial, especially in situations 
where ‘race’ is not ostensibly present” (286). These, precisely, are the theoretical and 
methodological investments of the literary analyses that follow. We will not have a 
comprehensive critique of the ways in which white people perpetuate their racial 
dominance until we recognize—alongside the many direct and spectacular forms of racial 
oppression so invaluably analyzed by other scholars—the subtler, more indirect forms of 
white supremacy scattered throughout white people’s intra-racial interactions and their 
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textual representations of one another. This dissertation endeavors to make some initial 




Devastatingly English: Locating Race in Jean Rhys’ Non-Caribbean Fiction 
In the course of her wanderings around Paris in 1937, Sasha Jensen, the 
impoverished, English protagonist of Jean Rhys’ Good Morning, Midnight (1939), 
befriends a gigolo named René of self-professed “‘French-Canadian’” origin (74). When 
he asks, as a fellow down-and-out émigré, whether she has made any other friends in the 
city, Sasha replies that she has recently met two Russians whom she likes very much. 
“‘Russians,’ he says in a spiteful voice, ‘Russians in Paris! Everybody knows what they 
are – Jews and poor whites. The most boring people in the world’” (163). During the 
1930s, perceptions of “the Jew as a working class immigrant who threatened the racial 
purity of the nation” were a prominent feature of French national culture, especially 
among the nation’s native-born, white working class (Stovall 63). René’s hostility toward 
Jews, however, cannot be explained in terms of a nativist antipathy toward immigrants, 
given that he himself is an émigré. Nor can it be explained in terms of resenting 
competition for scarce industrial wage labor since René, as a gigolo, is not looking for 
such employment. Rhys provides a clue to the motives and reasoning behind his 
comment through the second group he names for censure. By instinctively lumping “poor 
whites” together with the racially stigmatized category of Jews, René insinuates that the 
former group’s lack of bourgeois habits and values makes them, in fact, racially liminal: 
that the poorness of poor whites renders their whiteness suspect. Through René’s knee-
jerk prejudice, Rhys calls attention to how judgments about the racial identity of a group 
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or an individual are informed by judgments about the possession or lack of certain class-
based characteristics. 
Rhys bears this point out further by showing how René tries to use the 
intertwinement of race and class to his own advantage. Later in their conversation, he 
tells Sasha about some of the lavish mansions he has seen while servicing wealthy 
clientele: “‘I’ve stayed in one so rich that when you pulled the lavatory-plug it played a 
tune. … Rich people – you have to be sorry for them. They haven’t the slightest idea how 
to spend their money […]. Either they have no taste at all, or, if they have any taste, it’s 
like a mausoleum and they’re shut up in it’” (Rhys, Midnight 169).1 In this critique of the 
wealthy, René is not implying a plucky preference for rags over riches. He obviously 
seeks out only affluent clients, and he considers his own taste cultivated enough to 
critique their tastes as gaudy and their ideas about leisure as dry. René, in other words, 
affects a bourgeois comportment above his actual means, a tendency he has already 
exhibited by branding Jews and poor whites as uncouthly “boring.” That earlier comment 
has already hinted that René’s bourgeois posturing harbors racial motivations, and Rhys 
confirms this more clearly when, in a forlorn bid for Sasha’s attention and intimacy, René 
shows her the traces of a failed suicide attempt, a scar running from ear to ear across his 
neck. “He looks sad. He says, speaking in a low voice and for the first time with a very 
strong accent: ‘I have wounds,’ pronouncing ‘wounds’ so oddly that I don’t understand 
what he means” (174). Whatever the accent on René’s English may be, it does not seem 
to be French, which Sasha would recognize, and this renders his claim of French-
Canadian origin dubious. The likelihood that René is not Western European, perhaps not 
 
1 Rhys frequently uses ellipses in her own writing. In this chapter, I indicate omissions from quoted 
material by placing my own ellipses in brackets. Unbracketed ellipses are Rhys’ in the original. 
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European at all, brings the significance of his earlier, classist anti-Semitism more clearly 
into focus: by branding Jews and poor whites as “boring,” and by claiming the sense and 
sophistication to criticize the tastes of the rich, René whitewashes his own racially 
ambiguous background by consciously pretending to bourgeois status. He attempts to 
attenuate his racial liminality—to shore up his tenuous belonging within the French 
imperial metropole—using the ideas and language of class. 
 In this chapter, I show that in Good Morning, Midnight as well as in Rhys’ second 
novel After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie (1931), class-based ideas and practices serve as the 
basis both for judgments about the racial identities of individuals and for attempts by 
racially liminal subjects to pass as members of a dominant racial group. René’s comment 
about Jews and poor whites along with his bourgeois affectations exemplify these 
dynamics, but he also stands as a rather exceptional case because his flagrant anti-
Semitism makes the racial implications of his classed self-presentation hard to miss. By 
contrast, most of the racially charged classism I examine in this chapter is devoid of overt 
racism and often of any references to race at all. Both Sasha and the protagonist of After 
Leaving Mr. Mackenzie, Julia Martin, live unwed, unemployed, itinerant lives being 
financially kept by middle-class English men seeking casual sexual companionship for 
compensation in cash or kind.2 This mode of survival exposes Sasha and Julia to 
patronizing forms of gendered class discrimination both from their bourgeois English 
relatives and from their lovers and ex-lovers themselves. I argue, however, that the 
misogynistic classism faced by Rhys’ protagonists also bears tacit racial implications 
 
2 Though Midnight and parts of Mackenzie are set in Paris, Rhys’ narratives still tend to focus on 
interactions that Sasha and Julia have with men who are English. These may be ex-lovers or new lovers 
traveling or living in Paris, or they may be Englishmen who are recalled in London-based memories.  
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because it is deeply tied to the racial discourses of British colonial rule. Historically, the 
subjugation of colonized populations abroad and of poor English women at home relied 
upon a shared set of tropes—idleness, dependency, and irrational emotionality—which 
implied the inferiority of both groups to middle-class English men. Within this matrix of 
imperialist discourse, “Englishness” as a thoroughly racialized national identity was 
predicated on the display of bourgeois values and decorum, a nationally specific form of 
whiteness constructed through economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral 
terms. Sasha and Julia’s indecent domestic and sexual arrangements, along with their 
ostensible lack of self-discipline and work ethic, lead to their marginalization along lines 
of class and gender, but Rhys also shows how their non-bourgeois habits and values 
occasion a precarious relationship to Englishness, a racial liminality that, like René, they 
often try to offset by acting more bourgeois than their material circumstances allow. My 
claim here is not that these white Englishwomen are victims of racism. They are victims 
of classism, but the white-on-white class prejudice they face draws upon and feeds into 
the racial logics of British colonial rule. 
Thus, in Midnight and Mackenzie, Rhys calls attention to how ideas and practices 
that underwrite the racial domination of colonized nonwhites are subtly yet pervasively 
rehearsed in judgments and interactions that do not appear to be racial because they occur 
between different classes of white people. As John Hartigan Jr. notes in his study of how 
the racial category “white trash” is produced as a rhetorical weapon through discourses of 
class, gender, and sexuality, “the fact of racism does not explain everything about how 
and why race matters” (Odd Tribes 7). Overreliance on it as an explanatory principle can 
obscure from analysis ideas and practices that contribute to the formation of hierarchized 
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racial identities in more nuanced and indirect ways. Sasha and Julia’s marginalization by 
the patriarchal, imperial-metropolitan English bourgeoisie singles out and distances those 
who “exceed the class and [sexual] etiquettes required by whites if they are to preserve 
the powers and privileges that accrue to them as members of the dominant racial order” 
(Hartigan 115). This specific process does not directly involve people of color, but it still 
bears racial stakes and illustrates the importance of including the interactions that 
different groups of white people have with each other within the ambit of studies about 
race, colonialism, and white supremacy. 
This crucial point has been undervalued in Rhys scholarship. Whenever race and 
empire are topics of analysis, Rhys’ critics tend to focus on her two most famous texts, 
Voyage in the Dark (1934) and Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) (Emery; V. Gregg; Raiskin; 
Thomas; Clarke; Burrows; Eeva). Both novels include numerous scenes or memories set 
in the colonial space of the British Caribbean and feature female protagonists who are 
also white “Creoles”: people of “European descent born in European colonies” and, in the 
case of those born in British colonial territories, bearing “cultural ties to England fostered 
either by the self-identifications of settler societies or by Anglocentric colonial 
educations” (Raiskin 3, 1).3 Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea offer 
conspicuous examples of the racist fetishization of Afro-Caribbeans by white Creoles as 
well as the stigmatization of both groups in turn by the metropolitan English. By contrast, 
novels like After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie and Good Morning, Midnight focus on the 
relationships their poor, Englishwomen protagonists have with other metropolitan 
 
3 The meaning of the term of “Creole” varies widely across historical and geographic contexts. For a 
discussion of these variations, along with the term’s etymology, see Raiskin 1-5. Throughout this chapter, I 
use “Creole” (usually qualified with the adjective “white”) to denote people of European ancestry born and 
raised in a European colony. 
 
 68 
Europeans. Thus, Midnight and Mackenzie tend to be read as novels about women’s 
impoverishment more so than novels about racial and colonial dynamics due to the 
relative absence of narrative content that features overt racism or interracial social 
contact.4 The tendency to view Rhys’ Caribbean fiction as clearly concerned with race 
and her metropolitan fiction as focused on gender reflects an understandable yet limiting 
inclination on behalf of critics to look for white supremacy solely in the interactions that 
white people have with nonwhites or in the ideas and conversations that white people 
have about them. However, Rhys’ own childhood as a white colonist in the British 
Caribbean, as well as her young adulthood as a poor colonial émigré in London, made her 
intimately familiar with the prejudices held by England’s metropolitan bourgeoisie both 
against white Creoles believed to be morally and physically inferior due to their 
upbringing in the savage outposts of civilization and against the metropolitan white poor 
as a veritable race apart from the English middle class.5 Throughout her fiction, Rhys 
exhibited a keen sensitivity to the ways in which the constitution of an English race fit for 
imperial rule required the subjugation of some whites by other whites, particularly 
through classist and misogynistic discourses about work, self-discipline, sex, and 
domesticity. Her metropolitan fiction is thus an optimal archive for illustrating the 
arguments and stakes of this dissertation. 
 
4 There are of course exceptions to this trend. Of the critics cited here, some—like Emery, Gregg, and 
Thomas—certainly include Midnight and Mackenzie in their studies of the racial and colonial themes in 
Rhys’ work. The amount of attention these texts receive relative to Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso 
Sea, however, is often meager, and when Midnight and Mackenzie are being read, race tends to recede into 
the background of analysis where it was otherwise front and center throughout the critic’s study. For an 
indicative, state-of-field report on this scholarship-induced split between Rhys’ Caribbean and non-
Caribbean fiction, with the former tending to serve as the almost exclusive domain for questions about race 
and empire, see Dell’Amico 1-5. 
5 On the biographical details of Rhys’ Creole upbringing and her experiences with racial and class prejudice 
in the English imperial metropole, see Angier, especially 1-35. 
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This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with a brief sketch of the 
gendered forms of class discrimination that pervade Midnight and Mackenzie, stressing 
the language and common-sense reasoning wielded by middle-class Englishmen to 
stigmatize Rhys’ protagonists. I then turn to scholarship in colonial discourse studies 
showing how the cultivation of European bourgeois identity in the metropole was 
informed by racial discourses developed in the colonies. In imperial nation-states like 
Britain, the cultural standards of what it meant to be English and bourgeois were never 
separable from discourses of empire, from “reference points of difference” embodied 
both in the colonized and in déclassé European colonists who “provided contrasts for 
what a ‘healthy, vigorous, bourgeois body’ was all about” (Stoler 7). On this basis, I 
argue that the misogynistic classism endured by Rhys’ protagonists bears tacit racial 
implications. In the chapter’s second section, I show how Rhys’ novels not only portray 
this racially marked classism but also resist it. I argue that the tone and style of her 
writing pinpoint the many contradictions and hypocrisies of bourgeois class 
condescension and force implied, middle-class readers into anxious self-consciousness 
about perpetuating them. The chapter’s concluding section considers the relevance of 
these readings to the contemporary moment. I suggest that the insights gained from 
reading Midnight and Mackenzie are especially valuable now, in the context of the work-
enforcing welfare reforms rapidly transpiring under neoliberalism. 
 
I 
 In one of many flashbacks throughout Good Morning, Midnight, Sasha recalls a 
stranger buying her drinks in hopes of getting her into bed. In a blithely misogynistic 
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effort to establish a rapport, the man begins to read her a letter he has recently received 
from another girl with whom he is having casual sex. This woman has started asking him 
for money to buy new shoes because her own are all worn out. “‘I don’t believe it,’ he 
says, ‘it’s a trap. This girl, you understand, is a liar. What she wants is three hundred 
francs to give to her maquereau [her pimp]’” (88). He then invites Sasha to join him in 
impugning the girl’s request: “‘Well, what do you think? Do you think this letter can be 
genuine?’” (89). Sasha’s opinion, of course, does not really matter, for as he quickly 
reasons of his own accord, “‘even if it is genuine, I mustn’t send the money at once. […] 
If she thought she had only to ask, to have – that would never do. No, no, I must keep her 
waiting’” (89). Ultimately, this point, too, is rendered moot, for he soon decides he will 
not give her any money after all: “‘No. I think she is lying’” (89). 
Throughout both Midnight and Mackenzie, Rhys bears witness to countless 
instances of quotidian, classed and gendered aggression. Occasionally, the hostility borne 
by her protagonists assumes intensely physical forms (Midnight, for instance, culminates 
in a rape scene). But as in the case of the flashback above, Rhys devotes most of her 
attention in these novels to forms of patriarchal classicism that are more attritional and 
mundane, ones that typically involve middle-class men’s paternalistic ideas about 
“reasonable” and “proper” conduct. Sexist classism, in other words, most often figures in 
these texts as an ambient condition rather than a spectacular event, and Rhys pays keen 
attention to the rhetoric, terms, and often faulty patterns of reasoning that contribute to 
her protagonists’ oppression. The man at the bar in Sasha’s anecdote, for example, 
marshals two stereotypes about the poor (and especially about poor women) to make 
sense of a bothersome situation before him: the girl, allegedly, is both manipulatively 
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dishonest and a lazy scrounger. She is supposedly undeserving of support because her 
presumed lies indicate that she is less needy than she seems, yet, as Sasha notes in her 
role as narrator, this reasoning makes no sense: “if you’re determined to get people on the 
cheap, you shouldn’t be so surprised when they pitch you their own little story of misery” 
(90). Recourse to lies, in other words, would naturally scale as one’s circumstances 
became more dire, so if this girl is lying, this is likely to indicate that her material needs 
are more genuine, not less. From the man’s blinkered perspective, however, she is as 
dependent as a child, and what she needs is some discipline (“If she thought she had only 
to ask, to have – that would never do”).  
Rhys’ representations of gendered class condescension thus emphasize what we 
might call the “common sense” reasoning that underwrites it. She captures, that is, the 
“unsystematized, inconsistent, and contradictory” ideas instinctively wielded by 
bourgeois men to frame, interpret, and discount the struggles of impoverished women 
(Lawrence 79). Rhys’ depiction of Julia Martin’s most recent ex-lover in After Leaving 
Mr. Mackenzie is equally exemplary in this regard. The novel’s eponymous, bourgeois 
Englishman is likewise in the habit of soliciting poor women for casual sex, and they, 
too, solicit him in turn for cash or kind support he is unwilling to give. In order to deal 
with this, Mr. Mackenzie adheres to a common-sense “code of morals and manners” 
improvised from one-sided takes on past experience (Mackenzie 24). 
He soon stopped asking intimate questions, because he knew that it was a 
mistake to be too curious about people who drift into your life and must soon 
inevitably drift out again. That wasn’t the way to live. 
The secret to life was never to go too far or too deep. And so you left these 
people alone. They would be pretty certain to tell you lies, anyhow. And they had 
their own ways of getting along, don’t you worry. (Mackenzie 26) 
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Foremost among Mr. Mackenzie’s rules for interacting with poor women is a strict self-
restraint when it comes to intimacy and emotional connection. Echoing the tropes and 
language deployed by the man in Sasha’s anecdote, the poor do not deserve sympathy, 
here, because they lie about (read: exaggerate) their troubles. These lies imply their 
laziness, for they are clearly trying to get others to help them when they have “their own 
ways of getting along.” 
Such paternalistic tropes and language particularly structure Mackenzie’s 
thoughts about Julia, whom he has just cut sexually and financially out of his life. 
“[L]iving on the money given to her by various men” had obviously “become a habit,” he 
reflects (26). 
He merely asked himself, as a man of the world, “Does she, or does she 
not, get away with it?” […] The really incredible thing was that she did not seem 
to want to get away with it […]. He knew, for instance, that she had not a penny 
of her own. After all that time she had not saved a penny. 
Almost he was forced to believe that she was a female without the instinct 
of self-preservation. And it was against Mr. Mackenzie’s code to believe that any 
female existed without a sense of self-preservation. 
She was irresponsible. She had fits of melancholy when she would lose 
the self-control necessary to keep appearances. (26-27) 
 
Lack of self-discipline, in this account, is Julia’s defining characteristic. If she had “self-
control,” she would not only save face by maintaining her composure but also be less 
“irresponsible” with money. With no discipline or “instinct of self-preservation,” she is 
prone to dependency and emotional “fits,” and the assumption that most women do have 
an instinct for self-preservation is hardly less sexist, for it gestures toward a notion not of 
industrious feminine mettle but of petty feminine wiles—a notion not uncommon 
amongst the bourgeoisie in Rhys’ fiction (“This girl, you understand, is a liar”). 
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 If Midnight and Mackenzie seem so deeply preoccupied with gendered forms of 
class discrimination, then in what sense do these novels have anything to do with race? 
Despite the tendency in Rhys criticism to see race only or primarily at stake in texts like 
Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea, a few critics have offered accounts of racial 
and colonial dynamics in Midnight and Mackenzie as well. These readings have made 
crucial headway in dispelling the impression that race and empire are features only of the 
Caribbean portion of Rhys’ oeuvre, but they have also been marked by a number of 
limitations. One approach has been to show that Afro-Caribbean motifs such as zombis or 
carnivalesque masquerade inform the language and imagery even of Rhys’ metropolitan 
fiction (Emery 122-172; Thomas 83-84). This elucidates how Rhys’ background as a 
white Creole shapes all of her texts, but it does not tell us anything about the racial status 
of her non-Creole English protagonists. Other critics focus on allusions to colonial spaces 
and figures to suggest that Rhys drew parallels between the alienation of poor 
metropolitan Englishwomen and the subjugation of the colonized. This often involves 
focusing on a scene in Mackenzie where Julia’s sister Norah is reading a passage from 
Joseph Conrad’s Almayer’s Folly and identifies with the character of a slave girl in East 
Borneo (Abravanel; Dell’Amico 81-95). This approach too easily treats racism and 
sexism as analogous forms of oppression, reducing the former to a metaphor for the 
latter.6 Such analogies obscure specificities of geographic and historical context as well 
 
6 Here are a few illustrative lines from Abravanel’s Fanon-inspired reading of Mackenzie: “Rhys’s 
depiction of gendered alienation strongly resembles racial alienation as envisioned by Fanon”; “Fanon’s 
work allows us to see that Rhys’s tropes and images could easily come from a racist representation of the 
body”; “Rhys’s vision of female oppression also harbors elements that could well be transposed from a 
racial economy of power” (94, emphases added). Abravanel recognizes that this framework can be 
reductive and problematic but continues to insist on her main argument after acknowledging that limitation 
as such, hence the closing lines of the essay: “Rhys uses racial imagery and colonial themes to illuminate 
the psychic distress of English women. While such a transposition may falter in its easy exchange of racial 
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as the differences between ideas and practices that underwrite discrimination based on 
race versus that based on gender. Most importantly, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
both approaches inadvertently shore up the impression that race factors into Sasha and 
Julia’s lives only when characters of color or colonial settings enter the picture. 
 The gendered forms of class discrimination borne by Midnight and Mackenzie’s 
English protagonists offer a crucial, underexplored basis on which to theorize the 
operations of race and empire. The sexist classism depicted in these texts employs 
rhetorical tropes and common-sense reasoning that harbor tacit conclusions by bourgeois, 
English men about the racial status of poor English women, as the traits invoked to 
characterize the latter group—idleness, dependency, lack of self-discipline, hyper-
emotionality—mirror those invoked to characterize nonwhite, colonized populations 
abroad. Scholars in colonial discourse studies have thoroughly demonstrated that within 
the contexts of imperial rule, what it meant to be “European” and “white” was never 
separable from bourgeois cultural standards (Stoler). Failure to adhere to the latter often 
entailed a precarious relationship to the former, and while this was particularly true for 
whites living in the colonies, it pertained to those living in the metropole as well. “[T]he 
making of European bourgeois identity,” Ann Laura Stoler observes, played out across an 
“imperial landscape” (5).7 A thorough account of how race factors into Midnight and 
Mackenzie must attend to the ways in which construction of an English race fit for 
 
and gender oppression, it nonetheless reveals the important way in which … Rhys’s writing about the 
situation of English women never drew solely on the metropole …” (96-97). 
7 It is worth noting that Stoler’s work, in Race and the Education of Desire, engages primarily with a Dutch 
East-Indies colonial archive, but she also draws regularly on material from British and French colonial 
contexts and frames her insights as being geared toward the study of European colonialism in general, as 
suggested by her use of a phrase like “European bourgeois identity.” Historically, her claims and archival 
materials pertain to a long period from the 18th to the 20th centuries, though there is a strong focus on the 
19th and early-20th. 
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imperial rule entailed the marginalization of poor Englishwomen. As one of Rhys’ 
sharpest critics observes, “the claims of Englishness” were “dependent upon the 
dehumanization of both the metropolitan Self and its peripheral Others” (V. Gregg 179, 
emphasis added).8 
 Colonial discourses were rife with concerns about the alleged moral laxity and 
degenerate habits of the colonized. “The trope of the ‘lazy black’ whose refusal to work 
poses a threat to civilization” was a fixture in British imperial writings about the 
Caribbean (V. Gregg 11). While stereotypes about the native population provided the 
foundations for colonial race relations, these stereotypes also had ramifications for poor 
Europeans, mixed-bloods, and European Creoles born in the colonies (categories which 
could but did not always overlap). By virtue of their economic status, interracial descent, 
or place of birth and upbringing, these groups were closely associated with the culture, 
values, and habits of nonwhite, colonized races and incited “pervasive anxiety about 
white degeneration in the colonies” (Stoler 102). As Sue Thomas has shown, English 
commentators in the 19th and 20th centuries often viewed the West Indies as a place where 
“the general mood is one of ‘torpid content’” with “‘whites whom we planted as our 
representatives … drifting into ruin” (17, 19). These claims about white degeneracy 
rested upon theories about the effects of exposure to stifling, tropical climes, which 
 
8 Of all Rhys’ critics, Veronica Marie Gregg comes closest to this chapter’s argument about Rhys’ fiction 
in her readings of Rhys’ late short stories. Across these stories, Gregg notes, “Metropolitan social 
arrangements are informed by imperialist aggression,” which leads to the othering of the English poor and 
wayward Englishwomen (164). Gregg’s tends to fall back, however, on vague concepts and phrases that 
mystify rather than elucidate systems of oppression—broad references, for instance, to “the metropolitan 
social and cultural system of values” or “mechanisms of power and the ‘false consciousness’ of the 
dominant discourses” (165, 177). Those who have not “conformed to the social system,” Gregg writes, are 
ostracized because they are “not ideologically ‘white’” (165, 166). Although this is true, Gregg does not 
really specify the criteria by which an individual’s whiteness is deemed suspect. The values and logics on 
which this “social system” rests, along with how they manifest in everyday reasoning and ordinary 
conversation, are left vague. 
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allegedly induced the “reversion of all racial groups to the stereotypical ‘nature’ of black 
people: ‘chattering, idle, listless’” (Thomas 12). The reputed indolence of the colonized 
and of decadent white colonists provided points of contrast for metropolitan whites 
whose claims to authentic Englishness were verified by their self-discipline and work 
ethic. This feature of discourse in and about the British Caribbean reflects a more general 
discursive pattern across European colonial holdings: poor Europeans, mixed-bloods, and 
even well-to-do European Creoles composed what Stoler describes as “an ambiguous, 
hybrid population,” one that “confused the equation of whiteness and middle-class 
sensibilities” (106). Bereft of bourgeois values or domestic arrangements, their class 
liminality was linked to a racial liminality: 
They allegedly lacked the “inclination” to skilled work, the “suitability” for it, the 
self-discipline, sexual morals, and economic independence that would count them 
among a citizenry fit to rule. But whether it was their “class location” or racial 
attributes that were maligned is difficult to tell, for here was a scrambled category 
that made distinctions between racial and class discriminations blurred and 
problematic. (Stoler 130) 
 
Colonial anxieties about white racial degeneration thus manifested in the “insistent 
policing of those Europeans who fell from middle-class grace” (Stoler 102). 
 Europeans who fell from middle-class grace, however, were policed in the 
metropole as well, and there, too, a lack of bourgeois values and decorum could imply a 
racially liminal status. In several European countries, including Britain, 19th-century 
liberal reform movements targeted the demoralized living conditions of the poor, and 
these metropolitan civilizing missions drew upon colonial practices and debates. When 
playing out in the colonies, Stoler notes, such debates “took on an explicitly racialized 
form,” but this is not to say that metropolitan discourses of class were unrelated to race 
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(119, emphasis added). Indeed, metropolitan class discourses frequently inclined toward 
racial language. English reformers lent authority to their projects by “comparing the 
moral degradation of the British urban poor with ‘many savage tribes’” (Stoler 125). The 
management of the English poor at home was part of a discourse cementing the link, 
throughout the empire, between bourgeois class distinction and true belonging to the 
imperial race. Thus, the racial status of the metropolitan poor was constantly muddled by 
their discursive enmeshment in a web of associations with degenerate white colonials and 
with colonized groups both far and near. Features such as “‘chronic self-indulgence, 
indolence and laxity of purpose’ were invoked to distinguish the urban and rural laboring 
classes throughout Europe, both mixed-bloods and subaltern whites throughout the 
colonies” (Stoler 127). Insofar as metropolitan class discourses solidified the link 
between Englishness and bourgeois status, they drew upon and fed into the project of 
colonialism, where the same link was key to the power structures of colonial rule. 
 Women, moreover, were always more intensely subject to the dynamic by which 
a lack of bourgeois values and domestic arrangements could translate to a decline in 
racial status. The racial standing of English women, both in the metropole and in the 
colonies, was always more tenuous than that of English men. As Radhika Mohanram 
explains, Englishwomen’s role as “the reproducer[s] of the ethnic/racial group” placed 
their sexuality at the core of Britishness and rendered them the most likely source of its 
dilution given their alleged, feminine lack of self-control—especially if they were poor 
(34). European men could often live with or marry non-European women in the colonies 
“without necessarily losing rank, but this was never true for a European woman who 
might make a similar choice to live [with] or marry a non-European” man (Stoler 115). In 
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the early-twentieth century, as Thomas has observed, anxieties about the health of the 
English race arose in the metropole through moral panics about “amateur” prostitutes, 
impoverished women like Rhys’ protagonists who negotiated implicit contracts with men 
trading sex for cash, clothing, nights out, and more. Amateur women were blamed for 
“the incidence of venereal disease during the First World War” and for the “falling 
birthrate and changing attitudes toward motherhood in the 1920s” (Thomas 67, 69). As 
threats to the bourgeois family and to the male “soldier-citizen,” they “tapped eugenic 
fears” and “were represented as threatening a racial degeneration” (Thomas 68). Such 
anxieties over the fitness of the nation’s military implicitly mark the sexual control of 
poor English women as an imperial concern.9 Indeed, “If there is any discourse that joins 
the triumph of rational bourgeois man in colony and metropole,” Stoler maintains, “it was 
that which collapsed non-Europeans and women into an undifferentiated field, one in 
which passion and not reason reigned” (Stoler 128-129). 
 The gendered forms of class discrimination that Rhys’ protagonists endure at the 
hands of the English bourgeoisie exemplify the dynamics outlined by these critics of 
colonial discourse. The health and fitness to rule of the imperial-metropolitan race are 
shored up by the paternalistic efforts of its bourgeois members to discipline the 
degenerate poor and to alienate those poor individuals deemed unrepentant in their 
degeneracy and thus beyond saving. The very language that Rhys’ bourgeois characters 
use to stigmatize Sasha and Julia signals that the misogynistic classicism depicted in 
these metropolitan stories is tied to the racial discourses of British empire: Julia, in 
 
9 Mohanram makes this imperial connection more explicit by noting that the institutions and policing 
practices used to control the activity of amateur women in England had clear precedents in earlier use of 
these techniques for regulating prostitution by Indian women in the colonies (80-82).  
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Mackenzie’s eyes, as lacking self-control, as irresponsible, indolent, immoral (a liar), and 
impulsive (hyperemotional). These are the terms used to denigrate the colonized and the 
déclassé European colonists associated with them. This does not mean that Sasha and 
Julia are targets of racism; they are targets of a gendered classism that dovetails with the 
racial project of imperialism. The discourses are distinct, but they share the feature of 
ascribing qualities like rationality, industriousness, self-discipline, and sexual restraint to 
an idealized vision of white, middle-class Englishmen circulated throughout an imperial 
landscape to justify the subjection of both nonwhite races and degenerate whites abroad 
and women and the poor at home. 
 Rhys in fact signals, in the novels themselves, that the gendered classism Sasha 
and Julia face carries racial connotations, but this point has been overlooked because such 
signals of racial content do not take the form of the unambiguous blackness—of a clear 
“Africanist presence” (in Toni Morrison’s words)—that critics have typically relied upon 
to register the operations of race in a white character’s social and psychic life. In 
Mackenzie, Julia’s mother is both a Brazilian Creole and a comatose stroke victim. She is 
described as “[d]ark-skinned” and “inarticulate” (even before her stroke), but we are not 
given definite information about her lineage (97, 105). She could be non-European, 
mixed-race, or a woman of European descent born and raised in South America. 
Whatever she is, her racial status is liminal. Julia, on the other hand, was born and raised 
in England, and if she has inherited any non-English blood from her mother, it does not 
show: while she endures a great deal of class- and gender-based discrimination, at no 
point in the novel does any character stigmatize Julia on the basis of race. As regards her 
blood ancestry and place of birth and upbringing, Julia’s Englishness is not suspect. As 
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regards her class status, however, it is. Having fallen from middle-class grace and 
showing no concerted efforts toward recuperating it, Julia is marginalized by her more 
bourgeois family members in a way that throws her Englishness into question. Through 
tropes of dependency, idleness, and hyper-emotionality, Rhys associates Julia’s class 
liminality with her mother’s racial liminality. 
“Natural, accepting transplantation as a plant might have done. But sometimes 
you could tell that she was sickening for the sight of the sun”—Rhys has Julia think about 
her mother in terms that draw upon imperial stereotypes about the torpid tropics and 
Creole languishment, a pattern which reminds us that Julia is neither herself a Creole nor 
immune, as a lifetime resident of the metropole, to imperialist images and narratives used 
to represent them (105). But whereas the members of the metropolitan bourgeoisie might 
disparage such languorousness as a marker of degeneracy, déclassé Julia embraces it as a 
refuge from the chilling culture of industrious self-discipline that alienates her in 
England. She weaves “innumerable romances about her mother’s childhood in South 
America” and always recalls the one thing her mother said about England: “‘I can’t rest 
in this country. This is such a cold, grey country’” (123). The word “rest” serves as a 
linguistic link between mother and daughter, for Julia uses the same term a few pages 
earlier as a conspicuous code word when dropping in on a past lover named Mr. James to 
ask for cash. 
She said, rather sullenly: “I got fed up. I felt I needed a rest. I thought 
perhaps you’d help me to have a rest.” 
At last she has come to the point – relief of Mr James! And yet he felt 
harder, now that he was sure she had come to ask for money. Everybody tried to 
get money out of him. By God, he was sick of it. (Mackenzie 113) 
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Rhys’ carefully repeated diction creates a link between Julia’s begrudged dependency on 
middle-class English men and the utterly dependent figure of her mother. The two types 
of dependency are of course not equivalent (for one cannot help her condition due to 
sickness and old age). But the image of Julia’s mother—inert, aside from fits of crying 
“loudly and disconsolately, like a child”—becomes a kind of infantilized and ableist 
embodiment of the concept of dependency itself, such that the family’s comments about 
her palpably double as side comments about Julia: “‘You know,’” her sister Norah tells 
her about their mother, “‘she’s a dead weight’” (99). 
 Frequent run-ins with her sister and her Uncle Griffiths on account of her 
mother’s bad health repeatedly attest to a schism between Julia and the rest of her family, 
one that is class-based yet racially tinged by the role that the figure of her Creole mother 
plays in mediating it. Julia’s austere sister reads a bleak symbolism into their mother’s 
condition: “‘The fact is,’ said Norah, ‘that there’s something wrong with our family. 
We’re soft, or lazy, or something,’” a claim that Julia promptly denies (102). Indeed, 
Norah’s work ethic—that quality so central to imperialist racial distinctions—sets her at 
odds with her prodigal sister. Materially, Norah is about as poor as Julia, but she 
attenuates her class liminality by aspiring to bourgeois values. This manifests most 
clearly in Norah’s role as her comatose mother’s diligent, self-sacrificing caretaker. 
Despite her domestic care work being agonizingly underappreciated, Norah adheres to an 
ascetic Protestant work ethic as the price of enjoying what Julia lacks: belonging within 
the English nation’s social fold: “It was a sort of drug,” she reflects, “that unvarying 
admiration – the feeling that one was doing what one ought to do […]. It made you feel 
protected and safe” (104). Norah’s work ethic allows her to curry the favor of Uncle 
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Griffiths, the family’s stingy middle-class patriarch, who is openly contemptuous of his 
other niece. When Julia asks Uncle Griffiths for money, he paternalistically interrogates 
her about her absent husband and failed marriage before finally rendering his 
condescending verdict: “He said that he had not got any money and that if he had he 
would not give it to Julia […] but to her sister Norah, and that he would like to help 
Norah, because she was a fine girl, and she deserved it” (83). This familial class conflict 
comes to a boil when Julia’s mother passes away. Bending to kiss her mother’s dead 
body, Julia notes that her relatives “were all looking at her, expecting perhaps some 
violent and hysterical outburst,” and she eventually give them just that (123). Unable to 
shake the feeling that her mother’s funeral service is all a bunch of “talking and 
posturing,” Julia lashes out at her family for what she is convinced their bourgeois 
decorum is “there to prevent her from seeing”: relief at being free of a dead weight 
despite that dead weight being kin—relief that Julia cannot help but take personally 
(130). Julia’s alienation from her more “respectable” members family is not marked by 
any overtly racial language, yet throughout these scenes, Rhys signals the capacity of 
class-based dynamics to carry racial implications by representing Julia’s dissociation 
from her bourgeois family through a proportionally increased association with her 
racially ambiguous mother. While the latter figure makes the racial connotations of 
Julia’s class-based estrangement palpable, Julia’s non-Creole racial liminality is rooted in 
her non-bourgeois class habits: it is their racial significance that the associations with her 
mother’s Creole-ness bring into relief. 
 In Midnight, too, Rhys cues readers into the links between class and racial 
liminality, and again, this occurs in ways likely to be missed by those relying on an Afro-
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Caribbean presence as the litmus test for the racial-ness of a situation or experience in a 
white character’s life. The idea of “Englishness” plays a key role in how Rhys registers 
the racial content of the sexist classism her protagonist endures. In Paris, Sasha’s gigolo 
friend René tells her about his lucrative plans of moving to England where wealthy 
women are “just gasping for it,” what with (so he has heard) “fifty per cent of the men 
[being] homosexual and most of the others not liking it so much” (Midnight 157). Sasha 
warns René that it will not be so easy for him, but he remains unfazed: 
“You talk like that because you’re a woman, and everybody knows England isn’t 
a woman’s country. […] But for me it will be different.” 
That’s his idea. But he’ll find out that he will be up against racial, not 
sexual, characteristics. Love is a stern virtue in England. (Usually a matter of 
hygiene, my dear. The indecent necessity – and who would spend money or 
thought or time on the indecent necessity? […]) (157) 
 
As Sasha hints in her mockingly prim and ladylike voice, both middle-class English men 
and middle-class English women find sex an “indecent necessity” not so much because it 
is sordid as because it is rash. As the antithesis of a “stern” activity, sex invites passionate 
attachments that threaten one’s ability to drop a lover who becomes too boring or 
dependent. (The secret to life is never to go too far or too deep.) A gigolo looking to be 
kept by a well-to-do English woman will fare no better than a mistress looking to be kept 
by a wealthy English man because the English bourgeoisie in general maintains a frigid 
impersonality that keeps liaisons between the classes “hygien[ic].” Sasha thus alludes to 
how Englishness, as a “racial, not sexual, characteristic[],” emerges out of a national 
culture of classist sex and intimacy policing. A clean and healthy English race depends 
upon the bourgeoisie’s stern management of their interactions with the poor, which 
depends, in turn, upon sternly managing their feelings toward them. 
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 Sasha’s own history with men, like Julia’s, has left her no stranger to unloving 
sternness. René ostensibly befriends Sasha because he senses a kindred, down-and-out 
spirit with whom to commiserate, but Sasha has her guard up from the moment he starts 
opening up to her: “Shall I tell him to go to hell? But after all, I think, this is where I 
might be able to get some of my own back. You talk to them, you pretend to sympathize; 
then, just at the moment when they are not expecting it, you say: ‘Go to hell’” (72). This 
guardedness also manifests through her vindictive sense of humor: “He is looking straight 
ahead, gathering himself up for some effort. He is going to say his piece. I have done this 
so many times myself that it is amusing to watch somebody else doing it” (73). These 
rhetorical gestures are clearly the by-products of past experiences of sexist class 
subordination, yet Sasha signals in her narration that they are not just class- and gender-
related but race-related as well. “‘But why do you want to talk to me?’” she asks René: 
 He says: “Because I think you won’t betray me.” 
 I had meant to get this man to talk to me and tell me all about it, and then 
be so devastatingly English that perhaps I should manage to hurt him a little in 
return for all the many times I’ve been hurt. […] Now it won’t be so easy. (73, 
emphasis added) 
 
Talking to someone, pretending to sympathize, then telling them to go to hell may be a 
tactic for establishing class identity and difference, but it is not only that. As Rhys 
implies through Sasha’s word choice—“devastatingly English,” not “devastatingly 
bourgeois”—the practice of keeping the poor (sternly) at arm’s length also speaks to the 
racial status of its practitioners by aligning them with the class whose values and interests 
shape the nation’s dominant culture. In using the adjective “English” to describe Sasha’s 
brutally unsympathetic bearing toward René, Rhys hints at the underlying potential of 
class mannerisms to signify racial identity. 
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 That potential is clarified when a nonwhite, colonial migrant body enters the 
picture. One of Sasha’s few friends in Paris, a painter named Serge, tells her a story about 
a woman he once met while living in a London boarding house. She was alienated by her 
English lover and spent her time drinking and crying herself to death. “‘Exactly like 
me,’” Sasha says; “‘Not like you at all,’” Serge replies, “‘She wasn’t a white woman. She 
was half-Negro – a mulatto’” (95). 
‘She came from Martinique, she said, and she had met this monsieur in Paris, the 
monsieur she was with on the top floor. Everybody in the house knew she wasn’t 
married to him, but it was even worse that she wasn’t white. She said that every 
time they looked at her she could see how they hated her, and the people in the 
streets looked at her in the same way. At first she didn’t mind – she thought it 
comical. But now she had got so that she would do anything not to see people. 
[…] I said: “But this monsieur you are with, what about him?” “Oh, he is very 
Angliche, he says I imagine everything.” (96) 
 
The parallels to Sasha’s own history are apparent: the unwed dependency on an aloof, 
English lover, the determination to weather adversity by striving to find it funny. But 
their situations are of course hardly identical, for the class and gender marginalization 
suffered by the woman in the anecdote is made “even worse” by the racism she 
encounters as a nonwhite migrant from the colonies. Perhaps even more important than 
the story itself, however, is Sasha’s icy response to it, which demonstrates how the class 
attribute of a stolid, bourgeois unemotionality can serve to establish racial difference. 
“‘I’ve never forgotten this,’” Serge says, concluding his story about the woman, 
“‘Seriously, all the time I was in London, I felt as if I were being suffocated, as if a large 
derrière was sitting on me’” (98). But Sasha does not share his horror: “‘Well, some 
people feel that way and other people, of course, don’t. It all depends’” (98). This “very 
Angliche” reply strikes a clear antithesis between Sasha and the Martiniquan woman, 
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who (as Serge notes at the beginning of his story) “‘had been crying so much that it was 
impossible to tell whether she was pretty or ugly’” (95). Sasha’s class decline brings with 
it a concomitant racial liminality captured by her subjection as an Englishwoman to 
“devastatingly English” forms of oppression. But in her unemotional reply to Serge’s 
anecdote, she props up her tenuous Englishness through contrast with the spectacle of a 
hyperemotional colonized body, a contrast that occurs not through racial language but 
through classed comportment, through a phlegmatic bourgeois temperament. 
 The potential for bourgeois class distinctions to serve as criteria of racial inclusion 
and exclusion becomes explicitly manifest when non-English, nonwhite bodies enter the 
picture, but this does not indicate that the maintenance of class distinctions has nothing to 
do with race when those bodies are absent. This is precisely the impression that Rhys 
seeks to avoid by suffusing her text with moments like Sasha’s comment about being 
“devastatingly English” to René or her claim that, in England, he will be up against 
“racial, not sexual, characteristics.” By routinely naming the Englishness at stake in the 
display or lack of traits like self-dependence, a Protestant work ethic, sexual modesty, 
and stolid rationality, Rhys emphasizes how classist discourses ubiquitously provide 
substance to racial categories, often through language that is not racial at all (let alone 
overtly racist) and in interactions where nonwhite people are neither physically nor 
conversationally present. The mediating figure of Julia’s Creole mother helps to 
crystallize the racial connotations that her sister and uncle’s class-based judgments and 
practices have already put in the air. Likewise, Sasha’s reaction to the black woman in 
Serge’s story does not constitute an instance in which her self-presentational choices 
suddenly become race-related for a moment. Rather, it reveals how race-related her 
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choices of self-presentation have always been, reminding us that the strategies she uses 
throughout the novel to deal with the psychic and bodily strains of women’s 
impoverishment work as begrudging attempts to buy into a bourgeois Englishness from 
which she has mostly been cast out. Her grim adherence to standards of dispassionate 
bourgeois decorum enables her to purchase a modicum of English racial status, which she 
wields, however meagerly, to shore up a sense of superiority over comparably classed 
others. This dynamic attests not just to her experiences with gendered class 
discrimination but to her ability to affect an albeit compromised Englishness that offsets 
them, an Englishness whose accessibility depends on her whiteness. The appearance of a 
colonized subject whose blackness prevents her from recourse to similar measures makes 
this dynamic strikingly visible for a moment, but the dynamic itself is a perpetual feature 
of Sasha’s survival—one that Rhys registers but hardly condemns. 
 Indeed, while Midnight and Mackenzie show Rhys to be a shrewd critic of the 
racial and imperial implications of gendered classism, her insights are hardly free of 
contradictions. Rhys was aware that her English protagonist’s suffering would be, in 
Serge’s words, “even worse” if she were not white, but beyond the simple 
acknowledgement of this fact, Rhys’ critique of class-based racial dynamics is limited. 
The understanding she had of Afro-Caribbeans’ oppression did not stop her from 
contributing to it through fetishistic or patronizing representations of black people. 
Toward the end of Midnight, Sasha’s frigid disposition becomes increasingly frustrating 
for René, and he attempts to guilt her out of her defenses by remarking on the ghastliness 
of her capacity for cold, rational aloofness. She is, he alleges, 
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“a woman who likes nothing and nobody except herself and her own damned 
brain or what she thinks is her brain.” 
 So pleased with herself, like a little black boy in a top-hat. … 
 “In fact, a monster.” 
 “Yes, a monster.” (162) 
 
As if by instinct, Sasha reads a racial insinuation into René’s comment about her classed 
gender presentation, one that associates blackness with a pitiful, immature, and naive 
paucity of the self- restraint which is, for her, a point of not just necessity but pride. This 
simile comes and goes in a flash, the lack of pressure or reflection placed upon its racial 
trope signaling the uncritical-ness with which Rhys deploys it. Midnight and Mackenzie 
illuminate the racial stakes of gendered class discrimination, revealing the diffuseness 
and subtlety with which the white supremacy of British colonialism inflects social 
relations in the imperial metropole even between whites. Yet Rhys was unable (or 
unwilling) to register the colonialist, white-supremacist implications behind her own 
representations. Sara Eeva notes that in Voyage in the Dark and the Wide Sargasso Sea, 
Rhys’ protagonists wish to non-problematize – or refuse to admit – the whiteness 
of white Creoles, but certainly they still endeavor to problematize the “real 
whiteness” that is tightly interwoven with Englishness. In the text the white 
Creole women themselves never name their whiteness. … They articulate their 
differences from “real white people,” but not their similarities. (251) 
 
This phenomenon is not exclusive, however, to the Caribbeanist portion of Rhys’ oeuvre. 
Sasha and Julia are not Creoles, but their class liminality in the metropole begets its own 
kind of racial liminality and inclines them, too, “to problematize the ‘real whiteness’ that 
is tightly interwoven with Englishness.” In the process, they “never name their 
whiteness” either. Rhys thus illustrates how imperialist white supremacy informs the 
gendered class discrimination that takes place between English metropolitan whites, but 
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the language, imagery, and perspectives she uses to do this are also structured by the 
subtle forms of white supremacy she critiques. 
 
II 
 With their focus on everyday life and close attention to language, novels are 
especially effective at modeling how diffuse, structural forces can manifest at the level of 
individual, lived experience through particular vocabularies, rhetorical tropes, and 
ingrained forms of common sense. We have seen how Rhys’ metropolitan fiction depicts 
the local, mundane instantiations of a systemic and gendered class discrimination linked 
to the project of British imperialism—to the maintenance of a consummately bourgeois, 
English race fit for imperial rule. But this is only half the story. In Midnight and 
Mackenzie, Rhys does not simply portray racially charged forms of gendered class 
discrimination; she also enacts modes of resistance to this discrimination through the very 
tone and style of her writing. In narrating the indignities suffered by her protagonists, 
Rhys uses two rhetorical devices to create an unnerving and humbling reading experience 
for implied, bourgeois readers: the second-person voice and a sardonic sense of humor. 
Halfway through Midnight, for example, Sasha abruptly breaks the flow of her 
narrative to make the following scornful announcement: 
this is my attitude to life. Please, please monsieur et madame, mister, missis and 
miss, I am trying so hard to be like you. I know I don’t succeed, but look how 
hard I try. Three hours to choose a hat; every morning an hour and a half trying to 
make myself look like everybody else. […] And mind you, I know that with all 
this I don’t succeed. […] But think how hard I try and how seldom I dare. Think – 




Sasha’s “you” refers, in theory, to the bourgeois men and women that co-exist with her in 
the world of the novel, yet she does not actually address her comment to anyone in that 
world. It is hard to escape the feeling that as a narrator highly conscious of her position as 
a storyteller, she is visualizing her implied readers, assuming them, too, to be bourgeois, 
and catching them in an oblique pronominal crossfire. Taken at face-value, her passive-
aggressive remarks indicate that what angers her about her implied readers is their lack of 
sympathy. Her tone, however, suggests a more nuanced complaint. If what Sasha wants is 
“pity,” insulting her readers’ intelligence and calling them names is a strange way of 
asking of it. In fact, the snarling epithet “apes” suggests that pity might be precisely what 
she wants to avoid. The gushingly suppliant voice that opens the passage confirms this: 
“Please, please […] I am trying so hard […] look how hard I try.” These effusively 
prostrate lines represent less a genuine act of begging for sympathy than a sardonic, 
disaffected parody of one. Her subsequent, cheeky indication that she is one step ahead of 
her audience (“mind you, I know that with all this I don’t succeed”) only adds to the 
effect of making her less pitiful, not more, by warding off imputations of naiveté and 
turning them back on her readers. Sasha’s stance toward her readers’ pity, in other words, 
is not just paradoxical but vindictively so: she wants them to offer it but only so that she 
can scornfully refuse it, gaining initiative over those seemingly positioned to judge her in 
the process.  
 Both Midnight and Mackenzie are rife with such uses of sardonic humor and the 
second-person voice, along with the passive-aggressive tone they create. Rhys 
anticipates, on behalf of implied, bourgeois readers, an inclination not unlike that of her 
bourgeois characters: that of rendering paternalistic judgments about how much 
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sympathy and assistance her impoverished protagonists deserve, whether those judgments 
lead to patronizing pity or scornful indifference. The tonal and stylistic features of Rhys’ 
writing place this inclination under constant scrutiny and pressure, predicting, mocking, 
and evading it. Specifically, there are two ways in which Rhys’ tone and style challenge 
the classism depicted in her texts. First, her rhetorical devices work to corner bourgeois 
readers into a more self-conscious, less presumptuous mindset for thinking about the 
poor. As Sasha’s “attitude to life” announcement demonstrates, Rhys’ use of sardonic 
humor dispels any sense of intimacy or transparency between her protagonist and her 
readers. In obliquely addressing those “apes,” her implied bourgeois readership, Sasha 
does not “open up” to them so much as shut them out: enough is said to make her distrust 
and resentment clear, but beyond that, her thoughts and feelings remain spitefully 
opaque. This cagey, sardonic humor, then, refuses readers access to intimate details about 
the thoughts and lives of poor individuals that might facilitate paternalistic judgments 
about their deservingness of sympathy and support. When Rhys pairs such sardonic 
humor with the second-person voice, she not only destabilizes the grounds on which 
readers might feel complacent and informed enough to judge her protagonists but, 
further, prods them to interpret Sasha and Julia’s narratives as incitements to self-
scrutiny—as texts in which “you,” the reader, are being watched and prompted to take 
stock of the problematic assumptions and forms of common-sense reasoning that might 
mar your own thinking about the causes of women’s impoverishment and what it 
supposedly indicates about their character. The second way in which Rhys’ form and 
style interrupt the sexist classism depicted in her texts is that she uses Sasha and Julia’s 
seething, passive-aggressive tone to challenge one of the key tenets of the patriarchal 
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bourgeoisie’s common-sense thinking about poor women: their alleged laziness and lack 
of self-control. Rhys’ tense tone bears vivid witness to just how much of her 
protagonists’ everyday lives are made up of a constant, informal yet no less taxing labor 
of affective self-discipline: the labor of managing pent-up resentment so as not to let 
these feelings get the better of them and result in behavior that might call attention to 
themselves for the wrong reasons. Sasha’s blunt “you apes” comment is no exception. 
Her flash of volatility testifies to how much anger she has long since been bottling up, but 
her decision to lash out only at imagined readers and not to the actual bourgeoisie around 
her shows that even when venting her frustration, she carefully does so only in her head. 
In making these two claims about the politics of Rhys’ form, I follow the lead of 
Sianne Ngai, who has observed that tone bears “particular resonance for ideological 
analysis” because ideology “shares tone’s virtual, diffused, but also immanent character” 
(49, 47). Throughout Midnight and Mackenzie, Rhys represents the paternalistic ideology 
of the patriarchal English bourgeoisie—their common-sense ideas about poor women—in 
terms of its subtle, “diffused” manifestations in everyday life. It is fitting, then, that she 
would lodge her counter-discourse to this ideology in the likewise diffused and subtle 
phenomenon that is her texts’ tonal atmosphere. Her passive-aggressive tone and the 
sardonic humor and second-person voice on which it rests express the silenced feelings 
and perspectives of subjects who a) face constant condescension from bourgeois 
observers who presume to know their circumstances and b) devote a vast amount of 




 After her conversation with the man whose lover is asking him for money, Sasha 
leaves the bar with him and mentions that she is hungry. This is a risky move given their 
conversation, which suggests that this man will front the cost of a drink or two in pursuit 
of sexual favors but draws the line once a woman starts looking to be clothed or fed. Sure 
enough, as soon as Sasha mentions her hunger, he gets into a taxi without a word and 
abandons her in the street. 
And did I mind? Not at all, not at all. If you think I minded, then you’ve 
never lived like that, plunged in a dream, when all the faces are masks and only 
the trees are alive and you can almost see the strings that are pulling the puppets. 
Close-up of human nature – isn’t it worth something? 
I expect that man thought Fate was conspiring against him – what with his 
girl’s shoes and me wanting food. But there you are, if you’re determined to get 
people on the cheap, you shouldn’t be so surprised when they pitch you their own 
little story of misery sometimes. (Midnight 90) 
 
We have already noted how Sasha’s closing if-then statement points out the 
contradictions in this man’s common sense (if this girl is lying, her material needs are 
probably more genuine, not less). Sasha’s narrative commentary in response to this 
indignity, however, is also an instructive case of Rhys’ tonal and stylistic tactics. The 
direct address to readers in Sasha’s first paragraph (“If you think I minded”) sets up a 
troubling dynamic. She signals that she is thinking about her readers and their reactions 
as she tells the story, but lest this be misunderstood as some kind of chummy intimacy, 
she also makes clear that she is only acknowledging them in order to push them away. 
“And did I mind? Not at all”—a verbal shrug of the hand off her shoulder. This sense of 
her neither needing nor wanting the reader’s pity is reinforced by the deadpan, sardonic 
humor with which she narrates her own humiliation: her macabre, marionette-like 
imagery and the wry joke she makes about this poor man being hassled by “Fate.” Sasha 
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wears this mordant sense of humor like an eerie, smiling mask. Its function is 
simultaneously to provoke pity from readers by suggesting that these indignities are a 
frequent part of her life and then to scorn that pity by signaling that such indignities are 
so frequent that she has grown inured to them. As she puts it elsewhere in another 
sardonic aside: “when I think of my life it seems to me so comical that I have to laugh. It 
has taken me a long time to see how comical it has been, but I see it now, I do” (76). 
The “you” in Sasha’s second paragraph is even more unnerving: “[Y]ou shouldn’t 
be so surprised when they pitch you their own little story of misery.” This remark could 
be read as a chiding apostrophe, a belated address to the man in the story, or just as Sasha 
brooding to herself. But it could also be read as a roundabout stab at her readers. By 
voicing this rebuke after having just interpellated readers a few lines before, Sasha 
constructs her narration so that they can feel obliquely targeted by this upbraiding. The 
tacit implication is that she suspects them of needing to be told this: that without her 
commentary, they would miss the hypocrisy in this “[c]lose-up of human nature” and be 
unequipped to perceive the ways in which their own thoughts and actions might 
perpetuate it. That suspicion itself indicates that whatever range of readers she might 
have, the ones Sasha has in mind are bourgeois, and she has them in mind because she 
does not trust them. They may be more liberal and less callous than the man in the story, 
but they are still removed enough from her own circumstances—“you’ve never lived like 
that”—to need help understanding why his moralizations are absurd and why she is so 
un-reactively good-humored about his rudeness. The fact that this pointed address is 
ambiguous, that Sasha might be referring to the reader but does not explicitly say so, adds 
a layer of understatement that only makes her critique more acerbic. It is as if she cannot 
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be bothered to say this to readers directly because she has no faith that they will heed her 
complaints or because she is convinced they will do so only in a patronizing way. 
I propose the phrase “glancing 2nd person” to name this awkward, even torturous 
formal device in which one cannot be sure whether the deictic “you” marks the 
protagonist addressing herself or some other fictional character versus the protagonist 
singling out readers whom she is spitefully inviting to feel what it is like to walk in her 
shoes. These uses of the 2nd person, in which the word “you” glances or ricochets off a 
fictional referent to catch readers in a passive-aggressive crossfire, enable Rhys to raise 
pointed ethical questions about why and for whom the story is being told. Is Sasha 
imagining an audience that might partake of her experience so that they can better 
understand and pity her? Or is she using them instead—with no regard for their approval 
and understanding—as a mere rhetorical prop for venting her frustration and gaining a 
better grasp on her own situation by narrating it as if to someone else? Rhys’ tonal cues 
point toward the latter scenario, but this does not amount to a suggestion that readers 
should feel un-implicated by the story, for that freedom is precisely what the glancing 2nd 
person is designed to foreclose. Rhys is not concerned about whether or not readers 
approve of her protagonist; she is concerned about readers feeling entitled to judge her 
protagonist at all, whether by condemning or pitying them. Her prose is formulated to 
frustrate that presumptuousness: “You shouldn’t be so surprised when they pitch you 
their own little story of misery.” By placing the imperative in the negative and not 
speculating about what lies behind such little stories, Rhys refuses readers corrective 
insights about what the poor are “really” like. Her evasive rhetorical maneuvers do not 
help readers amend moral distinctions between “deserving” and “undeserving” 
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individuals but rather invalidates the impulse to make such distinctions altogether, 
leaving readers hesitant to pass such judgments due to a lack of information that 
undermines confidence in the legibility of “the poor” as a social category. 
In Mackenzie, these stylistic effects are especially evident in Rhys’ representation 
of the relationship between Julia and her most recent acquaintance, Mr. Horsfield. A 
rather special case amongst Rhys’ bourgeois men, Horsfield falls on the more liberal end 
of the political spectrum, and though sympathetic toward Julia’s struggles, his main 
reason for befriending her is boredom. After meeting her during a night of slumming, he 
sticks around because the act of sympathizing with her allows him to fill a personal void 
of middle-class anomie. When she takes him back to her lodgings one evening, her 
landlady accuses her of being a prostitute, and Horsfield defends Julia in a suspiciously 
vague rush of “overwhelming contempt for the organization of society” (166). Afterward, 
while walking home, he rides out the progressive euphoria of siding with the underdog by 
imagining a hypothetical spiel he will give to Julia the next morning: “He would hold her 
two hands […] and say: ‘Don’t look at me like that. That was how you looked at me last 
night. Why should you look at me like that? I’m for you and for people like you, and I’m 
against the others. Can’t you see that? […] I hate things as much as you do’” (167). Julia 
senses the patronizing shallowness of this relationship from the start and maintains a 
shrewd skepticism toward Horsfield throughout her interactions with him. “He looked the 
sort,” she reflects, “that never gives itself away and that despises people who do […]. He 
would think: ‘Poor devil.’ Yes, he might go so far as to think like that, but the poor devil 
would remain a poor devil whom you theorized about but never tried to understand” (87-
88). When Rhys uses free indirect discourse to blur the lines between Julia’s thoughts and 
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the voice of Mackenzie’s third-person narrator, Julia’s use of the word “you” in her 
thoughts about Horsfield acquires a discomforting, glancing-2nd-person feel for the 
reader. No less than in Midnight (though more circuitously, given the lack of a first-
person narrator), Rhys rhetorically crafts the narration in Mackenzie to prod readers into a 
humbling self-awareness. By conveying Julia’s “poor devil” comment via the 2nd person, 
Rhys hints at how the very act of reading can replicate the paternalistic, class-based 
aggression figured by Horsfield within the text: that of consuming Julia’s story with a 
superficially receptive and solicitous mindset that will still produce, at best, a patronizing 
form of sympathy-in-spirit-only that does nothing but reduce her to an opportunity for 
others to feel good about themselves by feeling bad for her. The sad fact, Rhys seems to 
suggest, is that this is hardly the worst-case scenario. For the other, more prevalent sense 
in which bourgeois interlocutors might be said to “theorize” about the poor without trying 
to “understand” them would be the one we have already seen from illiberal men like 
Mackenzie or the man in Sasha’s anecdote: that of using common-sense stereotypes 
about the laziness and dishonesty of poor individuals—and poor women, in particular—
to invalidate their need for support. 
Indeed, Julia has just had a humiliating experience of this sort at the hands of her 
Uncle Griffiths right before meeting Horsfield for a drink. When she had asked her uncle 
for financial assistance earlier that day, he subjected her to a degrading series of 
questions about her absent husband before unsurprisingly denying her request. “‘They 
force you to ask,’” she complains to Horsfield, “‘and then they refuse you. And then they 
tell you all about why they refuse you. I suppose they get a subtle pleasure out of it, or 
something’” (90). That embittering encounter is clearly on her mind during her 
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conversation with Horsfield throughout the evening, as indicated by her remote body 
language and spiteful choice of words: “she took a box of matches from her bag and 
amused herself by lighting them one after another and watching them burn down to the 
end. In the midst of this proceeding, she said: ‘It’s funny how you say one thing when 
you’re thinking of quite another, isn’t it?’” (93). Though it refers nominally to Horsfield, 
Julia’s “you” once again bears that unnerving, glancing-2nd-person tone by which Rhys 
signals to an implied audience that some form of commentary is being made about their 
position and proclivities as readers. Not least after her run-in with Uncle Griffiths, Julia 
knows that she has neither moral obligation nor rational incentive to open up to bourgeois 
people and provide them with earnest personal details they will only use to tell her why 
they refuse her when they do. (Horsfield, to be sure, does desert her by the end of the 
novel. Once he realizes his sympathy would entail helping Julia to “a bed to sleep in, 
food, clothes,” and other material necessities, he cuts her loose at the thought of such 
hassles [168]). Accustomed, like Sasha, to men who always assume that they have her 
figured and who always, eventually, let her down, Julia defends her self-esteem by 
adopting a barbed tone and rhetorical style that create a shroud of vindictive illegibility, 
sardonic humor by mask-like dissimulation and the 2nd-person by indirection. By 
weaving such displays of tonal and rhetorical evasiveness amongst scenes of bourgeois 
condescension that provide them with context, Rhys urges readers (in Julia’s words) to 
understand her impoverished protagonists’ shiftless, obstinate behavior rather than jump 
to the impulse of “theorizing” reasons to condemn it. She urges them, that is, to see Sasha 
and Julia’s recalcitrant caginess and bitter resignation as well-warranted and reasonable 
forms of conduct rather than something to moralize about. 
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Hence, when Sasha recalls telling that man she was hungry right before he 
abandoned her in the street, she has no qualms about bluntly outing herself in her 
narration as a habitual liar: “‘C’est vrai,’ I say, giggling still more loudly. ‘It’s quite true. 
I’ve had nothing to eat for three weeks.’ (Exaggerating, as usual)” (90). The frank, blasé 
tone of her aside blatantly insinuates that such dishonesty should not mar her character in 
the eyes of her readers because any reasonable person would see it not as a sign of moral 
corruption but of survival-oriented common sense. The behavior and thinking in need of 
scrutiny and rehabilitation, Rhys implies, is not that of the poor but that of the 
bourgeoisie who judge them. Note the rhetoric in the following recollection by Sasha of 
the one time she went home to family in London in hopes of financial support: 
“Why didn’t you drown yourself,” the old devil said, “in the Seine?” In the Seine, 
I ask you – but that was just what he said. […] “We consider you as dead. Why 
didn’t you make a hole in the water?” […] These phrases run trippingly off the 
tongues of the extremely respectable. They think in terms of a sentimental ballad. 
And that’s what terrifies you about them. It isn’t their cruelty, it isn’t even their 
shrewdness – it’s their extraordinary naiveté. Everything in their whole bloody 
world is a cliché. (41-42) 
 
In reviling the “naiveté” of the “respectable” English middle class, Sasha appears to talk 
to “you” on an intimate basis about “them” (“In the Seine, I ask you”). But like Julia 
lighting matches and remarking how funny it is when you say one thing while thinking of 
quite another, Sasha’s final lines, from “It isn’t their cruelty” onward, feel less like her 
talking to readers than at or through them, not necessarily acknowledging them and 
perhaps even suspecting them of the same naiveté without quite saying so to their face. 
Rhys exhorts readers not to think about the poor in terms of sloppy, common-sense 
“cliché[s],” but she also avoids making this easy by refusing to provide readers with 
protagonists who subject themselves to the intimate violence of confessing their 
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innermost thoughts and feelings and who take it upon themselves to defend the choices 
they make to avoid or blunt sexist classism on a daily basis. In probing the factors 
contributing to women’s impoverishment, Rhys insists on removing clichés about the 
degenerate character of poor women from the equation and shifts the burden of 
accountability onto the common-sense thinking of the middle-class. Her fiction not only 
frustrates a voyeuristic, bourgeois will to know (and judge) but reverses the gaze, 
working not as case studies in women’s impoverishment for readers’ consideration but as 
an unnerving hall of mirrors that traps readers into a process of self-scrutiny verbally 
cued by a narrator who scorns their pity from behind a smiling mask. 
 Sardonic uses of the glancing second person, however, are not the only way in 
which Rhys’ tone and style push back against a pervasive classism bound up with race 
and gender. In Sasha’s interior monologues at the opening of Midnight, Rhys uses the 2nd 
person voice to achieve a somewhat different effect: 
“[C]areful, careful! Don’t get excited. You know what happens when you get 
excited and exalted, don’t you? … Yes. … And then, you know how you collapse 
like a pricked balloon, don’t you? Having no staying power. …Yes, exactly. … 
So, no excitement. […] Above all, no crying in public, no crying at all if I can 
help it.” (15) 
 
The word “you,” in this case, does not mark an oblique jab at implied readers but rather 
Sasha admonishing herself to stick to a program of emotional self-restraint that facilitates 
her survival by allowing her to fly under the radar. As a single woman drifting through 
the demimonde, she is wary of unwanted attention from middle-class observers who 
might perceive her as a prostitute or a drunk and internalizes a regimen of rules and 
rituals to avoid hostile scrutiny. “Not too much drinking, avoidance of certain cafés, of 
certain streets, and everything will go off beautifully. The thing is to have a programme, 
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not to leave anything chance” (Midnight 15). Well-aware of her vulnerability to 
stereotypes about the feckless emotionality of poor women, Sasha disciplines herself to 
bottle up resentment, stifle her depression, and avoid opening up to anyone in hopes of 
sympathy since this only ever leads to disappointment. Rhys often uses her brooding tone 
along with occasional, non-glancing uses of the 2nd person to underscore the sustained, 
deliberate work that goes into this “programme” of affective self-management and 
cautious movement through public space. This regimen of emotional austerity, it should 
be noted, is crucial to how Sasha maintains the straight-laced façade she uses to shore up 
her claims to Englishness, rendered dubious by the material fact of her non-bourgeois 
domestic and sexual arrangements. 
 In addition, then, to preempting the moralizing inclinations of implied bourgeois 
readers, Rhys uses her tone and style to discredit common-sense stereotypes about the 
poor being lazy and undisciplined. In critiquing the gendered and racially charged 
classism that comprises her novelistic content, she suggests not only that the degree of 
cagey, exhausted shiftlessness that her protagonists do exhibit is both rational and 
understandable but that they are also not, in fact, as shiftless as they might at first glance 
seem. The task of evading or coping with misogynistic class stigma and its racial 
implications compels them to a rigorous, informal labor of affective self-management 
easily overlooked so long as thinking about “hard work” and “self-discipline” are 
considered solely in terms of contractual wage labor or informal domestic labor and care 
work done by women at home. As her self-addressed 2nd-person reminders about 
avoiding certain cafes, streets, and states of feeling attests, Sasha has self-discipline. She 
just does not have it in the narrow, idiomatic sense connoted by the liberal-individualist 
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image of pulling oneself up by the bootstraps. This common-sense notion of self-
discipline—so often deployed in a top-down fashion by the middle-class against the 
poor—presumes a completely unfeeling, hyper-rational subject. It ignores, that is, the 
extent to which survival on the social and economic margins can be an affective and not 
just material experience, one in which self-discipline might entail not only (or even 
primarily) job seeking and financial regimentation but also the task of managing the pain 
and anger that accompany material deprivation. 
 Throughout both novels, Rhys blunts potential criticisms of her protagonists’ 
allegedly lazy, itinerant behavior through scenes and images illustrating how factors like 
class and gender belie the meritocratic myth that patient and humble industriousness 
always leads to just desserts. Two of Sasha’s flashbacks in Midnight recall the indignities 
of her being fired from a retail job due to a mistake by her misogynistic employer and her 
quitting work as a tour guide because of repeatedly rude treatment at the hands of 
entitled, bourgeois customers (Midnight 17-31). In Mackenzie, it is Julia’s sister Norah 
that Rhys uses to critique the idea of ascetic industriousness as a means of dealing with 
impoverishment. As discussed earlier, Norah makes an impressively austere living caring 
for her and Julia’s comatose mother. Her dutiful domesticity and her loyalty to the 
nuclear family have allowed Norah, unlike her sister, to curry the favor Uncle Griffiths 
and other members of the English bourgeoisie, but as her embittered interior monologue 
makes clear, this has hardly brought her happiness or relief. 
Everybody always said to her: “You’re wonderful, Norah, you’re 
wonderful. I don’t know how you do it.” It was a sort of drug, that universal, that 
unvarying admiration – the feeling that one was doing what one ought to do, the 
approval of God and man. It made you feel protected and safe. 
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Besides, she wasn’t a squeamish sort. She could bear the disgusting sights 
and sounds and smells. And so she had slaved. And she had gradually given up 
going out because she was too tired to enjoy herself. Besides, there wasn’t any 
money. 
[…] 
Everybody had said: “You’re wonderful, Norah.” But they did not help. 
They just stood around watching her youth die, and her beauty die […]. They sat 
there and said: “You’re wonderful, Norah.” Beasts. … Devils. … (Mackenzie 
104) 
 
In a strategy Rhys implies is about as a pitiful as it is fruitless, Norah tries to live off the 
crumbs of trifling public approbation for her Protestant work ethic. Part of what Rhys 
highlights, via the blandishing, tedious colloquialisms of the bourgeoisie (“You’re 
wonderful …”), is the systematic under-appreciation and under-compensation of 
women’s and specifically poor women’s labor in the private sphere. But in this image of 
Norah, or rather in the tone of her brooding, angry voice, Rhys also encodes a critique of 
how the poor are unfairly expected to handle impoverishment by renouncing forms of 
leisurely self-indulgence and the much-needed physical and psychic relief they bring. 
Sasha and Julia refuse do this. By risking the more lonely, precarious option of being 
kept by various moneyed men, they seek not just to get by but to get by in a way that 
declines to forego the little pleasures taken for granted by the middle class, not because 
they are “impulsive” or “undisciplined” but because they know that occasional, petty 
consumerism, for example, is extremely valuable as a stopgap measure for dealing with 
anger and depression. When Sasha’s marriage had fallen apart, for instance, she begged 
money from her family in England and upon receiving a begrudgingly small sum, neither 
saved it nor used it to look for work: “Tomorrow I’ll go to the Galeries Lafayette, choose 
a dress, go along to the Printemps, buy gloves, buy scent, buy lipstick, […] buy anything 
cheap. Just the sensation of spending, that’s the point (Midnight 145). With the pleasure 
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of shopping subordinated to its analgesic function, such consumerism functions not as a 
lapse of self-discipline but an example of it. It is an indispensable part of how Sasha 
sticks to her program of flying under the radar by taming her emotions. This allegedly 
irresponsible behavior becomes much more understandable when placed alongside the 
joyless purgatory of Norah’s endlessly self-abnegating industriousness.  
  Ultimately, the seemingly contrasting examples of Sasha and Norah’s outward 
conduct and inward feelings demonstrate the same point: the paternalistic, bourgeois 
ideology of hard work and meritocracy has the pernicious, underacknowledged effect of 
superimposing an uneven distribution of pleasure upon an uneven distribution of wealth. 
The poor are deprived of not just material but also emotional well-being. Rhys represents 
this diffuse yet palpable social problem through the diffuse yet palpable aesthetic feature 
of literary tone, with non-glancing forms of the 2nd person being especially useful for this 
purpose. Whether in Sasha’s “careful! […] You know what happens when you get 
excited” or in Norah’s thought that the bourgeoisie’s approval, although begrudged, 
“ma[kes] you feel protected and safe,” Rhys uses the 2nd-person voice to capture the 
conscious efforts of these impoverished women to limit or ration their own access to 
good feelings and remind themselves why such choking self-restraint is important to their 
own survival. When perceptions of worthiness are attributed only to the poor who do the 
hardest work, and when, furthermore, the only work deemed worthy of material 
compensation is limited to wage labor in the public sphere, those on the social and 
economic margins are doubly saddled with ugly feelings that exacerbate the stress of 
material privation: resentment at having to deal with condescension and stigma from the 
middle class and even more resentment at how no one recognizes the energy and 
 
 105 
discipline that the informal labor of dealing with that condescension demands. Sasha’s 
narration, in particular, is designed to convey not just the feeling of being patronizingly 
judged everywhere she goes but also the compounded, second-order feeling of having to 
carry that feeling around with her. Here she is leaving a restaurant in which a posh 
Englishwoman has just snickered at the sight of her and whispered a snide remark to the 
owner: 
I would give all that’s left of my life to be able to put out my tongue and 
say: “One word  
to you,” as I pass that girl’s table. […]. As it is I can’t speak to her, I can’t even 
look at her. I just walk out. 
 Never mind. … One day, quite suddenly, when you’re not expecting it, I’ll 
take a hammer from the folds of my dark cloak and crack your little skull like an 
egg-shell. Crack it will go, the egg-shell; out they will stream, the blood, the 
brains. (52) 
 
Rhys’ tense and seething tone makes the reader feel that a large part of what Sasha 
resents is the underacknowledged burden of having to be so resentfully on-guard all the 
time. Indeed, much of the interior monologue comprising Midnight’s text aims to portray 
how much time the novel’s protagonist spends working to curb her anger and frustration 
by venting it in carefully controlled doses—by imagining homicide or taking oblique 
shots at readers (“you apes”). Because Sasha’s world is permeated by so much angry 
wariness, the discrete individuals who provoke it fade into the background, and the toxic 
atmosphere of ambient bad feeling itself becomes the object of representation: Sasha’s 
constant, smoldering rage at being denied the affective privilege of not having to spend 
every day dodging condescension and stigma from socially and economically advantaged 
onlookers. In capturing both her protagonist’s taut and livid mood as well as the little 
mental rituals she uses to defuse her pent-up anger (“One day, [… I’ll] crack your little 
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skull like an egg-shell”), Rhys’ tone and style bear witness to an easily neglected 
dimension of life on the sexual and economic margins: the self-disciplinary labor of 
curating both one’s outward conduct and inner thoughts and feelings to avoid conforming 
to common-sense, bourgeois preconceptions about lazy, impulsive, and hyper-emotional 
poor women. 
Insofar as we have already seen how the gendered forms of class discrimination 
depicted in these two novels dovetail with the project of British colonialism—with the 
maintenance of a consummately bourgeois English race fit for imperial rule—the social 
and affective dynamics captured by Rhys’s use of sardonic humor and the second-person 
voice should be understood, I argue, as racially charged dynamics. What we have here, in 
the mental and practical survival strategies embodied by Rhys’s tone and style, are the 
coping mechanisms Sasha and Julia use to navigate the pressures of white intra-racial 
class policing, the strategies they wield to stomach or evade “devastatingly English” 
forms of sexist class aggression. Where the preceding section’s analysis of novelistic 
content reveals the indirect operations of race in class distinctions between whites, this 
section’s analysis of form reveals Rhys’s protagonists’ affective and rhetorical responses 
to such classist intra-racial boundary work. It is important to the understand the latter, no 
less than the former, as racialized gender and class dynamics, ones that should be of 
interest to scholars of race and whiteness insofar as they not only exemplify patriarchal, 
bourgeois white supremacy’s more circuitous manifestations but also offer shrewd 






 In tracking the ways in which gendered forms of class discrimination against poor 
whites contribute to the maintenance of a metropolitan English race fit for imperial rule, 
Rhys illustrates in Midnight and Mackenzie how ideas and practices that seem to have 
little to do with race can subtly contribute to the formation of racial identities and 
hierarchies. In addition to this insight offered at the level of representational content, 
Rhys also uses her tone and style to pinpoint the hypocrisies and oversights that plague 
the paternalistic, common-sense thinking about the poor depicted throughout her texts. 
These observations clearly attest to the ability of Rhys’ fiction to illuminate the social and 
cultural dynamics of British colonialism, white supremacy, capitalism, and patriarchy in 
the early-20th-century period in and about which she wrote. I want to conclude by 
emphasizing that the insights offered by Rhys’ fiction into the racial implications of class 
distinctions between whites and the prejudices in bourgeois thinking about the poor are 
no less pertinent—are in fact increasingly urgent—to dismantling white supremacy in the 
present. 
 The vilification of the poor as lazy, undisciplined, and undeserving of support has 
become a rote feature of political discourse across a number of countries in the early 21st 
century, particularly in regard to welfare reform. As Jamie Peck has observed, poverty 
governance over the past few decades has been marked by the rise of welfare programs 
designed to “maximize work participation while minimizing ‘dependency’” (10). These 
work-enforcing welfare policies originated in the United States in the 1970s, but the 
globalization of neoliberalism has since brought them to prominence in a range of 
national contexts, including the U.K. (J. Peck 4-5, 17). Across Conservative and New 
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Labour governments since Thatcher, there has been a sustained commitment in Britain to 
policy reforms that cut state expenditure on the provision of social services. As numerous 
scholars have shown, this has been achieved through moral panics about “welfare 
scroungers” in political discourse and the media, which provide the chief justification for 
tightening restrictions on means-tested benefits and mandating the poor to pursue any 
work, no matter how unstable or low-paid (J. Peck 261-340; Fraser 305-324; Fisher; 
Byrne; Seabrook). 
 As Steve Garner (2016) notes in his recent study of whiteness in Britain, the 
increased austerity of the neoliberal welfare state is part of a larger historical context that 
also includes greater flows of immigrants and refugees to the U.K. (7-8, 80). In the wake 
of these overlapping factors, one of the predominant manifestations of whiteness in 
Britain has been a racist and xenophobic discourse in which native-born, white Britons 
see themselves as being unfairly marginalized by an over-politically-correct state that 
prioritizes the needs of immigrants and asylum seekers of color in the allocation of 
housing, jobs, and other resources (Garner 50-137).10 This supposedly unfair, preferential 
treatment is deemed even more unacceptable by allegations that migrants do not work or 
pay taxes for the benefits they claim (Garner 82-83; Ford and Heath 10-11). As British 
journalist Jeremy Seabrook writes, for instance,  
During my time in the West Midlands, many people on benefit – often 
disabled or severely disadvantaged in some way – expressed their resentment at 
the vilification of people like themselves. But in order to vindicate their own 
position, it seems, many have to contrast their situation, and the falsehoods 
 
10 While working-class and middle-class white interviewees differed in their attitudes toward migrants in 
some respects, Garner is emphatic that there is no clear class divide in Britain when it comes to white 
hostility toward immigrants and refugees (52-53). It is not just working-class or poor whites, in other 
words, who hold racist and xenophobic views, though Garner does note certain differences in tone and in 




attributed to it, with that of the truly undeserving. … A common story at the end 
of 2014 was of a woman “flown from Africa” to have a Caesarean birth on the 
National Health Service, simply because she had a visa to enter Britain. … People 
had heard stories of “asylum seekers” arriving at the council offices and being 
given priority accommodation over people who had lived here all their lives (126, 
original emphasis). 
 
It is important to note that condemning the alleged “welfare tourism” of non-white, non-
E.U. migrants is part of a neoliberal discourse of “colour-blind racism” in which racial 
distinctions are routed through a class-coded language of culture and moral values 
(Garner 8). In the midst of neoliberal rhetoric about industriousness, individualism, and 
self-reliance, both state and popular discourses have shifted away from an overt 
“language of race relations,” with “‘[s]hared values’ replac[ing] ethnic ties” as the 
foundation for “conceptions of ‘Britishness’” (Williams 155-156, 155, 154). The problem 
with migrants from non-E.U. countries, in this colorblind logic, is not (allegedly) that 
they are not white but that they supposedly lack a proper work ethic, that they are prone 
to violence and crime, that they have too many children when they cannot afford it, and 
that these are all features of a larger ethnic and/or poverty-based “culture” that they 
cannot or will not shed in order to integrate into the host nation by adopting the “British” 
values of hard work and disciplined individualism (Garner 43-46, 120-137, 159).11 
 In regard to the particular relevance of Rhys’s fiction to this neoliberal 
conjuncture, what needs to be understood is that intra-racial class distinctions between 
 
11 As Garner notes, “The practice[] of making ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘illegal immigrant’ stand in for all BME 
[black and minority ethnic] people … demonstrates that significant numbers of white UK people still base 
their ideas of who belongs in the UK primarily on traditional physical markers” (9). In other words, 
“‘cultural’ forms of racism co-exist happily with the ‘old’ body-centered forms, and indeed effectively 
combine” (9). This clarification echoes that of Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (whom Garner frequently cites), who 
stipulates, in the US context, that the Trump moment does not indicate the end of colorblindness and a 
return to old-fashioned, Jim Crow racism but demonstrates, rather, how any system of racial oppression 
“articulate[s] various modes of domination” (xiv). In both American and British neoliberal contexts, in 
other words, colorblind racism remains ubiquitous even if “it is not the only way of maintaining racial 
order” (Bonilla-Silva xiv, original emphasis). 
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whites are as crucial to the defense of (what is perceived to be) an embattled white 
supremacy as the scapegoating of nonwhite migrants. As Chris Haylett has argued, the 
neoliberalization of the British welfare state has always relied on “representations of the 
white working class” routinely marked by “positions of disparagement or retreat from 
people who are seen to embody an unsettling mix of whiteness, ‘working-classness’, and 
poverty” (353). Branded as being prone to idleness, dependency, criminal behavior, 
racism, excessive sex and pregnancy on behalf of women, and misogynistic violence on 
behalf of men, these “nonrespectable” working-class and poor whites have, since the 
1990s, been characterized through “motif[s] of degeneration” as a symptom of “national 
decline” and an “embarrassing sign” of what whiteness shorn of middle-class-ness could 
become (Haylett 353, 358). It is not a coincidence that the terms and tropes used to 
characterize this group echo those used during Rhys’s time to disparage working-class 
and poor whites in the metropole and colonies, for as Haylett notes, the discursive 
construction of Britain’s late-20th- and early-21st-century white underclass “is racialised 
in historical origin, referring to working-class groups outside of imperial British society 
as uncivilised, dangerous, [and] a ‘race apart’” (358). These non-respectable poor and 
working-class whites threaten the latent “symbolic order of British nationhood where 
hierarchies of national belonging and privilege are still naturalised by skin colour” 
(Haylett 361). In a neoliberal, multicultural, supposedly meritocratic society, the alibi for 
inequality is that poor people, who just happen to be disproportionately people of color, 
are predisposed to fail because they are embroiled in “cultures of poverty,” while white 
people succeed because of their supposed penchant for industrious individualism. “When 
large numbers of people are poor, and they are white, that symbolic order starts to break 
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down …” (Haylett 361, original emphasis). Since the 1990s, Haylett argues, New 
Labour’s takeover of neoliberal welfare reform has aimed at resolving these social and 
symbolic contradictions by bringing the white working-class poor “back into the fold of 
mainstream society”—not by providing more jobs or benefit increases but by pushing 
people to “make changes within their own lives” and pull themselves up out of “cultures 
of unemployment” (364, 362, 364).  
It is not just in the administrative discourses of the state and governing elites that 
class distinctions between whites are serving as a mechanism for the perpetuation of 
white supremacy in modern Britain. Intra-racial class distinctions are equally if not more 
pronounced in popular and media discourse. As Imogen Tyler has shown, in 
contemporary British newspapers, Internet forums, and popular culture, white, class-
based, intra-racial demarcations particularly revolve around the figure of the “chav.” 
Described by one journalist as the epitome of “the UK’s new underclass,” they are “the 
dole-scroungers, petty criminals, football hooligans and teenage pram-pushers” who 
“loiter listlessly on street corners and shopping malls, displaying an apparent lack of 
education and an all too obvious taste for fighting” (Davidson quoted in Tyler 21). Chav 
bashing, Tyler argues, is “a means of asserting middle-class identity” through class 
disgust, but it is also “always racialising” (23, 25). It is a way of managing the boundaries 
of whiteness:  
In a way that bears striking similarities to other national stereotypes of the white 
poor such as the US “white trash” figure, the chav foregrounds a dirty 
whiteness—a whiteness contaminated with poverty. This borderline whiteness is 
evidenced through claims that chavs appropriate black American popular culture 
… and have geographical, familial and sexual intimacy with working-class blacks 
and Asians and immigrant populations. …. Metaphors of disease, invasion, and 
excessive breeding that are often invoked in white racist responses to immigrants 
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and ethnic minorities are mobilised in white middle-class accounts of the chavs as 
a means of differentiating their “respectable whiteness” from that of the lower 
classes. (Tyler 25-26)12 
 
This is one of the reasons why reading Rhys’s fiction through a whiteness-studies 
framework is so valuable in our sociopolitical moment. Class distinctions between whites 
are an increasingly frequent and pernicious feature of white supremacy’s contemporary 
perpetuation. As Steph Lawler observes, white intra-racial class distinctions only cast 
working-class and poor white people “as the bearers of a problematic and unreflexive 
form of whiteness” while “[t]he whiteness of the middle classes remains silent, universal, 
and unmarked” (420, 419). Moreover, the inclusion of certain groups of whites within the 
predominantly nonwhite segment of British society condemned for lacking “British” 
values like individualism, hard work, and self-reliance shores up the impression that the 
neoliberalization of the welfare state and the white xenophobia that attends it are not 
racially discriminatory phenomena because white people are among those being 
criticized. As one right-wing voter in a study by sociologist James Rhodes states, “‘it’s 
not that I disapprove of all Pakis, it’s all these that’s not working, and it’s the same with 
whites, it’s not just them, it’s whites as well’” (109, original emphasis). As these forms of 
intra-racial class distinction become more rampant, our ability to recognize them as facets 
of white supremacy becomes more dire, and texts like Midnight and Mackenzie can help 
 
12 Such vilification of the non-respectable white poor and working classes is not limited only to “middle-
class accounts.” As Steve Garner notes, working-class white interviewees in his own sociological study 
justified their claims to state resources by emphasizing their respectability in terms of values like work 
ethic, cleanliness, and strong parenting: “[o]ther white working-class people who d[id] not meet these 
standards [were] frequently referred to in the same line of argument as new migrants” (63, emphasis 
added). In his analysis of white voter support for the far-right British National Party (BNP), James Rhodes 
observes that working-class and lower-middle-class BNP voters distanced themselves both from “what was 
interchangeably termed ‘the “Asian”/Pakistani/Muslim’ population as a group undeserving of [state] 
resources” and from “‘scruffy’ or ‘poor’ whites,” including “single mothers, drug addicts, [and] welfare-
dependent ‘dosers’ and ‘alkies’ … seen as lazy, prone to criminal behaviour,” and thus threating to 
“normative assumptions about whiteness” (108, 109). 
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to sensitize us to the kinds of vocabularies and rhetorics that shore up white supremacy in 
contexts largely devoid of interracial interactions and conflicts. 
 Additionally, the underacknowledged forms of behavioral and affective self-
discipline revealed by Rhys’ tone and style furnish points of departure for challenging the 
rote, neoliberal thinking about the poor as lazy, undisciplined, and over-indulgent that 
determines so much of the current poverty governance affecting both poor whites and 
poor people of color and pitting these groups against each other. None of the oversights 
and hypocrisies in bourgeois reasoning about the poor, and none of the kinds of 
emotional and behavioral self-discipline identified as routine efforts made in Sasha and 
Julia’s daily life, factor into actual state or popular assessments of how much “deserving” 
effort is invested by impoverished groups and individuals in attaining social and 
economic security. Addressing this oversight—in an effort to dismantle white supremacy 
by destabilizing the neoliberal economic rationalities that sustain it—might begin by 
adopting the kind of mindset cultivated, I have argued, by Rhys’ tone and style: a mindset 
rid of the impulse to “theorize” about the motives and character of poor individuals and 
focused, instead, on examining the faulty common-sense notions held about the poor by 
well-off observers, a mindset receptive to the idea that “hard work” and “self-discipline” 
might take forms other than the pursuit and maintenance of wage labor. Ultimately, in 
making these observations about race and whiteness through Rhys’ fiction, I am also 
arguing for the need to be attentive to the ways that race informs interactions and 
distinctions between whites even less overtly “about” race than the kinds of discourses so 
astutely analyzed by Haylett, Garner, Rhodes, and others. After all, much of the intra-
racial class discourse these scholars examine is quite clearly signaled as being about race 
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by the explicit references to the unfairly discriminated-against whiteness of the 
respectable working classes or the embarrassing, compromised whiteness of non-
respectable “chavs.” 
 It is important to note, finally, that if Rhys’ fiction offers prescient insights into 
the class-based dynamics of white supremacy today, this is not some inexplicable 
coincidence but rather a matter of historical continuity. Even during its most Keynesian, 
social-democratic phase in the mid-century moment, the policies of the British welfare 
state and popular discourse surrounding them were rife with racially discriminatory ideas 
about immigrants of color (then arriving at high rates in the wake of decolonization) as 
work-shy benefit scroungers whose claims upon the state warranted harsher scrutiny 
(Noble 91-120; Longpré 87-88; Craig 612). The white-supremacist policies of the 
postwar British welfare state were supplemented by others that ensured that white 
supremacy in post-imperial Britain was distinctly patriarchal. Although the Beveridgean 
welfare state offered a national social insurance program couched in a rhetoric of 
universal inclusiveness, postwar British welfare policy was designed with the aim of 
reinforcing a normative, patriarchal family form in which women remained at home, 
primarily dependent upon male breadwinners. As Virginia A. Noble has argued, the 
requirements for participation in the contributions-based national insurance scheme were 
made more strict for part-time workers, most of whom were married women, and lone 
women filing for means-tested, non-contributions-based assistance were systematically 
denied benefits and pressed to seek out estranged lovers, husbands, and ex-husbands for 
financial support (14-68). In considering how these historical developments might inform 
our thinking about the welfare state today, Noble stresses the need to de-exceptionalize 
 
 115 
the present neoliberal conjuncture. The emphasis on spending cuts and disciplinary 
sanctions since Thatcher “creates the impression that the government’s efforts to mold 
relationships and behavior in a systematic way and minimize state provision in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century were unprecedented, and that they grew out of the crisis 
of the welfare state precipitated by economic decline” (145). But even during the postwar 
period of economic recovery, when the British welfare state was not in crisis but in full 
bloom, it “used rewards, rehabilitation, training, expertise, surveillance, litigation, and 
threats to shape behavior and conduct” and did so, more importantly, with the specific 
intent “to instill or reinforce appropriately gendered standards of domesticity and 
breadwinning, as well as curtail the state’s role in providing cash benefits and other 
support to non-white immigrants” (Noble 10).13 In tracking the ways in which sexism and 
classism against poor Englishwomen could feed into the racial discourses of British 
colonial rule, Rhys was stressing a point of lasting relevance: while subject to 
geographically and historically specific manifestations, white supremacy is a power 
structure that routinely articulates the overtly racist domination of nonwhite groups to the 
marginalization of certain subsets of white people. Playing out between whites along 
lines of class, gender, sexuality, (dis)ability, and more, the latter process does not involve 
racism, but this does not make it irrelevant to the formation and policing of racial 
identities. Rhys’ keen attention to such dynamics and her tonal and stylistic insistence 
upon alternative mindsets for thinking about the poor become all the more relevant to 
 
13 Seabrook locates the historical precedents of neoliberal welfare reform even further back: “Today’s ‘new 
poor law,’ although not officially designated as such, owes much to its early nineteenth-century 
predecessor. The law of less eligibility enshrined in the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 – which 
declared that the worst-paid labourer outside the workhouse should be better off than the most comfortable 
inmate within the chill embrace of its walls – is resuscitated in the assertion that work, any work, all work, 
no matter how humiliating or ill-paid, must offer a better life than an existence on welfare” (114). 
 
 116 
critics of race and whiteness as neoliberal institutions build upon and intensify class 





“Owing Nothing to Any Man”: Faulkner, White Debt, and the Language of Moral 
Finance 
 
[I]t is only when a man is able, without bitterness or self-pity, to surrender a dream he has 
long cherished or a privilege he has long possessed that he is free—he has set himself 
free—for higher dreams, for greater privileges. 
 
—James Baldwin, “Faulkner and Desegregation” (209) 
 
He thought quietly: Not justice; I never asked that; jest fairness …. That was all; not to 
have anything for him: just not to have anything against him. 
  
—William Faulkner, The Mansion (119) 
 
 The preceding chapter on Rhys’ metropolitan fiction located an inconspicuous, 
under-examined component of British imperialist white supremacy in the gendered forms 
of class discrimination wielded by bourgeois English men against déclassé English 
women. In that case, whiteness took the form of the bourgeoisie’s smug identification 
with economic behaviors and values like hard work, self-discipline, and emotional 
restraint as well as its efforts to police other white people perceived as lacking these 
virtues and thus as racially liminal. Rhys portrays these dynamics from the perspective of 
poor white women on the receiving end of intraracial class condescension, and she 
illuminates, through her texts’ tone and style, the rhetorical, mental, and social practices 
poor women use to navigate class and sexual stigma (practices which should also be 
understood as racialized insofar as they derive from class and gender discourses with 
white-supremacist stakes). This chapter uncovers another form of white racial discourse 
embedded in conflicts between middle-class and poor whites, this time in the fiction of 
William Faulkner. As in the case of Rhys, these forms of whiteness involve the 
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valorization of certain economic traits, and they play out in novels that center on white 
characters without calling attention to whiteness as an explicit topic of reflection. Unlike 
Rhys, however, Faulkner is not critical of the economic virtues being wielded by some 
whites to distinguish between “good” and “bad” white people. The particular virtue under 
consideration here is unindebted-ness—the proud individualism of being debt-free—and 
Faulkner’s work, I argue, uncritically celebrates this virtue in ways that bear distinct 
implications for the perpetuation and dismantling of white supremacy. 
 Set over a period from the 1890s to 1946, William Faulkner’s The Hamlet (1940), 
The Town (1957), and The Mansion (1959) form a trilogy of novels that chronicle 
Yoknapatawpha County’s decades-long invasion by the Snopes family, a clan of poor 
white Southerners whose members exhibit a voracious penchant for unscrupulous 
profiteering and upward mobility. The novels take their names from the path of 
socioeconomic climbing charted by Flem Snopes, the trilogy’s main antagonist. 
Beginning as the son of a tenant farmer in the backwater hamlet of Frenchman’s Bend, 
Flem takes a position as the clerk of a store owned by local landowner and plutocrat Will 
Varner. There, he learns the ropes of business and commerce before striking out on his 
own lucrative and unprincipled trade deals. After exhausting his business acumen on the 
Bend’s un-savvy country folk, Flem moves to the county seat of Jefferson, where, by 
stealthy manipulation of his own wife, stepdaughter, in-laws, and cousins, he quickly 
rises from owning a back-alley restaurant to being president of a major bank, crowning 
this achievement by buying the house of the president he has ousted and remodeling it in 
the style of an antebellum planter’s mansion. While the trilogy’s final book thus opens 
with Flem at the peak of his success, it ends with his murder at the hands of two of the 
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relatives he wronged in the course of his rise to power: his cousin Mink, a tenant farmer 
who killed his condescending, rich neighbor and seeks revenge on Flem for having not 
bailed him out of jail, and Flem’s stepdaughter Linda, who, out of spite for his cruel 
manipulation of both herself and her mother (Flem’s late wife), expedites Mink’s early 
release from prison and facilitates his escape from the crime scene once he has murdered 
the man on whom they both wanted revenge. 
 As a series of disparate episodes narrating Flem’s unconscionable business 
dealings and the resulting acts of vengeance they provoke, the books of the Snopes 
trilogy are deeply invested in questions about what constitutes proper punishment for 
wrongdoings. How are the form and extent of punishment and compensation for a wrong 
determined? Who determines these things, and whose ends do the exacted retributions 
serve? These questions are crucially foregrounded, for instance, at the end of The Town, 
where Flem’s dastardly business machinations culminate in tragic consequences for his 
wife Eula and her lover Manfred de Spain. Throughout The Town, it is largely an open 
secret in Jefferson that Eula and Manfred are having an affair, but at the end of the novel, 
Flem officially blows the lid off the matter as part of a long-brewing plot to blackmail 
Eula’s father Will Varner into using his bank stock to vote Flem from vice president to 
president of the bank. Concerned about how her now-publicized adultery will affect her 
daughter Linda (Flem’s stepdaughter), Eula attempts to buy the town’s forgiveness by 
committing suicide, leaving Manfred behind, companionless and, as the bank president 
Flem has just ousted, jobless as well. Such is The Town’s denouement, and while the 
scandal and intrigue at the level of the story are compelling, it is Faulkner’s language at 
the level of discourse that I want to stress. Here is Charles “Chick” Mallison, one of the 
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novel’s recurring homodiegetic narrators, reflecting on what is left for Manfred in the 
aftermath of these events and why he will have to leave town: 
I know that we—Jefferson—all knew that he had lost the bank. … [A]fter this, Mr 
de Spain himself wouldn’t stay. In a way, he owed that not just to the memory of 
his dead love, his dead mistress; he owed that to Jefferson too. Because he had 
outraged us. He had … flouted the morality of marriage which decreed that a man 
and a woman cant sleep together without a certificate from the police …. [T]hey 
already hated him twice: once for doing it, once for not getting caught at it …. But 
that would be nothing to the hatred he would get if, after his guilty partner had 
paid with her life for her share of the crime, he didn’t even lose that key to the 
back door of the bank to pay for his. (The Town 354-355, emphases added) 
 
Chick’s recourse to financial rhetoric as a means of justifying these punishments is 
uniform yet troubled. On the one hand, there is a desire to see things in black and white, 
to see it as obvious that payment in some form must be made for outraging the Jefferson 
community and that where Eula has paid by suicide, Manfred can do so by exile. On the 
other hand, one senses that Chick himself does not fully buy this reasoning. His bathetic 
gloss on “the morality of marriage” as the decree that “a man and a woman cant sleep 
together without a certificate from the police” injects a dose of mocking irony into his 
narration, and the pronominal slippage halfway through the passage, from “he had 
outraged us” to “they already hated him,” further suggests that he does not endorse the 
town’s punitive calculus so much as stand judgmentally outside of it. 
Indeed, as Chick goes on to suggest, what is at stake in making Eula pay for her 
crimes is not so much the integrity of civic institutions or the moral fabric of the Jefferson 
community as it is the ability of that community to feel good about itself, to feel at once 
inviolably sovereign and mercifully forgiving. After Eula’s death, the town places a 
wreath on the bank door, ostensibly in condolence to Manfred, yet “that wreath,” Chick 
maintains, “was not the myrtle of grief … [but] the laurel of victory,” a “dangling chunk 
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of black tulle and artificial flowers” that expressed not mournfulness over Eula’s death 
but the “public triumph of virtue proved once more supreme and invincible” (354). In 
fact, despite its conservative moral standards having driven Eula to suicide, Jefferson, 
Chick observes, proceeded to congratulate itself for graciously accepting her suicide as 
payment for taking her daughter into the fold. Up to the point of her mother’s death, 
Linda had not known that Flem was not her real father (though she does divine this 
shortly thereafter). As a service paid for by the coin of Eula’s life, the community tacitly 
agrees to protect Linda’s ego by “keep[ing] any part of the guessing or suspecting or 
actual knowing” of her parentage “from ever reaching her” (357). So really, Chick wryly 
remarks, the town “forgave Mrs Snopes” (356).  
[T]hey could even forgive themselves for condoning adultery by forgiving it, by 
reminding themselves … that if she had not been an abomination before God …, 
she wouldn’t have reached the point where she would have to choose death in 
order to leave her child a mere suicide for a mother instead of a whore. (356-357) 
 
As a rhetorical device for expressing a particular understanding of wrongdoing and 
punishment, the language of finance often conveys a sense of dispassionate fairness and 
objectivity (he “owed that to Jefferson,” for she “paid with her life”). However, as 
Chick’s narration at the end of The Town suggests, that seemingly objective language of 
paying one’s dues and settling accounts can also be used to lend an air of righteous 
equanimity to moral calculations in fact shot through with the biases and interests of 
those doing the accounting. 
 This chapter uses Faulkner’s Snopes trilogy—particularly, its final book, The 
Mansion—to assess the affordances and, especially, the limitations of using financial 
rhetoric to describe the moral, historical, and material dimensions of white racial identity. 
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Specifically, it assesses the uses and limits of the idea of “white debt” as a conceptual and 
rhetorical device for articulating why white people should feel motivated to engage in 
racial justice movements and what the stakes of that engagement, for them, would be. As 
a goad to political action, the phrase “white debt” suggests that white people owe to 
people of color both material compensation and some form of moral compunction (tied to 
a significant change in behavior and self-perception) for past acts of racial oppression. In 
the United States, this is especially understood as pertaining to what white people owe 
African Americans for the history and ongoing legacies of slavery and Jim Crow. “White 
debt” implies, of course, an understanding that debt is bad—that the moral and material 
debt incurred by white people’s history as a social group compromises their moral 
character and that by engaging in racial justice movements, they can claim better moral 
standing in the eyes of themselves and others. Especially in recent years, discussions of 
white debt have been an increasingly familiar feature of public discussion and national 
debate. Though not using the exact phrase, Ta-Nehisi Coates, in his 2014 Atlantic article 
“The Case for Reparations,” has given wide notoriety to the idea the phrase represents: 
“An America that asks what it owes its most vulnerable citizens,” he writes, “is improved 
and humane.” In 2015, the essayist Eula Biss published a piece in The New York Times 
Magazine titled, precisely, “White Debt” and subtitled: “Reckoning with what is owed—
and what can never be repaid—for racial privilege.” There is, of course, abundant reason 
for why African Americans and white liberals (the former for centuries, the latter more 
recently) have been invoking a language of racialized debt within political debate. From 
slavery to Reconstruction to redlining and housing covenants and the subprime mortgage 
crisis, the United States has systematically and violently extracted labor and withheld 
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property from black people since its founding, and it has never issued, at the federal level, 
any apology or system of material reparations acknowledging and taking responsibility 
for this fact. The concept of white debt—implied if not explicitly named in reparations 
arguments—has been a key part of how black people have preserved a memory of this 
willfully forgotten truth and insisted on accountability for it by white Americans and the 
U.S. government. By corroborating the idea of white debt themselves, anti-racist white 
people are making an important gesture of solidarity with black struggles against white 
supremacy. 
 As I contend in this chapter, however, the language of white debt, as it has been 
invoked by white people, is not without its problems, and these problems are related to a 
set of affective and ideological tendencies that can accompany the use of financial 
rhetoric as a way of talking about racial inequality and dynamics of its projected 
resolution. These tendencies, I suggest, are clearly and instructively evident in The 
Mansion, the final book of Faulkner’s Snopes trilogy, whose main plotline is Mink 
Snopes’ pursuit of revenge against Flem. Throughout the novel, Faulkner frames Mink’s 
revenge plot through an ongoing financial conceit. He figures Flem’s death as the long-
awaited payment of an outstanding moral debt and Mink’s vengeance as a balancing of 
moral accounts. In Part I of this chapter, I make the first of two overall arguments: the 
financial rhetoric that Faulkner uses to frame The Mansion’s narrative of justice is 
marked by two affective and ideological impulses: 1) a constant anticipation of historical 
closure as the immediate result of debt repayment and 2) a related fetishization of 
unencumbered, history-less individualism as the ultimate payoff and endpoint of 
reckoning with past injustice. Faulkner’s financial rhetoric, in other words, constantly 
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projects an imminent future in which forgiveness for past moral crimes is achieved and 
the record of those crimes is consigned to a “settled,” cordoned-off, no-longer-mentioned 
past. It is a rhetoric that tends toward an ethos of individualism and reconciliation. I make 
this argument through an extensive close reading of The Mansion in the first half of Part 
I. Then, in Part I’s second half, I turn to the essays, speeches, and public letters that 
Faulkner wrote in the years surrounding The Mansion’s publication (i.e., the late 1950s, 
during the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement) in order to show that his thinking about 
debt was intimately tied to his thinking about race. As with the example from The Town 
above, the particular conflicts that Faulkner, throughout the Snopes trilogy, uses the 
rhetoric of finance to frame are all conflicts between white characters, which can produce 
the impression that novels like The Town and The Mansion have no racial stakes. 
However, as my engagement with Faulkner’s nonfiction will show, his entire vocabulary 
of debt, accountability, and repayment is informed by a set of effectively white-
supremacist beliefs and values: a strong disinclination to talk about the past (linked to a 
Cold-War sense that racial harmony was crucial to America’s ability to fight 
communism) and a fundamental assumption that hard-working, debt-free, self-made 
individualism is not just the sine qua non of upstanding moral character but a character 
trait foreign to “the Negro” and exemplified by white people. Faulkner, it should be 
noted, maintained these values and beliefs while still considering himself a political 
liberal (or at least moderate) ultimately supportive of black Americans’ struggles for 
equality and civil rights. His financially figured preoccupations with historical closure 
and unencumbered individualism are thus hardly race-neutral traits. They represent, 
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rather, affective and ideological tendencies by which white supremacy creeps back into 
his ostensibly anti-white-supremacist thinking and writing. 
 In Part II, I make the second, overall argument of this chapter: that the particular 
kind of closure- and individualism-oriented rhetoric of debt and repayment exemplified 
by Faulkner’s fiction continues to inform the ways in which white debt is invoked and 
understood by white people today. I demonstrate this claim both through a reading of 
Biss’ “White Debt” essay and, more extensively, through an engagement with 
scholarship on reparations to African Americans, formerly colonized peoples, and 
indigenous peoples still living under settler-colonial occupation. Expectations of 
historical closure and of morally vindicated individualism continue to underwrite 
contemporary efforts by white people and white governmental institutions at reckoning 
with their own histories of racial oppression. These expectations have led, in the context 
of reparations for colonialism, to premature declarations about the “end” of white 
supremacy and how the horrors of colonization are closed chapters of a national past. A 
similar pattern of inauspicious, hastily declared racial harmony also threatens to 
undermine efforts at reparations to African Americans (federal reparations for black 
people in the United States have still not yet been made, but I base this contention on the 
features of some of the models for black reparations already proposed by scholars). In the 
most insightful and circumspect reflections on white debt—such as Biss’—this 
preoccupation with historical closure and redeemed, white individualism is faint yet 
palpable nonetheless, and it speaks to the danger of white-debt rhetoric, if not subject to 
vigilant scrutiny, to perpetuate a mode of white investment in anti-racist politics in which 
white people’s anxious concern about their own moral standing is tacitly prioritized over 
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the goal of rendering people of color moral and material compensation adequate to their 
long-endured oppressions. After tracing these Faulknerian, affective and ideological 
tendencies into white-debt rhetoric in the present, I close by offering some reflections on 
what it would mean and what it would look like for white people to develop a sense of 
race-based moral indebtedness not informed—not sidetracked—by anxious anticipation 
of a future when they will be done owing people of color accountability for the past. 
How, I ask, might white people learn to embrace the idea of their group-based moral 
indebtedness rather than seek reassurance of individual moral goodness?  
 Before turning to The Mansion, I want to offer a few brief clarifications about my 
major claims and stakes. First, it is not my intent in this chapter to dismiss the language 
of white debt as a means of galvanizing white people’s engagement in racial justice 
movements. I do not seek to reject that language entirely but to ask what kinds of 
calibrations it might need to ensure (let alone maximize) its intended anti-racist effect. 
Second, for reasons of space and because of the particular demographics engaged 
specifically by Faulkner’s oeuvre, my discussions of white debt remain, for the most part, 
discussions about what white people owe to African Americans. This does not account 
for the fact that any true understanding of white debt in America would include the moral 
and material debts owed to indigenous people for both land appropriation and physical 
and cultural genocide. A more targeted and thorough exploration of the nexus between 
whiteness and indigeneity is provided in this project’s final chapter on Willa Cather. 
Here, while I sometimes use the term “people of color” where it seems appropriate 
regarding observations or contentions of broad relevance, I mostly refer to African 
Americans as the primary group to whom white debt is owed, largely as a way reflecting 
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the focus of my literary and theoretical sources. Finally, I want to be clear that in 
critiquing a concept like white debt—already rooted in anti-white-supremacist thinking 
by white and nonwhite people alike—I do not mean to engage in an unproductive, lefter-
than-thou, call-out culture but to rather encourage a network of mutual accountability 
amongst anti-racist white people. One’s status as a white ally can be buttressed by 
learning from, without condescending to, the political oversights of other whites. These 
might be contemporaries or white people in the past—like Faulkner—who sought to 




 Faulkner’s Snopes trilogy constitutes an extensive portrayal of the social and 
economic transformations that affected the post-Reconstruction South. Particularly 
prominent among these changes was the rise of finance capital and its repercussions on 
Southern culture and society. As the historian Don H. Doyle observes, in the period from 
the 1870s to the early-twentieth century, a “new merchant-creditor class” emerged as a 
“major force in the southern rural economy and rival to the planter class” (310). These 
financiers acquired land and property by foreclosing on unmet debts, typically those of 
struggling farmers who offered their land as collateral for credit (Doyle 310-311). Flem 
Snopes is a ruthless incarnation of this emerging class. Throughout the trilogy, Faulkner 
associates him not just with capitalism in general but with finance specifically as a 
burgeoning mode of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century capital accumulation. 
At the level of plot, Flem’s business ventures involve a deft array of maneuvers around 
 
 128 
promissory notes, mortgages, and bank stocks, yet the role of finance in the Snopes 
trilogy extends beyond the level of story and into the realm of discourse. Even when a 
particular scene or episode does not directly involve Flem’s financial practices, 
Faulkner’s homodiegetic narrators cannot help but describe him in financial terms. Chick 
calls Flem a “son of a bitch who had a vocabulary of two words, one being No and the 
other Foreclosure (Mansion 239). After Flem’s murder, Gavin Stevens—Chick’s uncle 
and another one of the novel’s homodiegetic narrators—notes that “He (the deceased) 
had no auspices … fraternal, civic, nor military: only finance; not an economy—cotton or 
cattle or anything else which Yoknapatawpha County and Mississippi were established 
on and kept running by, but belonging simply to Money” (Mansion 461). 
 Such disdainful comments, coupled with Flem’s unambiguous status as the 
trilogy’s main antagonist, make it tempting to read finance in these novels as a set of 
corrupt ideas and practices synonymous with greed and injustice. In the long arc of the 
trilogy, however, finance ultimately serves not as a force of categorical evil but as a kind 
of pharmakon—it is both poison and cure. Wielded by Flem as a material practice, 
finance is a source of extortion and rapine. But wielded by Faulkner as a representational 
trope, financial thinking functions in the trilogy’s final book as a template for justice. In 
The Mansion, I argue, Faulkner uses financial rhetoric to coax readers into viewing the 
series of vengeful and punitive actions comprising the novel’s story as just. He attributes 
a positive moral valence to financial language and logic by crafting a narrative in which 
the rhetoric of debt and accounting structures the story of the villainous Flem’s 
retributive demise. If the punishments meted out to Eula and Manfred at the end of The 
Town exemplify a financially-figured justice gone awry (excessive in its outcomes and 
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misplaced insofar as Flem escapes scrutiny), this is not Faulkner implying that financial 
thinking is incompatible with justice but rather Faulkner charging one final debit to his 
antagonist’s outstanding moral tab. At the end of The Town, Flem’s moral debt is 
compounded and remains unpaid; by the end of The Mansion, he will be held accountable 
for his moral crimes. 
 Though composed of numerous loosely connected episodes, The Mansion’s 
principal plot and through line is Flem’s death at the hands of his cousin Mink. The novel 
begins around 1923 with Mink 15 years into serving a 20-year prison sentence for the 
murder of his imperious, rich neighbor Zack Houston. That murder is originally narrated 
in The Hamlet, but in the first chapter of The Mansion, Faulkner re-tells the same events 
with a shift in point of view designed to make Mink into a more sympathetic character 
and reposition him as the hero (or rather antihero) of the trilogy’s final book. Where 
Mink is portrayed in The Hamlet as short-tempered, menacing, and confrontational, in re-
telling the murder at the outset of The Mansion, Faulkner re-characterizes him as a long-
suffering, ordinarily patient and uncomplaining man accustomed to stomaching a tenant 
farmer’s economic drudgery yet pushed by years of uncalled-for condescension to a point 
where it was impossible for him not to retaliate and still maintain his dignity. Mink, 
however, fully acknowledges the severity of his crime and accepts his prison sentence 
with patience and compliant behavior. The only hitch is that he still bears a grudge 
against Flem, who, with so much money on hand, should have bailed his cousin out of 
jail (Mink reasons) out of sheer deference to “the ancient immutable laws of simple blood 
kinship” (Mansion 5). This grudge is exacerbated early in the novel when Flem—clearly 
aware that Mink will try to kill him when he gets out—bribes another Snopes sentenced 
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to the same prison, Montgomery Ward, to trick Mink into dressing up in women’s 
clothing and attempting a jail break that predictably fails and adds 20 more years to his 
sentence. In a calm reply that captures Mink’s characteristic mix of infinite patience and 
vengeful resolve, he tells Montgomery Ward to relay a message to Flem upon his release: 
“‘Tell him he hadn’t ought to used that dress. But it dont matter. If I had made it out then, 
maybe I would a changed. But I reckon I wont now. I reckon I’ll jest wait’” (96). 
 From the very beginning of The Mansion, Faulkner frames this core revenge plot 
in terms of an ongoing financial conceit. In waiting out his prison sentence and abiding 
the obstacles that impede his quest for vengeance after release, Mink subscribes to what 
we might call a financial faith that there is some force in the universe which keeps tabs 
on how many blows every man suffers in his life and ensures that every dog has his day 
(or rather, gets his due): 
He meant, simply, that them—they—it, whichever and whatever you 
wanted to call it, who represented a simple fundamental justice and equity in 
human affairs, or else a man might just as well quit; the they, them, it … which 
simply would not, could not harass and harry a man forever without someday, at 
some moment, letting him get his own just and equal licks back in return. They 
could harass and worry him, or They could even just sit back and watch 
everything go against him … sit back and watch and—all right, why not? he—a 
man—didn’t mind, as long as he was a man and there was a justice to it—enjoy it 
too …. But at least that moment would come when it was his turn, when he had 
earned the right to have his own just and equal licks back, … and They dared not, 
They would not dare, to let him down, else it would be as hard for Them to live 
with themselves afterward as it had finally become for him to live with himself 
and still keep taking what he had taken from Zack Houston. (Mansion 6-7, 
original emphases) 
 
Positioning and elaborating this philosophy at the outset of the novel, Faulkner attempts 
to prime readers with a particular moral sensibility for interpreting the text. Mink’s 
financial faith equates “justice and equity in human affairs” with the discharging of all 
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moral debts. The world is at its most “just,” this reasoning goes, when no one owes 
anything to anyone anymore, and once this settling of moral accounts is achieved, there 
are to be no hard feelings over anything that has happened in the past. The forces that be 
have racked up a debt to Mink by having been content to “sit back and watch everything 
go against him,” but so long as there is eventually “a justice to it” (him getting the “licks” 
he is owed “back in return”), then he can and will forgive Them—“all right, why not?”—
for having stacked the deck against him and “enjoy[ed] it too.” Embedded in this 
financial logic is a teleological model of justice: all debts must be paid, and when they 
are paid, there should be no grudges for whatever occasioned indebtedness in the first 
place. 
Mink can safely expect this superhuman “They” to honor the debt They owe him 
because “They” are not really superhuman. “They” are just Mink. That “them—they—it, 
whichever and whatever you wanted to call it,” is a projection of his own belief in moral 
accountability into (or onto) the world. Faulkner does not open The Mansion with a 
metaphysical statement of faith that the universe really is governed by mysterious forces 
that are ultimately “good.” Nor is he asking readers to reflect on what actually existing 
social body, what nonfiction referent with the power to afflict or affirm society’s 
underdogs, “They” might index as a metaphor. Rather, The Mansion opens with a portrait 
of a man who believes so strongly in people paying their dues—in earning contentment 
through patient endurance, owning the consequences of one’s actions, and being 
adequately rewarded for such scruples—that he imaginatively populates the world with 
gods that personify his beliefs. That They “would not dare” to let Mink down is a 
testament not to Their scrupulosity but to his, and showcasing this staunch and ennobling 
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belief in accountability is Faulkner’s principal strategy for re-casting the murderous Mink 
as the novel’s quasi-heroic agent of justice. As Enrique García Díez has argued, “It is 
Mink’s sense of honour which redeems him [in Faulkner’s view] from being a common 
outlaw and which makes him the implicit hero of The Mansion” (38). That “sense of 
honour,” I am suggesting, is decidedly financial: it takes the form of a commitment to 
debt accountability as an absolute principle, to patiently paying one’s dues and getting, in 
turn, what one is owed. 
 As Erik Dussere has observed, based on their claims to numerical objectivity and 
their emphasis on the idea of balancing and balances, the forms and practices of financial 
accounting have historically served to signal the ethicality of the marketplace and private 
enterprise (16-17). The incorporation of financial forms into narrative serves the same 
ethicality-signaling function in Faulkner’s fiction. As evidenced most famously by Ike 
McCaslin’s harrowing encounter with the plantation ledgers in Go Down, Moses, 
Faulkner uses financial forms to signal the extent to which at least some of his white male 
characters are deeply troubled by the legacy of slavery and attempt to hold themselves 
accountable for it. As Dussere correctly notes, however, Faulkner’s attempts to represent 
and engage the past through financial concepts like accounting, debt, and repayment tend 
to devolve, especially in his more canonical fictions, into feeble broodings over history as 
an “unbearable burden” under which cynical, despairing whites opt for “self-sacrifice in a 
tragic and inevitably failed attempt to compensate in themselves for the sins of their 
fathers” (Dussere 7). (One thinks of Quentin Compson’s suicide or of Ike rejecting his 
inheritance of the McCaslin plantation.) Although Faulkner’s financial tropes convey 
attempts to reflect on “how the legacies of slavery linger in the lives and actions of [his] 
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characters,” his engagements with the question of racial debt are severely limited because 
they remain self-pityingly preoccupied with the “agonizings of Southern whites” 
(Dussere 13, 18). 
The Mansion, however, proves an exception to this trend. In the final book of the 
Snopes trilogy, Faulkner’s recourse to financial logic and the language of moral debt does 
not produce characters debilitated by guilt or plotlines of tragically failed compensation 
for the sins of the past. Flem is held fully accountable for his depravity, and he is brought 
to justice by the effective actions of willful individuals. As Blair Labatt contends, 
contrary to a rote, modernist view of Faulknerian character and plot as defined by 
“ineffective” actions and “indeterminate” events, “Faulkner affirms the possibilities of 
agency” in The Mansion and expresses conviction in “the independence, vitality, and 
growth of [his] characters” (xv, 135). To some extent, this deviation is easily explained. 
If brooding, inactive, white self-pity is typically associated with plotlines that involve 
some form of confrontation with the legacy of slavery, then there is no reason why such 
despairing inactivity would permeate The Mansion, for the novel’s major conflicts do not 
revolve around reckoning with slavery’s repercussions. By this account, the achievability 
of justice and the efficacy of individual actions in the novel would be linked to the way in 
which Faulkner’s late fiction “moves away from racial issues,” as Dussere puts it, and 
“concentrates primarily on the conflict between Southern and Northern value systems and 
between social classes in the New South” (77). By shifting the source of conflict to the 
unconscionable business dealings of a single financier—one still alive in the story’s 
present and thus accessible to social agents who might bring him to account—Faulkner 
sets himself a more manageable problem in The Mansion than the towering sins of the 
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slaveholding fathers and the legacies of incest, rape, and miscegenation they have 
produced. However, while the story of Flem’s rise and fall does foreground conflicts 
between social classes and values systems in the New South, it is not true, as Dussere 
implies, that foregrounding such conflicts entailed a move “away from racial issues” on 
Faulkner’s behalf. In the years leading up to The Mansion’s writing and publication, 
Faulkner was deeply engaged in the racial debates surrounding the Civil Rights 
Movement, and as I will later show, many of the ideas and values he used to frame 
conservative discussions of race in his nonfiction thoroughly inform The Mansion’s 
narrative discourse even though the novel’s story is not about racial conflict and features 
an almost entirely white cast of characters. Faulkner did not “move[] away” from racial 
issues in The Mansion; he incorporated them in less obvious, less conscious ways. The 
novel’s financial rhetoric is the key to unearthing this buried racial subtext.1 
In order to understand how The Mansion’s discourse of debt and accountability 
embeds and advocates Faulkner’s conservative racial views, two features of this 
discourse must be emphasized. On the one hand, the novel’s rhetoric of debt and 
 
1 In a revised and expanded version of this dissertation chapter, this would be the opportune moment to 
include a more thorough literature review of the ways in which race has been discussed so far in Faulkner 
studies. Based on some of the initial research I had started to do while working on the project, it seems that 
a situation similar to the one I described with regard to Rhys studies in my previous chapter holds true for 
Faulkner criticism as well. There is plenty of analysis of race in Faulkner studies, but those discussions are 
largely confined to a certain set of canonical novels that are forthrightly “about” race insofar they centralize 
interracial conflicts, feature many black characters, and thematize slavery and miscegenation. These are 
novels like The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, Absalom! Absalom!, and Go Down, Moses (the 
“Voyage in the Darks” and “Wide Sargasso Seas,” so to speak, of Faulkner’s oeuvre). There is a large body 
of Faulkner scholarship that examines race in his work by focusing on figures of blackness and deciphering 
the ways these encode white anxieties, fears, and fantasies—the kind of racial analysis advocated by Toni 
Morrison in Playing in the Dark. Novels like the Snopes Trilogy, however, tend to be overlooked as texts 
where racial identities and discourses are being worked out because they are filled with all or almost 
entirely white casts of characters. I would need to go through and more thoroughly read the criticism to 
which I am gesturing here before citing it outright (criticism that I have mostly only been able to skim or 
flip through while writing this dissertation), but this provides a sense of what a fuller literature review for 
this chapter would probably look like. 
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accountability attests to what Labatt has identified as Faulkner’s convictions about 
individual agency: his belief in the capacity and necessity of individuals to hold 
themselves and others accountable for wrongdoing through volitional acts that advance or 
impede the righting of wrongs. On the other hand, in addition to this philosophical 
valence, The Mansion’s financial rhetoric also serves an ongoing formal and affective 
purpose: it perpetually hints at the sense of an ending in which moral accounts will be 
settled and—the books having balanced—all grudges and obligations will be eliminated. 
The Mansion’s financial rhetoric is geared toward the enactment of narrative and 
emotional closure. This formal and affective orientation is evident from the start of the 
novel, where Mink’s beliefs about “Them” and the moral accountability They embody 
encode, as I have suggested, a strict demand for debt repayment as well as an injunction 
against hard feelings after debts are repaid. These two principles—unsparing 
accountability and ultimate forgiveness—are conspicuously enshrined in The Mansion’s 
climax and denouement. 
After his release from prison in the final section of the novel, and with nothing for 
morale other than his undying faith that They will eventually give him the licks he owed, 
a 63-year-old Mink travels to Memphis where he procures from a pawn shop an 
incredibly shoddy pistol and a few equally shoddy bullets to carry out a revenge coded by 
Faulkner as the bringing of Flem to justice. After finally making it back to Jefferson, 
Mink slips into Flem’s mansion under cover of night, where he finds Flem alone and 
holds him at gunpoint. With only three bullets to spare, two of them misfire before They 
pay Their dues, and the third bullet lands a kill, but what is curious about the scene of the 
murder is that Flem makes no show resistance. After the first misfire, he merely “sit[s] 
 
 136 
immobile and even detached,” watching Mink fumble to set up the next shot, and after 
that one misfires, too, Flem is described, again, as “not moving at all” (456). Based on 
the evidence of the shoddy old pistol and the number of shells left at the crime scene, 
V.K. Ratliff—the novel’s third, final, and shrewdest homodiegetic narrator—deduces 
what must have occurred during the confrontation, and he hits the nail on the head when 
he asks Gavin Stevens, in the novel’s last chapter, “‘[W]hat do you reckon Flem’s reason 
was for setting there in that chair letting Mink snap them two shells at him until one of 
them went off and killed him?’” (472). Still reeling over the news that Linda, his Platonic 
love interest, has helped Mink escape after the murder, Gavin is not only uninterested in 
the question but unwilling to talk about it. But Ratliff has a theory, and while he and 
Gavin drive around the county in search of the fugitive Mink at the end of the book, he 
lays it out for consideration: 
“You was town-raised when you was a boy; likely you never heard of Give-me-
lief. It was a game we played. You would pick another boy about your own size 
and you would walk up to him with a switch or maybe a light stick or a hard green 
apple or maybe even a rock, depending on how hard a risk you wanted to take, 
and say to him, “Gimme lief,” and if he agreed, he would stand still and you 
would take one cut or one lick at him with the switch or stick, as hard as you 
picked out, or back off and throw at him once with the green apple or the rock. 
Then you would stand still and he would take the same switch or apple or rock or 
anyways another jest like it, and take one cut or throw at you. That was the rule. 
So jest suppose—” 
  “Drive on!” Stevens said. 
“—Flem had had his lief fair and square like the rule said, so there wasn’t 
nothing for him to do but jest set there ….” (Mansion 472-473) 
 
Ratliff’s theory offers narrative closure by constructing Flem’s passivity as a final 
balancing act, an ultimate settling of moral accounts in which the man who had sacrificed 
all moral scruples to the pursuit of individual profit submits, in the end, to paying for all 
the “lief” he has taken by giving Mink “lief” to take his life. To some extent, this might 
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read as a discrepancy in character believability. After three novels’ worth of Flem’s 
dastardly profiteering, this moral 180 seems unrealistic. The theory, however, would be 
easier to dismiss if it came from anyone other than Ratliff, who consistently serves not 
just in The Mansion but in all three books of the trilogy as Faulkner’s most shrewd and 
reliable narrator, and the speciousness of the “Give-me-lief” theory is somewhat 
attenuated if we note that it hardly casts Flem as a good person but rather as just a 
marginally less bad one—not so depraved as to have no sense of accountability 
whatsoever but still depraved enough to put off paying for his crimes as long as possible 
so that he can enjoy the spoils of his financial scheming for the full duration of his life 
without allowing any sense of his own turpitude to limit his manipulative extortions 
along the way. In a kind of live-by-sword-die-by-the-sword financial mentality, Flem, it 
turns out, had been accounting for his accruing moral debt throughout all the years he had 
been foreclosing on others through material credit. Ratliff’s “Give-me-life” theory guides 
the reader to this conclusion. After risking a lifetime of investment in unconscionable and 
universally begrudged acts of speculation, even Flem himself viewed death at Mink’s 
hands as the warranted end to a long and exorbitant run: “fair and square like the rule 
said,” bubble and crash. 
As if to ensure that readers do not miss the poetic justice here—the financial 
character of the logic behind the financier’s undoing—Faulkner has Ratliff refer back, 
when articulating this “Give-me-lief” theory, to an earlier moment in the novel that 
likewise emphasizes the inexorable payment of moral debts as the underlying theme of 
Flem’s story. Picking up from where Ratliff, in the preceding passage, leaves off: “‘jest 
suppose … Flem had had his lief fair and square like the rule said, so there wasn’t 
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nothing for him to do but jest set there, since he had likely found out years back when she 
finally turned up here again even outen a communist war, that he had already lost” (473). 
The “she” to whom Ratliff refers is Flem’s stepdaughter Linda, who, after discovering 
Flem’s role in her mother’s suicide, left for New York City at the end of The Town but 
“turned up” again in Jefferson by the middle of The Mansion. In the interim, she had 
married a communist then lost him when they aided Republican forces together in the 
Spanish Civil War, and upon her return to Jefferson, she had begun to engage in radical 
politics, such as promoting education for black Southerners, which jeopardized her 
stepfather’s reputation with the town. Despite their resulting in a burning cross on his 
lawn and “the words Nigger lover scrawled huge in chalk on [his] sidewalk,” Flem, 
however, made no efforts to stop his stepdaughter’s activities (Mansion 250). The 
motivations behind this disinclination puzzle the town, but just as Faulkner offers readers 
Ratliff’s theory to help make sense of Flem’s passivity at gunpoint, he uses Chick at this 
midpoint in the novel to hint at why Flem resigns himself to Linda’s radicalism: “All you 
could do was speculate,” Chick muses, “on just what I.O.U. or mortgage bearing his 
signature she might have represented out of that past which had finally gained for him 
that back room in the bank where he could sit down and watch himself grow rich by 
lending and foreclosing other people’s I.O.U.’s” (Mansion 252). By figuring Linda as the 
living embodiment of a financial claim out of Flem’s past, Chick frames Flem’s 
resignation to the effects of her radicalism as an act of moral-debt amortization. Ratliff’s 
“Give-me-lief” theory reprises this financial conceit, bringing to fruition the seed of debt-
accountability-as-moral-principle originally planted through Mink’s ideas about “Them” 
at the start of the novel and watered, halfway through, by this image of Linda-as-I.O.U. 
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 After organizing the petition for Mink’s early release from prison and guiding him 
out of the house once he has murdered her stepfather, Linda leaves Jefferson in a shiny 
new Jaguar she had obviously ordered long in advance, but before departing, she asks 
Gavin to deliver a sum of money to Mink as a kind of fee or patronage for the poor soul 
she used to achieve her revenge. Unsure where Mink has gone, Gavin enlists the help of 
Ratliff, who conjectures—correctly, as usual—that Mink will have gone back to the small 
plot of land where he used to live before he murdered Houston and went to prison. The 
two make their way to the rundown hovel that used to be Mink’s home (during which 
drive Ratliff lays out his Give-me-lief theory), and there, “on a crude platform he had 
heaped together” in what used to be a cellar, “the man they sought half-squatted half-
knelt blinking up at them like a child” (475). This infantilized figuration of Mink as 
harmless, pitiful, and innocent signals the kind of forgiving affect that Faulkner will 
solicit from readers toward Mink at the end of the text. If Flem’s death and Ratliff’s 
explanation of it provide readers with a financially-figured sense of narrative closure, the 
treatment of Mink in the novel’s final pages confirms that the sense of closure being 
offered is not just narrative but also affective. The rhetorical discourse through which 
Faulkner narrates the end of the story works to defuse any negative feelings toward Mink 
that readers might hold because of his status as a two-time murderer. This becomes 
especially clear in the novel’s final paragraphs once Gavin has relayed Linda’s money 
and he and Ratliff depart, leaving Mink alone as our sole and final focalizer. 
 “I’m free now. I can walk any way I want to” (477, original emphasis). Freedom is 
the overarching refrain of Mink’s closing thoughts and of Faulkner’s concluding 
narration, a refrain which suggests that until this point, Mink has in some way not been 
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free. This is true in a literal sense insofar as he has been in prison for 38 years of his life, 
but in order fully to understand the discourse of freedom at The Mansion’s close, it is 
necessary to circle back to the beginning of the text. As part of a stoic strategy for inuring 
himself to his downtrodden, tenant farmer’s condition, Mink had never allowed himself 
to wish for anything so audacious as “justice” from the world: “He thought quietly: Not 
justice; I never asked for that; jest fairness, that’s all. That was all; not to have anything 
for him: just not to have anything against him” (104, 119, original emphases). This sense 
of having always been faced with a stacked deck—of everything always going against 
him—is the basis, of course, of Mink’s ideas about “Them,” but it also informs another 
trope that Faulkner establishes early in the text and carries to the end as a running 
conceit. With his quality of life before prison forever tied to the fecundity of the soil, 
Mink had developed an antagonistic relationship to the earth itself, “the ground, the dirt 
which any and every tenant-farmer and share-cropper knew to be his sworn foe and 
mortal enemy” (100). “It was the land itself which owned them,” he thinks of his tenant-
farming kind, “the earth itself passing their doomed indigence and poverty from holding 
to holding of its thralldom as a family or a clan does a hopelessly bankrupt tenth cousin” 
(102). Picking up on the term “bankrupt” as a description for the tenant farmer’s 
“hopelessly” indebted status, the earth itself becomes a banker in this financial metaphor, 
trading on the farmer’s debt as a financial security to be reinvested “from holding to 
holding.” Faulkner reactivates this conceit of the earth-as-claims-holder at the end of the 
novel while Mink travels to Jefferson to kill Flem. Every time he stops to rest, Mink 
contrives some way to avoid sleeping directly on the ground: “That was the danger, what 
a man had to watch against: once you laid flat on the ground, right away the earth started 
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in to draw you back down into it” (442). After sleeping one night in the bed of a truck 
owned by a farmer whose harvest he assisted earlier that afternoon, Mink decides while 
contemplating where to sleep the night thereafter that he could “risk the ground once 
more, this late, this last time, especially as he had last night in the cotton truck on the 
credit side” (447, emphases added). The financial character of Mink’s logic and, by 
extension, that of Faulkner’s narrative is thus constantly highlighted, and it is this 
language of risk and debt that Faulkner uses to signal the recapitulation of earlier themes 
at the novel’s close. 
 When Gavin and Ratliff depart after delivering Linda’s money, Mink is left alone 
“except for the old ground,” which is there, as usual, “waiting, pulling gently and without 
no hurry at him between every step, saying, Come on, lay down; I aint going to hurt 
you”—which Mink does, for as the narrator tells us, “he was free now, he could afford to 
risk it” (477, emphasis added). This newfound ability of being able to take a risk marks 
the achievement, finally, if not of justice then at least of fairness (to use Mink’s 
formulation): not of having anything for him but of not having anything against him. It 
signifies the sense of a fair game, of no longer playing against a stacked deck—or rather, 
the sense of a clean slate, for what Mink’s sense of freedom really connotes is the feeling 
of being absolved, of being released from some kind of pressure, obligation, or stigma 
that has dragged him down his entire life. The source of that absolution is neither “They” 
nor the ground itself but Faulkner, who uses his narrative discourse at the end of the 
novel to perform a forgiveness toward Mink as murderer that he likewise urges upon 
readers. Consider the novel’s closing paragraph, which suggests with incredibly florid 
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and effusive prose that upon risking the ground’s invitation to lay down, the beleaguered 
Mink is finally rewarded the peace of death: 
he could feel the Mink Snopes that had had to spend so much of his life just 
having unnecessary bother and trouble, beginning to creep, seep, flow easy as 
sleeping … down and down into the ground already full of the folks that had the 
trouble but were free now, … all mixed and jumbled up comfortable and easy so 
wouldn’t nobody even know or even care who was which anymore, himself 
among them, equal to any, good as any, brave as any, being inextricable from, 
anonymous with all of them: the beautiful, the splendid, the proud and the brave, 
right on up to the very top itself among the shining phantoms … which are the 
milestones of the long human recording—Helen and the bishops, the kings and 
the unhomed angels, the scornful and graceless seraphim. (478) 
 
The magnanimous tone of this ending is hard to miss. If Flem’s death after a lifetime of 
immoral business deals is figured as a discharging of moral debts, Faulkner’s treatment of 
Mink after the murder accounts for the latter’s vengeance not as an act of violence that 
leaves him morally in the red but as an act of violence that has already been paid for by a 
lifetime of “unnecessary bother and trouble.” Mink is allowed to claim over 20 years of 
tenant-farming indigence and 38 years of prison time as a write-off, so to speak, against 
whatever moral tax he incurs for not one but two murders, with the result being, in 
Faulkner’s calculations, that everything balances out. Whether Mink asked for justice or 
not, his actions (aided by Linda’s) have brought justice about for Flem’s wrongdoings, 
and it is only fair, given everything else he has been through (Faulkner seems to say), that 
we begrudge him no further. The Mansion thus concludes with what Labatt rightly calls a 
“suspension of judgment” (160). Mink and the entire history of betrayal, extortion, and 
vengeance he represents are quite literally laid to rest after a final reckoning that has 
called Flem to account, balanced the moral books, and produced a “sense that all conflicts 
have ceased, that the opposing forces have canceled each other, that an epoch of striving 
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is over” (Labatt 160). In the financial language and logic used to frame the events of the 
novel, Faulkner thus avails himself of “finance” in the most etymological sense of the 
term: from the Old French finer, “to end, to settle a dispute” (“finance, n.1”). 
 The Mansion’s financial discourse, then, facilitates a sense of both narrative and 
affective closure. It provides an interpretive framework in which the novel can be read as 
a story of justice achieved, with all the emotionally palliative effects that achievement 
brings. I want to shift now to an examination of Faulkner’s public statements and 
nonfiction writing in the years leading up to The Mansion’s composition and 1959 
publication in order to show that the novel’s financial discourse should be further 
understood as racially white—as embedding and promoting, that is, ideas and values that 
Faulkner mobilized for arguments about white racial superiority. Despite the critique of 
slavery and its racial legacies throughout his fiction, in the 1950s, Faulkner used his 
public addresses and nonfiction to articulate conservative ideas about African Americans 
and desegregation in the midst of the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement. Much of the 
thinking about race espoused in these essays, speeches, and public letters is echoed—or 
more to the point, plugged—by characters and scenes throughout The Mansion, and the 
financial language and logic used to justify Mink’s revenge and eventual narrative 
acquittal incorporates and exalts, in a less overtly racialized context, ideas and values that 
Faulkner used in his nonfiction to frame and apologize for racial inequality. The 
Mansion’s financial discourse, in other words, is not race-neutral. Reading the novel 
through the lens of Faulkner’s 1950s essays and speeches reveals how its language of 
debt and accountability serves as a veiled conduit for ideas and values central to 
Faulkner’s rearguard thinking about desegregation and the racial superiority of white 
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people. We have seen how The Mansion’s financial discourse encodes a drive toward 
narrative and affective closure and advances an understanding of justice premised on the 
elimination of all debts, justice as the absence of indebtedness. Faulkner’s nonfiction 
writings further help to illuminate two other features of his financial thinking and rhetoric 
closely tied to those identified in the novel: a relentless insistence on the importance of 
self-enclosed individualism and a constant fixation on the future that draws attention 
away from the enduring legacies of the past. 
Upon returning to Jefferson in 1938 after fighting fascist forces in the Spanish 
Civil War, the widowed Linda Snopes Kohl begins to lobby for changes to black 
schooling as part of her Communist radicalism. Barging into classrooms “without 
invitation or warning,” she pushes for a “competitive weekly test” whose winners would 
spend the following week in an “academy she would establish, with white teachers” (The 
Mansion 246, 247, 247-248). Linda conducts these lobbying efforts in a bulldozing, 
oblivious fashion, for in addition to losing her husband in the war, she was also rendered 
near-deaf by a shell blast. “[S]he couldn’t hear you see,” notes Chick, “not just the words 
but the tones, over- and under-tones of alarm, fright, terror, in which the black voice 
would have to say Thank You” (248). Through such commentary, Faulkner shows a 
solicitous awareness of the real, life-threatening danger posed by the terroristic backlash 
of white Southerners to the postbellum sociopolitical advancement of African Americans. 
Unfortunately, this very awareness, voiced by Chick within the fiction, served for 
Faulkner, outside his fiction, as the basis for a rearguard argument against federally 
enforced desegregation.  
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Faulkner’s notorious “go slow” position was premised on the not-incorrect idea 
that the South, as he put it in “Letter to a Northern Editor,” published in Life magazine in 
1956, “will go to any length [even and especially lethal violence] … before it will accept 
alteration of its racial condition by mere force of law or economic threat” (Essays 89). 
The fact that the recalcitrance of Southern whites was morally wrong was less important 
to Faulkner than the practical threat of potential bloodshed posed by their emotional fever 
pitch, and this line of reasoning led him to a political stance for which he is now 
infamous: 
I would say to all the organizations and groups which would force integration on 
the South by legal process: “Stop now for a moment. You have shown the 
Southerner what you can do and what you will do if necessary; give him a space 
in which to get his breath and assimilate that knowledge; to look about and see 
that (1) Nobody is going to force integration on him from the outside; (2) That he 
himself faces an obsolescence in his own land which only he can cure …. (Essays 
91) 
 
As a way of preparing readers for this call at the end of his “Letter,” Faulkner prefaced it 
with an admonishing reference to “the rioting at the University of Alabama because of 
the admission as a student of Miss [Autherine] Lucy, a Negro” (Essays 88). Her life, he 
implied, and the lives of many African Americans like her, would become collateral 
damage if organizations and groups pushing for desegregation did not ease their political 
momentum. Indeed, less than a month after “Letter to a Northern Editor” was published, 
Faulkner defended his go-slow position against Northern detractors by noting that he was 
attempting “to save the South and the whole United States from the blot of Miss 
Autherine Lucy’s death” (Essays 224). In a move marked not by insidious cunning so 
much as hapless short-sightedness, he justified his resistance to federally mandated 
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desegregation by framing it as a solicitous concern for the physical safety of African 
Americans.2 
Faulkner further buttressed this argument by observing that in the past, when he 
publicly “went on record as being opposed to compulsory racial inequality,” he had 
received many letters criticizing his outspoken position, and behold: 
a few of these were from southern Negroes, … saying in effect: “Please, Mr 
Faulkner, stop talking and be quiet. You are a good man and you think you are 
helping us. But you are not helping us. You are doing us harm. You are playing 
into the hands of the NAACP so that they are using you to make trouble for our 
race that we dont want. Please hush, you look after your white folks’ trouble and 
let us take care of ours.” (Essays 89-90) 
 
The point here is not that no actually existing African Americans could possibly have 
held this position (i.e., that Faulkner was lying) but that, in his public commentary, he 
selectively cited only the few that did in order to make it seem, as much as possible, that 
his views were shared by African Americans. The same strategy informs the creation of 
black characters in his late-career fiction. Linda’s activism is finally brought to an end 
not by backlash from reactionary whites but by a request from the black principal of the 
school at which she is lobbying. Vetted by Faulkner as “a college-bred man … of 
intelligence and devotion,” the principal meets with Gavin and asks him to call off Linda 
for the sake of the black community she thinks she is helping (247). The reasoning the 
principal offers is an unabashedly blunt fictional plug for the go-slow politics Faulkner 
espoused in his nonfiction: 
“[W]e have got to make the white people need us first. In the old days, your 
people did need us, in your economy if not your culture, to make your cotton and 
tobacco and indigo. But that was the wrong need, bad and evil in itself. So it 
couldn’t last. It had to go. So now you dont need us. There is no place for us now 
 
2 See Peavy for a comprehensive examination of Faulkner’s “go-slow” position and the various nonfiction 
statements throughout his career that comprised it. 
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in your culture or economy either. … [W]e have got to make a place of our own 
in your culture and economy too. Not you to make a place for us … but us to 
make a place for ourselves by compelling you to need us …. Will you tell her 
that? Say we thank her and we wont forget this. But to leave us alone. Let us have 
your friendship all the time, and your help when we need it. But keep your 
patronage until we ask for it.” (The Mansion 248-249) 
 
When Gavin suggests that not many black people are likely to agree with such thinking, 
the principal admits that “‘None of them will, … [j]ust as none of them agreed when Mr 
Washington said it’” (248). Faulkner thus willingly concedes that his school principal 
may be a minority in his own racial community. But just as he selectively cited the few 
black letter writers whose views reinforced his go-slow position, he strategically fills one 
of the only speaking roles for a black character in The Mansion with a figure who 
supports his own political views by selectively citing, in turn, the African-American 
political leader whose slower and quieter paradigm of self-reliance through patiently 
enduring hard work Faulkner himself found most palatable. 
 As the example of Linda’s activism and its culmination in the encounter between 
Gavin and the school principal suggests, the racialized subject matter that Faulkner 
incorporated into The Mansion is intimately tied to the statements about race he was 
making in public addresses and nonfiction writing at the time. In the broadest and most 
straightforward sense, the whiteness of The Mansion could be said to inhere in the 
representational tropes and the lines of reasoning it contains that cite or abet the racially 
conservative, go-slow stance of its author. Whiteness, in this sense, is most evident in 
moments where Faulkner employs black characters and narrative plots that directly touch 
upon the politics of racial uplift. But as with the other chapters of this project, I aim to 
show that racial identities and ideas are at stake throughout Faulkner’s texts in moments 
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that do not necessarily involve characters of color or explicitly racial language. As 
Theresa Towner argues in her study of his late fiction, “Faulkner did not need specific 
racial issues in order to racialize his subject matter” (11). Any given fiction “might not be 
‘about’ race, but it is nearly always about ‘race’” insofar as the histories of racial 
oppression and the processes of racial formation are ubiquitously dispersed throughout 
social life (Towner 11). Although the whiteness of The Mansion could be traced to the 
way Faulkner uses Linda’s racial activism as an occasion to plug his own go-slow 
ideology, the tangential episode of Gavin’s encounter with the black school principal 
does not capture the extent to which whiteness permeates the text. Beyond the single, 
interracial encounter showcasing Faulkner’s go-slow position, it is the entire discourse of 
debt surrounding the presentation of Faulkner’s characters—wherein justice is equated 
with debt elimination and individual self-worth is premised on being debt-free—that 
constitutes the novel’s participation in a white-supremacist moral and cultural paradigm. 
Examining how debt rhetoric itself enters into Faulkner’s public addresses and nonfiction 
enables us to see this. 
 Faulkner’s resistance to federally mandated desegregation was part of a larger 
anxiety about the mid-century deterioration of American character and values. The state 
apparatus, in his view, had become hypertrophied and coddling in the decades since the 
New Deal. In his 1952 “Address to the Delta Council,” Faulkner gave a lecture to a 
regional development organization in Mississippi on what he saw as the nation’s 
escalating betrayal of its own founding principles. Invoking the Declaration of 
Independence, he warned that Americans might have forgotten what the founding fathers 
meant: “‘Life and liberty in which to pursue happiness,’” not “just to chase happiness, 
 
 149 
but to work for it” (Essays 127, emphases added). Subtending all of the other rights upon 
which America was founded, he argued, was “the inalienable right to responsibility,” a 
point he could not emphasize enough (128). 
That’s what I am talking about: responsibility. … [T]he necessity of man 
to be responsible if he wishes to remain free; … the duty of a man, the individual, 
each individual, every individual, to be responsible for the consequences of his 
own acts, to pay his own score, owing nothing to any man. (Essays 129, emphasis 
added) 
 
Freedom, in this formulation, is an exacting, ideal condition that one approximates by 
being as self-made as possible, as minimally indebted to the state or society for 
sustenance as one can be: “owing nothing” to anyone other than one’s resilient, hard-
working self. This logic helps to account for why the stoic, determined Mink, despite his 
criminal record, is set “free” by Faulkner at the end of The Mansion, and it also accounts 
for the repeated attacks on the welfare state that crop up later in Faulkner’s Delta Council 
address: 
somewhere, at some moment, something had happened … to all the descendants 
of the old tough, durable, uncompromising men, so that now, in 1952, when we 
talk of security, we don’t even mean for the rest of our own lives, let alone that of 
our and our wife’s children, but only for so long as we ourselves can hold our 
individual place on a public relief role or at a bureaucratic or political or any other 
organization’s gravy-trough. (130) 
 
Coddled into the indignity of dependence and left incapable of (patriarchal) responsibility 
for the subsistence of their families, American men, Faulkner contended, have 
“swap[ped]” the right “to independence and freedom in which to work and endure in 
[their] own sweat” for “the right not to earn, but to be given” (131). In the process, he 
observed, America has “made respectable and even elevated to a national system, that 
which the old tough fathers would have scorned and condemned: charity” (131). 
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It may not be much of an exaggeration to say that in making such claims, 
Faulkner was among America’s first neoliberal intellectuals, and indeed, like the 
neoliberal ideologues whose claims about welfare dependency would rise to prominence 
later in the century, Faulkner, too, coded the characteristics of self-reliance, 
industriousness, and responsibility he deemed morally superior as racially white. In 
another public essay entitled “A Letter to the Leaders of the Negro Race” (1956), 
Faulkner reiterated his go-slow position by imploring African-American leaders to follow 
“a course of inflexible and unviolent flexibility” in the pursuit of civil rights (Essays 
109). “[I]f I were a Negro,” he posited in an audacious counterfactual, “I would say to my 
people: … ‘The white man has devoted three hundred years to teaching us to be patient; 
that is one thing at least in which we are his superiors. Let us turn it into a weapon against 
him’” (Essays 111). In his earlier “Letter to a Northern Editor,” the alleged reason for 
such patience was the pragmatic interest of avoiding lethal backlash from Southern 
whites. But however much Faulkner framed his resistance to enforced desegregation as a 
concern for the safety of African Americans, this was hardly his only justification, for in 
his “Letter to the Leaders of the Negro Race,” he goes much further by suggesting that 
African Americans should also go slow because they are not yet prepared for freedom’s 
responsibilities. Continuing his crude “If I were a Negro” conceit, while simultaneously 
reprising the language of his 1952 Delta Council address, he adds that 
above all, I would say this to the leaders of our race: “We must learn to deserve 
equality so that we can hold and keep it after we get it. … We must learn that our 
inalienable right … to freedom and liberty and the pursuit of happiness, means 
exactly what our founding fathers meant by it: the right to opportunity to be free 
and equal, provided one is worthy of it, will work to gain it and then work to keep 
it.” (Essays 112, original emphasis) 
 
 151 
Learning to deserve equality implies, in this logic, a capacity to assume the obligations 
attached to it, which, in addition to “‘the responsibilities of physical cleanliness and of 
moral rectitude, of a conscience capable of choosing between right and wrong,’” include, 
above all, “‘the pride of independence of charity or relief’” (Essays 112). “‘The white 
man has not taught us that,’” writes Faulkner in blackface, “‘He taught us only patience 
and courtesy. … So we must teach ourselves that’” (Essays 112). In the essay’s closing 
lines, he sugarcoats the interminably patient endurance and humility he asks of African 
Americans by framing it in terms of a lofty, dignified aesthetic category: “‘Our tragedy is 
that these virtues of responsibility are the white man’s virtues of which he boasts, yet we, 
the Negro, must be his superior in them’” (Essays 112). 
 In noting that whites often “boast” of such virtues but do not consistently practice 
them (as the term “boast” implies), Faulkner seems to acknowledge that asking African 
Americans to learn and exhibit such virtues as a precondition for sociopolitical 
advancement is hypocritical to no small degree. This logical hiccup, however, does not 
stop him from insisting that those virtues are nonetheless white and that, in consequence, 
the more African Americans “learn to deserve equality,” the whiter—symbolically, in 
terms of character—they will become. Nowhere is this more evident than in a 1958 
address he delivered to a group of honor societies at the University of Virginia. Stating 
forthrightly what was already implied in his earlier claim that the Negro must learn to 
deserve the opportunity to be free and equal, Faulkner opened this address with a barely 
qualified gambit: “For the sake of argument, let us agree that as yet the Negro is 
incapable of equality” because he is “not yet capable of, or refuses to accept, the 
responsibilities” attached to it (Essays 156, 157). Relying on a sweeping image of 
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African Americans as demoralized by slavery and Jim Crow to the point of being robbed 
by these institutions of the inclination and capacity for self-responsibility,3 Faulkner opts 
for full-on paternalism, claiming that “the white man, must take [the Negro] in hand and 
teach him [the] responsibility” he lacks—teach him, that is, “self-restraint, honesty, … to 
act not even as well as just any white man, but to act as well as the best of white men” 
(Essays 157, 158, emphasis added). The education of the Negro works toward a teleology 
of whiteness. In formulating this point, Faulkner manages yet again to tiptoe around the 
hypocrisy that mars his position without actually confronting it, for in learning “to cease 
forever more thinking like a Negro and acting like a Negro,” the African American will 
be up against what even Faulkner admits is a double standard (Essays 157). 
[B]ecause of his race and color, it will not suffice for him to think and act like just 
any white man: he must think and act like the best of white men. Because where 
the white man, because of his race and color, can practise morality and rectitude 
just on Sunday and let the rest of the week go hang, the Negro can never let up 
nor deviate. (Essays 157) 
 
3 It is unsurprising yet worth noting that nowhere in his nonfiction does Faulkner provide evidence of 
actually existing African Americans behaving with the irresponsible idleness and profligacy he imputes to 
them. Indeed, one would have to look to Faulkner’s fiction for any examples of the incapable Negro he 
ostensibly has in mind. One set of exemplary figures would be the black characters who serve as comic 
tricksters, prone to a leisurely blitheness occasionally broken by bouts of cunning activity when such 
activity offers a shortcut to something they want (e.g., Simon Strother in Flags in the Dust or George 
Wilkins in Go Down, Moses). A different kind of example would be Fonsiba Beauchamp and her husband 
in Go Down, Moses, who, in an act of negligence that Faulkner portrays with Gothic horror, are content to 
live on a decrepit, uncultivated farm, disinclined to develop and maintain their home because it is enough 
that they are, as Fonsiba says with an eerily blank stare, “‘free’” (Go Down, Moses 267). Even these 
fictional portraits of irresponsible Negroes are undermined in their ability to support Faulkner’s nonfiction 
claims by the presence of other black characters throughout his fiction (typically older women) who serve 
as sentimentalized paragons of humility, industriousness, and patient endurance—virtues of responsibility 
that Faulkner claims, in his nonfiction, the Negro has yet to learn. Dilsey Gibson in The Sound and the 
Fury would be one example here; Molly Beauchamp in Go Down, Moses would be another, to say nothing 
of Faulkner’s real-life caretaker Caroline Barr on whom the latter was based and whom Faulkner himself 
eulogized as a shining example of resilience, asceticism, and hard work [Essays 117-118]). Considered 
through the lens of his nonfiction, this latter group of virtuous old women reads as a set of exceptions that 
prove the rule or as sentimentalized visions of what, for Faulkner, the Negro should aspire to be. Faulkner, 
in other words, provides no evidence of Negro profligacy in nonfictional contexts, and even the examples 
found in his fiction are at cross purposes. 
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Faulkner does not decry this unfairness so much as shrug dismayed shoulders at it, 
chalking it up as par for the course. In the meantime, he safeguards the whiteness of his 
virtues of responsibility by stipulating that whiteness is emblematized not by “just any” 
white people—most of whom are liable, when they are anywhere other than church, to let 
it all “hang” out—but only by “the best” of them, invoking a dodgy, exceptionalist logic 
in which whites are not held accountable for any members of their race with whom they 
would prefer not to be identified, whereas blacks are held accountable to white 
stereotypes that even Faulkner admits have no basis in reality (“the white man,” he notes, 
“has forced the Negro to be always a Negro rather than a human being” [Essays 157, 
emphasis added]). 
In “Letter to the Leaders of the Negro Race”—speaking as if he were a Negro to a 
black audience—Faulkner deigned to admit that white hypocrisy was the source of 
African Americans’ tragedy: the latter had to stomach the indignity of proving they have 
attained virtues about which white people boast but hardly practice. In the 1958 address, 
however—speaking as a white man to a white audience—Faulkner changes his tune and 
re-signifies the very term he had used with respect to the Negro earlier: “His tragedy may 
be that so far he is competent for equality only in the ratio of his white blood” (Essays 
156). What used to be the tragedy of white hypocrisy has been revamped as a tragedy of 
black incompetence, yet those who have no white blood can still learn to cease thinking 
and acting “like a Negro” (the address implies) through the saving grace of white 
education. Hence, when Faulkner charges whites with teaching the Negro responsibility, 
he specifies that this might be done “either by taking him into our white schools, or 
giving him white teachers in his own schools until we have taught the teachers of his own 
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race to teach and train him in these hard and unpleasant habits” (Essays 158). When 
Linda Kohl lobbies, in The Mansion, to put “properly-educated white teachers in the 
Negro school” and send the displaced black ones “‘North to white schools where they 
will be accepted and trained as white teachers are,’” Faulkner is not criticizing her top-
down racial paternalism but rather the pace at which she works: she is on the right rack; 
she just needs to go slower (The Mansion 250). Likewise, when the school’s principal 
asks Gavin to call her off so that African Americans can work their own way, up from 
slavery, to an indispensable position in the South’s culture and economy, that black 
character’s favorable representation in the text is based on a conviction that associates 
him, in Faulkner’s mind, with “the best of white men”: the conviction that, in securing 
their prosperity, people must pay their own score, emancipated black people included. 
 Faulkner’s nonfiction insinuates a clear link, then, between whiteness, on the one 
hand, and the distinction of “owing nothing to any man,” on the other. If independence of 
charity or relief is a key virtue of responsibility, and if African Americans, in Faulkner’s 
account, lack those virtues, then white people necessarily become the exemplars of “the 
duty of a man … to pay his own score,” and internalizing that duty is what it means for 
Faulkner’s Negro to deserve equality by learning to “think and act like the best of white 
men.” All of this financial language, all this rhetoric of debt and accountability forever 
geared toward encouraging the avoidance and elimination of indebtedness, is linked, 
moreover, to the constant enshrinement of self-enclosed individualism as a universal 
ideal: “the duty of a man, the individual, each individual, every individual, … to pay his 
own score.” As Faulkner bluntly put it in an interview while abroad in Japan, “I think the 
salvation of man is in his individuality”: “the individual can be tough enough to protect 
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himself. … It may be a little easier to belong to a group, but I don’t think he has any 
business belonging to any group” (Faulkner at Nagano 195).4 Insofar as Faulkner racially 
coded the “pride of independence of charity or relief” that would distinguish such 
“tough,” self-reliant individuals, the social and moral outlook expressed across his 
nonfiction as a whole suggests that “the salvation of man” is really his approximation of 
whiteness. 
 This racialized constellation of ideas accounts not only for why Faulkner would 
choose a tenant farmer as the arguable protagonist of The Mansion but also for why that 
tenant farmer had to be white. Few historical figures would allow Faulkner to showcase 
the virtues of self-restraint and the resolution to exercise one’s right to an “independence 
and freedom in which to work and endure in [one’s] own sweat” better than the tenant 
farmers and sharecroppers who persevered under an economic system that obliged them 
to perpetual labor in order to pay off perpetual debt.5 While it might seem strange to 
embody and endorse a moral framework built around the importance of “owing nothing 
to any man” through a figure whose life is constantly structured by what he owes to a 
landowner, in fictionalizing the tenant farmer through Mink, Faulkner was careful to 
make the measure of a man not the sheer fact of his material debt but the way he handles 
his debt-ridden condition (the former judgment would amount, after all, to blaming the 
 
4 For a fuller discussion of Faulkner’s distrust of group-based social and political action, see Towner 126-
128. 
5 For a brief overview of the history and the legal, economic, and demographic parameters of tenant 
farming and sharecropping in the American South, see Ransom and Sutch, Mandle, Bolton, Ochiltree, and 
Douglas-Bowers. Tenant farming and sharecropping are similar but not identical conditions. “A tenant 
farmer typically paid a landowner for the right to grow crops on a certain piece of property” and “in 
addition to having some cash to pay rent, also generally owned some livestock and tools”; “[s]harecroppers, 
on the other hand, were even more impoverished than tenant farmers” and often had no resources or cash of 
their own (Bolton). Faulkner is never explicit about naming Mink as one or the other, but I describe him as 
tenant farmer rather than a sharecropper because he does not appear to be entirely destitute and, indeed, in 
line with the aforementioned distinctions, owns his own (albeit malnourished) milk cow.   
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individual simply for being poor and discount the reality of the economic and legal 
system that compels him to take on debt to survive). When Mink’s milk cow wanders 
onto his rich neighbor Houston’s property, he gives into the temptation of letting her 
winter there and then collecting her afterward by acting as though he did not realize she 
was gone. This desperate plan backfires when Houston points out that the fattened and 
now pregnant cow has drastically appreciated in value and appeals to the law to make 
Mink work off the price difference before the cow is returned. Despite the risk of 
physical exhaustion and of shortchanging labor on the crops at home that he will need to 
pay his rent, Mink insists upon laboring day and night for 37 days until “the judgment 
was worked out to the last penny,” refusing, in the process, his landlord Will Varner’s 
(self-serving) advice to pay the fee by adding it to his furnish bill for next year so he can 
get back to work on his own fields (The Mansion 25). Likewise, while on his way to 
Memphis to purchase a gun to kill Flem after being released from prison, Mink notes that 
one of the men who provides him with work, food, and accommodations has a pistol that 
he often leaves unattended, but Mink refuses to take it: “No. I aint never stole. I aint 
never come to that and I wont never” (302, original emphasis).  
Faulkner’s fictional treatment of the tenant farmer, in other words, uses the 
material fact of his impoverishment as a backdrop against which the virtues of self-
restraint and the pride of independence of charity or relief (or theft) can better shine 
through. Whatever material and moral debts Mink does accrue, whether by property 
infringements or murder, he insists on paying them in full via labor or prison time, 
refusing the charity of being let off the hook, and whenever it is in his power to do so, he 
avoids indebtedness all together by recourse to individual determination and hard work. It 
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is in this sense that Mink can think of himself, in terms that echo Faulkner’s nonfiction 
almost verbatim, as not a rich man but at least “an independent one, asking no favors of 
any man, paying his own way” (Mansion 9). That the tenant farmer through whom 
Faulkner embodied these virtues is white cannot be understood as a mere coincidence. 
Historically, the majority of the South’s tenant farmers and sharecroppers were black, and 
whatever economic adversities poor white farmers did face, black farmers faced the same 
trials with the added pressure of racial prejudice and legal disenfranchisements (Douglas-
Bowers; Bolton; Doyle 313-315). Faulkner was no doubt aware of this, and while too big 
a claim should not be made on a small point, his decision, in the face of historical fact, to 
make the novel’s doggedly resilient tenant farmer white conveniently racializes the 
virtues of responsibility in a way that shores up the contentions of his nonfiction. 
As far as those contentions go, Faulkner’s idealization of debt-free individualism 
is very forthright, but there is a final, distinguishing feature of his nonfiction racial 
commentary that is perhaps less premeditated but equally consequential: a disinclination 
to speak about the past that manifests as a constant inclination to frame the virtues of 
responsibility as virtues necessary for America to move forward. Faulkner’s debt-phobic, 
individualistic, white-supremacist thinking about race and American national character 
accommodates a tendency to avoid discussing the enduring legacies of past racial strife 
by emphasizing the importance of racial harmony as the precondition of an all-important 
national future. 
 To a considerable degree, this temporal orientation of Faulkner’s racial discourse 
stems from the historical context in which his nonfiction was produced. Cold War 
concerns about the spread of totalitarian communism in the wake of 1950s decolonization 
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led him to emphasize that the ability of the United States to sway formerly colonized 
nations to the path of capitalist democracy depended on the ability of Americans to 
surmount the racial prejudices that undercut their nation’s reputed devotion to freedom 
and equality. In a 1956 essay published in Harper’s Magazine, Faulkner observed that 
many countries, in “the Far and Middle East” and in “North Africa” among others, “were 
not communist” or “communist-inclined” even “where it seemed to [him] they should 
have been” (Essays 101). Upon wondering why, he reasoned, in a complacent gesture of 
American exceptionalism, that “[i]t’s because of America. These people still believe in 
the American dream …. They believe in us and are willing to trust and follow us not 
because of our material power: Russia has that: but because of the idea of individual 
human freedom and liberty and equality on which our nation was founded” (Essays 101-
102). American racial prejudice, however, jeopardized this anti-communist belief by 
revealing, as Faulkner put it, “that when we talk of freedom and liberty, we not only 
mean neither, we don’t even mean security and justice and even the preservation of life 
for people whose pigmentation is not the same as ours” (Essays 223). Faulkner’s Cold 
War plea to fellow Americans thus took the form of an incitement to colorblindness: “if 
we who are still free want to continue so, all of us who are still free had better 
confederate and confederate fast with all others who still have a choice to be free—
confederate not as black people nor white people nor blue or pink or green people, but as 
people who are still free, with all other people who are still free” (Essays 102).6 
 
6 It should be made clear that Faulkner’s emphasis on the Cold War stakes of achieving racial equality in 
America stood in unresolved tension with his claims about the need for African Americans to “go slow” in 
pursuing civil rights because of their unpreparedness for freedom’s responsibilities. In the 1956 Harper’s 
piece, where the time-sensitive need for all free people to confederate against totalitarian communism is 
explicitly on his mind, Faulkner identified the fear and insecurity of white Americans as the principle 
obstacle at hand. 
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 Situating Faulkner’s nonfiction in its proper Cold War context is crucial to 
historicizing his claims, and it accounts for much of the fixation on the future that 
pervades his thinking about race. However, I want to emphasize that this orientation 
toward the future is not a feature of Faulkner’s racial thinking only where concerns about 
the specter of totalitarian communism are present. Rather, it is the normative, default 
temporal orientation of all the racial discourse in The Mansion and his 1950s nonfiction. 
Simply recalling the many passages examined here confirms this. That “the white man … 
can practise morality and rectitude just on Sunday …, [while] the Negro can never let up 
nor deviate” is a call for future-facing resolve. That the white Southerner “faces an 
obsolescence in his own land which only he can cure” is a prophecy and a prognosis. 
Even The Mansion’s black school principal is concerned not with what was but with what 
is and what must become: “There is no place for us now in your culture or economy 
 
The white man knows that only ninety years ago not one percent of the Negro race could own a 
deed to land, let alone read that deed; yet in only ninety years, although his only contact with a 
county courthouse is the window through which he pays the taxes for which he has no 
representation, he can own his land and farm it with inferior stock and worn-out tools and gear—
equipment which any white man would starve with—and raise children and feed and clothe them 
and send them to what schools are available … and end his life holding his head up because he 
owes no man …. That’s what the white man in the South is afraid of: that the Negro, who has 
done so much with no chance, might do so much more with an equal one that he might take the 
white man’s economy away from him” (Essays 96). 
“We must be free not because we claim freedom, but because we practise it,” Faulkner concluded (Essays 
106). But to “practise” freedom, as we know, means, for Faulkner, accepting the responsibilities of hard 
work and self-reliance attached to it. As if to sharpen his claim in the Harper’s piece that the racial hang-
ups of white Americans are the problem, Faulkner even characterized African Americans as being more 
adept at these responsibilities than whites, what with the “Bunches and Washingtons and Carvers,” for 
years now, “teaching him—the Negro—by precept and example what a lot of our white people have not 
learned yet: that to gain equality, one must deserve it” (Essays 104, 105). From this single essay alone 
(titled “On Fear,” in reference to the white racial neuroses it critiques), one might get the mistaken 
impression that Faulkner’s view of African Americans was one of unqualified admiration, but placing it 
alongside his other writings throughout the decade clarifies that his statements about race are contradictory 
and opportunistic. In discussing the domestic issue of federally enforced desegregation, he maintained that 
African Americans were not yet ready for freedom’s responsibilities, but in discussing the international 
issue of looming totalitarian communism, he pinpointed the reactionary economic fears of Southern whites 
as the most pressing issue, a tedious recalcitrance the free world cannot afford. As Theresa Towner has 
rightly observed, Faulkner’s late-career racial views are best described as irreducibly “conflicted” (121). 
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either. … [W]e have got to make a place of our own in your culture and economy too.” 
Informing each of these utterances is a disinclination to think about the past that 
permeates Faulkner’s 1950s statements about race (this despite the fact that when taken 
as a whole, his literary oeuvre is marked by a constant concern with the historical legacy 
of slavery in the South). It is striking that Faulkner’s future-oriented statements about 
race sit comfortably alongside a vocabulary and rhetoric of debt and accountability, 
which usually connote attention to how the unresolved past impinges on the present. 
Indeed, in a gesture that begins to move us toward the discussion about contemporary 
reparations in this chapter’s next section, we might ask how it is possible for Faulkner to 
talk about the importance of paying one’s dues and owing nothing to any man without 
considering, historically, what white people might owe to black people (to say nothing of 
Native Americans) and whether whites have really worked to “deserve” the opportunities 
and privileges they enjoy. 
 Faulkner’s silence on this matter cannot be attributed to the notion that ideas and 
calls for black reparations did not exist during his lifetime. As Charles P. Henry has 
explained, though they may not have gone by the name of “reparations,” demands for 
material compensation to black Americans for slavery—as well as concrete proposals for 
how this might be arranged—were around (though not necessarily successful) since at 
least the Civil War and Reconstruction, whether in the form of policies for redistributing 
confiscated Confederate lands to freedmen or lobbying Congress to institute ex-slave 
pensions (9-57). The absence of any consideration of the possibility and rightfulness of 
reparations in Faulkner’s thinking is not due to the concept being historically unavailable 
to him but to the consummately individualistic, anti-statist nature of his moral values and 
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political views. Faulkner’s distrust of group-based social and political action, along with 
his aversion to individuals relying on the state (those formerly tough, independent 
American men being emasculated by the “public relief role” or “any other organization’s 
gravy-trough”) would have made the idea of federally instituted payments to black 
Americans doubly inconceivable to him and anathema if he ever considered them at all. 
To the man who prized above all “independence of charity or relief,” such payments 
would presumably have registered as in fact robbing black Americans of the opportunity 
to develop the virtues of responsibility they supposedly lacked, reproducing the effects of 
slavery rather than alleviating them. The habitual future-oriented-ness of Faulkner’s 
racial thinking is a symptom of the motivations that led him to invoke a rhetoric of debt 
and accountability in discussions of race in the first place. It reveals the extent to which 
his debt (or rather anti-debt) rhetoric is designed to structure a conversation about race in 
way that has, as its foremost goal, not the project of assessing and paying for debts 
incurred by past and ongoing racial oppression but rather the promotion of an ethos of 
proudly industrious, resolutely independent, self-enclosed individualism as a universal 
norm and sine qua non of American character. Though not necessarily a premeditated 
outcome, Faulkner effectively consigns the topic of uncompensated racial violence to a 
silenced and compartmentalized past by premising the achievement of racial equality on 
the future-facing insistence that each individual must “make the effort … to seek not for a 
mere crutch to lean on, but to stand erect on his own feet by believing … in his own 
toughness and endurance” (Faulkner at Nagano 186). 
 This fundamental disinterest—indeed, disbelief—in the idea that the legacies of 
racial oppression in the past warrant group-based, institutionally-backed compensation in 
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the present starkly differentiates Faulkner’s racial thinking from the discourses of white 
debt and reparations in our contemporary moment. But as I will argue shortly, 
contemporary ideas and practices of reparations are still beset by some of the pernicious, 
white-supremacy-consolidating limitations characterizing Faulkner’s racial discourse, 
making a thorough understanding of those limitations crucial to our ability to learn from 
his ostensibly anti-racist thinking in the present. Faulkner’s financial language of debt 
and accountability connotes less a desire to reckon with history than a desire to move past 
it—or at best, a desire to reckon with history on the condition that reckoning with it 
entails putting it behind us. While this is never said in so many words, it is palpable in the 
diction and verbal tense of his nonfiction pronouncements, and this racially fraught 
emphasis on futurity—on letting go of the past— is nowhere more vividly and alluringly 
enshrined than in a brief, utopian daydream Mink has about himself and Flem toward the 
beginning of The Mansion (a dream whose all-white cast can make its wistful yearning 
for a historically amnesiac, future harmony seem racially irrelevant). While Mink sits in 
prison contemplating his revenge early in the novel, Faulkner clarifies to readers that 
Mink’s grudge toward Flem is qualified, paradoxical as it may seem, by a fervent distaste 
for holding grudges: 
he even said aloud: “What a shame we cant both of us jest come out two old men 
setting peaceful in the sun or the shade, waiting to die together, not even thinking 
no more about hurt or harm or getting even, not even remembering no more about 
hurt or harm or anguish or revenge,”—two old men not only incapable of further 
harm to anybody but even incapable of remembering hurt or harm, as if whatever 
necessary amount of the money which Flem no longer needed … could be used to 
blot, efface, obliterate those forty years which he, Mink, no longer needed now 




Flem’s record of inexcusable moral crimes renders this endgame impossible, of course, 
and in closing the novel with Mink’s revenge, Faulkner unequivocally affirms his 
commitment to debt accountability and the financially figured justice it entails. In an 
ideal world, however, Mink and Flem’s conflict would be resolved in a way that 
precipitates reconciliation and forgiveness, and it would be easy to dismiss this as a 
superfluous counterfactual if the actual ending of The Mansion did not in fact fulfill this 
wish in part. Faulkner’s insistence on debt accountability forbids him from letting Flem 
off the hook, but once Flem is dealt with, the forbearing spirit of Mink’s vision is 
honored at the end of the novel when, as we have seen, Faulkner uses the rhetoric of 
freedom and the image of a beleaguered Mink laying down to rest to coax readers into 
being “incapable of remembering hurt or harm” and thus forgiving Mink for his 
murderous record. Ultimately, as Labatt argues, “Faulkner encourages a total relaxation 
of tensions, a belief that the past is past” (160, emphasis added). Beneath the drive 
toward unforgiving retribution that impels his plot runs a contrary longing for ungrudging 
conviviality that flickers in Mink’s peaceful vision of himself and Flem as two old men 
and ultimately triumphs in “the total relaxation of tensions” that closes the novel. 
However austere The Mansion’s unsparing commitment to debt accountability might 
seem, Faulkner tempers it by always keeping in mind the light at the end of the 
accountability tunnel: the payoff of an inviolate individualism un-haunted by the weight 
of the past for which The Mansion’s consummately self-reliant, debt-ridden yet 
accountability-obsessed, murderous yet heaven-bound tenant farmer is the unassuming 





Faulkner’s financial discourse of debt and accountability represents debt as 
something that exists only to be avoided or gotten rid of, a disposition highly amenable to 
conceptions of justice geared toward the normalization of self-enclosed individualism and 
closing off a chapter in history—toward making the past past. The narrative arc of The 
Mansion urges readers to view forgiveness, in the sense of total absolution from lingering 
grudges and obligations, as the proper affective response toward moral and material 
debtors who have since paid their dues. Playing out in a story with an almost entirely 
white cast of characters, these principles of debt accountability and future-oriented 
conflict resolution might seem devoid of racial significance, but we know from 
Faulkner’s nonfiction that they can facilitate discourses that conceptualize racial progress 
in ways that perpetuate white supremacy and render inconceivable any form of progress 
relying on group-based, state-backed initiatives rather than a universal commitment to 
individual patience and hard work. 
In epitomizing a particular kind of financial thinking wherein the language of debt 
and accountability tends toward a sense of historical closure and the fetishization of 
unencumbered individualism, The Mansion and Faulkner’s 1950s nonfiction serve as 
instructive object lessons for contemporary white anti-racist thinking and practice, for the 
same tendencies permeate the efforts of white people in the 21st century to atone for 
national histories of racial oppression as well as the way these efforts have been framed 
in governmental and popular discourses. We can discern these patterns by examining 
how the term “white debt” is invoked in U.S. media and by looking at contemporary 
scholarship on reparations to African Americans for slavery and Jim Crow and to 
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indigenous nations for colonial dispossession and genocide. Faulkner’s nonfiction claims 
about black irresponsibility might represent a brand of overt racism whose prevalence has 
declined in past decades, but his fixation on a racially harmonious future and his 
preoccupation with debtless, unencumbered individualism are mirrored throughout the 
contemporary, liberal, politically correct meditations on race characteristic of the post-
Civil Rights Era, undermining the capacity for discourses of reparations and white debt to 
dismantle white supremacy. It is easy to fault Faulkner for being blatantly racist by the 
standards of historical hindsight, but if we are to read him as critics committed to the 
improvement of contemporary white anti-racism, that purpose is best served not by 
scapegoating his conservative racial views but by questioning the extent to which the 
vocabularies and practices of white anti-racism today really are free from the rhetorical 
and affective inclinations that kept his critique of racial inequality mired in white 
supremacy. 
Arguments for reparations to African Americans stand as one of the clearest 
examples of how the language of debt remains central to contemporary racial politics in 
America. As a nation built upon centuries of slavery and decades of racist housing, 
educational, and financial policies during and after Jim Crow, the United States has 
thrived by violently extracting or withholding from black communities labor, wealth, and 
opportunities that the government has never sought to return in any substantial way. As 
Ta-Nehisi Coates has put it in “The Case for Reparations,” “It is as though we have run 
up a credit-card bill and, having pledged to charge no more, remain befuddled that the 
balance does not disappear.” Coates’ “we” is a curious formulation, and if he does not 
name white Americans specifically, this is because he seeks to emphasize that black 
 
 166 
reparations are a problem and an opportunity for the nation as a whole (“An America that 
asks what it owes its most vulnerable citizens,” he writes, “is improved and humane. An 
America that looks away is ignoring … the sins of the past …”). Nevertheless, Coates’ 
proverbial credit-card bill represents a moral and material debt accrued, first and 
foremost, by white people. When he glosses reparations as “the full acceptance of our 
collective biography” or “the price we must pay to see ourselves squarely,” it is white 
people’s willingness or refusal to acknowledge the nation’s history of violence and their 
own complicity in it that are at stake. In the United States, legal claims and institutional 
arrangements for black reparations have a long history with a record of occasional if 
limited success.7 Ultimately, however, it remains the case that the U.S. federal 
government has never issued a formal apology to African Americans as a group for 
slavery and Jim Crow nor established any system of material compensation for these 
injustices. But while black reparations have yet to occur on a national scale, there has 
been a rich body of scholarship debating the moral paradigms and institutional forms they 
should adopt. These debates clearly illustrate the contemporary stakes of the ideas and 
 
7 The history of precedents for black reparations includes initiatives during Reconstruction to allocate 
confiscated Confederate lands to freedmen; petitions to the government for ex-slave pensions; the persistent 
efforts of House Representative John Conyers Jr. to introduce a bill calling for a congressional study of 
slavery’s lingering effects and possible forms of reparation (although Conyers later resigned due to sexual 
harassment allegations and has since passed away); the 1994 Rosewood Compensation Act passed by the 
Florida legislature to address the destruction of black property in the Rosewood race riot of 1923; the 
organizational efforts of the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) as well 
as the Nation of Islam; legislation in the state of California requiring the assessment of insurance 
companies for records of slaveholder insurance and the determination of whether and how compensation 
can be made to slave descendants if so; and a variety of legal cases filed by black individuals against 
private corporations and state and federal governmental bodies, some successful, others not (Henry 9-99; 
Brooks 6-19, 119-138; Coates). In cases where material compensation has been made, it has often gone 
unaccompanied by any formal apology that would signal acknowledge of guilt and clarify the historical 
record. Likewise, there have been a few apologies made by U.S. government officials without any 
accompanying material compensation, such as President Bill Clinton’s apology for the syphilis tests on 
black men in Tuskegee, Alabama, or the 2005 apology by U.S. lawmakers to victims and survivors of 
lynching and their descendants (Henry 94). 
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structures of feeling identified in Faulkner’s work, for one of their biggest points of 
contention concerns precisely the matter of closure and forgiveness so central to The 
Mansion. This debate is encapsulated by the contrasting models of reparation offered by 
two scholars: the forward-looking “atonement and forgiveness” model of Roy L. Brooks 
and the backward-looking “rights-based” approach of J. Angelo Corlett. 
 “Racial reconciliation,” Brooks argues, “should be the primary purpose of slave 
redress,” for this gives reparations a “forward-looking quality” that enables a “more 
racially harmonious” future (141). Formal apologies are crucial here, for they signify an 
“acknowledgement of guilt” on behalf of the descendants of slavery’s perpetrators and 
“set the historical record straight” regarding “the magnitude of the injustice, including its 
lingering effects” (144, 148). Brooks’ goal of racial harmony renders him wary of 
reparations models marked by a “preoccupation with compensation and punishment,” but 
this is not to say that he discounts the importance of material compensation for past 
wrongs. Reparations payments are essential “because they make apologies believable” 
(142). They turn mere rhetoric into a “material reality” by practically embodying the 
perpetrator group’s commitment “to change its behavior” (142, 144). (For the 
compensation part of his model, Brooks proposes an atonement trust fund and a slavery 
museum [157-163]). Once an adequate apology and compensation have been made, they 
should be met, Brooks contends, with black forgiveness, which he regards—in a rather 
equivocal distinction—not as a “moral imperative” but as “an unconditional civic 
obligation” (168, original emphasis). That is, provided that “the federal government’s 
apology and reparations are substantial,” African Americans, for Brooks, have a “duty to 
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forgive” based not in some abstract notion of philosophical truth but in the pragmatic 
interest of black and white people living together in a single society (169, 168). 
Contrast this model with that of J. Angelo Corlett, who proposes instead “a 
backward-looking” approach that views reparations as a “compensatory right” (25, 26, 
original emphasis). “While utilitarian considerations of reconciliation may play a 
secondary role,” the chief purpose of reparations, in Corlett’s view, is to honor “the rights 
of those groups that would suffer at the hands of harmful wrongdoers” (25, 23). These are 
first and foremost “rights to compensation,” and to acknowledge such compensation as a 
right is to acknowledge that the moral claims and interests of the wronged group are valid 
and reasonable (26, original emphasis). As in Brooks’ model, the purpose of reparations, 
for Corlett, is “the acknowledgment of a past wrong” and the “‘repayment of a debt’” 
(23). They thus entail “unambiguous apology to the wronged parties (or their 
successors)” and appropriately scaled material compensation (25). Unlike Brooks’ 
forward-looking, reconciliation-based model, however, forgiveness, in Corlett’s rights-
based approach, is supererogatory: 
Reparations ought not to presuppose anything like reconciliation or social 
integration …. [I]t is presumptuous to think that the offspring of oppressed groups 
ought morally to desire to live with the offspring of oppressors. Should Indians 
and blacks [Corlett’s book argues for reparations to both] want to reconcile and 
remain integrated with the rest of the ethnic groups in the United States, so be it, 
and they ought to be treated with the dignity and respect they so richly deserve …. 
But only an unthinking ideology of forgiveness would entail that there is a moral 
duty of Indians and blacks to “forgive and forget” the evils perpetrated against 
their forebears by the U.S. government, certain U.S.-based business [sic] and 
institutions, and the U.S. citizenry. (Corlett 190) 
 
Corlett specifically singles out Brooks in making this point, charging him with a 
“utilitarianism” that shortchanges “black compensatory rights” in exchange for 
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“considerations of social utility maximization”—i.e., the duty to forgive whites in the 
name of the civic interest (233). 
 To be fair, Brooks contends that forgiveness would entail “the cessation of 
resentment,” not that “the victim is supposed to forget about the atrocity,” so the charge 
that a reconciliation-based approach would entail black people to forgive and forget is 
misguided (169, 165). Indeed, while Corlett’s critiques of Brooks are often convincing, 
some are highly debatable and even rest on blatant mischaracterizations of the latter’s 
thought.8 That being said, I argue nonetheless that Corlett’s backward-looking model 
should be endorsed over that of Brooks and that justification for this claim rests on the 
inauspicious precedents set by ineffective and even counterproductive forward-looking 
apologies and reparations that have already been made, outside the U.S., to groups other 
than African Americans. Recent national apologies and gestures of reparation for past 
atrocities of colonialism demonstrate the dangers of forward-looking, reconciliation-
based models of redress.  
 Chiara De Cesari, for instance, has examined the rhetoric and media coverage of 
Italy’s 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation with Libya, intended as a 
 
8 As Corlett persuasively notes, a reconciliation model overlooks the extent to which many black 
Americans might not view the U.S. government as their own, and he fairly questions the justification for 
Brooks’ stipulation that reparations trust fund money must be spent specifically on black education, asking 
why black people should not be “entitled by right” to do with their money as they please (232). Corlett also 
suggests, however, that for Brooks, “apology requires no compensation,” which is patently untrue (231). 
He also argues that Brooks’ proposed trust fund would fail to “compensate blacks to the extent of their 
suffering” but does not support this claim with any figures or calculations justifying the charge (233). Most 
alarmingly, he pushes his critique of Brooks’ reconciliation model to an aggressive, lefter-than-thou extent 
verging on ad hominem attacks: “Brooks’s approach to ‘justice’ for blacks is essentially one that mirrors 
the attitude of the ‘house negro’ who is so concerned about his white master that he would do anything 
reasonable to protect those interests—even sacrifice greatly his own remedial rights and those of other 
blacks” (Corlett 235). (Corlett goes on to compare himself, in this analogy, as being “akin” in attitude and 
thinking to the more radical “‘field negro’” by contrast [235].) 
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national apology and reparations for abuses suffered by Libyans under Italian 
colonialism. The Treaty, De Cesari observes, 
repeatedly alludes to Italian regret for past colonial abuses, and to settlement of 
colonial-era disputes, but only to declare them now settled and resolved. The 
words “close” and “closure” recur every time mention is made of the colonial 
past. The colonial past is always defined as “the chapter of the past” or the 
“painful chapter of the past,” but there is no clue as to exactly what those 
“sufferings” involved: they are only cited to declare that the Treaty will put an 
end to their legacy. (317, original emphasis) 
 
Unsurprisingly, given its sanitized wording, the Treaty’s Italian press coverage likewise 
made no mention of the specific atrocities for which Italy was atoning, and the alleged 
“reparations” the Treaty enacts actually involve the allocation of funds for Libyan 
infrastructural development by Italian companies as well as a range of political and 
economic agreements that facilitate the flow of capital across national borders while 
restricting human migration (319-321). Reparations, in other words, amount here to the 
establishment of neoliberal economic and political structures and a rhetorically 
constructed situation in which people are “able to speak of colonialism only in the remote 
past tense” (De Cesari 324). 
 This is not an isolated incident. Tony Barta identifies a similar dynamic in the 
context of the Australian government’s 2008 apology for the removal of mixed-race 
Aboriginal children from Aboriginal parents and communities. Framed within a discourse 
of “what has come to be called ‘reconciliation,’” Barta observes, the apology 
conspicuously avoided using “one word: genocide” (210, 206). It was meant “to validate 
enough of [Aboriginal people’s] suffering to enable … progress with less dissent into the 
future,” creating a context “within which Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians can 
now ‘move on’” (Barta 210, emphasis added). In 2008 and 2009, the Canadian 
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government, too, offered official apologies advocating reconciliation and forgiveness for 
the injustices of settler colonialism. As Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Sean Coulthard 
argues, the apologies “ideologically manufacture[d]” a sense of historical “transition” by 
rhetorically “allocating the abuses of settler colonization to the dustbins of history” (108). 
Since these apologies, governmental policies and court rulings in Canada have continued 
to undercut indigenous efforts to reclaim land and material resources and maximize 
political self-determination, illustrating how reparations efforts by the Canadian 
government have aimed to render indigenous nationhood compatible with and 
subordinate to the sovereignty of the settler state (Coulthard 107, 122-124). 
As these varied examples attest, the impulse toward closure and forgiveness that 
marks Faulkner’s financially figured racial discourse has perniciously structured many 
contemporary efforts to reckon with what white people owe for national histories of 
racial oppression. In the context of redress for indigenous dispossession and genocide, 
reconciliatory, forward-looking acts of reparation have resulted not only in insufficient 
(or nonexistent) material compensation but also in the disastrous tendency to downplay 
the extent of colonial white-supremacist violence in the past and make premature 
declarations about the end of white supremacy in the present.  
In a specific, practical sense, I am suggesting that these colonial precedents 
should render us wary of black reparations models that prioritize affective and historical 
closure. In a general, more conceptual sense, however, I am arguing that the 
disappointing history of reparations for colonialism and the very real possibility that its 
pitfalls might be reproduced in reparations for African Americans alert us to the dangers 
of modeling racial justice on a particular kind of financial thinking epitomized by The 
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Mansion and Faulkner’s nonfiction. Any act of reparations, however sincerely motivated 
by the goal of naming and dismantling white supremacy, will be severely compromised 
in its ability to achieve that goal to the extent that its purpose is framed as that of paying 
off white people’s moral and material debt, of freeing them from indebtedness all together 
and ushering in a present in which it is no longer necessary for white people to think of 
themselves as members of a racial group with a history of violently secured privileges. So 
long as it is pursued with this purpose in mind, the ostensibly anti-racist commitment to 
reparations risks collapsing into a conservative discourse of what legal scholar Cheryl 
Harris has famously called “whiteness as property.” Throughout its history, Harris 
argues, the U.S. legal system has constructed white racial identity as an exclusive 
“possession,” one that confers “tangible and economically valuable benefits” on those 
who can claim it (1726). U.S. courts have affirmed time and again that “the settled 
expectations” white people have developed as a result of these benefits will be protected 
by law (Harris 1731, emphasis added). In its Brown v. Board of Education decision to 
overturn separate but equal doctrines without mandating government programs to address 
the lingering inequalities produced by Jim Crow—or in its Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke ruling against affirmative action as an unfair denial of whites’ ability 
to compete for every seat at an institution of higher education—the U.S. Supreme Court 
has repeatedly ratified a “status quo” of historically sedimented racial inequality as “an 
accepted and acceptable base line” (Harris 1753). It has recognized the material benefits 
accruing to white people from that status quo as “tantamount to property that could not 
permissibly be intruded upon without consent” (Harris 1731). The idea of whiteness as 
property thus refers to a long-standing legal pattern in which “the parameters of 
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appropriate remedies [for racial oppression] are not dictated by the scope of injury to the 
subjugated, but by the extent of infringement on settled expectations of whites” (Harris 
1768). Forms of reparation that prioritize closure and forgiveness—that anticipate the 
total elimination of white indebtedness—perpetuate this same dynamic by defining the 
project of dismantling institutional racism in terms that cater to white expectations. They 
project onto the political horizon not a sustained need for a chastened, white group 
consciousness (a small price to pay to help ensure that white-supremacist inclinations will 
not just resurface later) but an untroubled future in which the nation’s populace is, in the 
words of The Mansion, “incapable of remembering hurt or harm” and white people, while 
no longer “hav[ing] anything for [them],” will also no longer “have anything against 
[them].”  
To be clear, I am not arguing here that black reparations should only be instituted 
if white people adopt a particular set of motivations for supporting them and a certain 
understanding of what reparations would mean. The capacity of material compensation 
for slavery and Jim Crow to make invaluable, positive differences to black communities 
is obviously not dependent on how white people think and feel about reparations 
payments. I am arguing, rather, that in order for reparations to serve as more than a 
stopgap measure for racialized economic inequality, white people must relinquish the 
expectation that reparations will result in immediate white absolution, that after 
reparations are paid, white people will finally be “off the hook” for past racial violence, 
will no longer owe anything to people of color and will be free to live as history-less 
individuals, “equal to any, good as any,” “all mixed and jumbled up comfortable and 
easy” amidst a racially harmonious America (The Mansion 478). The repayment of white 
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debt through reparations does not strike white supremacy from the historical record. It 
does not amount to a Mansion-esque denouement in which the settlement of outstanding 
moral debt yields a suspension of judgment and the sense that an epoch of striving is 
over. The repayment of white debt through reparations represents one more chapter in the 
ongoing history of slavery and its aftermath. It marks the beginning of white 
accountability for the past, not the end of it. 
In relinquishing the expectation of a post-reparations future in which the history 
of white supremacy is consigned to an unspeakable past, white people would also 
relinquish the settled expectation of untroubled individualism. These are two sides of the 
same whiteness-as-property coin, and it is precisely because Faulkner’s debt-phobic 
racial discourse exhibits them both that it serves as an instructive object lesson for 
contemporary white anti-racism. As Eduardo Bonilla-Silva argues, the rhetoric of 
individualism has been crucial to how ideologies of colorblindness deploy the elements 
of classical liberalism to rationalize ongoing racial inequality in the present. 
Individualistic thinking is a key component of “the meritocratic frame” by which whites 
explain the underrepresentation of minorities in employment, promotion, and higher-
education as a result of discrepancies in work ethic rather than racial discrimination 
(Bonilla-Silva 60). It also informs both the general, neoliberal conviction “that 
governments should intervene in economic and social matters as little as possible” and 
the specific tendency of (mostly but not solely) white Americans to oppose policies that 
“ameliorate racial inequality because they are ‘group based’” (Bonilla-Silva 61, 63). If 
this sounds like a precise echo of Faulkner’s nonfiction claims, this should not be 
surprising, for as Bonilla-Silva observes, “the belief that racial change should happen 
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through a slow, evolutionary process in ‘peoples’ hearts’ rather than governmental 
action” was especially prominent during Jim Crow: it is an “old standpoint … 
reformulated in the modern era to justify keeping racial affairs the way they are” (62).  
 Given these ideological precedents, it is quite alarming that within contemporary 
U.S. media, even the most insightful discussions about what white people owe for 
national histories of racial oppression tend to reinforce a political trajectory that ends 
with white individualism. In December of 2015, the American essayist Eula Biss 
published a piece in The New York Times Magazine entitled “White Debt.” Written in 
response to Claudia Rankine’s essay “The Condition of Black Life is One of Mourning,” 
Biss reflects on “what the condition of white life might be” and arrives at the phrase 
“‘forgotten debt’” as her most accurate shorthand. White Americans, including herself, 
she writes, are “moral debtors who act as material creditors.” They share “a system of 
social advantages” rooted in “the advent of slavery [and, we might add, indigenous 
dispossession] in the colonies,” and these advantages, Biss contends, are “costing” white 
people their “moral life.” It behooves them, therefore, to support initiatives that would 
allow them to discharge their moral debt by gradually dismantling the system of unjust 
advantages they enjoy. (One assumes that reparations would be a major priority here, 
though Biss never uses the term). The essay opens with an autobiographical fact: “I’m 
newly in debt, quite a lot of it, from buying a house. So far, my debt is surprisingly 
comfortable, and that’s one quality of debt that I’ve been pondering lately – how easy it 
can be.” Home ownership then becomes the essay’s organizing conceit, and while this 
makes for a very personal piece of writing, it also enables expectations of white 
individualism to creep in through the back door. “Once you’ve been living in a house for 
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a while, you tend to begin to believe that it’s yours, even though you don’t own it yet. 
When those of us who are convinced of our own whiteness deny our debt, this may be an 
inevitable result of having lived for so long in a house bought on credit but never paid 
off.” Biss’ conceit dovetails nicely here with Coates’ proverbial credit-card bill, but by 
her essay’s penultimate paragraph, the home-ownership metaphor slips into a vision of 
the future in which racial justice amounts not to any attenuation of the comfortable 
individualism symbolized by debtless ownership of one’s house but rather to that 
individualism’s eventual vindication: 
I once feared buying a house because I didn’t want to be owned. I had 
saved money with no purpose in mind other than the freedom to do whatever I 
wanted. Now I’m bound to this house, though I’m still free to lose it if I choose. 
But that isn’t the version of freedom that interests me at the moment. I’m more 
compelled by a freedom that would allow me to deserve what I have. Call it 
liberation, maybe. 
 
Ultimately, Biss finds political hope in the idea that “debt can be repaid incrementally, 
resulting eventually in ownership” (emphasis added). Clearly, the “ownership” achieved 
here by paying off white debt includes a sense of rightful possession of one’s home, but 
the desire for a morally untainted relationship to one’s private property stands in for 
something bigger: the desire for a morally untainted relationship to one’s self, articulated 
by Biss as the “freedom” of feeling that one “deserve[s] what [one] ha[s],” of being 
comfortable and secure in one’s status as a self-made, self-enclosed individual, for which 
the feeling home ownership is an apt metaphor. While Biss’ essay is entirely free from 
the racism running throughout Faulkner’s nonfiction, the sense of white “liberation” she 
ultimately envisions perpetuates the Faulknerian obsession with “owing nothing to any 
 
 177 
man,” implicitly maintaining a sense that the goal of white anti-racism is to re-secure 
white people’s ability to think of themselves as innocently self-made individuals. 
 In the second book of Faulkner’s Snopes trilogy, readers are briefly introduced to 
a minor character named Old Het, a poor aged black woman whose panhandling around 
Jefferson is the farcical stuff of local legend. Forever touting a succession of ragged 
“paper shopping bags” and clad in “tennis shoes and [a] long rat-colored coat trimmed 
with what forty or fifty years ago had been fur,” she passed daily from house to house, 
Faulkner writes, “travelling in a kind of moving island of alarm and consternation as she 
levyed her weekly toll of food scraps and castoff garments and an occasional coin for 
snuff, moving in an urbane uproar and as inescapable as a tax-gatherer” (Town 242). 
With a “bright happy voice,” full of “strong and childlike pleasure,” Old Het serves as a 
source of stereotypical black comic relief in the text (241). But in a brief scene where she 
asks Gavin Stevens for snuff money, something in the tone and mood of her 
conversation—of Faulkner’s representation of her—undergoes a grave, even ominous 
shift, and for one fleeting moment, Old Het becomes the single most concise literary 
encapsulation of the white social and cultural anxieties surrounding racial debt that I have 
been trying to illuminate through Faulkner’s work: 
“There’s some folks thinks all I does, I tromps this town all day long from can-see 
to cant, with a mouth full of gimme and a mouth full of much oblige. They’re 
wrong. I serves Jefferson too. If it’s more blessed to give than to receive like the 
Book say, this town is blessed to a fare-you-well because it’s steady full of folks 
willing to give anything from a nickel up to a hold hat. But I’m the onliest one I 
knows that steady receives. So how is Jefferson going to be steady blessed 
without me steady willing from dust-dawn to dust-dark, rain or snow or sun, to 




By noting how the very gesture of supporting the black poor affords white people highly 
coveted moral credit, Old Het voices what is, for Faulkner, a truly horrifying prospect: 
the idea that white moral debt might in fact be a potentially endless condition in which 
white people will be forever beholden to black people—perpetually “oblige[d]” to 
them—for the exonerating “bless[ing]” of their propitiation and forgiveness. That 
Faulkner so vividly imagines this paradox as a possibility speaks not, of course, to the 
reality of some inordinate vindictiveness on the part of black people but to the excessive 
self-concern that structures white people’s relationships with them. As the whiteness-
studies critic Shannon Sullivan has observed, “What is at stake for many liberal white 
people in their dealings with people of color seems to be achieving a self-righteous 
distance from whiteness and obtaining relief from the affective burdens of white guilt and 
shame. It should go without saying, but it is inappropriate and harmful for white people 
to use people of color in this way” (151). Such reductive (ab)use of people of color—this 
fetishization of them as vessels of white absolution—is one of the most damaging 
consequences of the closure- and individualism-oriented notions of white debt critiqued 
in this chapter, and it is precisely because the figure of Old Het embodies this dynamic in 
fictional miniature that she so effectively encapsulates this chapter’s argument and stakes. 
The fear that white people might never be able to pay off the debt they owe as a group for 
the sins of the past clearly crossed Faulkner’s mind, and Old Het serves as a vehicle for 
expressing this. But for a writer whose moral and political imagination regarded 
indebtedness as anathema, the fear she represents was too great to appear in the text 
without a dose of attenuating irony, so she could only be admitted into the novel as a 
figure of comic relief whose ridiculousness makes it difficult to distinguish even her most 
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solemn expressions from laughably glib cant. As a prime example of what Toni Morrison 
has called American Africanism, Old Het cannot exist as a full, complex human being (as 
a rounded character, in literary terms) because she carries the weight of all the anxieties 
and expectations derived from a white fixation on innocent, unfettered individualism. The 
pressure of that psychological obsession flattens her into a Dickensian grotesque, and her 
aesthetic disfigurement thus bears the traces of a violent racial insecurity that afflicts 
white people today as much as it did Faulkner over sixty years ago. 
 What would it mean for white people, as part of their commitment to dismantling 
white supremacy, to embrace the idea of being morally indebted to African Americans 
for the history of slavery and Jim Crow rather than forever anticipating the moment when 
they will finally be done owing black people accountability for the past? I would propose 
that this is the question (or rather, the aspiration) to which this whole reading of Faulkner 
and of contemporary white anti-racist discourse finally gives rise. Another way of 
phrasing this would be: what would it mean for white people to commit their time, 
energy, and resources to anti-racist movements without worrying about whether or when 
this will result in the clearing of their moral reputation in the eyes of black people? As I 
have argued, a tacit preoccupation with an ideal of innocent, debtless, unencumbered 
individualism has long kept white anti-racist thinking and practice stubbornly if 
unwittingly complicit in the perpetuation of white supremacy, often resulting in the 
production of distorted historical narratives that prematurely herald a racially harmonious 
present and future while silencing a discomforting, compartmentalized past. Ultimately, I 
argue, in order for an idiom like “white debt” to serve its intended, anti-white-
supremacist purpose, rather than incite such pernicious, counterproductive effects, white 
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people will need to work as individuals and as a group to recalibrate the way they think 
and feel about indebtedness as a moral condition. They will need to find ways of viewing 
their racial debt not as a source of incapacitating shame but as a source of identity and 
purpose, not something to be disavowed and frantically gotten rid of but something to be 
embraced for as long as it lasts, as the basis, perhaps, of a much less anxious and 
defensive self-respect premised upon a humility which, compared to a delusional and 
endlessly contested insistence on debtless irreproachability, might even feel, in Biss’ 
terms, “liberat[ing].” As Shannon Sullivan has rightly observed, “A set of virtues 
different than the ones generated by white liberalism is needed to govern white people’s 
involvement in racial justice movements,” virtues, especially, that do not revolve around 
a “reassurance of moral goodness” (146). To the extent that debtless individualism has 
been a crucial liberal virtue governing and derailing white people’s commitments to 
racial justice, there is a great deal riding on their ability to own their status as a morally 
indebted racial group, and it is useful to consider what kinds of conceptual developments 
and concrete practices this affective shift might entail. I want to close this chapter by 
offering a few preliminary remarks along these lines. 
 An anti-white-supremacist, affective reorientation toward indebtedness on behalf 
of white people would entail, first, making a key distinction between the repayment of 
white material debt and the repayment of white moral debt. By striving toward a less 
averse, less allergic relationship to the fact of their own racial debt, white people can 
weaken and eventually break the pernicious hold that an ideal of irreproachable 
individualism has maintained on their political imagination. This revamped relationship 
toward race-based indebtedness would entail that white people open themselves up to 
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white debt, that they not only internalize it but mine it as a source of humbling and 
rewarding self-awareness rather than focusing perpetually on when it will be resolved. 
This willingness to linger on a sense of ongoing moral indebtedness, to inhabit it with 
uncomplaining patience, must coexist, however, with a commitment to paying off white 
material debt as swiftly and thoroughly as possible—for instance, through reparations. 
This is a key point of clarification. The most effectively anti-white-supremacist 
orientation toward white debt that white people can adopt would be one in which that 
term is understood as connoting two different types of action in two different economies: 
a material economy in which white people would support the prompt redistribution of 
wealth and resources and an affective economy in which, alongside and despite this 
repayment of white material debt, a sense of white moral indebtedness would still persist. 
The distinction and seemingly paradoxical relationship drawn here between the material 
and moral dimensions of white debt might seem specious and illogical, but it is, in fact, 
part of how the nature of the problem is reflected in its solution. That any effective 
gesture of reparations, as indicated in the discussion above, would entail both a formal 
apology and material compensation signals the extent to which the dismantling of white 
supremacy entails both a redistribution of material wealth and an affective and 
ideological shift in the way white people view themselves and their nation’s history. The 
fact that there have been so many instances of inadequate, failed reparations consisting of 
compensation-less apologies or apology-less compensations illustrates the extent to 
which progress (or attempted progress) in one vein hardly implies progress in the other, 
and to separate the repayment of white material debt from the repayment of white moral 
debt is thus to acknowledge that the dismantling of white supremacy will require from 
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white people something more than just support for material compensation, something 
along the lines of an inner, affective and ideological shift, which—especially for middle-
class white liberals who enjoy substantial economic security—is not necessarily implied 
by support for reparations as an economic and institutional initiative. 
 I would argue that this non-material something, this thing needed from white 
people beyond support for institutionalized material compensation, is best defined as 
accountability for other white people, an accountability that anti-racist white liberals 
would concretely practice by focusing on their similarities to conservative white racists 
rather than their differences from them and by doing the work of confronting and 
dialoguing with the latter on people of color’s behalf. “[S]omeone needs to talk with 
white supremacists,” Sullivan observes, and it should be white liberals who do this 
because they “generally don’t risk being harmed as severely as people of color by 
attempting to engage in respectful conversations with [them]” (51, 51-52, original 
emphasis). The goal of these conversations would be “to learn how [white supremacists] 
came to view white people as superior to people of other races and how their experiences 
have shaped their sense of the world” (Sullivan 48-49). It is emphatically not, that is, “to 
shame” them and thus create situations where “some white people who feel they ‘get it’ 
… [can] preach to others about how to end white domination” (53, 52-53). The necessity 
of this affective and ideological shift pertains to how white liberals relate to white 
supremacists in the past as much as to those in the present. Sullivan takes equal aim, for 
instance, at the tendency of contemporary white liberals to regard past slaveholders “as 
monstrously evil and thus of no relation to white people today,” a scapegoating gesture 
“intimately connected with the positing of good white liberals as racially innocent 
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angels” (61, 66). Obviously, this is not to say that past white slaveholders should be 
defended but that, regardless of blood ancestry, “growing up white in the United States 
means that white slaveholders can and should be thought of as [one’s] forebears” 
(Sullivan 71). Subscribing to a “false dichotomy between defending or demonizing” them 
merely impedes awareness of the extent to which “good white people are also flawed 
human beings, complicit with rather than hovering apart from white domination” 
(Sullivan 64, 65).  
This “white middle-class othering” of both past white slaveholders and 
contemporary white conservatives (rich and poor) maintains “problematic assumptions 
about who white racists are” and exemplifies the tendency of white people, including 
those of the liberal middle class, “to see themselves as individuals and believe that they 
should be treated as such” (Sullivan 26, 72). Rather than “object to thinking of 
themselves as bound to other white people through their whiteness”—as being defined by 
one’s “racial group membership”—a white person committed to dismantling white 
supremacy, Sullivan argues, “should acknowledge the network of relations with white 
people in which she is bound and for which she is responsible. And being responsible for 
them means confronting how [one is] implicated in their behavior” (72). This acceptance 
by white anti-racists of a sense of “responsib[ility]” for the violent actions, thinking, and 
rhetoric of white supremacists should be understood, I am arguing, as part of what the 
phrase “white debt” implies. It is part of what white people owe to people of color and of 




It is in this regard that Faulkner’s fiction proves, again, instructive to 
contemporary white anti-racist thought, this time as a model to be emulated rather than as 
an object lesson in affective and ideological inclinations to be avoided. If Faulkner’s 
work bears an impulse toward historical closure and a fixation on debtless individualism, 
both inimical to an effective reckoning with white supremacy, it also shows how he 
refused to demonize unabashedly racist whites as if they were exceptionally or uniquely 
evil and solely responsible for white supremacy. In November of 2016, just before the 
election of Donald Trump, the Argentine-Chilean-American novelist Ariel Dorfman 
published a short piece in The Atlantic emphasizing precisely this aspect of Faulkner’s 
work and noting its relevance to our polarized historical moment. Faulkner, Dorfman 
writes, 
lovingly and often good-humoredly portrayed the lives of those whom we might 
identify today, forgiving the generalization, as core Trump supporters—hunters 
and gun owners; ill-informed men clinging to their threatened virility and old time 
traditions; white Americans of small rural or economically depressed 
communities overwhelmed by the harsh rush of modernity, unprepared for a 
globalization they cannot control. Without ever condoning their racial prejudices 
and paranoia he also never condescended to them, never looked down upon their 
bafflement and blindness …. (emphasis added) 
 
Faulkner’s representation of Mink is a perfect case in point. Throughout The Mansion’s 
opening chapter, which narrates Mink’s botched attempt to winter his cow on his rich 
neighbor Houston’s farm, Faulkner frequently calls attention to Mink’s racist views 
toward African Americans. The figure of Houston’s black farmhand, for instance, 
repeatedly provokes Mink’s ire: “a Negro to whom Houston furnished a better house to 
live in than the one that he, Mink, a white man with a wife and two daughters, lived in,” a 
Negro whom Mink “curs[ed] … for his black skin inside the warmer garments than his” 
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(10, 12). As Dorfman contends, Faulkner does not “condon[e]” these racial prejudices, 
for they are clearly included as unsympathetic character traits, yet he also does not 
“condescend[]” to Mink for bearing them. Rather than portraying him as a petty, 
despicable bigot, Faulkner contextualizes his racism within the broader structures of 
emasculating economic inequality through which it is best understood, hence Mink 
“cursing the Negro for his black skin inside the warmer garments than his, … [but] 
cursing above all the unawares white man through or because of whose wealth such a 
condition could obtain” (Mansion 12-13, emphasis added). Faulkner’s phrasing here is 
brilliantly nuanced. He manages to capture the full extent of Mink’s indignation, 
including his class-based resentment toward Houston, while carefully noting that this 
resentment does not imply cross-racial solidarity, for Mink curses Houston not just for 
the sheer fact of his wealth but also because that wealth enables a black man to be more 
comfortably housed and clothed than a white one. Neither denying nor sugarcoating 
Mink’s racism, Faulkner also avoids reducing him to it, and by gesturing toward the well-
to-do figure of Houston in the wings, he refuses any narrow vision of white supremacy in 
which an easily scapegoated group of unrefined poor whites are stigmatized as racists 
while the white rich escape scrutiny. Indeed, this refusal of any reductive, classist 
understanding of white supremacy informs the Snopes trilogy as a whole, which takes as 
its main moral and social problem Flem’s plutocratic rise to power via unbridled and 
remorselessly unscrupulous speculation and situates the misguidedly racist anger and 
frustration of someone like Mink as a structure of feeling incited by the spectacular, 
coveted success of Yoknapatawpha’s 1%. As Dorfman maintains, “Faulkner would have 
understood the roots of the present disaffection of those people he cared for so much and 
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the fear from which that disaffection derives, the feeling that they are trapped in a 
historical tide not of their making, their American dream gone berserk.” 
 In his uncondescending portrayals of the simultaneously bigoted and beleaguered 
white poor, Faulkner, in other words, displayed a kind of nuanced thinking about 
different groups of white people that serves as an instructive model for contemporary 
white anti-racism today, where the deconstruction of a pernicious “good white 
liberal”/“bad white racist” binary is an urgent conceptual task. This is no less true of 
Faulkner’s treatment of Gavin Stevens, an upper-middle-class, Harvard-educated lawyer 
whose simultaneous disdain for racism and obsessive concern for his own moral and 
social reputation creates a measured yet critical portrait of complacent and often 
hypocritical white liberalism. The first time Gavin appears in The Mansion he is chiding 
his nephew Chick for an anti-Semitic remark made about Linda’s late husband Barton 
Kohl. “‘You didn’t find that at Harvard,’” Gavin tells Chick in reference to his anti-
Semitism (Chick, too, being a Harvard grad like his uncle), “I thought that maybe after 
two years in Cambridge, you might not even recognise it again when you came back to 
Mississippi” (123). Throughout the novel, however, Gavin’s progressivism is revealed to 
have strict limits, particularly during The Mansion’s denouement. In 1946, 38 years into 
Mink’s 40-year prison sentence, Linda approaches Gavin for legal expertise, asking him 
how one might go about expediting Mink’s release. At this point in the novel, readers are 
well-aware that Linda holds a grudge against Flem for driving Eula, her mother and his 
late wife, to suicide. Her sudden interest in Mink is clearly related to her desire for 
revenge against her stepfather. Gavin, who has long held Linda as a Platonic love 
interest, does not (or will not) fathom that she could hold such motives, but her request 
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creates a dilemma for him all the same because he knows that Mink will try to kill Flem 
upon release. Desirous as anyone for a Jefferson and Yoknapatawpha rid of this 
Machiavellian financier yet loath to think of himself as knowing accomplice to murder, 
Gavin manages to have his cake and eat it too by trading on the fact that Linda (deafened 
by a shell blast while fighting in the Spanish Civil War) cannot hear. Throughout The 
Mansion, Gavin communicates to her by means of a writing pad, and he resolve (or 
rather, sidesteps) his moral dilemma by deciding not to use it when warning Linda about 
Mink’s murderous inclinations: 
He had even moved the pencil again when he stopped and spoke aloud 
instead; later he told Ratliff why. “I know why,” Ratliff said. “You jest wanted to 
keep your own skirts clean. Maybe by this time she had done learned to read your 
lips and even if she couldn’t you would at least been on your own record 
anyhow.” “No,” Stevens said. “It was because I not only believe in and am an 
advocate of fate and destiny, I admire them; I want to be one of the instruments 
too, no matter how modest.” (Mansion 405) 
 
Ratliff, that is, suspects that Gavin wants Flem killed but that—for the sake, if not of his 
public reputation, then at least of his own private self-regard—he only wants this done in 
a way that would allow him to say that he tried to stop the murder. Warning Linda by 
mouth rather than in print was his way of putting up a show of conscientious resistance, 
of being clear “‘on [his] own record,” while leaving an ample chance that his warning 
will not interfere with her plans. Gavin, however, tries to give his actions a more self-
righteous spin, suggesting that he chose the means of communication more difficult for 
Linda to understand because he wanted, unambiguously, to be an “‘instrument[]’” of 
Flem’s fate regardless of the murderous implications this entails. As the final chapters of 
the novel unfold, it becomes clear that Ratliff’s conjecture is nearer to the truth and that 
Gavin’s involvement in the tangle of justice the Mink-Flem conflict represents is shaped 
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by the priority he places on his own respectability. Once Linda arranges for Mink’s early 
release, Gavin makes one last half-hearted attempt to preempt the murder by setting up a 
bribe in which Mink would take $1,000 in exchange for agreeing upon release to leave 
Mississippi immediately and for the rest of his life. When Ratliff wonders if they should 
consider Plan Bs in case Mink does not take the bribe, Gavin dismisses the concern, and 
it is only when the prison calls to say that has Mink left without the money that he finally 
admits to himself that Ratliff was right about his will to keep his own skirts clean: 
“Stevens thought rapidly So I am a coward, after all. When it happens two years from 
now, at least none of it will spatter on me”—a coward for having orchestrated a series of 
intentionally ill-conceived obstacles to Flem’s murder, leaving ample room for its 
occurrence while gaining the alibi of having tried to stop it (413, original emphasis). 
 Faulkner’s critical portrait of Gavin as a white liberal, like his forbearing portrait 
of Mink as a poor white bigot, refuses any reductive, classist ideas about who, morally 
and politically, are the “good” white people and who are the “bad” ones. It should be 
noted, however, that even this more laudable aspect of Faulkner’s fiction has its limits, 
for as much as he created in Gavin a rather effective case study in the shortcomings and 
hypocrisies of educated, middle-class white liberalism, Gavin also makes a number of 
passing remarks that bear alarming, counterproductive implications for racial justice and 
that Faulkner himself (rather than holding them up for critique through a tone of clear 
irony) appears to condone if not endorse. When Faulkner’s black school principal 
approaches Gavin to ask for help in calling off Linda’s overzealous and paternalistic 
activism, Gavin’s response reveals an understanding of white moral debt better geared 
toward perpetuating white supremacy than dismantling it. “‘Just say we thank her and 
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will remember her, but to let us alone,’” the principal requests, to which Gavin replies: 
“‘How can you say that to someone who will face that much risk, just for justice, just to 
abolish ignorance?’” (Mansion 249, emphasis added). The remark betrays a ingenuous 
yet no less pernicious tendency to place concern for the moral credit white people get (or 
believe they should get) for challenging white supremacy above or at least on par with 
the needs and wishes of the black people to whom they are allies, an obsession with one’s 
own moral credibility as a white anti-racist that trivializes the infinitely greater risk faced 
by people of color in challenging white supremacy and in simply moving through a 
white-supremacist world. I am not suggesting that involvement in anti-racist struggles is 
not a creditworthy commitment on white people’s behalf but that a true embrace of the 
idea of white moral debt—a truly anti-white-supremacist understanding of that concept 
and of the affective and ideological self-recalibrations it implies—would be one in which 
the moral credit accrued by white people for anti-racist commitments is beside the point. 
Emphasis on the risk that good white people take in challenging white supremacy betrays 
a fundamentally skewed conception of the purpose and stakes of racial justice movements 
and risks, in turn, perpetuating a racial-justice narrative in which the elimination of white 
supremacy is credited to white people. That Faulkner’s account of Linda as an activist 
emphasizes the tones of “alarm, fright, [and] terror in which the black voice [from fear of 
terroristic white backlash] would have to say Thank You” suggests that he was aware that 
the risks faced by Linda’s black students were greater than those faced by Linda herself 
(248). Yet the unresisting tone of the black principal’s response to Gavin’s comment 
suggests that Faulkner ultimately shared the Gavin’s sense of how regrettable it was for 
her brave activism to go to waste: “‘I know,’ the Principal said. ‘It’s difficult’” (249).  
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I cite this instance of ingenuously white-supremacist white liberalism not to 
stigmatize Faulkner for this racial faux pas but to acknowledge how easy it is for 
seemingly innocuous and reasonable impulses—like anticipations of historical closure, of 
vindicated individualism, or of recognition for the risks taken by anti-racist whites—to 
infiltrate and undercut white anti-racism. Faulkner’s instructiveness for contemporary 
white anti-racist thought lies both in his unwitting exhibition and thus crystallization of 
these impulses and in his less frequent identification and critique of them. Sometimes, as 
in the case of Gavin venerating Linda’s risk, Faulkner’s position with regard to such 
inclinations is clear (either oblivious endorsement or conscious rejection). At other times, 
it can be harder to tell. In the course of one of his interior monologues, for instance, 
Gavin contemplates the value of forgiveness and forgetting when it comes to reckoning 
with past wrongs: “his, Stevens’, thought was that what the world needed was more 
forgiving: that if you had a good sensitive quick-acting capacity for forgiving, it didn’t 
really matter whether you ever learned or even remembered anything or not” (Mansion 
402). After this chapter’s discussions about reparations (and perhaps even without them), 
it should be clear that such thinking would be politically disastrous, especially with 
regard to histories of white supremacy and racial justice. On the one hand, one would like 
to believe that this is another instance (as with Gavin’s concerns about his own 
reputation) of Faulkner being critical of one of his white characters. The sweeping idea 
that it might not “really matter whether [one] ever learned or even remembered anything 
or not” seems like such an extreme and universally disagreeable conviction that it is hard 
to believe that Faulkner is voicing it in any way other than ironically, positioning Gavin’s 
wishful thinking as an object of critique. On the other hand, if one recalls the wholly un-
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ironic presentation of Mink’s albeit untenable wish that his bad blood with Flem could be 
set aside so that he and his cousin could grow old together in the sun, it seems 
conceivable that Gavin’s thought might not be that absurd to Faulkner after all—that 
while it might be impractically, too lavishly articulated, it bears, at its core, a sentiment 
worth endorsing.  
Whatever Faulkner’s position toward it may be, Gavin’s wishful, Pollyannaish 
conviction about forgiveness prompts one final stipulation about what a politically 
productive embrace of white debt by white people would mean. I have noted already that 
it would require distinguishing between the repayment of white material debt and that of 
white moral debt, for the latter entails an affective and ideological shift not necessarily 
implied by the former. It would also entail an assumption of accountability by white 
liberals for the ideas and actions of white conservatives, a focus on one’s similarities to 
overt white supremacists that would mean, in turn, antiracist whites relinquishing 
preoccupations with their own moral goodness. I would suggest, lastly, that white people 
adopting a productive understanding and practice of white debt would amount to them, 
contra Gavin’s thought, neither forgetting their history nor prematurely forgiving 
themselves for it but rather claiming it and, as James Baldwin once put it, “learning how 
to use it” (The Fire Next Time 333). “To accept one’s past,” Baldwin stipulated (speaking 
specifically of white people), “is not the same thing as drowning in it” (333). It means 
coming to terms with that history so that it can be claimed as a resource for living in the 
present. In his own conceptual lexicon, Baldwin described the acceptance of one’s history 
as indicative of a capacity for self-love, where “love” is understood in turn as implying a 
capacity for self-criticism. “White people in this country will have quite enough to do in 
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learning how to accept and love themselves and each other,” Baldwin wrote; yet, as he 
further added, “[p]eople always seem to band together in accordance to a principle that 
has nothing to do with love, a principle that releases them from personal responsibility” 
(Fire 299, 333, emphasis added). The same idea is expressed at the start of Notes of a 
Native Son: “I love America more than any other country in the world, and, exactly for 
this reason, I insist on the right to criticize her perpetually” (9). The notion of a white 
critical self-love—often justified through references to Baldwin—has been advocated in 
much recent work within whiteness studies. Sullivan herself ends her most recent 
monograph with a call for a “spiritually healthy [white] self-love” that is “different from 
that of narcissism” (124). This would be a love that includes “room for criticism of that 
which one loves”—of white family and friends, of one’s white self—that “requires such 
criticism as part of spiritually healthy loving” (Sullivan 160, emphasis added). And as far 
as white liberals’ relation to white conservatives is concerned, it would be a connective 
rather than distancing love, one “willing to risk complicity with the criticized object 
because of the love felt toward it” (Sullivan 161). 
To be sure, much of Faulkner’s writing resonates with this line of thought. In his 
hybrid essay/short story “Mississippi,” he concluded a poignant meditation on the not-
always-flattering history and people of his home state with a self-addressed closing line 
akin to Baldwin’s claim about the need to keep criticizing America out of love: “Loving 
all of it even while he had to hate some of it because he knows now that you dont love 
because: you love despite; not for the virtues, but despite the faults” (Essays 43). For my 
own part, I am more interested in history than in love—in fact, while I understand the 
impetus to identify affects conducive to more productive political action than white guilt 
 
 193 
and shame, the theorization of “love” or “self-love” as a mantra or watchword for white 
anti-racism strikes me not only as an unnecessary rhetorical maneuver but as a 
dangerously slippery one. The particular kind of reckoning with white debt proposed in 
this chapter would result, rather, in white people accepting their group history not as 
source of “love”—nor of unproductive shame and guilt—but of enabling humility, of 
patient humility. It would mean (in Baldwin’s terms from the epigraph to this chapter) 
that white people surrender, without bitterness or self-pity, the long-held dream of 
historical closure and the long-cherished privilege of history-less individualism for the 
higher dream, the great privilege, of a black forgiveness willingly bestowed, a 
forgiveness earned by not obsessively anticipating it but by displaying an awareness of 
the scale of the debt owed by inhabiting white indebtedness with a patient concern for the 
flourishing of black people rather an anxious concern for one’s own moral vindication. It 
would mean (in Faulkner’s terms from the chapter’s second epigraph) white people 
working toward not have anything for them without expecting that this will immediately 
mean not having anything against them.9
 
9 The main constructive criticism I received from a committee member on this chapter was that it could be 
improved by a discussion of how the neoliberally resonant, debt-phobic logics and structures of feeling I 
illuminate have affected not just white people but also the black middle-class. I agree that this could 
helpfully broaden the chapter’s scope, and while I was not able to incorporate this criticism into the project 
by the defense, I do want to gesture toward some of the ways I imagine it playing out. I think, clearly, this 
discussion would go somewhere in the concluding portion of the chapter, in the range of what is currently 
page 60 to the end, and I think one place to begin is with the work of the African American conservative 
public intellectual Shelby Steele. He has published a number of works that are highly critical of notions like 
“white guilt” and “white debt,” claiming that these concepts and feelings undermine black people’s 
independence and capacity to build a sense of racial pride and self-regard because it keeps black progress 
indebted to white compunction and charitability. Steele’s thinking quite tightly links racial equality to 
notions of self-made independence akin to those that Faulkner so strongly championed. Obviously, a 
discussion of the ways in which the black middle-class has been affected by neoliberal ideas about debt and 
indebtedness would need to go beyond Steele, and there’s much research I would need to do in order to 
more fully incorporate this constructive critique. But I do want to mention Steele as one way into the 
discussion. I would also note that another point I was going to raise in the chapter (not one requested by 




in black studies about debt as an object of celebration and means of social cohesion, especially in work by 
Fred Moten. The discussion would have noted the ways in which whiteness studies might draw on Moten’s 
work, learning from some of the debt-philic philosophies and perspective in that vein of thinking. I would 
also, however, frame this prospect with a high degree of wariness, however, insisting very clear that the 
kind of thinking Moten is doing about debt as a celebratory basis for black fugitive sociality speaks to a set 
of material and historical conditions specific to black life that do not really map, in any straightforward 
way, onto white people’s lived experience. Any model of thinking about how white people might cultivate 
a positive relationship toward debt would thus have to depart substantially from Moten’s, even if it were 
complementary to and drew upon the latter. These are of course high speculative, low-resolution thoughts, 
but I hope it at least honors the constructive criticism given by this committee member and illuminates 




Your Own Worst Critic: Whiteness as Professionalism in Fitzgerald’s Tender is the 
Night 
 
Perhaps that was, is, the hope of the movement: to awaken the Dreamers, to rouse them 
to the facts of what their need to be white, to talk like they are white, to think that they 
are white, which is to think that they are beyond the design flaws of humanity, has done 
to the world. 
 
– Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me (146) 
  
In April of 1930, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s wife Zelda suffered the first in a series of 
psychiatric breakdowns inaugurating a long period of institutionalization at various 
clinics in France, Switzerland, and the United States. The prospects of her ever making a 
full recovery were bleak, and her ongoing treatment caused a serious financial and 
emotional strain that Fitzgerald weathered through alcohol, an affair, and the half-hearted 
drudgery of churning out poorly remunerated short stories to cover the bills while 
keeping his daughter Scottie in school with a veneer of secure middle-class standing 
(Bruccoli, Some Sort of Epic Grandeur 286-486).1 Fitzgerald soldiered on under these 
conditions for as long as he could, until sometime around the middle of the decade, when 
he ran out of steam and realized that he had hit rock bottom. With his marriage in 
shambles, his finances tanked, and his self-confidence and literary career severely 
atrophied, he published in Esquire, in 1936, a three-part essay series now collectively 
called “The Crack-Up,” in which he reflected on the past, personal conduct that he 
believed had led him to the lowest point of his life. 
 
1 In addition to the biography of Fitzgerald by Matthew J. Bruccoli, a less succinct but higher-resolution 
image of Fitzgerald’s life during this time is furnished by his epistolary correspondence. See F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, A Life in Letters, 181-324. 
 
 196 
Ultimately, Fitzgerald concluded that he had ruined himself by being too giving. 
He had spent the better part of his adulthood “mortgaging [him]self physically and 
spiritually up to the hilt,” trying to please and entertain those around him by deferring to 
their opinions, needs, and desires, whether those of his wife, friends, critics, or fellow 
writers (Fitzgerald, “The Crack-Up” 72).2 The result? “[T]here was not an ‘I’ any more 
[sic]—not a basis on which I could organize my self-respect” (CU 79). Fitzgerald thus 
announced the self-corrective intention of making a “clean break”: of rescuing what was 
left of his professional career by abandoning in the future all pretense to giving a damn 
about other people’s feelings or even the most basic moral obligations of human decency 
(CU 81). “I would cease any attempts to be a person,” he writes, “to be kind, just or 
generous” (CU 82). Newly committed to taking care of himself, he would have nothing to 
do, anymore, with anyone from whom he has “nothing to gain” (CU 83). “The old dream 
of being an entire man in the Goethe-Byron-Shaw tradition, with an opulent American 
touch, a sort of combination of J. P. Morgan, Topham Beauclerk and St. Francis of 
Assisi, has been relegated to the junk heap” (CU 84). No more well-rounded self-
cultivation, no more romance, no more political commitments, no more witty social flare, 
and certainly no more saint-like altruism. If Fitzgerald is to resemble any of these six 
men, post-crack-up, it is J. P. Morgan alone, dedicated to nothing but the successful 
enterprise of his business as an author. With a “heady villainous feeling,” he proclaims, 
“I have now at last become a writer only” (CU 82, 83). 
There is something about the way Fitzgerald describes and makes sense of his 
own professional downfall here that speaks, I would argue, to his racial identity, 
 
2 All further references to this essay are cited parenthetically in the chapter with the abbreviation “CU.” 
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something about the mixture of self-pity and self-flattery by which he positions himself 
as the unwitting victim of an overly kind, generous, and hard-working nature. To be sure, 
none of the language or imagery in “The Crack-Up” has anything, explicitly, to do with 
race—until, that is, the very end. In his final paragraph, Fitzgerald cynically sketches his 
imminent life of post-crack-up misanthropy with the help of an overtly racialized simile: 
I shall manage to live with the new dispensation, though it has taken some 
months to be certain of the fact. And just as the laughing stoicism which has 
enabled the American Negro to endure the intolerable conditions of his existence 
has cost him his sense of the truth—so in my case there is a price to pay. I do not 
any longer like the postman, nor the grocer, nor the editor, nor the cousin’s 
husband, and he in turn will come to dislike me, so that life will never be very 
pleasant again, and the sign Cave Canem is hung permanently just above my 
door. I will try to be a correct animal though, and if you throw me a bone with 
enough meat on it I may even lick your hand. (CU 84, original emphasis) 
 
In this final rhetorical flourish, Fitzgerald assumes a knowledge of African American 
experience intimate enough to judge that “the American Negro” has lost his sense of 
reality by using humor to survive racist conditions. The problem here is not just the 
presumptuousness of Fitzgerald’s judgement about African Americans’ sanity but his 
attempt to claim what African Americans have: namely, the distinction of having 
suffered, of having endured “intolerable conditions” of adversity. Fitzgerald seeks the 
prestige of dogged resilience under circumstances of hardship. The phrase “price to pay” 
is crucial here, for it is precisely the dignified solemnity of having survived only by 
paying a price (that of becoming a tough lone wolf “dislike[d]” by everyone) that 
Fitzgerald wants to exude for readers. In other words, while “The Crack-Up” is framed, 
on the whole, as a work of humbling self-criticism—a confession of the author’s 
character flaws and past mistakes—it is also manages, through its aesthetic tropes and 
hardboiled tone, to be surprisingly egotistic. Fitzgerald stylizes himself like a martyr to 
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the cause of solicitous selflessness, betrayed by the selfishness of others and now bitterly 
disillusioned with his own charitability. The essay thus offers an ironically self-
aggrandizing performance of self-criticism, and while Fitzgerald’s shortsighted comment 
about “the American Negro” does not, on its own, provide a robust, detailed way of 
describing what we might call the whiteness of “The Crack-Up,” it does at least mark 
these reflections on his professional identity as reflections coming from a distinctly white 
subject position. 
 From the perspective of a reader interested in what Fitzgerald’s work might 
contribute to discussions of whiteness, what makes “The Crack-Up” at once provocative 
and frustrating is the way Fitzgerald’s self-aggrandizing self-pity coexists alongside 
mentalities and convictions that could in fact behoove middle-class white people in their 
efforts at humbling self-criticism. One of the essay’s underlying implications, after all, is 
that becoming a better person might require relinquishing certain hyper-idealistic self-
images and -expectations—like, for instance, a self-image that combines material 
success, career prestige, moral uprightness, and social affability into one blissfully 
innocent yet egotistical fantasy. What Fitzgerald calls his “old dream of being an entire 
man in the Goethe-Byron-Shaw tradition” is redolent with what Ta-Nehisi Coates, in the 
epigraph to this chapter, describes as the “white” need to believe oneself “beyond the 
design flaws of humanity,” not in the sense of an overtly bigoted belief that one’s own 
race is superior to others (though that is surely part of what Coates has in mind) but in the 
subtler, more insidious belief that one’s conduct and character are beyond critique 
because they align, supposedly, with universal values like kindness to others and a 
commitment to hard work. While not intended to do so, Fitzgerald’s “old dream” is 
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evocative of the kind of wishfully faultless self-image that many middle-class white 
liberals invoke today to deny their complicity in white supremacy: that innocent sense of 
oneself as someone who personally harbors no discriminatory feelings toward others and 
has only ever aspired to be “a good person,” a self-understanding easily trotted out as a 
defense against charges that one is complicit in white-supremacist power structures. In an 
albeit loosely figurative sense, “The Crack-Up” could be said to exhibit what Coates 
might call one of “the Dreamers” rousing himself to the facts of what his need to be white 
has done—not, admittedly, “to the world” but to himself. Realizing that the “old dream” 
of aspiring to near-perfection is an unsustainable and self-damaging lie, Fitzgerald’s 
“clean break” provocatively illustrates the idea that growth can come in the form of 
lowering one’s self-estimations and not expecting that becoming a better person 
inevitably or immediately implies becoming more likable. As an ethical bankrupt and 
self-styled dog, Fitzgerald ends up avowedly less “beyond the design flaws of humanity” 
after his clean break than he was before it. The problem is that this humbling self-
abasement is, to some extent, a form of false humility. It is a performance of self-
criticism that backtracks its self-criticality by clinging to and spectacularizing the self-
critic’s virtuous industriousness and adopting an air of mistreated victimhood through a 
clumsy racial simile that highlights the author’s white identity. 
 This initial reading of “The Crack-Up” sketches in miniature the larger project of 
this chapter: to demonstrate that Fitzgerald’s writings from the 1930s can help us think 
about forms of whiteness that inhere not in unselfconscious enjoyment of social and 
economic privileges and an unbothered sense of oneself as a “good person” but rather in 
distressed self-consciousness about one’s privileged social standing and in earnest yet 
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flawed attempts at self-criticism related to it. This chapter argues that in his fictional and 
nonfiction reflections upon his own identity as a working “professional,” Fitzgerald 
exhibited an anxious form of middle-class whiteness defined by the compulsive need to 
prove (to oneself) that one has earned any elite social and economic standing one enjoys 
and has lived life in a way that accords with seemingly universal ideals of moral 
uprightness and social accountability.  Moral uprightness, of course, is not a phrase one 
would use to describe the Fitzgerald we end up with in “The Crack-Up,” and this is 
because “The Crack-Up” captures him at a point in his life when he had just decided, out 
of despondency and exhaustion, to abandon the moral standards that had structured his 
work and self-image prior to his professional decline in the 1930s. I positioned “The 
Crack-Up” as a lead in to this chapter because it provides a concise illustration of the 
main trope under which this chapter’s thinking about whiteness is organized: that of 
earnest yet partial and imperfect self-criticism. It is not “The Crack-Up,” however, that 
constitutes this chapter’s archive so much as Fitzgerald’s fourth novel, Tender is the 
Night (1934), which tells the semiautobiographical story of the psychologist Dr. Richard 
“Dick” Diver’s ’s tragic decline from a promising young professional to a dissipated 
wreck after an imprudent marriage to his wealthy patient Nicole Warren. In his self-
conscious work ethic and his work-ethic-based sense of identity—what I call Dick’s 
“professionalism”—Fitzgerald’s semiautobiographical protagonist embodies, I argue, an 
insecure, middle-class, male whiteness distinguished by ironically self-critical yet self-
aggrandizing concerns about how one has acquired and inhabited elite positions of 
occupational prestige and material comfort and how such privileges may have marred 
one’s moral character and distorted one’s self-perception. 
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The moral and affective “professional” outlook that Dick brings to his work in 
Tender combines an ambitious drive for personal success with both a neurotic need to be 
loved and an anxious awareness of having been buoyed up in life by privileged access to 
social and economic resources and opportunities. Concerned that his good fortune and 
privileges have put him at risk of becoming a self-absorbed egotist whose professional 
successes derive less from his own hard work than from a lifetime of lucky advantages, 
Dick holds himself to a set of what are at once ego-checking and ego-boosting standards 
of moral exemplarity and social affability. He clings to a meritocratic self-image built 
around a commitment to working hard, taking risks, and growing through challenges that 
toughen his mettle, while, at the same time, using his professional talents and resources to 
make a constant show out of being of service to others—an altruism that, while admirable 
to some extent, is largely and consciously based in his own self-centered desire to be 
well-liked. In its focus on Dick Diver’s professionalism, then, this chapter illuminates a 
form of bourgeois whiteness characterized by a self-conscious, almost paranoid fixation 
on reconciling one’s comfortable social standing with fetishized notions of innocence and 
moral uprightness. As I demonstrate in the chapter, however, Dick’s professionalism also 
exists alongside—or rather, accommodates—a paternalistic male chauvinism, flashes of 
Aryan and Anglo-Saxon race pride, and a sententious middle-class disdain for the rich. 
Indeed, in both Tender is the Night and in nonfiction contexts like his epistolary 
correspondence, Fitzgerald’s specifically middle-class professional pride tends to involve 
a white intra-racial class conflict in which the virtues of “good” (white) people like Dick 
Diver and himself are emphasized by scapegoating the leisure-class rich as “bad” (white) 
people who lack a sense of work ethic or moral integrity. The middle-class whiteness 
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embodied in Fitzgerald’s novel is thus defined by an anxious, self-aggrandizing form of 
auto-critique which, in its classed and gendered biases, is not just a form of earnest self-
criticism but a form of earnest self-criticism that is also problematically incomplete.  
 In pursuing this line of argument, this chapter aims to build upon the work of 
scholars like Shannon Sullivan, who, in Good White People: The Problem with Middle-
Class White Anti-Racism, explores the limitations and pitfalls affecting the types of 
growing yet imperfect racial awareness that many middle-class white people have now 
managed to achieve. Sullivan reveals, that is, “the particularities of white liberalism’s 
style of white racism,” and she does this not to shame middle-class liberal whites for the 
enduring shortcomings of their racial optics but to aid in the ongoing project of 
developing whiteness “into an identity grounded in racial justice” (4, 22). The uptake of 
objectives like this is a relatively recent development in whiteness studies. As explained 
in this dissertation’s Introduction, for the past two decades, the majority of whiteness-
studies scholarship has offered excellent historical, materialist analyses of how ethnic 
groups that at one time were not considered white “became white” by participating in 
racist practices against people of color. The field’s general thrust has thus been to talk 
about whiteness in terms of the concrete institutions and practices, like slavery, 
naturalization law, (settler) colonialism, and redlining, on which the material privileges of 
whiteness have been founded. The past few years, however, have witnessed a plethora of 
new studies, like Sullivan’s, that build upon the field’s earlier work by asking, in effect: if 
this is whiteness’ violent history, then what can white people do about it now? How can 
they begin to take responsibility for white supremacy in the past and present, and what 
kinds of behaviors and ways of thinking obstruct this goal? These newer works of 
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scholarship elucidate how many white people, bothered by their implication in historical 
and ongoing forms of white supremacy, have developed mindsets and strategies either for 
addressing this fact or for denying and obscuring it (Bonilla-Silva; Sullivan; Alcoff; 
Yancy; Matias). These scholars have adopted multiple approaches, with particular 
emphasis falling on affect-oriented analyses of white guilt, shame, and anxiety and on 
discourse analysis of the rhetorical strategies white people use to shore up their moral 
innocence (like pointing out their many black friends or appealing to abstract, 
“colorblind” beliefs in a meritocratically structured world).3 Dissociating whiteness from 
white supremacy will be a lengthy and thorny endeavor, one that requires, on the one 
hand, optimistic sensitivity to the moments where acts of white self-reflection result in 
actual or potential strides toward anti-racist self-transformation and, on the other hand, 
vigilance about how white people’s self-criticisms often leave certain racial biases 
untouched or even perpetuate other biases (ones related to class and gender, for instance) 
in the process of working through this racial baggage. White self-criticism, in other 
words, will frequently be partial and flawed, but it is an iterative process, and we need to 
able to discern and acknowledge the moments where it does happen, while remaining 
cognizant of the work that remains to be done. 
 Tender is the Night, I argue—and, to a lesser extent, “The Crack-Up”—offers a 
literary example of such earnest yet flawed white self-criticism in action. Having laid out 
this chapter’s overall framework, I want to add, at this point, an important clarification. 
The discourse of white self-criticism I track across Fitzgerald’s novel is not one in which 
 
3 These affect-oriented and discourse-analysis approaches are blended together throughout the studies by 
Matias and Yancy. The discourse-analysis approach dominates Bonilla-Silva’s Racism without Racists as 
well as the first three chapters of Sullivan’s Good White People, while the affect-oriented approach 
predominates Sullivan’s final chapter and conclusion. 
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the protagonist’s whiteness is itself the object of critique. This, of course, is the sense of 
white self-criticality that contemporary scholars of whiteness-studies have in mind: white 
people who, by voluntary self-education or by exposure to the political unrest of the 
racially oppressed, have been made aware of their racial identity as a problem (whether 
they respond to this by committing to further self-criticism in an act of racial solidarity or 
by grasping at various discourses of self-exculpation). It has taken until the late-twentieth 
and early-twenty-first centuries, however, for this type of white racial self-awareness to 
develop on a large scale, and Fitzgerald was a man of his time. Coming of age as he did 
in a world steeped in the culture and politics of Jim Crow, nativism, eugenics, and 
vaudeville minstrelsy, Fitzgerald never thought of himself as “white” in any problematic 
sense. Indeed, in a perfect example of the kind of racial discourse historians in whiteness 
studies have meticulously elaborated, Fitzgerald was highly self-conscious about what he 
called the “black Irish” half of his ancestry (Life in Letters 233).4 
Fitzgerald’s semi-autobiographical protagonist, then, is not self-critical because 
he is white and because he understands whiteness as a racial identity haunted by a 
horrific history of violence. Dick is self-critical, rather, about the material privileges that 
have buoyed him up to a position of professional and social prestige. Those privileges 
themselves, however—along with the anxieties they engender about being seen as 
someone who has earned one’s successes and who is kind and generous and “good,” 
despite one’s position of socioeconomic comfort—are products of Dick’s whiteness, 
 
4 See also Fitzgerald’s July 1921 letter to Edmund Wilson in which he speaks, among other things, about 
the “negroid streak creep[ing] northward to defile the nordic race” and Italians having “the souls of 
blackamoors” (A Life in Letters, 47). I will have more to say later about the place of race in Fitzgerald’s 




regardless of whether he or his creator note them as such. What interests me about the 
discourse of professionalism in Fitzgerald’s work is not that it provides an example of a 
middle-class white man consciously interrogating his own whiteness but that it provides 
an example of a middle-class white man who is at least uneasy about a host of social and 
economic privileges that derive from his whiteness (whether he marks them that way or 
not) and whose anxious attempts to fashion himself as someone who has earned and 
made selfless use of those privileges constitutes a nominally self-critical yet persistently 
self-exculpating form of whiteness instructive even to white people today whose self-
criticisms include a conscious sense of their whiteness as such. This instructiveness is 
especially keen insofar as the discourses of professionalism played out in Tender and 
“The Crack-Up” fall back, in their self-exculpating moments, on a language and rhetoric 
of meritocracy, a blinkered faith in the equation of moral goodness with hard work, 
which is a major part of how neoliberal white supremacy is articulated today in 
seemingly race-neutral, economically coded terms. “[M]y experience in this world has 
been,” writes Coates, “that the people who believe themselves to be white are obsessed 
with the politics of personal exoneration. And the word racist, to them, conjures, if not a 
tobacco-spitting oaf, then something just as fantastic—an orc, troll, or gorgon” (Between 
the World and Me 97, original emphasis). I hope this chapter’s reading of Tender is the 
Night helps to stem the tide of such tendencies. In addition to revealing a whole new way 
of reading race in Fitzgerald’s work, I offer an analysis in which whiteness takes the form 
not of some monstrous display of ignorance or cruelty but rather that of a polished 
professional earnestly striving to be a man of integrity and service to others, someone 
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whose determination to be an exceptionally good person renders him capable only of an 
incomplete, ironically self-pitying, self-aggrandizing form of self-criticism. 
 The first section of this chapter begins by outlining, in greater detail, the affective 
and moral components of Dick Diver’s “professionalism.” I start with a brief summary of 
Tender’s overall plot and structure, then illuminate the psychic anatomy of Dick’s 
professional identity by breaking his professionalism down into three main parts. I then 
turn to sociological and historical scholarship on professionalization to bring some of the 
key elements of Dick’s professionalism into further relief as well as situate them within a 
larger historical and social context. With this argumentative scaffolding then established, 
Part II embarks on an in-depth close reading of Fitzgerald’s novel. I show how Dick’s 
self-critical professionalism plays out over the course of the novel as form of concerted 
yet imperfect auto-critique. Worried that his personal history of good fortune might 
weaken his character, Dick frets over his own moral integrity and tries to hold himself to 
exceedingly high standards, yet this self-criticism proceeds in ways that involve an 
enduring male chauvinism, a vague Aryan/Anglo-Saxon race pride, a sententious middle-
class scapegoating of the leisure-class rich, and a meritocratic belief in the self-
exonerating value of hard work. Part III closes by offering a short debrief on the reading 
offered in the preceding two sections. I contrast my approach to reading race in this novel 
to the ones taken thus by Fitzgerald critics thus far and underscore the stakes of this 
reading by gesturing toward the enduring and not unproblematic place of the professions 





I. Enter: The Professional 
In the correspondence it occasioned between herself and her husband and between 
her husband and her doctors, Zelda’s psychiatric collapse brought Fitzgerald into 
extensive reflection on the nature of his professional work as a writer, especially insofar 
it illustrated, in his view, crucial differences between his wife’s character and his own. A 
letter to one of Zelda’s doctors provides a typical case in point (the underlining is 
Fitzgerald’s): 
During my young manhood for seven years I worked extremely hard, in six years 
bringing myself by tireless literary self-discipline to a position of unquestioned 
preeminence among younger American writers, also by additional “hack-work” 
for the cinema ect. [sic] I gave my wife a comfortable and luxurious life such as 
few European writers ever achieve. My work is done on coffee, coffee and more 
coffee, never on alcohol. At the end of five or six hours I get up from my desk 
white and trembling and with a steady burn in my stomach, to go to dinner. 
Doubtless a certain irritability developed in those years, an inability to be gay 
which my wife—who had never tried to use her talents and intelligence—was not 
inclined to condone. It was on our coming to Europe in 1924 and apon [sic] her 
urging that I began to look forward to wine at dinner—she took it at lunch, I did 
not. (Fitzgerald, Life in Letters 196, underlining in original) 
 
By appealing to his role as breadwinner as a basis for authority, Fitzgerald routinely 
reminded Zelda’s doctors of the contrast between his indomitable work ethic and her lack 
thereof (often as a way of deflecting her own well-evidenced charges against the 
destructive force of his drinking upon their marriage). To be clear, his criticism was never 
that Zelda lacked ambition or talent. He recognized that her exhaustive determination to 
excel at ballet, for example, was part of what pushed her to a breaking point, and he and 
her doctors continually tried to facilitate her recovery by limiting the time she could 
devote to dancing, painting, and writing while institutionalized (Bruccoli, Some Sort 288-
289, 310; Fitzgerald, Life in Letters 212-213, 219-221). Rather, his criticism was that 
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Zelda had neither the discipline nor the stamina to put her skills to purposive use and that 
she had no sense of hard work as an occasion for sacrifice and commitment. She labored, 
Fitzgerald alleged to one of her clinicians, under the “abnormal illusion … that her 
work’s success will give her some sort of divine irresponsibility backed by unlimited 
gold” (Life in Letters 230). “There is a vague form in her mind,” he lamented, “of ‘go 
on—do what you want—All I want is a chance to work.’ The only essential that she 
leaves out is that I also want a chance to work, to cease this ceaseless hack work that her 
sickness compells [sic] me to” (Life in Letters 213).  Throughout these frustrations runs 
the insistence that his wife’s institutionalization had taken the form of “a very expensive 
chance to satisfy her desire for self-expression” paid for by his own time and money 
(Fitzgerald, Life in Letters 213). 
 Fitzgerald’s resentful disappointment over the dissipation of his own professional 
talent lies at the heart Tender is the Night. The novel encodes his reflections upon his 
own professional self-image and work ethic and the deterioration prompted by having to 
care for an ailing member of the American leisure class. Fitzgerald did not translate this 
autobiographical situation one-for-one into the text. Tender is the Night is divided into 
three Books, none of which are narrated exclusively from a single perspective, though 
each is dominated nonetheless by one character’s point of view. The young actress and 
ingenue Rosemary Hoyt focalizes Book One. After recent success starring in her first 
film, Rosemary has come with her mother to vacation on the Riviera in 1925, where she 
meets and falls in love with the stylish Dick and Nicole Diver and begins a flirtatious 
romance with the former. Fitzgerald uses Rosemary to provide a naïvely romantic picture 
of the Divers while his omniscient narrator occasionally intervenes to tip readers off to 
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cracks in their polished social façade that the smitten Rosemary does not see. Book One 
ends on the cliffhanger of Nicole relapsing into a psychiatric break, in the middle of 
which Fitzgerald abruptly cuts the story and segues to the next Book. Focalized through 
Dick, Book Two begins by jumping back eight years to narrate his emergence as a 
budding psychologist, the courtship of his patient Nicole Warren, and eventually their 
marriage, at which point we are returned, story-wise, to where Book One left off. As 
Nicole’s condition improves, her dependence on Dick fades along with the romantic 
passion her dependency once brought, and it becomes increasingly clear that their 
marriage and indulgent lifestyle are doing little other than preventing Dick from new 
work. He continues to offset the awareness of his marital and professional decline 
through his liaisons with Rosemary until she, too, outgrows him. Book Three, finally, 
assumes Nicole’s point of view and completes the chiasmus of the overall plot by 
narrating her blooming strength and confidence alongside her husband’s continuing 
decline. Dick eventually “saves” himself by consciously allowing their marital 
dysfunction to progress to the point where both he and Nicole are prepared for a divorce, 
whereby he can “transfer” her to their friend Tommy Barban, a French-American soldier 
who has coveted Nicole from the beginning of the story and been increasingly aggressive 
in courting her as her weakening attachment to Dick becomes apparent. 
Written during the early 30s but set over a period from 1919 to 1929, Tender is 
the Night serves as an aesthetic vehicle through which Fitzgerald can re-trace his steps 
through the Jazz Age and review his past conduct in order to assess the origins of the 
downward spiral he was suffering in the present. As we have seen already from both 
“The Crack-Up” and his epistolary correspondence with Zelda’s doctors, a tremendous 
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part of Fitzgerald’s ego revolved around his identity as a “professional,” his sense of his 
own indomitable work ethic, the discipline and hours he put into his specialized craft, and 
the socioeconomic prestige this professional standing was supposed to grant him. It is 
thus unsurprising that more than any other aspect of Dick’s character, Fitzgerald 
emphasizes the professional identity of Tender’s semi-autobiographical protagonist. The 
work ethic, affective tendencies, and moral aspirations comprising what we might call 
Dick Diver’s professionalism are established early in the novel and serve as both the 
engine and gauge of the narrative’s progression. In the opening sections of Book Two—
the chronological start of the story—Dick arrives in Zurich in 1919 to begin his career at 
a clinic where Nicole Warren is one of the patients. Before that ever romance begins, 
however, Fitzgerald spends about 20 pages revealing to readers Dick’s private hopes and 
anxieties about the trajectory of his career and how the nature of his professional will 
reflect upon his character. The opening pages of Book Two, then, provide a detailed 
portrait of the morals, aspirations, and self-image characterizing Dick’s professional 
identity, which serves as a reference point for gauging his decline over the rest of the 
novel. Dick’s professionalism, I argue, can be characterized by three points. 
The first and most straightforward of these is a simple aspiration toward 
preeminence captured in Dick’s frank avowal to his colleague, Franz Gregorovius, that 
his one goal is “‘to be a good psychologist—maybe to be the greatest one that ever 
lived’” (Fitzgerald, Tender 132).5 However it may appear on the surface, this desire for 
greatness is not a sign of mere egotism, and misunderstandings of it as such are prevented 
by the second feature of Dick’s professionalism: a hyper-self-conscious anxiety over 
 
5 All the quotations from the novel are hereafter cited parenthetically with the abbreviation “TN.” 
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having been given a too-easy ride to the top. By 1917, at the age of 26, Dick’s 
educational history had come to include Yale, Oxford, and Johns Hopkins, and now, in 
1919, he continues his studies in France and Switzerland while being enlisted with the 
good fortunate of having only “seen around the edges of the war” despite, as he admits to 
Franz, “‘draw[ing] military pay all the rest of the year if I only attend lectures at the 
university’” (TN 115, 132). It is one of the most conspicuous features of Dick’s psyche 
that he is consistently paranoid about the detrimental effects of having not been faced 
with challenges and setbacks in his formative years. Eavesdropping on his private 
thoughts, the narrator reveals this obsession as a running theme of the young Dick’s 
nervously self-deprecating reflections: 
“—And Lucky Dick can’t be one of these clever men; he must be less intact, even 
faintly destroyed. If life won’t do it for him it’s not a substitute to get a disease, or 
a broken heart, or an inferiority complex, though it’d be nice to build out some 
broken side till it was better than the original structure.” (TN 116) 
 
Knowing “that the price of his intactness was incompleteness,” the insecurity of being too 
secure in his success underlies Dick’s compulsion to be the greatest psychologist that 
ever lived (TN 117). “[M]en and women had made much of him” in recent years, and “an 
intuition that this was not too good for a serious man” provokes an intense fear of resting 
on his laurels (TN 133).  
Dick’s theory is that by working on the front lines of his discipline, pushing 
boundaries and going where no psychologist has gone before, he can expose himself to 
the kinds of dangers that will make him a better man by breaking him in. “‘The weakness 
of this profession,’” he warns Franz, “‘is its attraction for the man a little crippled and 
broken. Within the walls of the profession he compensates by tending toward the clinical, 
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the ‘practical’—he has won his battle without a struggle’” (TN 137-138). Dick’s 
incautious decision to marry a patient and combine the normally separate roles of 
husband and doctor is a conscious attempt to turn his career into a mettle-building 
crucible, a gesture in which professionalism connotes a meritocratic work ethic designed 
to dignify one’s character with the distinction of having struggled one’s way to prestige 
rather than receiving it on a silver platter. 
The third and final characteristic of Dick’s professionalism, however, is the 
qualification that these commitments both to pioneering hard work and to just desserts 
are based neither in an impersonal concern for the status of his field nor in a disinterested 
matter of moral principle. There remains behind them the hope, if not the expectation, 
that such sacrifice and self-discipline will result in the payoff of being admired. Dick, in 
other words, “wanted to be good, he wanted to be kind, he wanted to be brave and wise, 
but it was all pretty difficult. He wanted to be loved, too, if he could fit it in” (TN 133). 
This modest wish would seem reasonable if Fitzgerald weren’t being tongue-in-cheek in 
the gingerly touch with which his narrator notes this aspect of Dick’s professional 
aspirations. Here, at the chronological beginning of the story, Dick’s need to be loved is 
only barely intimated (though the intimation is still tonally ominous). In fact, however, 
the narrative progression of Dick’s professional decline is punctuated by a slew of 
situations in which a paternalistic savior complex, driven by this need to be loved, 
compels him to the rescue of those in mental, physical, or even legal danger. Marrying 
Nicole is only the first and most bindingly consequential instance of Dick “mortgaging 
[him]self physically and spiritually up to the hilt” (Fitzgerald, “The Crack-Up” 72). The 
whole arc of the novel clarifies for readers that far from being something merely to be 
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had “if he could fit it in,” Dick’s need to be loved is not an afterthought so much as an 
addiction. Toward the end of the book, when he decides to rescue two acquaintances 
whose partying shenanigans have gotten them in trouble with the police, this compulsion 
is explicitly identified as a kind of tragic flaw: “the old fatal pleasingness, … with its cry 
of ‘Use me!’” according to which he had originally married Nicole: “[w]anting above all 
to be brave and kind, he had wanted even more than that, to be loved. So it had been. So 
it would ever be” (TN 302). Reprising the line so gingerly planted earlier, Fitzgerald 
leaves no ambiguity about his interpretation of his protagonist’s fall: Dick’s tragedy is 
grounded in a habitual altruism that bespeaks not an ego so secure and overflowing with 
self-confidence that it cannot help but help others but one that stifles insecurity by 
dramatically giving itself away to the paternalistic service of others out of a desperate 
need for affirmation. 
As a set of moral and affective inclinations entailing the inextricability of one’s 
identity and work ethic, this, then, is the model of professionalism that provides the 
foundation for the novel. It is marked by what we might call a self-interested selflessness. 
In Fitzgerald’s text, the professional is he whose work of making pathbreaking 
achievements in a field of specialized knowledge doubles as the arena for a personal 
struggle not to overcome some bad hand dealt by fate but, on the contrary, to save oneself 
from the danger and embarrassment of having been dealt pocket aces. The professional 
struggles to be able to say that he has struggled, that he has faced and endured adversity 
and can thus exonerate himself to his own moral conscience with the assurance that an 
assortment of inherited privileges have not made him soft and that his prestige and 
authority have been hard-earned. This self-serving work ethic is also the means by which 
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he endears himself to a wider public on the grounds of having selflessly given excessive 
amounts of his time and energy to ameliorating the quality of life of any number of 
individual clients or contributing to the fund of human knowledge as a whole. 
 Professionalization, as a political, economic, and sociological process played out 
at the level of both individuals and groups, has been the focus of its own scholarly field 
for decades, and the figure cut by Fitzgerald’s protagonist resonates with certain elements 
in this scholarly corpus while downplaying others. The general contours of the rise-of-
the-professions narrative are a matter of relative consensus. As described by Magali 
Sarfatti Larson, professionalization, which began in the first half of the nineteenth 
century and culminated at the turn of the twentieth, was “a collective process of upward 
social mobility” pursued by middle-class workers in the fields of medicine, law, and 
engineering (xvi).6 Its purpose was to produce and monopolize a market for the products 
and services made possible by new forms of specialized training and expertise. As Larson 
emphasizes, this process required the gradual standardization of products—i.e., expert 
knowledges and services offered on the market—via standardization of producers—i.e., 
the professionals themselves, who would submit to increasing uniformity and exclusivity 
within their fields by way of licenses, qualifying exams, and common educational 
curricula that made membership to a profession dependent both on the acquisition of a 
standardized body of knowledge (almost always available only through universities) and 
on bureaucratized credentials whose authority would be legally sanctioned as the 
professions sought state recognition for their expertise (Larson 9-52; Bledstein; Freidson 
17-123). 
 




 Scholarship on the professions is thus particularly keen on how the development 
of highly specialized knowledges and skills and the strict management of rarified access 
to them enables the structuring and re-structuring of social and economic inequality.7 
This element of professionalization is especially highlighted by Barbara and John 
Ehrenreich who suggest that during the Progressive Era, in order to consolidate fields like 
public education and health care into arenas requiring scientific intervention by “experts,” 
many services that had once been “an indigenous part of working-class culture were 
edged out by commodities conceived and designed outside of the class” (17, 16). In a key 
example of Progressive-Era class conflict, a “professional-managerial class” of 
inspectors, administrators, and authorities found occupational niches in schooling, 
sanitation, child rearing, recreation, and more via claims to objective expertise that 
enabled them to organize these activities with “‘efficiency,’ ‘order,’ and rationality” 
(Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 23). If the acquisition and display of credentialed scientific 
expertise is taken as the primary indicator of professional status, however, Fitzgerald’s 
protagonist would hardly appear on the radar. As Matthew J. Bruccoli has observed, a 
frequent criticism of the novel is that “Dick is not a convincing figure as a psychiatrist” 
because he is rarely portrayed exercising the clinical knowledge and skills that would 
illustrate his specialized training (Composition 84). Bruccoli’s defense of Fitzgerald on 
this charge is partly correct but also misleading: “Fitzgerald never intended to write a 
professional novel. His novel is not specifically about a psychiatrist. It is about Dick 
 
7 This is what Larson foregrounds when she refers to a “monopoly of competence legitimized by officially 
sanctioned ‘expertise’” that “leaves the public without legal or credible alternatives” to the pricey services 
provided by credentialed professionals (38). Likewise, she observes, the exclusivity of university 
admissions and the many batteries of tests and other qualifications prevent “the overproduction of 
professional producers [which] may cause the price of professional services or labor to fall” (42). 
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Diver, who is a psychiatrist. … [T]he absence of medical details from the novel was 
planned” (Composition 84). To say that Tender is “about Dick Diver” who only happens 
to be a psychiatrist is correct, but that is not mean that Tender is thus not “a professional 
novel.” What it indicates is that Fitzgerald was interested in a concept of professionalism 
that was more about the professional’s affective subjectivity and moral character (his 
“personality”) than his possession of objective knowledge and its standardized 
application (his “expertise”). 
In embodying professionalism as a matter of personality more than expertise, 
Fitzgerald’s Dick Diver brings into vivid relief what we might call the ideological rather 
than socioeconomic side of the professionalization phenomenon: the set of ideas, values, 
and narratives invoked to justify or apologize for the economic privileges and social 
prestige accorded to the professions and their elite cadre of workers. As the professions 
establish a monopolized market for their specialized goods and services as well as an elite 
educational system by which professional knowledges are standardized and distributed, 
professionalization as a project, Larson argues, “passes from a predominantly economic 
function—organizing the linkage between education and the marketplace—to a 
predominantly ideological one—justifying inequality of status and closure of access in 
the occupational order” (xvii). Elite professionals, in other words, have to establish 
“social credit” with their nonprofessional consumer base by ensuring that the pursuit of 
specialized knowledge and work is driven by something other than a bid for social 
authority and an impressive salary (Larson 56). 
One of the most effective weapons in this ideological arsenal is what critics often 
call the service ideal: the notion, whether in medicine, law, or engineering, that 
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professionals pursue and exercise their expertise for the sake of “the public interest,” that 
they work according to a drive that “does not obey first to the profit motive, but seeks 
first to improve the quality of life” of their clients and of society as a whole (Larson 57, 
58). In a phrasing with clear resonance to the Ehrenreichs’ idea of the professional-
managerial class and its bourgeois control of the working class, Larson calls this the 
professions’ “civilizing function” (58).8 Eliot Freidson takes this idea of the service ideal 
even further, enshrining it as a professional standard with scarce empirical reality, 
perhaps, but well worth pursuing as an ideal nonetheless: 
The professional ideology of service goes beyond serving others’ choices. Rather, 
it claims devotion to a transcendent value which infuses its specialization with a 
larger and putatively higher goal …. Each body of professional knowledge and 
skill is attached to such a value, one sometimes shared by several disciplines. … 
Such values as Justice, Salvation, Beauty, Truth, Health, and Prosperity are large, 
abstract, and on the face of it indisputably desirable, the devil, of course, being in 
the details. Nonetheless it is because they claim to be a secular priesthood that 
serves such transcendent and self-evidently desirable values that professionals can 
claim independence of judgment and freedom of action rather than mere faithful 
service. (122) 
 
To be clear, Freidson’s study is a cautious yet impassioned defense of professionalism as 
a set of ideas and principles comprising a “logic” for structuring the social division of 
labor. He contends that “free-market” or “bureaucratic” logics (the ones the opposes to 
the logic of professionalism) have become increasingly rampant in recent decades with 
disastrous social and political results. Despite having their own imperfections, reprising 
certain “professional” mores like the service ideal, Freidson argues, is a valuable 
 
8 For a particularly literal example of the so-called “civilizing function” of the professions during 
Fitzgerald’s time, see Emily S. Rosenberg’s account of the imperialist advisory missions to Latin and 
Central America made by U.S. experts in foreign finance in Financial Missionaries to the World: The 
Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (see especially Chapter 7, “Faith in Professionalism, 
Fascination with Primitivism”). As Rosenberg explains, finance itself was an economic profession and sub-
speciality crystallizing in the early twentieth century.  
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corrective.9 This line of reasoning enables Freidson (not entirely convincingly) to argue 
that professionals go through all their training and put in all their hours because they are 
good people with admirable values rather than because of their paygrade: they “work 
more for the satisfaction gained in performing their work well than for its role in 
providing them with a good living” (Freidson 108). 
 The other major fixture of professionalism’s ideological arsenal is the idea of 
meritocracy as an explanation for the persistence of inequality under democratic 
conditions. In the wake of professionalization as a social, economic, and political project, 
Larson writes, “[e]lite status” was no longer claimed according to older, “aristocratic” 
criteria but rather “on a new basis—that of competence, as defined and measured by a 
system of testing” (70). Larson is emphatic about the extent to which professionalism’s 
meritocratic ideology suffuses public discourse with the idea of an “illusory road to high 
status” accessible to all: 
The prestige accorded year after year to the professions in occupational prestige 
scales reflects the ideological function which they perform simply by being 
visible: in our society, they keep ‘open’ the road to freedom through more formal 
education, through more individual effort; they appear to be our last ideological 
frontier. The link they visibly establish between education and the labor market 
reinforces the ideological notion that there is such a link, and that rewards—both 
material and psychological—are, after all, rationally distributed to the ablest and 
the hard-striving. (242, original emphases)10 
 
Enjoying economic security and sociocultural prestige along with the opportunity of 
immense self-cultivation via schooling and training, professionals are the class of 
workers, perhaps more than any others, who come closest to embodying what Fitzgerald 
 
9 For Freidson’s idea of professionalism as a “logic,” see Professionalism 1-14. For his account of the free-
market and bureaucratic forces currently competing with and eclipsing it, see 179-222. 




would call the old dream of being an entire man: “Education, intelligence, persistent 
effort, and social usefulness appear to grant professionals … the possibility of full human 
development” (Larson 242). 
What I aim to show here is that Fitzgerald sees through this ideological façade. 
He both sympathizes with yet ultimately punctures and deflates the idea of a professional 
ego premised on achieving occupational success, economic prosperity, social prestige, 
and lovability all at once. We have already begun to see how and where this occurs in 
“The Crack-Up”—the cynical “clean break” from an impossibly self-idealizing old dream 
(topped with the rhetorical cherry of a racist simile.) But the clean break self-prescribed 
in that essay follows from the self-diagnostic work performed through Tender’s fictional 
medium. The moral and affective complex outlined above as Dick’s professionalism 
evokes, with remarkable precision, the central elements of the privilege- and inequality-
justifying ideology described by professionalization’s critics. Dick’s deep-seated 
compulsion to cultivate his own social popularity and approval through extravagant 
displays of his capacity to help others blatantly and even neurotically embodies the 
professions’ service ideal, and ideas of meritocracy permeate his conviction that “the 
price of his intactness was incompleteness,” that one becomes the greatest psychologist 
that ever lived not by having it easy but by facing trials and tribulations that build one up 
by breaking one in (TN 117). I have noted that these moral and affective inclinations are 
present at the beginning of the novel, but the novel’s actual progression—the real 
substance of Tender’s narrative—is the process by which these young, starry-eyed 




In what follows, then, I trace a critique of professionalism embedded in the 
trajectory of Tender’s narrative, a critique that is not exhaustive. It does not work, that is, 
by rejecting every aspect of the professional ethos that serves as the narrative’s engine 
and point of origin. As the novel progresses, Dick’s desires to be the greatest 
psychologist that ever lived and to be loved while doing it gradually eclipse his 
professionalism’s third element: the meritocratic injunction to keep oneself in rare 
form—morally, occupationally, and psychologically—by ensuring that one’s prosperity 
and prestige are the result of sustained exposure to consistent challenges that toughen 
one’s mettle. Under the socioeconomic conditions of decadent luxury that pervade the 
historical milieu of the novel’s Jazz-Age, leisure-class story, the aspect of Dick’s 
professional identity most susceptible to deterioration is its meritocratic basis. The more 
his wife’s money draws him away from work, the less his prosperity can be justified as 
merit-based and the more he tries, in conscious self-delusion, to retain the idea of his own 
goodness by using his material wealth and social charms either to bail people out of 
trouble or cater to their emotional needs by lavishing them with attention and intimacy at 
parties or other social gathers—the more he tries, that is, to compensate his lack of hard 
work by literally paying tribute to an ersatz, leisure-based service ideal. Just as in 
Fitzgerald’s autobiographical crack-up, Dick’s inclination to “mortgag[e] [him]self 
physically and spiritually up to the hilt” does not save his professional standing but rather 
destroys it, and the novel thus ends with divorced and disgraced, a martyr to his own 
work-eschewing selflessness. Tender’s critique of professionalism’s ideology, in other 
words, is only partial. In Fitzgerald’s narrative formulation, the service ideal—the need to 
be loved—is what ruins Dick; the meritocratic ideal is what, ostensibly, could have saved 
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him. (The solution of a selfish commitment to one’s own professional labor is implied 
rather than actually played out in Tender, as the novel ends, morosely, with Dick drifting 
in companionless professional obscurity. This solution is played out, however, just a few 
years later in “The Crack-Up,” where Fitzgerald proclaims his newfound, selfish 
determination to be “a writer only.” The essay’s grim “clean break” performs the 
selfishness that Dick could not bring himself to perform in the novel.) 
These are the parameters of the partial critique of professionalism’s ideology 
embedded in the novel. My reading tracks the multiple ways in which this critique 
manifests within the text: as a sententious discourse of leisure-class-bashing meritocracy 
suffusing the entire novel as well as routine interrogations of Dick’s selfless 
serviceability, interrogations that invalidate it on the grounds of both its recklessly self-
exhausting consequences and the fact that is motivated, at bottom, by selfish motives 
anyway (Dick’s need to be loved). What interests me in all of this is the way that 
Fitzgerald’s portrayal of an idealized professionalism and his critique of it illustrate a 
self-conscious mentality with regard to how one inhabits a position of social and 
economic privilege: how one reflects upon, edits, and carries oneself in a way that 
persuades both oneself and others that one’s privileged social positioning is simply the 
outward manifestation of and well-deserved reward for an inward exceptionality of 
character. This aspect of how Fitzgerald characterizes and portrays Tender’s protagonist 
is the basis for my claim that his reflections on his own professional work ethic and 
identity in Tender furnish valuable insights for theorizing whiteness. I seek to trace the 
contours of what I am suggesting is a characteristically “white” kind of auto-critique—
trace them in order, of course, to critique this auto-critique, this form of self-criticism in 
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which a genuine concern that one’s self-estimation has been distorted by long-term or 
lifelong enjoyment of socially and economically advantageous circumstances leads to a 
concerted effort to check and curb that self-estimation in a way, however, that still allows 
for the re-introduction of ego-conserving, self-exculpating rationalizations through the 
back door. This is the form of auto-critique modeled by Tender, one in which Fitzgerald’s 
efforts to take himself down a peg by exposing (through Dick) the way his supposedly 
selfless penchant for people pleasing is rooted, at bottom, in an ingratiating to be loved 
coexists with a variety of residually self-aggrandizing ideas and practices, including, as I 
will show, an enduring male chauvinism, a meritocracy-touting, white-intraracial, 
middle-class scapegoating of the rich, and even a vague form of Aryan and Anglo-Saxon 
race pride. 
 
II. Race Work: Notes on the Manners of a Professional Son 
 The formal and stylistic features of Fitzgerald’s initial presentation of the young 
Dick Diver palpably indicate the skeptical and critical nature of the author’s relationship 
to Dick’s idealistic professionalism. The first two sentences of Book Two read, 
In the spring of 1917, when Doctor Richard Diver first arrived in Zurich, 
he was twenty-six years old, a fine age for a man, indeed the very acme of 
bachelorhood. Even in war-time days, it was a fine age for Dick, who was already 
too valuable, too much of a capital investment to be shot off in a gun. (TN 115) 
 
From the beginning of this portrait of the professional as a young man, Fitzgerald 
qualifies the narrative with a tonal wink to the reader, a gentle note of compensatory 
over-indulgence (“a fine age … indeed the very acme …”) that signals a transparent 
attempt to capture this protagonist in just the right light to make him appear more heroic 
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than he will actually prove to be—to make him appear, that is, superficially heroic to the 
point where his seeming imperviousness can be made the butt of a subtle, sarcastic joke. 
Dick’s grand stature, in other words, is being humored, and the reader is explicitly 
positioned as in on it. Thus, after a few pages of backstory detailing the impressive 
educational and pre-professional achievements of Dick’s early years, Fitzgerald 
concludes the first section of Book Two with a paragraph of self-reflexive meta-discourse 
that heralds Dick’s future success with such dripping irony as to leave the reader 
convinced that his youthful vigor and idealism really augurs nothing but trouble: 
The foregoing has the ring of a biography without the satisfaction of knowing that 
the hero, like Grant, lolling in his general store in Galena, is ready to be called to 
an intricate destiny. Moreover it is confusing to come across a youthful 
photograph of some one [sic] known in a rounded maturity and gaze with a shock 
upon a fiery, wiry, eagle-eyed stranger. Best to be reassuring—Dick Diver’s 
moment now began. (TN 118) 
 
The allusion is to Ulysses S. Grant, who worked for a period in his family’s store in 
Galena, Illinois, before leading the Union Army to victory in the Civil War and becoming 
the 18th president of the United States. The joke, then, is that having read Book One and 
thus known him in the “rounded maturity” of 1925—stagnating professionally and 
compensating for his strained marriage through an affair with a girl half his age—the 
reader knows that Dick’s biography does not have the upward trajectory of Grant’s 
military career and can rest reassured that whatever “intricate destiny” awaits Dick after 
1917, it is not one of ascendency but decline.11 
 
11 The Grant allusion at the start of Book Two forms one of two bookends to the story as a whole, syncing 
up with a second allusion to Grant in the novel’s final paragraph that echoes the morbidly ironic tenor of 
the first. As with the majority of Book Three, the novel’s final paragraph is focalized through Nicole, now 
remarried to Tommy Barban yet keeping up with news on Dick’s whereabouts and always remembering 
him with loving fondness. All that Nicole can gather is a scant paper trail of letters whose post markings 
indicate that Dick is practicing in obscure corners of the map in upstate New York and whose contents 
include unconvincing reports that he is enjoying moderate success (Nicole heard that he “always had a big 
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 As Kirk Curnutt notes in what is arguably the best account of Tender’s form, 
Fitzgerald frequently uses his omniscient narrator to preclude the reader’s overly 
sympathetic identification with his hero, ironizing Dick by pointing out the oversights in 
his judgments about himself and others (Curnutt 137). The narrator notes, for example, 
that “Dick got up to Zurich” with a host of typically American, Manifest-Destiny 
“illusions of eternal health and strength” instilled by “the lies of generations of frontier 
mothers who had to croon falsely, that there were no wolves outside the cabin door” (TN 
117). Curnutt also notes, however, that the novel’s form is not geared only toward 
dissuading sympathy for the protagonist: Dick is a tragic hero, ruined by his own 
professional hubris, but he is still the hero nonetheless, and the author has to temper the 
criticism he invites on Dick’s behalf. Curnutt contends that Fitzgerald does this by 
punctuating the moralizing, omniscient, realist component of the novel’s form with a 
more disorienting set of modernist narrative techniques, which prevent the attribution of 
Dick’s decline solely to his own unchecked idealism by incorporating a cacophony of 
voices and motives from other characters who affect Dick’s professional trajectory, 
particularly Nicole and her sister Beth “Baby” Warren (Curnutt 124, 137-140).12 
 
stack of papers on his desk that were known to be an important treatise on some medical subject, almost in 
process of completion” [TN 315, emphases added]). The novel’s final sentence reads: “Perhaps, so she 
liked to think, his career was biding its time, again like Grant’s in Galena; his latest note was post-marked 
from Hornell, New York, which is some distance from Geneva and a very small town; in any case he is 
almost certainly in that section of the country, in one town or another” (TN 315). This viciously flat, hard-
boiled sentence is part of the aesthetic device of closure Fitzgerald repeatedly referred to in letters about the 
novel to friends as his “dying fall”: his “deliberate choice” in the “avoidance of a dramatic ending” 
designed “to let [the reader] come to bat for me rather than going out to shake his nerves” (A Life in Letters 
253, 264). The intent seems to be that of impressing upon the reader the severity of Dick’s disastrous 
idealism and decadence by leaving him utterly and pathetically unredeemed on the levels of both form and 
content. 
12 Curnutt is particularly thinking here about certain sections of the novel where Nicole becomes the 
focalizer, and the story is conveyed through stream of consciousness narration or excerpts from love letters 
written by her to Dick during the period of her clinical institutionalization and shortly thereafter. 
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Curnutt is not incorrect in this regard, but registering the intervening impulses and 
desires of the novel’s other characters is not the only way Fitzgerald tempers the reader’s 
inclination to criticize his hero. This is also done by preempting such critiques through 
vivid portrayals of the hero’s own obsessive impulse to criticize himself, which is exactly 
what so many of the playful slippages out of third-person omniscience in the opening 
sections of Book Two are designed to convey. Here is the narrator, for instance, ceding 
ground to Dick’s own misgivings about being elected to one of Yale’s elite secret 
societies during his time at the university: 
In some moods he griped at his own reasoning: Could I help it that Pete 
Livingstone sat in the locker-room Tap Day when everybody looked all over hell 
for him? And I got an election when otherwise I wouldn’t …. He was good and 
right and I ought to have sat in the locker-room instead. Maybe I would, if I’d 
thought I had a chance at an election. … I guess I knew I had a chance all right, 
all right. But it would have served me right if I’d swallowed my pin in the shower 
and set up a conflict. (TN 117) 
 
Such passages not only attest to the hero’s fixation upon the meritocratic bases of his 
success but also clarify that the novel is structurally designed as a case study of the hero’s 
own discourse of self-criticism. In certain moments of third-person omniscience, 
Fitzgerald even calls attention to Dick’s ongoing project of self-assessment as something 
about which readers should be aware: “The truth was that for some months he had been 
going through that partitioning of the things of youth wherein it is decided whether or not 
to die for what one no longer believes” (TN 133). The subtext of this remark is that we as 
readers are going to witness this “partitioning” play out and need to be able to balance 
our sympathy for it as a struggle with an ongoing critical capacity to judge the way Dick 
goes about it. Dick’s professional idealism does not literally kill him, but he does ruin 
himself by refusing to relinquish certain aspects of it that even he recognizes as 
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disingenuous and self-destructive, like his service-ideal need to be loved. Part of our task 
as readers is to discern what (Fitzgerald believes) the correct “partitioning” of beliefs and 
values would have been by discerning how the beliefs and values to which Dick clings 
lead to his ruin. 
 We can initially sense that, in Fitzgerald’s view, the commitment to a meritocratic 
ethos is the part of Dick’s youthful professionalism that should indeed be retained by 
examining the representation of some of the wealthy, female characters surrounding the 
protagonist. Nicole Diver, née Warren, for example, is the daughter of a wealthy Chicago 
industrial magnate, and here is Fitzgerald’s description of her on a typical shopping spree 
in Paris: 
Nicole bought from a great list that ran two pages, and bought things in the 
windows besides. Everything she liked that she couldn’t possibly use herself, she 
bought as a present for a friend. She bought colored beads, folding beach 
cushions, artificial flowers, honey, a guest bed, bags, scarfs, … [etc.]—bought all 
of these things not a bit like a high-class courtesan buying underwear and jewels, 
which were after all professional equipment and insurance—but with an entirely 
different point of view. Nicole was the product of much ingenuity and toil. For 
her sake trains began their run at Chicago and traversed the round belly of the 
continent to California; chicle factories fumed and link belts grew link by link in 
factories; men mixed toothpaste in vats and drew mouthwash out of copper 
hogsheads; girls canned tomatoes quickly in August or worked rudely at the Five-
and-Tens on Christmas Eve; … these were some of the people who gave a tithe to 
Nicole, and as the whole system swayed and thundered onward it lent a feverish 
bloom to such processes of hers as wholesale buying …. (TN 55) 
 
Throughout his early life, Fitzgerald struggled as a member of the middle class to live 
above his means in order both to win girls of the coveted, debutante type he cherished 
and to travel in the extravagant social circles of heightened culture and feeling he deemed 
most hospitable to his art. That he had to work for these privileges while others inherited 
them at birth was an object of lifelong resentment, and this begrudging middle-class 
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feeling informs the tone of morbid captivation and barely suppressed disgust that frames 
this telescoped view of American industry feeding the flame of one woman’s 
consumerism. That tone is exactly what one might expect from the writer who once 
admitted to “an abiding distrust, an animosity, toward the leisure class—not the 
conviction of a revolutionist but the smouldering [sic] hatred of a peasant” (CU 77). This 
barbed, feudal motif is picked up here in the anachronistic metaphor of the “tithe” which 
anchors this portrait of the nation’s imagined community as a labor camp of continental 
proportions paying in blood, sweat, and tears for the purchases of a Jazz-Age princess 
living on the Gilded-Age fortune of her industrial tycoon of a father. 13 
The impulsiveness and uselessness of Nicole’s purchases earn them the 
conspicuous if awkwardly phrased demerit of being “not a bit” “professional,” which is 
to say that her feminine leisurely fripperies are an insult to those who work hard for the 
money they spend and, like the hypothetical “courtesan” to which she is contrasted, 
spend their money with an eye toward their work. Fitzgerald continues to underscore the 
contemptibility of Nicole’s “unprofessional” leisure by noting its corruptive effects upon 
Rosemary Hoyt, the impressionable young ingenue whom the Divers have lately 
befriended and who often accompanies Nicole on her Parisian consumerist benders. 
Despite the monstrous exorbitance of her spending, “there was grace in the procedure, 
and presently Rosemary would try to imitate it” (TN 55). Being only “from the middle of 
 
13 Fitzgerald’s ambivalent attitudes toward the rich are one of the most fascinating and challenging aspects 
of his biography and oeuvre. Generally speaking, Fitzgerald resented class stratification because he wasn’t 
at the top yet treasured it because he wanted to get there and because he subscribed to an Arnoldian idea of 
a cultural aristocracy. His resentment of the rich was both a corollary to his shame about being a parvenu 
and a frustration with the fact that the wealthy frequently squandered their potential as the custodians of 
culture by letting their money become the basis, instead, for philistine dissipation. For a survey of 
Fitzgerald’s relationship to money and class, see Bruccoli, Some Sort of Epic Grandeur 43, 110, 229-230; 
Fitzgerald, A Life in Letters, 107, 184, 233-234, 302, 352, 372, 462, 471; and Peter L. Hays, “Class 
Differences in Fitzgerald’s Works,” 215-223. 
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the middle class,” Rosemary cannot actually do this because she does not have the capital 
(TN 53). But not being rich is part of what endears her to the third-person narrator who 
clearly shares the author’s middle-class prejudice against the wealthy and sententiously 
reminds us, for instance, that unlike Nicole (and however much she might like to imitate 
her), “Rosemary spent money she had earned” (TN 54). Her recently successful work as 
an actress has paid for the time she is spending with her mother in Paris and on the 
Riviera, and the necessity of setting them apart from other expatriates as professionals 
rather than socialites is apparently important enough for the narrator to offer the weirdly 
unprompted clarification in the novel’s opening pages that she and her mother arrived in 
France “not from the necessity of stimulating jaded nerves but with the avidity of prize-
winning schoolchildren who deserved their vacations” (TN 4, emphasis added). 
 Rosemary’s mother, Mrs. Elsie Speers, is crucial to an understanding Tender’s 
model of professionalism and the class and gender coordinates it entails. She effectively 
serves as her daughter’s talent manager and has raised her from the start with a resilience 
and respect for hard work that would serve as the foundation for her professional success. 
“By not sparing Rosemary she had made her hard” and “cultivated an idealism” in her 
daughter “which at present was directed toward herself and saw the world through her 
eyes” (TN 13). By the time we meet Rosemary at the beginning of the story, she has “a 
mature distrust of the trivial, the facile and the vulgar” imbibed from her mother’s own 
diligence and self-discipline, which is why her mother, in turn, is entertaining an idea of 
which Rosemary is unaware but that the narrator makes clear: “with Rosemary’s sudden 
success in pictures Mrs. Speers felt that it was time she were spiritually weaned; it would 
please rather than pain her if this somewhat bouncing, breathless, and exigent idealism 
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would focus on something except herself” (TN 13). Thus, when the Riviera season is over 
and the Divers invite Rosemary to travel with them to Paris, her mother seizes the 
opportunity to let the spiritual weaning process begin, being fully aware that her 
daughter, who had never been in love before, is now deeply in love with both the Divers 
as a couple and with Dick, in particular: 
With the ensuing success and the promise of comparative stability that followed, 
Mrs. Speers had felt free to tacitly imply tonight: 
 “You were brought up to work—not especially to marry. Now you’ve 
found your first nut to crack and it’s a good nut—go ahead and put whatever 
happens down to experience. Wound yourself or him—whatever happens it can’t 
spoil you because economically you’re a boy, not a girl.” (TN 40) 
 
At the level of content, Mrs. Speers’ parenting mirrors Dick Diver’s professionalism in 
the core tenet that “[w]ound[ing]” oneself can be a good thing, that it can make one more, 
not less whole and that one is indeed only an overgrown child at best until one is exposed 
to some kind of blow that will cultivate you by chastening you. But Fitzgerald is more 
upfront here about the very practical economic prerequisites for subscribing to this 
character-building metaphysics. The professional capacity to “put whatever happens 
down to experience” obviously depends upon the privilege of having a minimum amount 
of income to cushion the blows you invite. Mrs. Speers’ discourse codes this degree of 
economic solvency as a gendered matter: if you have it, “‘you’re a boy, not a girl.’” 
Rosemary arriving on the Riviera in 1925 thus quite resembles Dick arriving in Zurich in 
1917. One is male while the other is female, but at the level of their shared, solidly 
middle-class professional standing, they are both effectively men. 
The fact that Mrs. Speers can only “tacitly imply” all of this further betrays 
Fitzgerald’s enduring male chauvinism at the level of form. The passage’s paradoxical 
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stylistic construction can only be described as a kind of misogynistically fake tagged 
direct discourse: it reads, that is, as tagged indirect discourse that Fitzgerald has 
graciously condescended to put in quotation marks. The paternalistic effect is that of a 
narrator speaking for this woman in a way that allows her to appear to speak for herself 
yet ironically shoring up the impression that she needs to be spoken for because she 
wouldn’t, on her own, have had the words to express her ideas. If this reading seems 
unfairly harsh, one need only look, for further confirmation, to the scene in Book Two 
when Rosemary’s time in Paris imbibing and emulating the Divers’ charm and style is 
over, and Dick must bid her and her mother farewell: 
Saying good-by, Dick was aware of Elsie Speers’ full charm, aware that she 
meant rather more to him than merely a last unwillingly relinquished fragment of 
Rosemary. … If the cloak, spurs and brilliants in which Rosemary had walked off 
were things with which he had endowed her, it was nice in contrast to watch her 
mother’s grace knowing that it was surely something he had not evoked. She had 
an air of seeming to wait as if for a man to get through with something more 
important than herself, a battle or an operation, during which he must not be 
hurried or interfered with. When the man finished she would be waiting, without 
fret or impatience, somewhere on a highstool, turning the pages of a newspaper. 
(TN 165) 
 
Mrs. Speers’ “full charm,” in other words, is that as a woman she knows her place, and 
given the regularity with which Fitzgerald uses his omniscient narrator to guide the 
reader’s interpretive and affective reactions, the shift into free indirect discourse (starting 
at “She had an air of seeming”) is telling in its collapse of the psychic distance otherwise 
holding Dick’s sexist paternalism at bay. The praise accorded to Rosemary’s mother for 
the amenability of her own values and disposition to Dick’s patriarchal professionalism is 
thus just as patriarchal as the stigma accorded to Nicole for her leisure-class 
jeopardization of it. 
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 Aside from its backhanded sexism, the scene of Mrs. Speers’ parting conversation 
with Dick broaches a crucial topic that enables us to move from the question of gender to 
that of a larger theme in the novel. Dick maintains with self-conscious modesty that his 
effect on the love-struck Rosemary has been only minimal, which her mother knows to 
be untrue: 
“This wasn’t incidental,” Mrs. Speers insisted. “You were the first man—
you’re an ideal to her. In every letter she says that.” 
“She’s so polite.” 
“You and Rosemary are the politest people I’ve ever known, but she 
means this.” 
“My politeness is a trick of the heart.” 
This was partly true. From his father Dick had learned the somewhat 
conscious good manners of the young Southerner coming north after the Civil 
War. Often he used them and just as often he despised them because they were not 
a protest against how unpleasant selfishness was but against how unpleasant it 
looked. (TN 164, emphasis added) 
 
Shelving, for now, the racially significant reference to Dick’s Southern father (to which I 
will later return), the cynical idea that good manners are most often a cosmetic mask for 
what are at bottom selfish impulses serves as one of the dominant thematic threads in the 
novel, and the moment here, in which the narrator states it most explicitly, is also 
noteworthy for pointing out that the protagonist is just as prone to such duplicity as 
anyone else. As they pertain to Dick, good manners imply the ability to be charming, 
which, trivial as it may seem, is the foundation of his professional work as a psychologist. 
Dick is in the business of repairing shattered egos, which is what the narrator means by 
referring, at one point, to “Doctor Diver’s profession of sorting the broken shells of 
another sort of egg” (TN 177). His method for putting the pieces of people back together 
again is not hypnosis or talking cures but rather his tactful and charismatic skill at 
massaging people with attention and admiration that makes them feel special. Dick’s 
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success at curing patients, in other words, rests on the same skill set as his success at 
hosting parties. This seemingly fanciful quality of the protagonist is serious enough for 
Fitzgerald to use his omniscient narrator to state it early on as unambiguously as possible: 
[T]o be included in Dick Diver’s world for a while was a remarkable experience: 
people believed he made special reservations about them, recognizing the proud 
uniqueness of their destinies, buried under the compromises of how many years. 
He won everyone quickly with an exquisite consideration and a politeness that 
moved so fast and intuitively that it could be examined only in its effect. Then, 
without caution, lest the first bloom of the relation wither, he opened the gate to 
his amusing world. (TN 27-28) 
 
Dick knows that this aspect of his character is a professional asset, which is why he tells 
Nicole’s sister, Beth “Baby” Warren, that although “‘[t]here’s not much variety in 
treatment any more … you try to find the right personality to handle a particular case’” 
(TN 214). If Dick’s is the right personality for Nicole’s recovery, this is not just because 
he can make her feel like the only girl in the world and thus charm her back to self-
confidence but because his own need to be loved ensures that he will do this with an 
addictive dedication that no other doctor can offer. 
 Here is Dick “treating” Nicole, for example, before they are even married. She 
has come to the clinic because of a traumatic history of incest forced upon her by her 
father when she was young, and Dick’s treatment combines a keen sensitivity to the need 
of protecting her from the advances of men who might exacerbate her traumatic sexual 
history with a sense of the pleasure derived on his part from being the one needed and 
loved for this ego-building protection: 
[W]hen a stranger stared at her from a nearby table, eyes burning disturbingly like 
an uncharted light, he turned to the man with an urbane version of intimidation 
and broke the regard. 
 “He was just a peeper,” he explained cheerfully. “He was just looking at 
your clothes. Why do you have so many different clothes?” 
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 “Sister says we’re very rich,” she offered humbly. “Since Grandmother is 
dead.” 
 “I forgive you.” 
 He was enough older than Nicole to take pleasure in her youthful vanities 
and delights …. He delighted in her stretching out her hands to new octaves now 
that she found herself beautiful and rich. He tried honestly to divorce her from 
any obsession that he had stitched her together—glad to see her build up 
happiness and confidence apart from him; the difficulty was that, eventually, 
Nicole brought everything to his feet, gifts of sacrificial ambrosia, of worshipping 
myrtle. (TN 137) 
 
There would be no need for the conspicuous adverb “honestly” in the last paragraph if 
Fitzgerald had not already trained readers to suspect that on some level Dick enjoys 
Nicole’s obsession with the fact that “he had stitched her back together.” The word reads, 
indeed, less as a genuine move by the narrator to qualify the intensity of Dick’s need to 
be loved than as a transparent reminder of it by calling attention to the very fact that 
readers would even have to be reassured that Dick’s attempts to quell another’s 
dependency on him are not half-hearted or disingenuous. The point is not that Dick does 
not really want Nicole to “build up happiness and confidence apart from him”; he can 
simultaneously love and want the best for her while loving the feeling of being needed. 
The problem is that this initially utopian professional setup is ultimately unsustainable. 
The affects fueling his professionalism are necessarily in conflict with his professional 
work because his need to be loved and to be of service is stimulated but always 
eventually defeated by his job as a doctor, which is precisely to help people get to the 
point where they no longer need him. 
 The more Nicole improves, the less suppliant and dependent she becomes and the 
more their marriage modulates from its original conditions as a passionate romance 
where Dick could also feel desperately needed to a much cooler relation in which Nicole 
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needs him less as a doctor than as a socialite spouse and her sister Baby stomachs him 
only as a perpetually available hired hand to care for a sibling whose mental illness Baby 
does not want to deal with herself. A few years into Dick’s marriage, the prestigious 
bloom of his daring role as doctor and husband all in one begins to flag and backfire: 
“Naturally Nicole, wanting to own him, wanting him to stand still forever, encouraged 
any slackness on his part, and in multiplying ways he was constantly inundated by a 
trickling of goods and money” (TN 170). This accusation is largely inconsistent with 
abundant evidence elsewhere in the novel, especially in Book Three, that Nicole is 
painfully aware of the career sacrifices Dick has made in marrying her. Though she may 
harbor toward him a mixture of feelings—including guilt, frustration, fear, pity, and 
gratitude—malicious possessiveness is not one of them. As Bruccoli notes, however, 
“Fitzgerald’s stock-in-trade was his control over tonal effects,” and the line “Naturally 
Nicole, wanting to own him” is less salient for its truth content than for its capacity to 
convey Dick’s passive-aggressive mood (Composition 159). This passive aggressiveness 
indexes the larger behavior structuring his predicament: Dick is too good-mannered to 
rock the boat. Not least because his ego has long been based on his self-conscious ability 
to be charming, he will neither openly declare that he expected this marriage to advance 
rather than impede his professional esteem nor openly charge his wife and sister-in-law 
with the decadence and exploitation he believes their relation to be forcing upon him. 
Following the distinction made during his farewell to Mrs. Speers, these good manners 
are evidence not that Dick isn’t unpleasantly selfish but that he isn’t selfish enough to let 
his unpleasantness become apparent, even if it means saving him from his own 
professional stagnation. All of this will reek of foreshadowing to the readers familiar with 
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“The Crack-Up.” There is a clear degree to which the character of Dick Diver allowed 
Fitzgerald to criticize his own hubristic over-ambition to be professionally successful, 
socially popular, and intimately loved all at once. Like his creator, who had “mortgage[d] 
[him]self physically and spiritually up to the hilt” until there was “not an ‘I’ any more” 
on which to organize his self-respect, Dick “had been swallowed up like a gigolo, and 
somehow permitted his arsenal to be locked up in the Warren safety-deposit vaults,” 
being too good-mannered and un-self-serving to do anything about it (CU 72, 79; TN 
201). 
 Throughout the novel, Dick’s resentment at himself and at others over his self-
conscious professional dissipation ferments beneath a well-mannered front. The indignity 
of this situation is brought home to the protagonist as much as to the reader by the 
transparency with which the good manners of others so barely conceal their own self-
serving agendas. When his colleague Franz approaches Dick with the business 
opportunity of buying and co-owning their own clinic, Baby, “thinking that if Nicole 
lived beside a clinic she would always feel quite safe about her,” coolly yet sternly 
advises Dick that he should seriously consider the prospect (TN 176). Dick struggles to 
put his finger on something about this advice that feels distasteful, and it crops up in a 
mini-epiphany well after the fact “it came to him under the form of what Baby had said: 
‘We must think it over carefully—’ and the unsaid lines back of that: ‘We own you, and 
you’ll admit it sooner or later. It is absurd to keep up the pretense of independence’” (TN 
177). Because he is gradually destroying himself by suppressing his own needs while 
catering to those of others (according to Fitzgerald’s logic), the moments in which Dick’s 
façade of good manners breaks and his more unpleasantly selfish side appears are not 
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moments where Fitzgerald portrays his protagonist in a negative light but rather quite the 
opposite: they signify that there is still a pulse somewhere in that enervated professional 
shell, a will to survive. This faint heartbeat sounds its ugly, smothered thump, for 
instance, early in Book One when Dick tells Nicole that he wants to “‘give a really bad 
party. I mean it. I want to give a party where there’s a brawl and seductions and people 
going home with their feelings hurt’” (TN 27, original emphasis). At this point, Dick is 
still ruined lightly enough to be satisfied by sublimating his frustration through a 
vindictive schadenfreude passing under the cover of gregarious emceeing. But toward the 
end of novel, when his sense of his own decline is most acute, the mask cannot hold its 
shape, and Nicole, as the visible embodiment of his own depletion, comes in for bad-
mannered thrashings. 
She went up and putting her arm around his shoulder and touching their 
heads together said: 
“Don’t be sad.” 
He looked at her coldly. 
“Don’t touch me!” he said. 
… 
“I didn’t come over here to be disagreeable.” 
“Then why did you come, Nicole? I can’t do anything for you any more. 
I’m trying to save myself.” 
“From my contamination?” 
“Profession throws me into contact with questionable company 
sometimes.” 
She wept with anger at the abuse. 
“You’re a coward! You’ve made a failure of your life, and you want to 
blame it on me.” (TN 301, original emphasis) 
 
Both the author and his protagonist know that Nicole is not entirely wrong. Even in the 
summer of 1930, when the hell of bracing their marriage against her recent psychiatric 
collapse was at its freshest, Fitzgerald could admit to Zelda, “We ruined ourselves—I 
have never honestly thought that we ruined each other” (Life in Letters 189). Something 
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of this self-critical perspective rings through Dick’s double-edged comment about his 
profession. While sneering at the “questionable company” of Nicole’s illness, he still 
tacitly if grudgingly acknowledges that she cannot really be blamed for the kinds of 
patients his job as a psychologist brings him into contact with, and he conveniently 
glosses over the fact that nothing in the job description required him to marry her. 
This obvious point bears repeating because it clarifies that Dick’s decline has 
nothing to do with the specific profession of psychiatry but everything to do with the 
subjective work ethic and sense of identity I originally schematized into three parts and 
have collectively called Dick’s professionalism—the affective impulses and moral values 
that pre-exist his arrival on the scene of his employment, shape how he inhabits the 
psychiatric profession (e.g., marrying a patient), and also reveal his embeddedness within 
historically specific frameworks of class, nationality, and gender. Other psychiatrists in 
the novel are not ruined by the profession they share with the protagonist, so Dick’s 
professionalism must make all the difference. When he first meets his colleague Franz, 
the latter is living peacefully if modestly with a rather homely wife, and though Dick is 
too good-mannered to say it out loud, “[h]e felt vaguely oppressed … by the sudden 
contracting of horizons to which Franz seemed so reconciled” (TN 132-133). Fitzgerald 
crafts his prose to capture Dick’s pompous aspirations while maintaining a critical 
distance from them, switching, for instance, from free indirect discourse in one sentence 
to third-person omniscience in the next: “The domestic gestures of Franz and his wife as 
they turned in a cramped space lacked grace and adventure. The post-war months in 
France, and the lavish liquidations taking place under the aegis of American splendor, 
had affected Dick’s outlook” (TN 133). 
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If the moments where Dick’s selfishness breaks through the façade of his good 
manners register both the progression of his decline and his resistance to it, then the most 
striking of these occurrences happens in Rome at the end of Book Two, when Rosemary 
finally breaks off their liaisons and Dick plunges into a downward spiral. The episode 
brings us to the home stretch in this reading of the novel and brings us as well to the topic 
of race. Dick runs into Rosemary in Rome while she is there to shoot a movie and hopes 
that by reprising his relationship with her he can savor just a little more of the immense 
and even childish need and admiration that Nicole used to give him when she was sick 
and that Rosemary had briefly given him anew upon their initial encounter. The events in 
Rome at the end of Book Two take place about four years after Book One’s Riviera and 
Paris sequences in 1925, and Dick knows that Rosemary’s view of him is likely to have 
changed. She turns out to be still infatuated with him, but her sweet nothings are 
nonetheless foreboding. “‘I was just a little girl when I met you, Dick. Now I’m a 
woman’” (TN 209). The coming fiasco is signaled here as a déjà vu, for Dick turns out to 
have been outgrown again: the same ability to charm another’s ego into bloom that first 
made a wife out of a patient has since made a woman out of a girl, and Rosemary’s 
capacity to attract other men is a product of Dick’s own confidence-inspiring handiwork. 
Her co-star, an Italian actor named Nicotera, has become a competitor for her affections, 
and when his incessant phone calls keep interrupting one of her trysts with Dick, the 
latter finally cracks. “[F]rantic with jealousy” because he “didn’t want to be hurt again,” 




 This break-up initiates a sequence in which Dick gets drunk, fights with a taxi 
driver, and is then beaten by the police and mortifyingly rescued from prison by Nicole’s 
sister Baby. While stuck in a holding cell, hungover with one eye swollen shut, Dick 
experiences a racially coded premonition that clearly anticipates the clean break at the 
end of “The Crack-Up”: 
Dick’s rage had retreated into him a little and he felt a vast criminal 
irresponsibility. What had happened to him was so awful that nothing could make 
any difference unless he could choke it to death, and, as this was unlikely, he was 
hopeless. He would be a different person henceforward, and in his raw state he 
had bizarre feelings of what the new self would be. … No mature Aryan is able to 
profit by a humiliation; when he forgives it has become part of his life, he has 
identified himself with the thing which has humiliated him—an upshot that in this 
case was impossible. (TN 233) 
 
In the wake of acute impotence and shame, the idea of race serves to provide Dick with 
both a corrective ideal and a reassuring fact. The figure of the “mature Aryan” 
apotheosizes what he has failed to be yet does so while conveniently implying that this 
apotheosis is nonetheless who he actually is because it is in his blood. Dick knows and 
has known for some time that he cannot “profit by a humiliation,” that the wealth and 
popularity of a socialite are not sufficient payment for his professional stagnation as the 
Warren family’s private medical gigolo. But by not directly confronting Nicole and Baby 
about them, he has forgiven his dissipation and exploitation to the point where they have 
“become part of his life” and “has identified himself with the thing which has humiliated 
him”: the American leisure class.14 The “Aryan” ideal of Dick’s projected clean break 
 
14 My focus here is on Dick, but Baby’s part in this episode is highly significant in that it continues to 
iterate the theme of unpleasant selfishness underlying the veneer of good manners and distinguishes this as 
a specifically American, leisure-class problem. When she gets the news in the middle of the night that Dick 
is in jail, Baby lives up to her namesake and throws a tantrum at the American Consulate in Rome trying to 
get an official and a lawyer together to save her brother-in-law from the Italian police and courts. The 
Consul implores her to be patient, but as the narrator observes in a tone of subdued horror, “This proved of 
no avail: the American Woman [capitalized here as a type or genus], aroused, stood over him; the clean-
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invokes an opposing model of character marked by a resilient capacity to endure hardship 
rooted in a healthy pride that holds the self apart from its embarrassments. By framing 
this model of character in racial terms, Dick tacitly relies on the explanatory principle of 
heredity to assure himself that although he has not exhibited these qualities as of late, 
they are nonetheless at the core of who he really is because he is descended from a 
lineage of people who did. The upshot is that the idea of race enables him to dissociate 
from his past by allowing him to rationalize it as a time in which he wasn’t being himself. 
The term “Aryan” thus encodes a racially based claim to the dignified traits of not only 
pride and resilience but also integrity: in being “a different person henceforward,” Dick 
will ostensibly be truer to himself in the future than he has been in the past. 
 That he has not been true to he who is—or at least to who he was raised to be—is 
made clear in the short section of the novel dealing with Dick’s father, the petite-
bourgeois Southern clergyman from whom (if we recall Dick’s parting conversation with 
Mrs. Speers) he inherited his conscious good manners. Dick’s father never appears in the 
novel in-person, but his presence is felt as a loss when Dick receives a telegram while 
traveling informing him of his father’s passing. The brief account of Dick’s 
psychological and emotional reaction to his father’s death and burial further elucidates 
the racial angle behind the place of manners in the novel and their relationship to Dick’s 
professional work ethic and identity. Dick’s father serves as another figure in the text 
through which Fitzgerald iterates the idea that one’s character can be ruined by a lack of 
 
sweeping irrational temper that had broken the moral back of a race and made a nursery out of a 
continent, was too much for him” (TN 232, emphasis added). Fitzgerald prevents his reader from 
misinterpreting Baby’s intercession as a glimmer of genuine selflessness by noting her real motives: “It had 
been a hard night but she had the satisfaction of feeling that, whatever Dick’s previous record was, they 
now possessed a moral superiority over him for as long as he proved of any use” (TN 235). 
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adversity: “Dick was born several months after the death of two young sisters and his 
father, guessing what would be the effect on Dick’s mother, had saved him from a 
spoiling by becoming his moral guide” (TN 203). This guidance function is most clearly 
encapsulated in the form of a remembered anecdote once told by father to son: 
“Once in a strange town when I was first ordained, I went into a crowded room 
and was confused as to who was my hostess. Several people I knew came toward 
me, but I disregarded them because I had seen a gray-haired woman sitting by a 
window far across the room. I went over to her and introduced myself. After that I 
made many friends in that town.” 
 His father had done that from a good heart—his father had been sure of 
what he was, with a deep pride of the two proud widows who had raised him to 
believe that nothing could be superior to “good instincts,” honor, courtesy, and 
courage. (TN 203-204) 
 
The strength of the impression Fitzgerald wanted Dick’s father to have not just on Dick 
but on the reader is stylistically signaled by the author’s use of direct discourse rather 
than indirect speech. Something that this dead man stands for is important enough for 
him to be given his own voice, and lacking, as this voice does, even a third-person speech 
tag, it cuts through both historical time and narrative mediation like a knife. The anecdote 
clarifies the point that good manners have been subject to historical decay: there was a 
time when they were something other than the mask for unpleasant selfishness they have 
since become and when they could simply be the outward expression of a truly “good 
heart.” This stands, of course, in contrast to the perfect storm of fake or half-hearted good 
manners practiced by characters across the landscape of the story’s present, from Baby, 
who uses hers to put a pretty face on her designs to own her sister’s husband, to Dick, 
who uses his to stifle and cushion his professional frustrations by charming people into 
loving and admiring him at parties or in adulterous trysts with a girl half his age. In the 
Jazz Age and its aftermath, so the implication goes, manners, decorum, and savoir-faire 
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are well in bloom, but “‘good instincts,’ honor, courtesy, and courage” are hardly at their 
root, which is why the memory of his late father can only leave Dick guiltily “wishing he 
had always been as good as he had intended to be” (TN 204). 
 This ideal of “good”-ness is as racially marked as the different person Dick is 
determined to become after his police beating and arrest. Even without explicitly racial 
terms, the description of Dick’s father as a man of “deep pride” who was “sure of what he 
was” forecasts the moral motifs of pride and integrity that will echo in the word “Aryan” 
later in the story. But when Fitzgerald locates the Divers’ hometown and the father’s 
burial site in the conspicuously Anglo-Saxon, colonial-American epicenter of 
Chesapeake-Bay area Virginia, even the legacy of Dick’s father becomes an overtly racial 
matter and forecasts, moreover, that third moral motif of racially distinctive resilience 
that “Aryan” will also come to connote. 
Next day at the churchyard his father was laid among a hundred Divers, Dorseys, 
and Hunters. … Dick had no more ties here now and did not believe he would 
come back. He knelt on the hard soil. These dead, he knew them all, their 
weather-beaten faces with blue flashing eyes, the spare violent bodies, the souls 
made of new earth in the forest-heavy darkness of the seventeenth century. 
 “Good-by, my father—good-by, all my fathers.” (TN 205) 
 
The elegiac language and imagery of the colonial frontier reprise the idea running 
throughout the text that sound and resilient constitutions (“spare violent bodies”) only 
grow from “hard soil,” which effectively casts Dick’s father’s good manners in turn—and 
his “‘good instincts,’ honor, courtesy, and courage”—as the august precipitate of a life 
whose austerity is not elaborately disclosed but is nonetheless intimated in such details as 
the unexplained fact, mentioned in the previous passage, that the late clergyman was 
raised by “two proud widows.” 
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I cannot emphasize enough the following distinction about Fitzgerald’s use of 
race as it pertains to his protagonist: as much as they tend historically and colloquially to 
connote lineages of privilege, conquest, and domination, Fitzgerald uses the tropes of 
“Aryan” and Anglo-Saxon descent to signify racial roots in humbling, exacting 
circumstances that toughen one’s mettle. The point of the hypothetical Aryan is how he 
handles humiliation, and the point of the colonial fathers is how their “weather-beaten 
faces” attest to their survival in “the forest-heavy darkness” of the settler frontier. Both 
are good stock not because they are rich and powerful but because they are not and 
because in not being so (to recall the language of Dick’s thoughts as a young professional 
in 1917) they had become more complete from being less intact—had built out their 
broken sides, after being faintly destroyed, until they were better than the original 
structure. Writing over histories of African enslavement and native displacement and 
genocide, this is obviously a highly selective idea of what it means to benefit from an 
Aryan or Anglo-Saxon inheritance in America. But while I don’t mean to defend or 
excuse Fitzgerald on this account, the narrowness of his racial vision must be understood 
in the context of its specifically classed contours. The novel’s particular constructions of 
Aryan-ness and Anglo-Saxon-ness are carefully crafted corollaries to its protagonist’s not 
poor but still humble economic origins. Financially speaking, Dick’s father, like Dick, 
married well, but he “always considered that his wife’s small fortune belonged to his son, 
and in college and in medical school sent him a check for all of it four times a year” (TN 
204). In ascetically declining to partake of his wife’s money, he models a self-inflicted 
sparseness generative of an impressive diligence, stamina, and humility that always 
inspired his young son: “Watching his father’s struggles in poor parishes had wedded a 
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desire for money to an essentially unacquisitive nature,” had birthed a desire for 
prosperity not as an end in itself but only as a means to sustain one’s ability to do hard 
work of great value. (TN 201). The novel’s Aryan and Anglo-Saxon figurations serve the 
purpose of crystallizing and highlighting this distinctly petite-bourgeois value system and 
work ethic as the racial inheritance bequeathed to Dick by his father(s). Within this 
discursive logic, the more he is entrenched in the American leisure class, the less 
Aryan/Anglo-Saxon he becomes. 
As far as Dick’s professionalism is concerned, then, the visceral conviction that 
the price of his intactness is incompleteness represents an affective inheritance from the 
past of a class-specific racial instinct. The other two components of his professional 
ethos—the morbid need to loved and the desire to be the greatest x that ever lived (where 
the fact that x = psychologist is less relevant than the superlative nature of the desire 
itself)—are affective inheritances from the present, postwar aegis of American splendor 
that has affected his outlook since childhood. In the palpably American dream of being 
good and wise and brave and kind and loved, too, if he could fit it in (a dream, we might 
say, of “being an entire man”) Dick attempts to rationalize the pursuit of the latter two 
ideals as an expression of fidelity to the first: his endeavor to be the greatest x and to be 
loved while doing it doubles as the challenge that will break him down in order better to 
build him up. The ironic result, however, is that his attempt to build character by losing 
intactness turns into the failure of losing character by gaining too much money and 
leisure. In mapping out the affective contours of a Jazz-Age culture of abundance, 
Fitzgerald sought to find, through Tender, what had been lost over the course of the 
1920s in both himself as an individual and in his national generation as a whole (or rather 
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in his generation of fellow Aryan/Anglo-Saxon, bourgeois to petite-bourgeois, American 
men): find what had been lost, that is, less in the sense of relocating something one 
already knows to be missing than of figuring out what exactly has gone missing in the 
first place so one can determine the next steps for moving forward. 
What turns out to have been lost is the capacity for well-measured judgment of 
one’s own strengths and weaknesses, a loss I am arguing Fitzgerald encodes as a matter 
of national and race decline, a matter of the decay of American character resulting from 
estrangement from its Anglo-Saxon/Aryan roots. The self-critical ability to gauge one’s 
own merits and demerits accurately has not so much atrophied from disuse as been 
distorted by the self-aggrandizing effect of wealth and the disinclination toward any open 
and honest assessment of self or others perpetuated by the haute-bourgeois version of 
good manners. All of this is encapsulated in one of Dick’s comments to Baby, just after 
his frustrating mini-epiphany about the unsaid “We own you” at the back of her aloof 
encouragement that he buy and co-own a clinic. Reflecting out loud, Dick alleges, 
“Good manners are an admission that everybody is so tender that they have to be 
handled with gloves. Now, human respect—you don’t call a man a coward or a 
liar lightly, but if you spend your life sparing people’s feelings and feeding their 
vanity, you get so you can’t distinguish what should be respected in them.” (TN 
178, original emphasis) 
 
This comment is hypocritical of course to some degree, a clear attempt to call Baby a 
coward and a liar herself but in a way that is still WASPishly good-mannered enough to 
avoid the ugly scene of singling her out and accusing her directly. The pronouncement’s 
self-critical spirit, however, is unmistakable. Dick knows that it is his feelings that have 
been spared and his vanity that has been fed since his professionally degrading entrance 
into the leisure-class scene. By now, we can intuit the qualities Fitzgerald believes should 
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be respected by using the images and vocabulary provided over the course of the novel 
itself, and they are hardly qualities free of bias or bigotry: a healthy, “Aryan” pride in 
confronting and overcoming one’s humiliations; a humble appreciation for hard work and 
a resilient constitution for performing it under trying conditions reminiscent of the Anglo-
Saxon pioneers; and, if you are a woman, the ability to sense when men are tackling 
matters more important than you and you should just find a paper and a high stool and sit 
tight. 
Tender uses the story of Dick Diver and the origins, practice, and corruption of 
his professionalism to narrate the historical eclipse of these older qualities from a heartier 
generation by the newer environment of an age when “Americans were getting soft” from 
excessive liquor, wealth, and leisure (Fitzgerald, “Echoes of the Jazz Age” 19). The novel 
is a belated expression of the conviction Fitzgerald had formed back in 1925 that Jazz-
Age America was a “decadent” nation of “brilliant children” “unable to endure or tolerate 
things-as-they-are” because they had become too accustomed, when faced with 
unpalatable circumstances, to the privilege of paying for things to be different or paying 
for enough alcohol and parties not to care (Fitzgerald, Life in Letters 130). This intense, 
usually bitter, self-implicating awareness of the detrimental effects of too much national 
or economic privilege was already coloring Fitzgerald’s perception and values by the 
mid-1920s. It only hardened further in the 30s, with Zelda’s illness, the Depression, and 
debt, and he bore it with him to the very end of his life. “You speak of how good your 
generation is,” he wrote to his daughter in 1940, a few months before his unexpected 
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death, “but I think they share with every generation since the Civil War in America the 
sense of being somehow about to inherit the earth” (A Life in Letters 465).15 
 
III. The Weight of the Aegis: How to Kill without Hurting a Hair 
One might be inclined to agree with this frank appraisal of American entitlement 
if the important caveat were added that whoever the members of Fitzgerald’s imagined 
“generation[s]” were, they were not likely to have been black, Native American, Asian, 
or Latinx or, for that matter, working-class. The more accurate appraisal would have been 
that every generation of Americans that was also middle- to upper-class and white has 
likely shared the sense of being somehow about to inherit the earth and that some, 
moreover, have been more conscious of this as a sensation and as a problem than others. 
The point here is not to shame Fitzgerald for this oversight from the moral high ground of 
our historical hindsight but to recognize, in his writing, an earnest effort at humbling self-
 
15 In an extended, revised version of this chapter, this second section would conclude with a discussion of 
the way Fitzgerald’s professionalism-coded thoughts about his own work ethic and decadent decline are 
also informed by his ideas about “American” identity. Throughout his essays, especially, Fitzgerald created 
a strong link between his personal career and biography in the 1920s and 1930s and the cultural and 
economic trajectory of the United States during the Roaring 20s and the Depression. He turned his own 
story, in other words, into an allegorical narrative, one in which his (and Zelda’s) extravagant behavior in 
20s planted the seeds for his eventual ruin the following decade, just as the economic downturn of the 
Depression inevitably followed from profligate leisure of the Jazz Age, what Fitzgerald called “the most 
expensive orgy in history,” “[a] whole race going hedonistic, deciding on pleasure,” living on “borrowed 
time” (“Echoes” 21, 15, 21). The connection between Americanness and what I have been describing as 
Dick’s implicitly racialized professionalism has been mentioned in passing at various points throughout this 
chapter, from the line on page 38 about the “aegis of American splendor” having “affected Dick’s outlook” 
to the one on page 26 about his “illusions of eternal health and strength” planted by “the lies of generations 
of frontier mothers who had to croon falsely, that there were no wolves outside the cabin door” to the 
footnote on page 40 noting the way Fitzgerald’s Baby Warren’s selfish and child-like temper as a trait 
typical of “the American Woman” (TN 133, 117, 232). The textual evidence of the Americanness of Dick’s 
professionalism and Fitzgerald’s emphasis on Americanness as a theme are thus already woven throughout 
the chapter, and a revised version would simply take a moment to reflect on this in a more focused way. I 
think the major point here would be that the whiteness I am detailing through Dick’s professionalism is also 
a very nationally-specific form of whiteness, one tied to a typically “American” sense of the boundless of 
one’s own potential, of what one can aspire to be, of which Fitzgerald, particularly in his 1930s writings, 
was ruefully critical as an egotistical and self-destructive quality.  
 
 248 
criticism that unfortunately accommodates persisting forms of gendered racial and class 
bias. 
A recognition of that sort is precisely what I have tried to accomplish in the 
reading of Tender offered above. The origins, contours, and ramifications of Dick Diver’s 
professionalism bring into relief its ability to embody a particular manifestation of 
whiteness, one that exhibits as its defining feature neither overt racism against people of 
color nor oblivious unawareness of one’s material privileges and opportunities but rather 
a compulsive need to prove that one has earned the social and economic standing one 
enjoys and lived one’s life in a way that accords with seemingly universal ideals of moral 
uprightness and social accountability. This anxious form of middle-class whiteness is 
distinguished by genuine yet flawed efforts at self-criticism, by an impulse to take stock 
of the social and economic privileges one has had the good fortune to inherit and 
apologize for them on the grounds that a) they have not disposed one to a cushy life 
without struggle and b) whatever successes one has achieved are not just inevitable 
derivations of the racially, economically, nationally, and/or sexually hospitable 
circumstances of one’s birth and upbringing but products of integrity and hard work. 
Whiteness, in this formulation, connotes a set of moral and affective dispositions centered 
around a self-conscious fixation over the potential culpability of how one has come into 
certain coveted positions like material comfort or occupational prestige and how one has 
used and appreciated these benefits (or squandered them and taken them for granted). 
To speak of a “self-critical whiteness” by the standards of our own contemporary 
moment would likely imply speaking about white people who are self-critical about their 
own whiteness, who reflect on the ways in which their racial identity has accorded them 
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various privileges and opportunities and who reflect on this topic in effort to dismantle 
the societal structures that have made this possible. Obviously, that is not quite what we 
are getting from Fitzgerald’s protagonist. Dick’s anxious self-criticism clings to rather 
than criticizes his white racial background: “No mature Aryan is able to profit by a 
humiliation.” When I say that Fitzgerald’s novel illustrates a form of self-critical 
whiteness that can help us think about white racial identity and the dynamics of white 
supremacy in our contemporary moment, I mean that his protagonist models a form of 
self-criticism that begins to interrogate whether one has earned the social and economic 
advantages one enjoys only to end up, down the line, rationalizing and apologizing for 
one’s privileged social positioning, particularly by recourse to ideas and logics that 
ultimately work to reinforce the status quo, such as the language of meritocracy or the 
idea that social and economic elites do the work they do out of a selfless desire to be of 
service others. 
Fitzgerald critics have long been attentive to the place and function of race in his 
fiction, but this reading of race in Tender departs drastically from their usual approaches. 
One branch of scholarship focuses on Fitzgerald’s fiction from the 1920s, especially The 
Great Gatsby, in order to reveal the ways in which the racial logics and prejudices unique 
to American nativism during that decade manifest within his texts (Michaels 17-29; 
Clymer). Other critics note that the self-conscious construction and management of 
identity via social theatricality and conspicuous consumption is a consistent theme in 
Fitzgerald’s work and have used this as the basis for claims about the performativity and 
instability of race, coded in his fiction as a liberating or a dangerous quality (or both) 
(Goldsmith; Keller). But despite a variety of specific arguments and methods, the general 
 
 250 
tendency of racially oriented Fitzgerald criticism has almost always been to isolate and 
expound upon stereotypical characters, plot devices, or figurative tropes that exemplify 
the degree to which, in one way or another, he shared in and perpetuated the racist biases 
and anxieties of his own historical moment. The major studies of Tender’s racial 
semiotics are no exception in this regard. They tend to focus on one or more of three 
specific characters in the novel and the brief episodes with which they are associated—
characters and episodes that I have deliberately avoided discussing until now. 
The first of these involves Abe North, an American musician and friend of the 
Divers vacationing with them in France who has become resigned to a life of parties and 
drinking and lost his resolve to return to America and continue his career. At the end of 
Book One, Abe arrives at Dick’s Paris hotel with “a small, respectable Negro” from 
Sweden named Jules Peterson whom he has just befriended and endangered in an 
“alcoholic fog” in Montparnasse (TN 106). A drunken Abe, clearly unable to keep track 
of his money, had improperly accused an African American bar patron of stealing his 
cash and had placed charges with the police to which Peterson “had been a legal witness” 
(TN 106). While the identity and guilt of the accused party was still in question, the 
police further complicated the situation by arresting a second African American tourist as 
a suspect, until “[t]he true culprit,” a third African American man, eventually reappeared 
with the alibi “that he had merely commandeered a fifty-franc note to pay for drinks that 
Abe had ordered” (TN 106). In a furious vengeance one can only assume Fitzgerald 
intended as a primitivizing mark of irrational Negroid passion, the three black Americans 
implicated by Abe’s indiscretion “were not so much after Abe as after Peterson,” whom 
the narrator describes as “rather in the position of the friendly Indian who had helped a 
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white” by serving as Abe’s legal witness in the police charges (TN 106). When Abe and 
Dick momentarily leave Peterson alone in a hotel room, they return to find his murdered 
corpse splayed out on the bed, the three African Americans having tracked him to the 
hotel where he and Abe had gone to seek advice and shelter from Dick. 
The other two characters exemplify Fitzgerald’s flirtations with Orientalism. Abe 
soon meets a disgraced and fitting end being beaten to death in a speakeasy, and his 
widow Mary North remarries to an Italian count, the “ruler-owner of manganese deposits 
in southwestern Asia” (TN 258). “‘Conte di Minghetti’ was merely a papal title,” we are 
told, stemming from the man’s wealth (TN 258). The real name of Mary’s new husband 
is Hosain, and he is not Italian but rather “of the Kyble-Berber-Sabaean-Hindu strain that 
belts across north Africa and Asia, more sympathetic to the European than the mongrel 
faces of the ports” yet “not quite light enough to travel in a pullman south of the Mason-
Dixon” (TN 259, 258). This Orientalist figure—or, specifically, his interracial marriage to 
Mary—is the second feature of the novel foregrounded by critics discussing race, and the 
third feature also pertains to another interracial pairing. Toward the end of Book Three, 
as Dick’s professional, romantic, and social capacities decline, Nicole’s disaffection with 
him is matched by her frequent and intense flirtations with a French-American soldier 
Tommy Barban. Each time he appears on the scene, Fitzgerald codes Tommy’s romantic 
and sexual allure in racially darkening terms. Traveling and fighting wars in distant lands 
has left him “dark, scarred and handsome,” and Nicole is erotically thrilled by the 
coloring of his complexion “by unknown suns, his nourishment by strange soils, [and] his 
tongue awkward with the curl of many dialects” (TN 294, 269). Nicole gradually builds 
up the ego and confidence to break from Dick and plunge into a romance with Tommy 
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invigorated by a sense of danger and spontaneity based on his darkened, vaguely foreign 
racial profile. The language and imagery used to describe their trysts assume an explicitly 
exoticizing and Orientalist cast: “it was all as new as they were to each other. 
Symbolically she lay across his saddle-bow as surely as he had wolfed her away from 
Damascus and they had come out upon the Mongolian plain. Moment by moment all that 
Dick had taught her [control, reserve, dispassion] fell away …. Tangled with love in the 
moonlight she welcomed the anarchy of her lover” (TN 297-298). 
 These are the types of scenes and characters centralized by the most influential 
criticism on race in Tender, their value of course being their capacity to evidence and 
clarify Fitzgerald’s racist inclinations and world views. Felipe Smith traces Fitzgerald’s 
use of racist tropes and characters to misgivings about the Jazz Age’s decadent moral 
climate, “its indulgence of new and corrupting forms of sexuality by previously 
suppressed social forces—blacks, lesbians, heterosexual women—all in revolt against 
social propriety” (“The Figure on the Bed” 195). For Smith, the plot device of Peterson’s 
murder signifies a reactionary phobia about the breakdown of social distinction and 
hierarchy, what Smith calls Fitzgerald’s deep-seated anxiety over “the encroachment of 
all forms of ‘difference’ into the preserve of white male privilege” (“The Figure” 208). 
The important aspect of Peterson’s death at the hands of “‘rioting’ black American 
expatriates” in this reading is “the fact that Dick is incapable of preventing their invasion 
of his exclusive world” (Smith, “The Figure” 208). Chris Messenger adopts a similar 
approach in his reading of Tender, focusing especially on the novel’s interracial 
romances—Nicole and Tommy, Rosemary and Nicotera, Mary and Hosain—which he 
reads as evidence of Fitzgerald’s insecurity, as an Anglo-Saxon male, over “the 
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Hollywood of ‘dark men’ such as Rudolph Valentino” that gained eroticized popularity 
among white women during his time (161). Dick’s decline, Messenger writes, “is 
punctuated by repeated unstable boundary constructions of race and ethnicity in which 
Fitzgerald works through racial anxieties in a continuing dialogue on whiteness and 
darker males” (160).16 
 The general thrust behind such readings of race in Fitzgerald’s fiction is thus to 
trace the significance of all racial signifiers to the wellspring of his more or less open 
identification with and rearguard defense of patriarchal white supremacy. As Smith aptly 
observes, 
Because he was so concerned about the loss of the genteel America which had 
engendered his fantasies of social conquest, because all his hopes for the 
realization of that dream depended upon America remaining the America of his 
youth (its elitist social structure making that conquest all the more impressive) 
Fitzgerald was troubled by trends which blurred the old lines of social distinction. 
(Smith, The Dark Side of Paradise 21) 
 
In this light, the conflict between Fitzgerald’s desire for upward mobility and his disdain 
for the idea of being a parvenu climber created a persistent inferiority complex that stands 
 
16 Peterson is killed in Rosemary’s hotel room, and Smith notes that the placement of his black corpse in 
the bed of Dick’s white lover ominously foreshadows the rising tide of white-woman/dark-man pairings 
that will eclipse the protagonist by the end of the novel, further illustrating the anxious, reactionary vision 
of an apocalyptic breakdown of moral and social order underlying Fitzgerald’s narrative (209). Messenger 
argues that in contrast to the gentle, chaste, scripted romances Dick maintains with Rosemary and Nicole, 
Fitzgerald acknowledges the desirability of the more passionate, uninhibited forms of sex and romance 
represented by darker, more potent male lovers like Tommy and even uses such fictional characters to play 
out sexual fantasies (“Fitzgerald [is] liberated through Tommy to ‘do’ darker sexuality” [166]). 
Messenger’s take on the figure of Peterson works to point out the limits of Fitzgerald’s already limited 
racial openness: if he is albeit ambivalently “captivated by Hollywood conceptions of darker (white) 
males,” he has nothing but unthreatened contempt for black Americans and Europeans, and it shows in 
Fitzgerald’s representation of the murder episode, which Dick reassures Rosemary is “‘only some nigger 
scrap’” (Messenger 160; TN 110). Lacking any “history or family in the text,” Fitzgerald’s black characters 
are denied any “fundamental humanity … that might elicit a sympathetic relation to their story,” and 
Peterson is just an occasion for the Anglo-Saxon hero to swing into action and protect Rosemary from 
embroilment in a disgraceful situation, “an accessory,” in Messenger’s words, “to Fitzgerald’s needs to 
keep the white heroine inviolate, nothing more” (169, 170, 171). 
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at the root of his recourse to racist tropes and logics.17 The task of the critic becomes that 
of showing, through Fitzgerald’s fiction, how “he adopted hostility toward otherness in 
compensation for his own economic, class and ethnic insecurities,” precisely what Smith 
and Messenger do by reading the Peterson murder and the novel’s white-woman/dark-
man couplings as signals of Fitzgerald’s anxiety over the precarious state of patriarchal 
white supremacy (Smith, The Dark Side 14). 
In F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Racial Angles and the Business of Literary Greatness, 
Michael Nowlin proffers one of the few treatments of race in Fitzgerald’s oeuvre that 
does not operate, primarily at least, in the vein of exposing the author’s reactionary 
phobias about the breakdown of patriarchal and white-supremacist social hierarchies in 
the wake of Jazz-Age decadence. Nowlin’s study is also of particular interest here as the 
only work to date that collates issues of race and professionalism within Fitzgerald 
criticism. Nowlin astutely characterizes Fitzgerald’s professionalism in terms of an 
ambivalent commitment to two different, polarizing aspects of his career as a literary 
artist: on the one hand, a highbrow, “modernist” aspiration to the prestige and symbolic 
capital accruing from postures of disinterested, autonomous aesthetic production; on the 
other hand, the mundane, lowbrow reality of the economic survival and commercial 
success to be gained by working in the artistic mediums and forms of mass entertainment 
(such as film or magazine fiction) and catering to the tastes and trends of popular culture 
 
17 This racialized inferiority complex was the subject of a 1933 letter Fitzgerald wrote to friend and fellow 
writer John O’Hara. “I am half black Irish,” he wrote, “and half old American stock,” but “[t]he black Irish 
half of the family had the money and looked down upon the Maryland side … who had, and really had, that 
certain series of reticences and obligations that go under the poor old shattered word ‘breeding’ (modern 
form ‘inhibitions’)” (A Life in Letters 233). This produced “a two cylinder inferiority complex,” he 
avowed, “[s]o if I were elected King of Scotland tomorrow after graduating from Eton, Magdalene to the 
Guards with an embryonic history which tied me to the Plantagonets, I would still be a parvenue. I spent 
my youth in alternately crawling in front of the kitchen maids and insulting the great” (Ibid.). 
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(Nowlin 1-9). Nowlin argues that Fitzgerald worked through this tension in his fiction by 
coding its respective halves in racial terms. He coded “his ‘higher’ aspirations—after 
artistic purity and literary immortality—in terms of a transcendental ‘whiteness’” 
(Nowlin 12). But he also used a variety of characters and tropes evocative of “a figurative 
‘blackness’” “to represent his enmeshment—by both desire and economic necessity—in 
the entertainment business and America’s mass culture of celebrity,” his “imaginative 
affiliation with a feminized, black and immigrant America” that served as both the 
lifeblood and the exploited labor pool of the nation’s vibrant popular culture (Nowlin 11, 
14). 
Nowlin carefully notes that this binary racial symbolism is hardly stark or 
simplistic. For there is also a version of whiteness associated not with commercially 
unsullied artistic purity but with the philistinism and materialism of the nation’s upper 
class—the “corrupt, compromised ‘rich man’s club’” from which Fitzgerald’s high-
cultural idea of whiteness as aesthetic autonomy was as distant as the black, female, and 
immigrant masses of popular entertainment (Nowlin 13). Hence, the problem with the 
dyad of “the pure white artist and compromised black entertainer” for Fitzgerald is 
precisely that these two personas “always threaten to collapse into one another inasmuch 
as both express a will to overreach, distinguish themselves from, and enact a rivalrous 
vengeance upon a dominant, waspish, bourgeois, patriarchal social subject that 
nonetheless exerted a powerful, lifelong attraction for him” (Nowlin 13). Ultimately, 
Nowlin argues that Fitzgerald managed this self-conflicting tension “through a formal 
irony proper to aesthetic disinterestedness,” through irony, that is, as a mode of 
expressing his identification with “the (black) entertainer’s aspiration to cultural and 
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social equality” in a way that still allows him to disavow that blackness as abject while 
displaying, in the very use of that irony, a modernist formal sophistication testifying to 
cultural distinction nobler than the sheer economic distinction of being rich—what 
Nowlin calls an “elite whiteness that is whiter than white” (14). Nowlin thus provides a 
very nuanced interpretive framework for reading the presence of black characters and 
tropes in Fitzgerald’s work as something other than just symbols of a reactionary 
paranoia over the modern breakdown of genteel, traditional social orders. But the arc of 
his argument about the racialized, middle-class, aspirational elitism undergirding 
Fitzgerald’s literary production still points, of course, to the bottom line of Fitzgerald’s 
latent white supremacism: the anti-blackness, however ambivalent, that informs his 
artistic self-image. 
Criticism like that of Smith, Messenger, and Nowlin has proven invaluable to 
shedding light on the racial dynamics of Fitzgerald’s work and the rootedness of both his 
fiction and his personal prejudices within historically and nationally specific contexts. I 
want to reiterate that in departing from their precedents for reading race in Fitzgerald’s 
texts, I am not questioning the accuracy or importance of their contentions but rather 
offering another approach that builds upon the criticism that has come before and fills in 
some of its gaps. The issue here is not that discussions of race in Fitzgerald’s work have 
completely overlooked the question of whiteness in favor of frameworks that only see 
race at work in the appearance of nonwhite characters. This is obviously not the case in 
Nowlin’s excellent study, for one, given that half of his attention is devoted to the place 
of whiteness in Fitzgerald’s professionalism, and Susan L. Keller, to take another 
example, has attended to the matter of race specifically as it pertains to white characters 
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in the novel in her analysis of tanning as a form of racialized “consumer self-fashioning” 
among leisure-class expatriates of Fitzgerald’s time (Keller 149).18 I am taking issue not 
with a critical inattention to the status of whiteness but with a critical compulsion to affix 
the significance of all manifestations of race—whether in whiteness, blackness, or 
discourses of Orientalism—to the foundational fact of an underlying reactionary racism 
(even Keller’s analysis of white characters’ racial self-fashioning via tanning also ends up 
at this point).19 Fitzgerald’s inclination to defend and glorify Anglo-Saxons or Aryans 
while stigmatizing black people, Asians, and other darker races is a fact, but it is not the 
only fact of racial relevance. Inequality depends upon concrete and ideological 
mechanisms that both keep certain groups down and buoy others up. In the hyper-
vigilance with which critics have elucidated the means and terms by which Fitzgerald 
renders racialized Others inferior, they have missed the complementary discourse by 
which he not only renders his own racialized self as superior but, even more than that, 
registers the self-destructive effects of the very superlative standards to which he holds 
 
18 In the opening scenes of Tender, Fitzgerald distinguishes the Divers and their coterie from other 
beachgoers on the Riviera by their tans, which, Keller explains, were “supposed to make known one’s class 
status and to display one’s conspicuous consumption of leisure time” (139). She adds (echoing Messenger’s 
comments on Fitzgerald’s vicarious relation to the figure of Tommy Barban as an erotic sheikh), that 
“[t]anning affords white characters like Nicole and [Dick] a way safely to ‘try on’ a darker sexuality, to 
‘do’ sensuality” (144). 	
19 The liberty of consumer self-construction through tanning, Keller notes, “comes at a cost—the blurring 
of clear-cut racial distinctions and the loss of white supremacy” (144). What tanning finally signifies as a 
self-racializing practice of conspicuous leisure and consumption is capitalist modernity’s disruption of 
“older racial hierarchies” in which outward appearance could be depended on to indicate “essential 
qualities of identity”; when one can pay for products and leisure time that modify one’s appearance, a 
particularly fashionable, culturally celebrated skin complexion “turns out to be a symbol of purchasing 
power, not intrinsic worth” (131, 140). For Keller, too, then, it is some form anxiety about the breakdown 
of a racially stratified and conservative social order that underwrites Fitzgerald’s vision. Thus, she 
describes Tender as “haunted” by “the proliferation of equivocal racial figures whose exceptional wealth 
promises them entry into cosmopolitan society despite their dark skin,” her case in point being Mary’s 
husband Hosain (Keller 152). After reminding us that one of the few details we get about Jules Peterson is 
that he is a small manufacturer of shoe polish—a product that alludes “to the burnt cork of blackface 
minstrelsy”—Keller argues that by “killing [him] off,” Fitzgerald “attempts to repress the crisis that occurs 
when the biological model of racial hierarchies collides with the capitalist model of creating identity 
through consumption” (151). 
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himself (the service ideal) and even attempts self-chastising corrections that unfortunately 
re-accommodate a logic of righteous self-aggrandizement (the meritocratic ideal). This is 
the discourse of middle-class whiteness as professionalism I have sought to illuminate: 
whiteness as a self-conscious moral and affective compulsion to be critical yet apologetic 
about one’s racially marked position of social and economic privilege and the values and 
strategies for social self-presentation that allow one to walk that tightrope of self-critique-
qua-self-exoneration. 
 Few things serve as such instinctive evidence of the quality and exceptionality of 
one’s character than narratives about the work one does for a living and how and why one 
does it, which is why the idea of professionalism—as a kind of ideologically charged, 
identity-grounding work ethic—proves so germane to the analysis of whiteness in this 
sense. This has become even more true under the economic and cultural conditions of 
neoliberalism, where the language and logics of meritocracy are increasingly used as a 
colorblind explanation for inequality and where work itself, moreover, is becoming ever 
more central to people’s sense of their own identities. In Work’s Intimacy, for instance, 
Melissa Gregg elucidates “the increasingly intimate relationship salaried professionals 
have with their work” (2). In line with a neoliberal value system that emphasizes 
entrepreneurial individualism (and maximizes profit by cutting costs related to 
management and oversight), many corporate environments today extract more labor from 
their employees by making them responsible for overseeing their own productivity and 
discipline. Professionals are increasingly pressured to be “self-motivating agents,” 
workers who can be “relied upon ‘to control themselves’” (M. Gregg 13). Such pressures 
overlap with increasingly long workdays, new technologies that allow people work from 
 
 259 
home, and greater engagement in networking and forms of social media that require 
people to instrumentalize their personality and social relationships for work. All of this 
contributes to what Gregg calls the “presence bleed” of work culture, “where firm 
boundaries between personal and professional identities no longer apply” (M. Gregg 2, 
original emphasis). “There is now a significant number of people for whom paid 
employment is the most compelling demonstration of virtue, accomplishment, and self-
identity that society makes available” (M. Gregg xi).20 
The increasing tendency of white-collar professionals to base their sense of 
identity and self-regard around their work is understandable yet also somewhat 
concerning given the wealth of scholarship suggesting that the professions and 
professionalism have historically been and continue to be hot beds of inequality, bastions 
of white male privilege that place disproportionate burdens on women and people of 
color as they access and navigate these spaces. Corinne Castro, for instance, has shown 
how the institutional and economic conditions that structure academia continue to create 
obstacles for aspiring or practicing academics of color (Women of Color). Karen Ho has 
 
20 For a further discussion of the increasingly role of meritocratic ideology in contemporary workplaces and 
modern forms of capitalism, see Richard Sennett’s The Culture of the New Capitalism. For another account 
of the increasing breakdown between personal and professional identities under modern forms of work 
discipline, see Peter Fleming, who details a new management ethos “in which personal authenticity is the 
primary refrain in a growing number of corporations” (viii, original emphasis). Fleming outlines a new 
form of control in corporate management culture that takes a more “laissez-faire approach to norms” (21). 
Employees are actually encouraged to express their “playful and fun nature” and even engage in light forms 
of counter-cultural, anti-capitalist expression, so long as these expressions are only “aesthetic”: confined to 
“a ‘gesture’ or ‘style’ that individuates rather than collectivizes” the employee’s rebellious critique of the 
system (Fleming 21, 81, 91). This ethos of personal authenticity functions as a form of worker self-
discipline because it distracts from other forms of inequality and control, “emphasizing a particular kind of 
freedom [in the work place], which pertains to identity and expression of self rather than, say, job 
discretion or participation in decision-making” (Fleming 33). Similar to what Gregg calls the “presence 
bleed” of work culture into personal life, Fleming notes that the personal-authenticity approach to 
management increasingly capitalizes on “those aspects of the self that are more associative of the private or 
non-work realm,” including things like “signs of leisure, sexuality, ethnicity, alternative lifestyles, and 
[personal] consumption patterns,” all of which are newly “welcomed into the sphere of production” (7). 
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made similar observations about the way Wall Street investment banking firms structure 
their promotional ladders and allocate various kinds of differently remunerated work, 
Women of color in these firms put in more hours for fewer rewards in a field that claims 
to be meritocratically structured on pure, individual performance (Ho 73-121). Other 
scholars have shown how, in addition to the demands of their work, professionals of color 
frequently deal with the additional strain of balancing their upward economic mobility 
with commitment to activist work on behalf of the working-class communities from 
which they may have come and which remain politically and economically marginalized 
(Rentería; Powers, Oriol, and Jain). Daniel Rosenblatt’s Bourdieu-based analysis of the 
contemporary professional-managerial class reveals the enduring whiteness of this 
demographic by examining the consumer tastes of its members (613-615). In focusing 
specifically on the affective dimensions of professional identity, this chapter’s critique of 
professionalism is perhaps closest in approach to that of literary critic David Trotter, who 
argues that paranoia is a signature component of professionalization, as professional 
writers (male ones especially) often feared that their specialized expertise might go 
insufficiently recognized and valued by the public.21 The idea of professionalism as a 
state of paranoia is quite germane to this chapter’s reading of Fitzgerald, except that 
where, for Trotter, the professional is paranoid about the public recognition and valuation 
of his expertise, I am suggesting a sort of professional paranoia about the moral 
innocence or culpability of the means and comportment by which a position of 
socioeconomic prestige is acquired and inhabited. 
 
21 Trotter reads the impulse toward abstraction and other non-mimetic aesthetic forms by turn-of-the-
century English male modernists as indicative of a need to distinguish the elite uniqueness of their artistry 
and display their aesthetic expertise at creating order out of the messiness of their representational objects. 
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 Admittedly, paranoia is in fact too specific and intricate a term for my own 
purposes, but Fitzgerald’s epistolary record clearly shows that his literary production was 
always undergirded by some form of distressed self-consciousness on these matters. A 
few years after the publication of Tender and just months after that of “The Crack-Up,” 
he wrote to fellow writer John O’Hara, 
Again and again in my books I have tried to imagize my regret that I have never 
been as good as I intended to be (and you must know that what I mean by good is 
the modern don’t-hurt-a-hair-of-anybody’s-head-and-kill-a-hundred-thousand-
people-if-necessary—in other words a personal conscience and meaning by 
personal conscience yourself stripped in white midnight before your own God). 
(Life in Letters 303) 
 
What I mean by liberal, middle-class whiteness as a self-critical yet self-apologetic 
obsession with the moral culpability of one’s own social prestige and economic 
prosperity is captured, I suggest, by this massively hyphenated gloss on what Fitzgerald 
means by being “good”: “kill-a-hundred-thousand-people-if-necessary”—do whatever it 
takes to get to the top in this world, to prosper in it—but “don’t-hurt-a-hair-of-anybody’s-
head”—do it in a way where you can say that no blood, sweat, or tears were spilt but your 
own, one that allows your acquisition of success to dovetail with the acquisition of love 
and social approval.22 The idealistic reconciliation of these two imperatives (indeed, the 
idealization that these two imperatives are reconcilable) constitutes a Fitzgeraldian 
expression of what Ta-Nehisi Coates, writing to his son in Between the World and Me, 
calls “the Dream”: the Dream of “perfect houses and nice lawns,” of “Memorial Day 
cookouts, block associations, and driveways,” of being a good person with nice things in 
 
22 The caveat here of course is that in 1936 Fitzgerald was hardly enjoying prestige or prosperity as a 
novelist, what with the Depression, his wife’s condition, and the slump in artistic productivity these 
circumstances had long been engendering. But the point about this ideal goodness is that it is an ideal. It is 
not what Fitzgerald thought himself actually to be in 1936 but the moral standard he had held throughout 




an ethically untroubled world (11). In reality, Coates reminds his son, that Dream only 
“persists by warring with the known world,” and it “rests on our backs,” black backs, 
immigrant backs, working-class backs, all kinds of backs, in the present and in the past, 
except those of the Dreamers themselves, who, by the very nature of their Dream (in 
which perfect houses can and must be had with perfect innocence) have to believe that 
the only backs on which the Dream rests (Coates, Between 11). This is the key to the 
Dreamers being able to “think that they are white,” as Coates puts it in the epigraph to 
this chapter: appealing to the work they have done to pay for the Dream—the careers 
they have established—as an alibi for having not, as individuals, hurt-a-hair-on-
anybody’s-head (Coates, Between 146). This obscures the fact that, systemically and 
institutionally, the Dream’s history and scale has always been and continues to be that of 
the kill-a-hundred-thousand-people-if-necessary type. 
Yet the image of “yourself stripped in white midnight before your own God,” 
captures another aspect of the Dream, another dimension of it, that is difficult to talk 
about because even the slightest attempt to acknowledge it can resemble and be 
misconstrued as an attempt to pity and defend the Dreamers’ need to believe themselves 
to be white. If the Dream exists, as Coates makes clear, only by warring with reality, then 
the same must be true of the Dreamers, who must constantly sharpen, repair, and retool 
their ideological narratives in the fight to maintain their ego-ideal as good white people 
and submit to the kind of chronic, internal self-tribunal imagined in Fitzgerald’s “white 
midnight” of existential flagellation. Tender is the Night and “The Crack-Up,” each in 
their own way, exhibit Fitzgerald confronting his own status as a Dreamer and the 
damage, specifically, that his Dreaming has wrought on his capacity to pursue fulfilling 
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work, healthy relationships, and honest self-assessment. But these texts also exhibit him 
grasping for ideas and narratives with some sort of redemptive value, something to take 
the edge off his self-critique and recuperate both Dick and his own misanthropic persona 
as a writer only as dignified figures martyred to their own professional ideals of 
impossible goodness. If these two texts contribute anything toward a vision of the “white 
race”—or a liberal, middle-class segment of it—they remind us that this racial group only 
exists by a slight variation on the same principle by which the black race can be said to 
exist for Coates: 
“Make the race proud,” the elders used to say. But by then I knew that I wasn’t so 
much bound to a biological ‘race’ as to a group of people, and these people were 
not black because of any uniform color or any uniform physical feature. They 
were bound because they suffered under the weight of the Dream, and they were 
bound by all the beautiful things, all the language and mannerisms, all the food 
and music, all the literature and philosophy, all the common language that they 
fashioned like diamonds under the weight of the Dream. (Coates, Between the 
World and Me 119) 
 
The people who believe themselves to be white, on the other hand, are bound together, no 
doubt, because they are buoyed up by the Dream rather than crushed by it. I am 
suggesting, however, that they are also bound by their own form of strain ironically 
incurred not under “the weight of the Dream” but under its aegis—a strain incomparably 
less severe, of course, than the suffering endured by people of color. The white Dreamers 
are bound by “the language and mannerisms” fashioned like armor under the pressure of 
the Dream’s moral defense, bound by the common injunction to constant self-exculpation 
framed as self-criticism, by all the rationales and rhetoric invoked to testify to their don’t-
hurt-a-hair-on-anybody’s-head goodness and advertise the meritocratic bases of their 
success and the social contributions of their work. 
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It should thus be both highly unsurprising and highly alarming when the course of 
elite or at least middle-class white auto-critique ends up in a meritocratic place—and 
highly frustrating, too, as one wants to acknowledge and encourage the impulse to take 
oneself and one’s privilege to task as such yet must ultimately criticize it where it 
eventually assumes a self-apologetic form. Perhaps this is why Fitzgerald’s private 
correspondence from the late-30s until his death can be, by turns, both incredibly 
poignant and incredibly off-putting. Nothing characterizes it so much as the mixture of 
offensive sanctimoniousness and exasperated desperation with which he invokes the 
language of meritocracy left and right, as if it were the primary takeaway—the last basis 
for self-respect—yielded by the self-exploratory writings like Tender and “The Crack-
Up” which occupied him in the early and middle parts of the decade. Particularly 
illustrative here are his letters to his daughter Scottie, whom he feared would repeat the 
decadent behavior that ruined himself and Zelda in the 20s if she didn’t apply herself to 
her studies. “In your career as a ‘wild society girl,’ vintage of 1925, I’m not interested,” 
he warned Scottie as she was finishing high school, verging on college, and spending 
more time on boys, parties, and the like (Life in Letters 365). What concerned him, above 
all, was having her internalize the idea that a Dick-Diver-like charm and popularity in 
social circles is a cheap substitute for real achievement. “[Y]ou’re going on blind faith,” 
he warned, “when you assume that a small gift for people will get you through the world” 
(Life in Letters 346). On another occasion, when Scottie’s social conduct led to some 
mild self-embarrassment, he repeated the admonition again: “If you did not have a charm 
and companionability, such a blow might have chastened you, but … you will always be 
able to find companions who will reassure you of your importance even though your 
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accomplishment is a goose-egg” (Letters 364). Fitzgerald clearly felt it his parental duty 
to counter such misguiding reassurance and had no problem resorting to an almost cruel 
kind of shaming if such cushioned warnings did not take. “She never knew how to use 
her energy,” he reminded Scottie about her mother Zelda, “she’s passed that failing on to 
you” (Letters 363). When Fitzgerald bore down on Scottie for unsatisfactory 
performances in school, the language of his fatherly censure palpably reprised the 
paternalistic professionalism that grounded his frustrations with his wife: “I never wanted 
to see again in this world women who were brought up as idlers …. There is not enough 
energy, or call it money, to carry anyone who is dead weight and I am angry and resentful 
in my soul when I feel that I am doing this” (Letters 363). 
 Fitzgerald’s recourse to these meritocratic exhortations bespeak his uneasiness 
about the manner in which Scottie, to his mind, was inhabiting and squandering the social 
and economic opportunities his struggling professional work afforded her, particularly 
insofar as it resembled the Jazz-Age behavior he concluded had been his own ruin. He 
expressed this uneasiness to his daughter by pontificating the meritocratic gospel in a 
combined display of sententious hauteur and genuine, loving parental concern. He was 
trying to enjoin her at an early age to the kind of self-conscious humility and vigilant 
awareness of one’s own limitations and weaknesses he felt he himself had lost in the 20s 
(as fictionalized in Tender)—trying to spare her, that is, from the kind of crack-up he 
suffered after accumulating naively distorted self-estimations from his early success. In 
this respect, at least, his parenting philosophy in the final few years of his life stays 
surprisingly true to the perspicacious if overdramatic moral lesson drawn at the end of 
“The Crack-Up”: “This is what I think now: that the natural state of the sentient adult is a 
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qualified unhappiness. I think also that in an adult the desire to be finer in grain than you 
are, ‘a constant striving’ (as those people say who gain their bread by saying it) only adds 
to this unhappiness in the end—that end that comes to our youth and hope” (CU 84). This 
is poor material for a pep talk but a rather valuable heuristic for anyone seeking to 
disabuse himself or others of the dream of being beyond the design flaws of humanity, 
the need to believe oneself to be white. 
And yet the very whiteness of the critique resurfaces in the ease with which such 
an unforgivingly self-critical impulse can still double as the foundation for a social 
outlook with conservative implications. In one of the final letters he wrote to Scottie, 
Fitzgerald reiterated the same bleak gloss on adulthood as “qualified unhappiness” and 
the same warning about thinking yourself “finer in grain than you are” in slightly 
different, more encouraging terms. This time, he called it his “wise and tragic sense of 
life”: 
By this I mean the thing that lies behind all great careers, from Shakespeare’s to 
Abraham Lincoln’s, and as far back as there are books to read—the sense that life 
is essentially a cheat and its conditions are those of defeat, and that the redeeming 
things are not ‘happiness and pleasure’ but the deeper satisfactions that come out 
of struggle. Having learned this in theory from the lives and conclusions of great 
men, you can get a hell of a lot more enjoyment out of whatever bright things 
come your way. (Life in Letters 465) 
 
Framed as both a marker of philosophical maturity and a condition of professional 
success (the foundation of “all great careers”), one can appreciate, again, the sentiment of 
humbling self-mitigation while noting the slippage back into precisely the kind of 
meritocratic discourse that would obscure racial difference and oppression by 
universalizing struggle as the baseline condition of everyone’s existence. That all “great 
men” have struggled is a truism as serviceable to the task of curbing overinflated egos as 
 
 267 





“Something that spoke of race”: Whiteness and Settler Moves to Innocence in the 
Novels of Willa Cather 
 
In her 2015 essay collection The White Possessive: Property, Power, and 
Indigenous Sovereignty, Goenpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson critiques the long-
standing “invisibility of Indigeneity” within critical whiteness studies (xix). Since its 
founding, the most recognizable and thoroughly pursued intellectual project of the field 
has been that of “historicizing the acquisition of white identity”: of examining how 
various not-quite-white, non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrants became white “through 
ideological and political means that operated to distinguish them from African American 
blackness” (50). Yet, as Moreton-Robinson observes, “the question of how anyone came 
to be white or black in the United States is inextricably tied to the dispossession of the 
original owners and the assumption of white possession” (51). 
Slaves were brought to America as property of white people to work the land that 
was appropriated from Native American tribes. Subsequently, [im]migration 
became a means to enhance capitalist development in the United States. … The 
United States as a white nation-state cannot exist without land and clearly defined 
borders; it is the legally defined and asserted territorial sovereignty that provides 
the context for national identifications of whiteness. (Moreton-Robinson 51) 
 
Despite the undeniable links between slavery, immigrant labor, and indigenous 
dispossession, whiteness studies—in the American academy, at least—has been 
dominated by a “black/white binary” in which “tropes of migration and slavery” have 
eclipsed indigenous dispossession and the ongoing sovereign presence of Native 
Americans (Moreton-Robinson 50, 51). With the exception of Cheryl Harris’ “Whiteness 
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as Property,” Moreton-Robinson contends, both white and black scholars of whiteness 
studies have been complicit in this erasure (xix). 
In the preceding readings of Rhys, Faulkner, and Fitzgerald, this project has 
examined constructions of white racial identity and forms of unspectacular white 
supremacy scattered throughout a range of mostly intra-racial scenes and discourses. I 
have sought not only to expand the range of ideas and practices in which we look for race 
as an operative factor in the lives and cultural production of white people but also to 
locate, in these modernist novels, racialized logics and structures of feeling that resonate 
particularly with the concepts and dynamics underpinning the maintenance of racial 
inequality under contemporary neoliberalism. So far, these neoliberally resonant racial 
dynamics have centered around questions of debt and labor: around the racial 
implications of the white poor’s alleged lack of industrious self-discipline (Rhys); around 
white people’s deeply ingrained, self-serving ways of thinking about debt and 
indebtedness (Faulkner); and around the simultaneously self-aggrandizing yet insecurity-
inducing effects of fantasies about the self-sacrificing, Other-serving nature of elite, 
professional labor (Fitzgerald). While my chapter on Rhys accounts for and indeed relies 
upon the discourses of colonialism to make its claims about the intersections of race, 
class, and gender, the discourses under consideration there were not unique to settler 
colonialism, and as both indigenous and settler scholars have pointed out, settler 
colonization entails distinctive structures and motivations that cannot be adequately 
theorized through discussions of colonialism in other forms (Wolfe; Tuck and Yang 4-7). 
The final chapter of this project aims to ensure that this study of white identity does not 
perpetuate the erasure of settler colonialism that has plagued whiteness studies for 
 
 270 
decades, particularly in the United States. To do so, I turn to the work of Willa Cather, an 
author whose fiction dwelt upon scenes of pioneering and frontier settlement more than 
any other modernist writer. 
As I will show in a discussion ranging across multiple novels, Cather’s pioneer 
fictions revolve around a set of themes, images, and structures of feeling that work, 
inadvertently but no less effectively, to erase the violence of indigenous dispossession 
from scenes of pioneer life on the North American frontier. Cather is hardly the only 
American writer whose work obscures the realities of indigenous dispossession and 
genocide, but her novels perpetuate this dynamic in a unique way linked, I argue, to 
anxieties about the moral and cultural degeneration of bourgeois whiteness in modern 
America. In order to begin fleshing out this link, it is useful to start with an immediate 
glimpse into the tonal ambience of Cather’s frontier narratives and the particular kinds of 
aesthetic tropes that characterize her representations of white settlers. We can do this 
through a brief foray into one of her early novels, O Pioneers! (1913). 
In contrast to the harrowing scenes of martial frontiersmanship most famously 
depicted in James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales, Cather was supremely 
uninterested in “Indian wars” and perilous adventures through the wilderness as the stuff 
of life on the frontier. To the extent that these things factor into her portrayals of pioneer 
life at all, they function merely as the contrastive backdrop against which the true 
material of her pioneer narratives shines through: the domestic labor, carried out mostly 
though not solely by women, of establishing on foreign soil an orderly, civilized home 
that provides a sense of comfort and security in a New World landscape while preserving 
the culture of the Old World nations from which the settlers have come. The opening 
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paragraph of O Pioneers!, for instance, describes the fledgling town of Hanover “trying 
not to be blown away” on a windy January day (3). The town’s buildings are all 
“huddled” on Nebraska’s “tough prairie sod,” and “[n]one of them,” the narrator remarks, 
“had any appearance of permanence” (3). As Alexandra Bergson, the novel’s young 
Swedish heroine, rides home to her family farm, we are reminded that “[t]he homesteads 
were few and far apart” and that “the great fact was the land itself, which seemed to 
overwhelm the little beginnings of human society that struggled in its somber wastes” (8). 
The forebodingly untamed landscape thus initially looms large, but as the novel unfolds, 
it becomes clear that Cather has sketched this inhospitable terrain only to highlight more 
vividly the epic feat of Alexandra maintaining and indeed expanding the Bergson 
homestead through harsh winters, bad harvests, and the death of two parents. In a series 
of vignettes covering 16 years in less than 40 pages, we witness no “Indian raids,” no 
forays into the wilderness, and barely any outdoor, agricultural labor. Rather, we see 
Alexandra advising her brothers on land speculation, resisting their calls to sell the farm, 
and ruminating with her parents on the lives of her Swedish grandparents in the Old 
World. Already, at the start of Part Two, we are presented with the serene image of “one 
of the richest farms on the Divide”:  
 If you go up the hill and enter Alexandra Bergson’s big house, you will 
find that it  
is curiously unfinished and uneven in comfort. One room is papered, carpeted, 
over-furnished; the next is almost bare. The pleasantest rooms in the house are the 
kitchen—where Alexandra’s three young Swedish girls chatter and cook and 
pickle and preserve all summer long—and the sitting-room, in which Alexandra 
has brought together the old homely furniture that the Bergsons used in their first 




After a 40-page montage of time-skipping vignettes, Cather uses the present tense to 
arrest the pace of the narrative, inviting “you” to pause and witness the culmination of 16 
years of pioneer endurance: not a distinctly “American” national character forged, á la 
Jackson Turner, through the crucible of going temporarily native, nor the Cooperian 
spectacle of “the last” of some nobly savage race naming the Turnerian frontiersman heir 
to the land, but rather a homey and thriving domestic interior, a little clipping of Sweden 
successfully grafted onto foreign soil. The fact that this big house is “curiously unfinished 
and uneven in comfort” is a crucial detail meant to signify that Cather’s heroine, though 
successful, is not materialistic. Alexandra’s indifference to luxury clarifies (we are 
supposed to understand) that she had never engaged in land speculation with an intent to 
get rich but merely to attain economic security and provide for her family. Indeed, the 
narrator soon walks us outside Alexandra’s house to visit her flower garden, where we 
feel, we are told, not only “the order and fine arrangement manifest all over the great 
farm” but also “that, properly, Alexandra’s house is the big out-of-doors, and that it is in 
the soil that she expresses herself best” (43). Though upwardly mobile, in other words, 
Alexandra remains—economically, physically, and spiritually—grounded: a figure of 
abiding rusticity and fidelity to family tradition whose achievement of bringing to what 
seemed like an inhospitable landscape not just “order” but beauty is a testament not to 
some ravenous entrepreneurialism but to more than a decade of resilient austerity and the 
faith she had in the land when everyone else wanted to leave it. 
 And it is Alexandra’s resilience, to be sure, that is the star of Cather’s novel. The 
present-tense respite of the Bergson house tour assures readers that Alexandra’s 
endurance is paying off, but the vast majority of the narrative depicts the litany of trials 
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she suffers both leading up to and long after that moment. By the time she has built her 
big farmhouse in Part Two, Alexandra has weathered not only the death of two parents 
but the departure from Hanover of her closest friend, Carl Linstrum, and the relentless 
criticism of her agricultural and financial practices by her two virulently misogynistic 
older brothers. The latter half of the novel, moreover, revolves around the tragic deaths of 
Alexandra’s youngest and favorite brother, Emil, and her friend, Marie Shabata, two 
lovers who are shot by Marie’s temperamental husband when he finds them lying 
together in an orchard. Rather than organizing these events into a steadily elaborated plot, 
Cather presents them in a loosely juxtaposed fashion yielding a discontinuous tableau of 
Alexandra’s trials from youth to late middle age. The effect of this novelistic structure is 
to expand our focus beyond any one of Alexandra’s particular adversities to a more 
holistic sense of the perpetually impending atmosphere of adversity that pioneer life 
entails. “She had a serious, thoughtful face,” we are told of our young heroine, “and her 
clear, deep blue eyes were fixed intently on the distance, without seeming to see 
anything, as if she were in trouble” (4). 
Yet, for all of the challenges that accompany life on the frontier, the overall tone 
of O Pioneers! is not one of sadness so much as equanimity and calm. In the novel’s final 
pages, after having lost many loved ones, Alexandra contemplates the future of the farm 
with her childhood friend Carl, who has returned to Hanover after hearing about the 
tragic deaths of Emil and Marie. “‘Suppose I do will my land to their children,’” she 
reflects, speaking of her older brothers Lou and Oscar, “‘what difference will that make? 
The land belongs to the future …. I might as well try to will the sunset … to my brother’s 
children. We come and go, but the land is always here. And the people who love it and 
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understand it are the people who own it—for a little while’” (158). As a novelist of the 
frontier, Cather was in many ways a curator of American historical memory, and her 
fiction works to ensure that the pioneers are enshrined there in very specific poses: 
namely, in postures of exquisite resignation. Like a cliff or a lighthouse being battered by 
the waves, the pioneers’ aesthetic appeal, for Cather, is proportional to their 
embattledness, a passive yet reassuring form of beauty defined by sanguine acceptance of 
limited agency and mental and spiritual fortitude in the face of uncertainty. As in 
Alexandra’s case, this posture is typically correlated with a somewhat ironic, tepid regard 
for material property. The noble figure Alexandra cuts in this final scene relies on the 
idealistic notion of land ownership she proposes, one based on “love” and 
“understand[ing]” rather than law and money. Cather assumes readers will see this not as 
a politically evasive form of sentimentality (which it, in fact, is) but as a gorgeously 
humble and scrupulous re-conception of the otherwise vulgarly materialistic property 
relation. In this culminating scene, Alexandra is posed in a spectacularly unpresuming 
fashion that encourages readers to measure her not by what she has but by what she is 
prepared to lose—by the fact that she is prepared to lose the land and even expects to do 
so. 
The overarching theme of Cather’s representations of pioneer settlers, in other 
words, is their epic capacity to endure deprivation and hardship. Cather’s formal and 
stylistic maneuvers all work to enhance this content. In novels like O Pioneers!, A Lost 
Lady (1923), Death Comes for the Archbishop (1927), and Shadows on the Rock (1931), 
we do not find settler protagonists who explore and conquer, claim and enclose, or 
skirmish and raid (we rarely even see them work the land, though we assume much 
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plowing and tilling goes on in the narrative gaps). To describe Cather’s pioneers, one 
needs a more passive set of verbs: they wait and reflect; they worry and pray; they 
mourn; they console; they economize. Above all, they endure. This is not to say that these 
characters are lazy or weak but that Cather constructs frontier narratives that emphasize 
how white settlers react to the New World around them rather than how they act upon 
it—an aesthetic slant that downplays their participation in acquisitive projects like the 
accumulation of land and other forms of capital. 
As signaled above, these depictions of pioneer settlers were intimately tied to 
anxieties Cather held about the moral and cultural degeneration of the modernized white 
bourgeoisie in early-twentieth-century America. Throughout her nonfiction, Cather was a 
relentless critic of the cultural consequences of industrialism and commercialization. 
These forces had created a fast-paced life full of mass-produced art and modern 
conveniences, which, in her view, had created in turn a modern bourgeoisie that had lost 
both the capacity to appreciate good art and the grace and substance of character that can 
only come from mettle-toughening exposure to hardship. I argue, in this chapter, that 
Cather’s novelistic fixation on the embattled, resilient, economically austere lives of 
bygone settler pioneers stemmed from a desire to re-associate whiteness with the morally 
and economically virtuous and, to her, aesthetically beautiful capacity to endure 
hardship—an economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral virtue from which 
whiteness was being increasingly severed by industrial and technological advances in the 
early twentieth century. The white intra-racial class conflict around which this chapter 
revolves, then, is the contrast Cather staged between her modern, white, bourgeois 
contemporaries and the host of stalwart, principled white settlers venerated in her fiction. 
 
 276 
The latter, as we have seen in the example of Alexandra’s big farmhouse, are certainly 
not poor. The specific pioneers Cather writes about—the ones who serve as the 
protagonists and focalizers of her fiction—are those who have managed to establish a 
degree of civilized, one might even say “bourgeois” domesticity on the frontier’s rough 
terrain. In their outward, material circumstances, their lives might appear somewhat 
comparable to those of America’s early-twentieth-century bourgeoisie (minus some 
technologies and mass-produced goods). But their values, their economic, social, and 
cultural behaviors, and the harsh, unsettled environments in which they live are all so 
different that they can still function as clear foils for the modern bourgeoisie Cather 
disdained. 
Faced, then, with the reality of an America whose middle-class whites had 
devolved into vessels of a spoiled, trifling, Philistine form of whiteness, Cather, I argue, 
retreated through her fiction to the spectacle of a bygone whiteness still marked by 
principled idealism, mental and spiritual fortitude, and artful (literally, art-filled) living. 
As illustrated in the brief glimpse into O Pioneers! above, Cather’s effort to recall and 
preserve a more morally and aesthetically palatable form of whiteness hinges on the way 
she frames the pioneers within her texts: how she captures them—from just the right 
angle and in just the right light—in actions and situations that position them as paragons 
of an exquisitely resigned, gorgeously stoic, non-acquisitive austerity. These 
representational strategies occur on the levels of both content and form. On the one hand, 
Cather showcases the determined yet humble, embattled yet steadfast, propertied yet non-
materialistic whiteness of her pioneer settlers by carefully choosing which spheres or 
activities of pioneer life she opts to depict (patient endurance and cozy homemaking, for 
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instance, rather than conflicts with “Indians” or the concrete acts of capital 
accumulation).1 On the other hand, these strategies also inhere in aspects of Cather’s 
literary form, from her time-lapse use of narrative gaps to shifts in narrative tense and 
scale. Cather uses these formal and stylistic techniques to highlight even further what are, 
to her, admirable qualities in the character and circumstances of her pioneers. Throughout 
her fiction and nonfiction, Cather rarely ever explicitly remarks on the whiteness of either 
America’s modern bourgeoisie or the historical pioneers she writes about. Her lack of 
commentary on this topic signals, of course, the extent to which whiteness functioned as 
an invisible norm in her life and artistic outlook, and it suggests that in writing novels 
about the frontier, she was not consciously processing and working through anxieties 
about whiteness in modern America. As Richard Dyer reminds us, however, the 
challenge in any thorough study of white racial identity “is to see the specificity of 
whiteness, even when the text itself is not trying to show it to you, doesn’t even know 
that it is there to be shown” (13-14). In fictionalizing the trials and the resilient endurance 
of bygone white settlers and memorializing these figures as aesthetic ideals to shore 
against the ruins of a Philistine bourgeois modernity, Cather’s frontier novels do 
important cultural work in managing the image and connotations of whiteness, even if 
she was not deliberately trying to do this. 
That cultural work is premised—to bring this back to where we began—on the 
reification of American settler colonialism, on obscuring the realities of indigenous 
 
1 Throughout this chapter, I place the term “Indian” in scare quotes to signal an awareness of its 
problematic history and usage. I only use this term when reproducing the language used in another critic’s 
writing or when trying to convey the mindset of someone (like Cather) for whom this would have been the 
instinctive term for referring to Native Americans. Otherwise, I use the terms “Native American” or 
“indigenous people” in my own writing. 
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dispossession through depictions of white settlers as humble, non-acquisitive individuals 
with no personal interest in rapacious land appropriation. The historical reality, of course, 
is that the economically motivated and violently dispossessive policies and military 
campaigns of settler states are what opened up these lands to white settlement in the first 
place.2 But as part of their work of summoning up and memorializing an aesthetically and 
morally superior form of whiteness as a bulwark against the degraded whiteness of 
bourgeois modernity, Cather’s pioneer fictions all but erase the violence of settler 
occupation and, instead, aestheticize the act of frontier settlement into a theater for the 
display, by white individuals, of economically coded yet racially charged virtues like 
principled austerity and the capacity to endure hardship. If Cather’s novels of pioneer life 
functioned as an aesthetic means for coping with a crisis in the meaning of modern 
American whiteness, they do this in a way that takes for granted settler-colonial 
ownership of the land on which that crisis and its therapeutic, fictional narratives play 
out. As Moreton-Robinson phrases it, the structures and histories of settler colonization 
“provide[] the context for national identifications of whiteness” (51, emphasis added). 
 Indeed, to put this claim, finally, in the terms of indigenous and settler colonial 
studies, this chapter reads Cather’s novels as an archive of what Unangax scholar Eve 
Tuck and settler scholar K. Wayne Yang call “settler moves to innocence”: “those 
 
2 In a revised and expanded version of this project, one of the things this chapter should include is a section 
that briefly details some of the histories of white settlement and indigenous dispossession in the specific 
geographical areas Cather writes about: the American Midwest, the American Southwest, and the St. 
Lawrence-River-area of present-day Canada. This would be an important part of bearing witness to the 
particular structures of violence and dispossession endured by indigenous nations in these areas (including 
but not limited to the Sioux, the Navajo, the Puebloans, the Iroquois, and the Hurons) and of breaking down 
the tendency to discuss “indigenous people” as an undifferentiated category rather than acknowledging the 
specific histories and experiences of distinct indigenous nations. (Initial research into this topic, particularly 
with regard to the Hurons and the Pueblos, was underway in the final stages of this dissertation’s research 
and writing but did not make it into the final product.) It seems like this section would not fit well in the 
Introduction and would be better placed later in the chapter, perhaps near the beginning of what is currently 
Section II, where the close readings of Cather’s novels actually begin. 
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strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or 
responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege” (10). Settler moves to 
innocence are not limited to the things settlers say or do with conscious intent to deny 
complicity in settler colonialism. They can also include rhetorical and logical maneuvers 
deployed by settlers in contexts entirely devoid of concerns about indigenous people. 
Tuck and Yang cite, for instance, the tendency within social-justice work to refer to any 
group of marginalized people as “colonized” or the rhetoric of “occupation” used by the 
Occupy Movement in its calls for a redistribution of wealth that does not include a 
redistribution of land (17-19, 23-28). In such cases, settler moves to innocence eclipse 
indigenous sovereignty and obscure the specificity of settler-colonial oppression in spite 
(or rather because) of settlers not being conscious of any past or present colonization to 
feel guilty about. Cather’s settler moves to innocence are of this unwitting yet no less 
consequential type. With the exception of a few pages in Death Comes for the 
Archbishop lamenting the interment of the Navajos at Bosque Redondo, there is nothing 
in Cather’s fiction or nonfiction to suggest that she was troubled by her country’s past or 
present treatment of indigenous people. She did not write about the frontier out of some 
felt need to reckon with the moral and material quandaries of settler colonialism; she 
wrote about it out of concern for how the forces of mass consumerism and modern 
business were affecting a rising generation of implicitly white Americans.  
Beyond suggesting that Cather’s fiction makes settler moves to innocence that are 
largely unwitting and subtle, then, I am arguing that her moves to innocence are also 
specifically white. This is an important qualification since, as many scholars have noted, 
settler colonialism is not perpetrated only by white people. Part of the difficulty of 
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theorizing it is accounting for the ways in which various non-indigenous people of color 
arrived on indigenous land and enjoy unequal access to the benefits of colonialism based 
on factors like race, class, gender, and sexuality (Byrd xii-xxvi; Snelgrove, Dhamoon, 
and Corntassel). Cather’s settler moves to innocence are both unpremeditated and racially 
specific. Their whiteness inheres in both the overwhelmingly white nature of the problem 
she was addressing—the degenerative consequences of a restless, mass-consumerist, 
thoroughly bourgeois modern existence—as well as the wholly white population she 
invoked to address it—the Western- or Norther-European pioneers (homesteaders, 
colonists, or missionaries, depending on the text) whose humble austerity furnished a set 
of lost values and epic aesthetic silhouettes to shore against the ruins of a modern 
America synonymous with mass consumption and callous profiteering. 
 A final clarification about the nature and scope of this chapter’s interventions: as 
with the other chapters of this project, my engagement with Cather’s novels concerns the 
way we read race and, specifically, whiteness in the aesthetics of modernist fiction. I am 
not intervening in indigenous or settler-colonial studies but rather drawing on concepts 
and frameworks from these fields to address oversights in studies of whiteness, Cather, 
and modernism. The claim that the work of a non-indigenous writer more or less 
completely ignores the histories and structures of settler colonization would hardly be a 
revelation to any indigenous person or to non-indigenous scholars who work on settler-
colonial topics. Indeed, at least since the 2000s, Cather scholars themselves have pointed 
out this fact in many ways. The point of this chapter is not simply to note that Cather’s 
fiction obscures the processes of indigenous dispossession (though it is crucial to register 
this, and we do not want to be cavalier about it). The point, rather, is to demonstrate  how 
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particular kinds of historical fiction and modernist literary techniques are tacitly colored 
by white racial anxieties and fantasies with specifically settler-colonial implications, to 
illustrate how Cather’s fiction participates in discourses of whiteness and do this in a way 
that registers how these forms of whiteness rely upon and reify settler-colonial histories 
and conditions. Tuck and Yang’s formulation of settler moves to innocence—as a set of 
“strategies or positionings” by which settlers, however (un)consciously, relieve feelings 
of responsibility for colonialization—is especially apropos because this chapter, at its 
core, is about the ideologically fraught positionings of white pioneers in Cather’s fiction: 
the way she poses them in specific activities, situations, and postures that allow her to 
narrate frontier settlement as a process that white people “endured” rather than carried 
out. This is not an archive or method that centers the voices and experiences of 
indigenous people (an absolutely crucial endeavor successfully advanced by much 
indigenous studies scholarship but one to which Cather’s fiction could hardly contribute). 
It is, however, an archive and method that broadens our awareness of the many 
differently racialized aesthetic forms that settler moves to innocence can take—a 
contribution to the larger project of unsettling settler innocence, which is particularly 
pressing with regard to a canonical American author whose narratives of frontier 
settlement are still celebrated today as honest, unadorned records of a rustically humble 
and even progressively multicultural America. I aim not to vilify Cather for her bad 
settler politics (as if she were unique in this regard) but to reveal how those very politics, 
the racial anxieties and therapeutic fantasies they encode, are a key part of her past and 
present aesthetic appeal, particularly for white, bourgeois readers. 
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 This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section begins with a survey of 
the ways in which race and settler colonialism have been discussed so far in Cather 
scholarship. I then embark on an in-depth exploration of Cather’s speeches, interviews, 
and essays in the 1920s and 1930s. I show how her nonfiction criticisms of the modern 
American bourgeoisie provide a solid justification and framework for reading her 
novelistic depictions of bygone pioneers as attempts to memorialize and cling to a form 
of whiteness free of the moral degeneracy and Philistinism that Cather viewed as 
byproducts of modernization. Her jeremiads against America’s modern bourgeoisie 
condemn the way that mass consumption and modern conveniences have robbed people 
of certain economically coded and thus seemingly race-neutral virtues: austere resilience, 
self-discipline, and mettle. I argue, then, that her literary portraits of past settlers awash in 
these qualities must be read as racialized aesthetic tropes providing a fictional escape 
from the onrush of modernity and its negative effects on white America. With this 
nonfiction scaffolding in place, Section II then focuses on close readings of Cather’s 
fiction, bearing out these claims through analyses of both narrative content and form. 
These close readings move across four of Cather’s frontier-based novels: O Pioneers! 
(1913), A Lost Lady (1923), Death Comes for the Archbishop (1927), and Shadows on the 
Rock (1931). Section III offers a brief conclusion, gesturing toward the contemporary 
stakes of this chapter’s engagement with Cather’s work. 
 
I. “Restlessness such as ours”: Modernity, Whiteness, and Cather in Context 
 For a writer whose oeuvre is so consistently concerned with the settlement of the 
frontier, there has been relatively little scholarship in the past few decades examining the 
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settler-colonial elements of Cather’s work and virtually none exploring the links between 
settler-colonialism and white racial identity. As early as the 1970s, critics wrote about 
representations of “Indians” in Cather’s fiction, but early treatments of this subject did 
not identify these depictions as part of a settler-colonialist discourse so much as discuss 
Cather’s “appreciation” for indigenous cultures without recognizing that appreciation’s 
fetishistic dynamics: its reduction of Native Americans to de-politicized cultures, 
imagined as primitive remedies for the ills of modernity available for white aesthetic 
appropriation (Stouck; Swinehart). By the mid-1990s, critics were writing more scholarly 
monographs entirely devoted to Cather, but the majority of these studies have nothing 
critical to say about the settler-colonial ramifications of the major themes and tropes of 
Cather’s work. Guy Reynolds’ Willa Cather in Context: Progress, Race, Empire sounds 
exactly like the kind of study that would at least mention the settler-colonialist processes 
of Manifest Destiny as a context for Cather’s fiction, but there is in fact no discussion of 
settler colonialism in his book. Joseph Urgo’s Willa Cather and the Myth of American 
Migration uses Cather’s fiction to show that “the central theme … that defines American 
culture at its core is migration,” “the vigilant maintenance of unsettled lives, 
impermanent connections, and continuous movements in space” that keep Americans 
resilient, adaptable, and vigorous (5, 15). The issue of settler colonization, of the 
appropriation of the indigenous lands that make all this American migration possible, 
does not factor into Urgo’s argument, despite the fact that he uses phrases like “empire of 
migration” in his writing (5).3 Finally, in The Imaginative Claims of the Artist in Willa 
 
3 Indeed, there are numerous moments throughout his study where Urgo makes offhand comments that 
either position indigenous people, as opposed to settlers, as sources of violence on the frontier or cast 
indigenous people’s rootedness to place as a culturally Darwinistic explanation for their disappearance. 
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Cather’s Fiction: “Possession Granted by a Different Lease,” Demaree C. Peck 
examines the vocabulary and tropes of both Cather’s fiction and nonfiction to argue that 
all of her novels work as “variations of a single story”: “the artist’s quest to achieve 
imaginative possession of the world in order to recover the dominion of her own soul” 
(30). Peck shows how “Cather’s protagonists, serving as her surrogates [as figures of the 
artist], lay claim to the world as their own mental property,” “appropriate [it] as a 
reflection of the self” (30). As both the subtitle of Peck’s monograph as well as the few 
quotes from it already provided here suggest, the language of possession and acts of 
appropriation are the crux of Peck’s readings, yet there is no attention paid to the 
material, settler-colonial valence of this theme—this, despite the fact that, like Urgo, 
there are many instances where Peck’s terminology is rife with colonizing connotations 
(“Cather’s characters absorb the world in order to recreate an imperial self” [D. Peck 
31]). 
Since the 1990s and early 2000s, however, critics have produced far more 
sophisticated analyses of the settler-colonialist dynamics in Cather’s work, and there are 
typically two ways in which critics have done this. The first method is to point out how 
Cather’s novels about the frontier more or less completely erase histories of indigenous 
sovereignty and dispossession from the places about which she wrote. This is the method 
employed by Mike Fischer, who examines My Ántonia and O Pioneers! to show how 
Cather’s novels of the Great Plains eclipse the history of treaty violations and other forms 
 
“Seventeenth-century Puritan settlers,” Urgo writes in his Introduction, “were schooled in the practice of 
transit by their vulnerability to capture and forced removal by migrant Native Americans” (9). At the end of 
his first chapter, which involves a reading of The Professor’s House, Urgo sums up the moral of the story 
with these concluding sentences: “The cliff dwellers ultimately were defeated by tribes that dwelt nowhere 
in particular, tribes that kept moving. These tribes were in turn conquered by migratory Americans who had 
traveled even further, with fewer ties to place, whose spatial conception of the future far outweighed their 
memories of the past” (39). 
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of settler-colonial violence perpetrated against the Oglalla Sioux. This first approach to 
illuminating the settler-colonial dimensions of Cather’s aesthetics works, then, by 
focusing on the overall absence of indigenous people in her fiction. The second approach 
taken by critics revolves around discussing the ways indigenous people and cultures do 
appear in her work in the fleeting moments where this occurs. Like Fischer, Janis Stout 
has noted the various ways in which Cather wrote indigenous people and indigenous 
dispossession out of her fiction, despite living in places where Native Americans would 
still have been present during her lifetime or were only very recently removed (8, 109-
110, 156-158, 196). In addition to this, however, Stout also observes that when Cather 
does incorporate indigenous people or tropes of indigeneity into her work, she does so in 
ways that construct indigeneity as a thing of the past or as something rapidly passing 
from the present. In The Professor’s House (1925), for instance, the Anasazi people are 
given a metonymic, archaeological existence in the form of pottery shards and cliff cities 
that fascinate the humble, boyish adventurer Tom Outland, yet “his esteem for the 
Anasazi relics,” Stout notes, “entails no equivalent esteem for living Native Americans” 
(228). Likewise, “[i]n Death Comes for the Archbishop, two years later, Cather’s 
emphasis would again be on the death or dying of the Indians,” who have no role to play 
“in her vision of contemporary America” (Stout 228). To be clear, Archbishop does 
contain numerous representations of living indigenous people (it is the only Cather novel 
to do so), but Stout is still correct in observing that the representations of Native 
Americans that do appear in this text are oriented toward a horizon of death. The Pueblo 
and Navajo people that feature in the story of Bishop Jean-Marie Latour’s efforts to 
found the first Catholic diocese in 1850s New Mexico are, as I discuss later in this 
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chapter, portrayed in ways that highlight their non-modernity, their impenetrability to 
Catholic evangelism and Americanization. This impenetrability is not presented, by 
Cather, as some kind of noble and deliberate, anti-colonial indigenous nationalism but 
rather as a chaotic part of the untamed, un-Christian landscape that her pioneer hero has 
to contend with, part of the local color or backdrop of the Southwestern frontier against 
which her white protagonist’s racialized virtues of patient endurance, tolerance, and 
humble resolve shine through. 
One of the strongest critiques of Cather’s settler-colonialist representations of 
indigenous people comes from Caroline Woidat, who reads The Song of the Lark (1915) 
and The Professor’s House in the context of commercialized, turn-of-the-century tourist 
advertisements for travel to the American Southwest. Cather herself was an avid 
participant in this tourist economy, and she was particularly smitten with the ancient, 
Native American cliff cities carved into the mesa that were a principal attraction of the 
area. Woidat shows that in addition to providing a primitivist escape from the stiflingly 
overcivilized, industrial conditions of modern existence, the cliff cities “offered tourists 
an opportunity to transcend political and cultural conflicts between whites and Native 
Americans and identify with cliff dwellers as their ‘own’ ancestors and fellow citizens” 
(Woidat 35). In selling the cliff cities to modern travelers, tourist advertisements made 
much of the fact that “[t]he cliff dwellers had ‘vanished’ mysteriously” before the arrival 
of Colombus or Coronado’s Spaniards and also described the apartment-building-like 
cliff dwellings as forms of architecture “linked to modern American rather than Native 
American culture” (Woidat 31). The cliff dwellers were thus de-indigenized in these 
advertisements, “ennobled as the forerunners of American civilization” and seen, in light 
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of their architectural achievements, as “more ‘civilized’ than … tribes who later defended 
their land against European invaders” (Woidat 30, emphasis added, 31). Visiting these 
long-empty cliff cities thus allowed travelers both “to escape their own country’s history 
of conflict with Native Americans” and to “embrace the ancient people as their own 
relatives” (Woidat 29). Cather, Woidat shows, was an uncritical consumer of this 
touristic discourse in her own life, and it played out in her novels. In The Professor’s 
House, for example, Tom Outland claims that he has a sense of “filial piety” for the cliff 
dwellers, whose ruins he and his friend Rodney have worked to excavate (227). When 
Rodney sells a few of the cliff dweller relics, Tom—who, like Rodney was orphaned at a 
young age—furiously chastises him for the sale: “‘they weren’t mine to sell—nor yours! 
They belonged to this country, to the State, and to all the people. They belonged to boys 
like you and me, that have no other ancestors to inherit from’” (Cather, Professor’s 
House 219). It is worth noting that the kinds of dynamics Woidat identifies—where the 
indigeneity of indigenous people is erased by settlers claiming them as American or 
where settlers indigenize themselves by claiming some fancied, ancestral relation to 
indigenous people—are one of the key types of settler moves to innocence that Tuck and 
Yang specifically name in their article. They call these “settler adoption fantasies”: 
stories, like The Last of the Mohicans, that envision a settler being adopted by Native 
Americans because he has internalized indigenous knowledges and practices or like The 
Professor’s House, where a settler adopts an indigenous nation, by fiat, as his own patria 
(Tuck and Yang 14-17). 
While a good deal of Cather scholarship thus ignores the question of settler 
colonialism entirely, some scholars have carefully attended to the ways in which Cather’s 
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fiction undermines indigenous sovereignty either by erasing indigenous peoples or 
representing them in unwittingly problematic ways. The issue of settler colonialism in 
Cather’s work is closely associated with yet still distinct from the issue of race. When 
discussing the latter, scholars have tended to focus on Cather’s representations of black, 
Mexican, or indigenous people or of not-quite-white Eastern-European immigrants like 
My Ántonia’s Ántonia Shimerda. Early critics of Cather’s work, like Guy Reynolds, 
established a reputation for Cather as a writer who held a “multicultural” vision of 
America quite unique and progressive for her time. This claim relied upon the alleged 
racial and ethnic diversity of the frontiers depicted in her fiction, the mix of Swedish, 
Czech, German, and French immigrants, Mexicans, and occasionally Native Americans 
that populate her fiction’s frontier locales. Since 2000, most of the scholarship discussing 
race in Cather’s novels focuses on her representations of non- or not-quite-white racial 
Others, fleshing out further the nature of Cather’s supposed, immigrant-loving 
multiculturalism and, often (but not always), identifying its limitations and oversights. 
For example, in her reading of My Ántonia, Linda Joyce Brown argues that Cather 
constructs her eponymous, immigrant heroine “both as an ethnically-marked Bohemian 
and as a white American,” a construction that folds Ántonia into the self-consciously 
white American nation while still retaining a hint of ethnic diversity that allows Cather to 
exude an air of “cultural pluralism” (83, 84). However, Brown argues, the condition of 
Ántonia’s racial whitening is the reification and exclusion of blackness via Blind 
D’Arnault, an African American jazz pianist whose savage rhythms are a textbook 
example of modernist primitivism. “It is only because black Otherness is reified through 
th[is] character,” Brown observes, “that the Bohemian Ántonia can enter into whiteness” 
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(84). Many critics have pointed out that aside from the Czech Catholic Ántonia, the 
“celebrated ethnic variety” of Cather’s Nebraska frontier was never in fact “too various” 
(Stout 154, original emphasis). The Swedes, Norwegians, Acadian French, Danes, 
Germans, and Russians that populate Cather’s pioneer Midwest are “not only not-black,” 
Stout observes, “but also not-Italian, not-Asian, [and] not-Jewish” (154). Her Nebraska 
pioneers are thus neither people of color nor members of those historically stigmatized, 
“ethnic” European groups whose presence would be a crucial part of any truly 
multicultural, diverse literary vision. Speaking of the novels set in the Southwest, Stout 
also notes that in addition to depicting Native Americans as people incompatible with 
modernity, Cather generally adopts “a denigrating or at best condescending attitude 
toward Mexicans,” whom she either “romanticiz[es] as innocent and quaint” or portrays 
as foolish, impulsive, indigent, and fickle (240). Despite such critiques, some critics have 
continued to detail the multicultural inclinations of Cather’s fiction while admitting its 
limitations. In his reading of The Song of the Lark, The Professor’s House, and Death 
Comes for the Archbishop, Christopher Schedler acknowledges that “Cather’s 
representations of other cultures in the Southwest have been characterized as primitivist 
and racist,” yet he still sets out to show that “Cather’s Southwestern fiction is centrally 
concerned with the aesthetic ‘preservation’ of Native American and Mexican cultures” 
(86, 85). 
It is absolutely imperative that we be aware of the ways that Cather erased 
indigenous people and indigenous sovereignty from the places about which she wrote. 
We must also be able to decipher the representations of indigenous people and cultures 
that do appear in her fiction as the unwittingly self-serving embodiments of settler 
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fantasies and anxieties they almost always are. Finally, we also need to examine the uses 
and implications of Cather’s representations of not-quite-white European immigrants like 
Ántonia and of non-indigenous people of color, such as African Americans, Mexicans, 
and Mexican Americans. These are indispensable components of the racial and settler-
colonial dimensions of Cather’s work—are indeed the groundwork for comprehending 
these things. The problem I am identifying, then, is not that Cather scholars have failed to 
discuss settler colonialism or race. They have discussed settler colonialism (or at least 
some of them have), and this chapter follows Fischer in locating Cather’s settler-colonial 
politics in the way her fiction erases histories of indigenous dispossession and takes for 
granted settler access to the land. What Cather scholars have not done is fully consider 
how whiteness manifests in her work. They have tended to equate discussions of race 
with discussions of characters who are completely outside whiteness or straddling its 
boundaries: black people, Native Americans, Mexicans, and not-quite-white European 
immigrants like Ántonia. Yet this is not the only way of reading whiteness in Cather’s 
work. If we think about race in terms of contrasts made between white people by way of 
seemingly race-neutral, economically coded virtues, then there are things to be said about 
whiteness even in texts or in parts of texts that revolve around settlers who are squarely 
within the bounds of whiteness as a racial category—readings that still attend to how the 
structures and assumptions of settler-colonial occupancy “provide[] the context for 
national identifications of whiteness” (Moreton-Robinson 51). The first step in 
addressing this scholarly oversight is to look at what Cather thought not about Native or 
African Americans, Mexicans, or immigrant Bohemians but about white, bourgeois, 




 A modernist in form but a Romantic in sentiment, Cather relentlessly maintained 
that industrialization, new technologies, and mass consumerism had degraded the 
production and consumption of art in modern America. In a 1925 speech at Bowdoin 
College, she argued that “the modern novel, the cinema, and the radio form an equal 
menace to human culture” and that the novel had even become “too democratic,” “too 
easy to read and too easy to write” (Willa Cather in Person 155, 157).4 This criticism 
builds upon comments Cather made a year earlier in a 1924 interview with journalist 
Rose C. Feld for The New York Times Book Review: 
“Don’t confuse reading with culture or art,” [Miss Cather] said …. “So many 
books are sold today because of the economic condition of this country, not the 
cultural. We have a great prosperous middle class, in cities, in suburbs, in small 
towns, on farms …. They want a book which will fill up commuting boredom 
every morning and evening; … they want a book to keep in the automobile while 
they’re waiting for tardy friends or relatives; they want fillers-in, in a word, 
something to take off the edge of boredom and empty leisure. Publishers, who are, 
after all, business men [sic], recognize the demand and pour forth their supply.” 
(WCIP 68) 
 
The quality of literature in America had thus declined, in Cather’s view, because of a 
Philistine, bourgeois reading public that only wants to be entertained and because of 
commercial publishers who pander to these Philistine tastes. This line of argumentation 
eventually led Cather to make what would appear to be some unabashedly elitist 
declarations: “Forty years ago, … only good books were published, only cultivated 
people read. The others didn’t read at all, or if they did it was the newspapers, the 
almanac, and the Bible on Sundays. … Fine books were written for fine people” (WCIP 
 




69). No doubt aware that this language of fineness might sound condescending, Cather 
immediately added an important clarification: 
“The discrimination is not a snobbish one …. By the fine reader I don’t 
necessarily mean the man or woman with a cultivated background, an academic, 
or a wealthy background. I mean the person with quickness and richness of 
mentality, fineness of spirituality. You found it often in a carpenter or a 
blacksmith who went to his few books for recreation and inspiration.” (WCIP 69) 
 
Though it is not, perhaps, the most obvious takeaway here, I would suggest that this 
account of the “fine reader”—when read alongside Cather’s remarks about people who 
only want books “to take off the edge of boredom and empty leisure”—clarifies that a 
crucial component of modern, bourgeois America’s Philistinism is a lack of discipline 
and mettle: a woeful inability to endure even the smallest of inconveniences, manifested 
aesthetically in a taste for “easy” literature. The same processes of industrialization that 
have made America’s “great prosperous middle class” materially comfortable have also 
made it more needy and trifling. Cather’s repeated jibes at the quintessentially bourgeois 
problem of “boredom” are an apt register of this cultural development: nothing illustrates 
how low Americans’ tolerance for adversity has fallen better than a pervasive, urgently 
felt need to alleviate the most unurgent form of adversity imaginable. Contrast this to the 
“carpenter or blacksmith who went to his few books for recreation and inspiration.” The 
term “recreation” here might seem to suggest a vapid desire for mere entertainment akin 
to that of the modern bourgeoisie, but it is clearly implied that the preindustrial carpenter 
or blacksmith Cather envisions went to his books for the books—to appreciate their 
artistry rather than simply to kill time. The novel was not “too easy to read” in the past, 
then, because there were still people who devoted time and energy to books that were 
artistically and intellectually complex—even if this meant they were less easily read. 
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Cather sums up these criticisms in the Feld interview, insisting that America’s newfound 
wealth had yielded a culture of crude materialism where luxuriousness and immediate 
gratification trump sound and purposeful composition as the prevailing criteria of 
aesthetic appeal: “‘It’s our prosperity, our judging success in terms of dollars. … It makes 
for nice, easy family life but not for art. … Restlessness such as ours, success such as 
ours, striving such as ours, do not make for beauty. Other things must come first: good 
cookery; cottages that are homes, not playthings; gardens; repose.’” (WCIP 70-71). 
 These references to cooking, gardening, and homemaking bring us to what Cather 
felt were the best remedies for America’s commercially and industrially induced artistic 
decay. Chief among these were a return to Romantic craftsmanship ideals and a greater 
appreciation for the humble yet substantial forms of artistry implicit in the creative and 
ordering rituals of everyday life, such as cooking and housework. In describing these 
panaceas, Cather used a language as rife with prescriptions of discipline, diligence, and 
resilience as the language she used to criticize the Philistine restlessness being remedied. 
“I think it a great misfortune for every one [sic] to have a chance to write—to have a 
chance to read,” she lamented, clearly referring to what she then saw as the low-quality 
aesthetic productions passing for “culture” in modern America: 
 “A little culture makes lazy handiwork, and handiwork is a beautiful education in 
itself …. Good carpentry, good weaving, all the handicrafts were much sounder 
forms of education than what the people are getting now. 
 “… The one education which amounts to anything is learning how to do 
something well, whether it is to make a bookcase or write a book. If I could get a 
carpenter to make me some good bookcases I would have as much respect for him 
as I have for the people whose books I want to put on them.” (WCIP 79-80) 
 
This appreciation for the artistry of good “handiwork” goes beyond the masculine realm 
of the preindustrial trades to include the domestic arts as well. “‘There is a real art in 
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cooking a roast just right,’” Cather remarks, and “the farmer’s wife who raises a large 
family and cooks for them and makes their clothes and keeps house and on the side runs a 
truck garden and a chicken farm and a canning establishment, and thoroughly enjoys 
doing it all, and doing it well, contributes more to art than all the culture clubs” (WCIP 
47). The constant refrain here of making or doing something “well” continues the latent 
criticism of an undisciplined, frivolous America identified in Cather’s earlier comments 
about the nation’s great, prosperous middle class. It is not carpentry or roast cooking in 
and of itself, after all, in which Cather is interested. Her primary concern is the 
degradation of art in early-twentieth-century America, which the quality of the 
preindustrial carpenter’s well-made bookcase or of the farmer’s wife’s domestic economy 
brings into relief. The language in which Cather couches these claims, however, implies a 
judgment not just about the declining quality of American art but about the source and 
causes of that decline. It suggests that modern Americans have lost certain character 
traits, ones that the mastery of preindustrial handicraft production used to instill: 
patience, diligence, the determination to commit oneself to a challenge and see it 
through—which is always a part of “learning how to do something well,” regardless of 
what that something is. To suggest that modern Americans do not know how to do this—
“this” being neither carpentry nor housework but the broader capacity of applying oneself 
to an aesthetic or practical endeavor and sticking to it with enough care and investment to 
“do it well”—is to suggest that modern bourgeois Americans suffer from an inability to 
face challenges of any kind, a weakness reflected in the “lazy handiwork” then passing 
for modern culture and, especially, in the bourgeoisie’s taste for “easy” literature. Spoiled 
by their “prosperity” and “easy family life,” incapable even of withstanding the 
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inconvenience of being bored, modern bourgeois Americans have gone soft. They have 
lost their mettle. 
 Both the underlying values and the national specificity of Cather’s criticisms are 
further clarified by the comments she makes about a contrasting group of people who, in 
her estimation, have escaped this modern cultural malaise. The French, Cather insists, 
have retained the values and character traits that make for good art and cultured society: 
 “We [Americans] can build excellent bridges; we can put up beautiful office 
buildings,  
factories … but literary art, painting, sculpture, no. We haven’t yet acquired the 
good sense of discrimination possessed by the French, for instance. They have a 
great purity of tradition; they all but murder originality, and yet they worship it. 
The taste of the nation is represented by the Academy; it is a corrective rod which 
the young artist ever dreads. He revolts against it, but he cannot free himself from 
it. … Here in America, on the other hand, every little glimmer of color calls itself 
art…. It’s rather pathetic.” (WCIP 70) 
 
Cather’s praise for French art is thus inextricable from her praise of French discipline. 
The latter is the former’s condition of possibility, and the main point of this nation-to-
nation comparison is that artistic production actually benefits from conditions of 
austerity. The “corrective rod” of the Academy and the “sense of discrimination” and 
“tradition” that pervade the French artist’s social and cultural milieu do not prohibit 
artistic originality but merely prevent a “pathetic[ally]” self-indulgent lowering of 
standards. True to the aesthetic philosophy outlined above, Cather’s claims about the 
superior aesthetic sensibility of the French extend beyond “literary art, painting, [and] 
sculpture” to the more informal forms of artistry embedded in everyday life. “The 
Frenchman,” she maintains, is “greatly occupied with building the things that make his 
home. His house, his garden, his vineyards, these are the things that fill his mind” (WCIP 
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71). Even Cather’s earlier comments about America’s artistically corruptive ease and 
affluence are actually part of a comparative critique: 
“It’s our prosperity, our judging success in terms of dollars. Life not only gives us 
wages for our toil but a bonus besides. It makes for nice, easy family life but not 
for art. The French people, on the other hand, have had no bonus. Their minds 
have been formed by rubbing up cruelly with the inescapable realities of life …. 
[Edith] Wharton expressed it very well in a recent article when she said that the 
Frenchman elected to live at home and use his wits to make his condition happy. 
He don’t want [sic] an easier land. He chose France, above all, as the home of his 
family, and his children after them.” (WCIP 70) 
 
Where Americans tend toward restless striving, the French tend toward repose, which is 
not, in Cather’s formulation, the same thing as ease, the absence of hardship, but is rather 
a capacity for taking hardship in stride, a kind of staying power (literally exemplified 
here by the act of settling on and refusing to leave a particular area of land). 
 Cather’s fictional preoccupation with the stalwart, exquisitely resigned pioneers, I 
argue, must be understood in the context of these nonfiction jeremiads about the cultural 
degeneracy of post-pioneer, bourgeois America. In recreating the lives of Alexandra 
Bergson and other settlers on the North American frontier, Cather was indulging in a 
form of nostalgic escapism, a means of coping with the disappointments of modern 
American culture by immersing herself (and her readers) in the memory of times, places, 
and people unmarred by the Philistine consequences of industrialization and mass 
consumerism. In fact, Cather was unabashedly forthright about these escapist 
inclinations. In a 1936 letter to The Commonweal magazine, she openly scorned the idea 
that artists have any obligation to be political in times of crisis. “[T]he world has a habit 
of being in a bad way from time to time,” she contended, “and art has never contributed 
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anything to help matters – except escape” (On Writing 19).5 Literary artists, she claimed, 
are especially burdened with the expectation of “loyalty to a cause”: “[s]ince poets and 
novelists do not speak in symbols or a special language, but in the plain speech which all 
men use and all men … read, they are told that their first concern should be to cry out 
against social injustice” (OW 20, 22). But fiction, Cather insists, is a “rickety” vehicle for 
“the propagandists,” and “the man who wants to reform industrial conditions” should 
“follow the method of the pamphleteers” (OW 23). Granted, she concedes, “[t]here have 
been generous and bold spirits among the artists: … Citizen Shelley stepped into line and 
drove his pen—but he was not very useful to the reforms which fired his imagination. He 
was ‘useful,’ if you like that word, only as all true poets are, because they refresh and 
recharge the spirit of those who can read their language” (OW 20, emphasis added). 
Cather spoke of her own fiction—specifically those works set on unsettled frontiers—in 
terms of a similar emotional effect, as works whose chief merit was that of giving her as a 
writer (and us, we presume, as readers) the sensation of being spiritually “refreshe[d].” 
Writing to one reviewer about Shadows on the Rock (1931), her novel about French 
colonists living in barely settled, late-seventeenth-century Quebec, Cather reflected: 
To me the rock of Quebec is not only a stronghold on which many strange figures 
have for a little time cast a shadow in the sun; it is the curious endurance of a kind 
of culture …. There, among the country people and the nuns, I caught something 
new to me; a kind of feeling about life and human fate that I could not accept, 
wholly, but which I could not but admire[,] … [one] full of pious resignation. 
… Those people brought a kind of French culture there and somehow kept 
it alive on that rock, sheltered it and on occasion died for it, as if it really were a 
sacred fire – and all this temperately and shrewdly, with emotion always tempered 
by good sense. 
 




It’s very hard for an American to catch that rhythm – it’s so unlike us. But 
I made an honest try, and I got a great deal of pleasure out of it, if nobody else 
does! (OW 15-17) 
 
The effect on Cather of the settler “endurance” she describes here is precisely that of a 
spiritually recharging breath of fresh air, an escape from the modern “rhythm” of restless, 
trifling American life to an older rhythm of noble repose, which connotes, again, not the 
absence of hardship but the capacity to weather precariousness and austerity “temperately 
and shrewdly,” to accept the blows of “fate” gracefully, with “pious resignation.” Cather 
felt similarly refreshed when writing Death Comes for the Archbishop (1927), her 
narrative of French Catholic missionaries spreading their faith in the newly annexed 
American territory of 1850s New Mexico. In another letter to The Commonweal, Cather 
recalled reading the letters of the real-life priest on whom she based one of the book’s 
protagonists: “What I got from Father Machebeuf’s letters was the mood, the spirit in 
which they accepted the accidents and hardships of a desert country” (OW 10). In writing 
Archbishop, Cather sought to convey this “hardihood of spirit” to her readers (OW 10). 
From the 1920s to the 1930s, then, Cather’s views of American art and American 
culture revolved around a critique of the modern bourgeoisie’s lack of aesthetic taste, a 
lazy palate she attributed in turn to the socioeconomic problem of shallow, bourgeois 
“restlessness”: an inability to endure challenges or hardships of any kind. The final piece 
of this contextual puzzle pertains to the racial specificity of Cather’s criticisms, which, 
unlike their national specificity, is entirely tacit. Nowhere in her critiques of the 
American bourgeoisie does Cather explicitly associate the degeneration she saw in 
modern American art with a degeneration in American whiteness. The class parameters 
of her criticisms, however, clearly imply a circumscribed demographic. “It’s our 
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prosperity,” our “easy family life”; “Life not only gives us wages for our toil but a bonus 
besides.” We do not need Cather to specify the race of the people she is talking about to 
know that when she speaks of “a great prosperous middle class” in early-twentieth-
century America, she is speaking of a bourgeoisie that is almost entirely white. Countless 
Americans at the turn of the twentieth century, after all, were not paid any wages for their 
toil (let alone a bonus besides) until after 1865, and embourgeoisement for some—“in 
cities, in suburbs, in small towns, [and] on farms”—required the dispossession and 
exploitation of others still barred from “prosperity” and “easy family life” by institutions 
like the Dawes General Allotment Act or the Chinese Exclusion Act.  
The implicit racial homogeneity of Cather’s thinking is evident, however, in more 
than just the class parameters of her nonfiction. The centering of white lives and white 
perspectives is equally conspicuous in her novels, where the whiteness of her characters 
is frequently (though not always) as unmarked as that of the “prosperous middle class” 
taken to task in her nonfiction criticism. In all of the fiction Cather wrote about pioneer 
homesteaders on the Great Plains, for example, there are only two black characters: Blind 
D’Arnault, the touring pianist in My Ántonia (1918) whose savagely beautiful jazz music 
is a textbook example of modernist primitivism, and a speechless servant character in A 
Lost Lady (1923) bluntly named Black Tom. As noted above, Cather’s fiction often 
alludes to the bygone presence of indigenous people via archaeological traces like pottery 
shards or cliff cities, but her novels almost never acknowledge the presence of living 
Native Americans in modern America. And while Cather is often regarded, due to novels 
like O Pioneers! and My Ántonia, as a writer of immigrant literature, critics have long 
pointed out that the immigrant homesteaders she lovingly fictionalized were never that 
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racially diverse. As noted earlier, Cather was not writing about those groups, like the 
Irish, Italians, or Jews, that critical whiteness studies has taught us not to mistake for 
white in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most liminally white of the 
immigrant groups about whom Cather wrote were Bohemians, like the Catholic Ántonia 
Shimerda, and even this exception to an otherwise entirely white immigrant cast has been 
qualified by Cather scholars. During World War I (the time of My Ántonia’s writing and 
publication), the Bohemians, or Czechs, were “the most Western and consequently least 
threatening of the Eastern European peoples toward which the [United States] 
government was willing to extend the promise of self-determination” (Fischer 41). This 
was “a promise much vaunted by Woodrow Wilson in his war aims,” and favoring 
Bohemians was thus a gesture of wartime propaganda, “an ideological figuration of 
American tolerance” (Stout 156; Fischer 41).  
Overwhelmingly, however, it is Northern and Western European immigrants that 
occupy Cather’s literary limelight, and their whiteness, historically, was never in 
question. Take the Swedish Bergsons in O Pioneers!, for example. As historian Jason E. 
Pierce observes in Making the White Man’s West, the settlement of the Great Plains in the 
late nineteenth century was largely driven by the construction and advertising efforts of 
major railroad companies. “Instead of simply building a line to tap an existing market,” 
Pierce explains, railroads building into the unsettled Plains were faced with the task of 
“creating a market” that their lines would supply (151). Thus, in addition to building the 
transportation infrastructure for future settlements, these companies “charged their land 
departments with advertising to prospective settlers” (Pierce 153-154, 154). These 
“colonization project[s]” were not pitched to everyone equally (Pierce 154). 
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Railroad executives, like most other nineteenth century Americans, made 
numerous distinctions between ethnic and racial groups. Certainly, they saw racial 
divisions between whites and African Americans or Native Americans, but they 
also discriminated between the ethnic groups of Europe, or as many preferred to 
call them, the “races” of Europe. “Real” whites, usually defined as those of 
Northern European ancestry, rated as the most desirable potential citizens. 
Believed to be hardworking, independent, and intelligent, they allegedly made 
ideal settlers. (Pierce 152) 
 
Advertisements thus “consciously targeted Germans, Scandinavians, and Englishmen to a 
much greater degree than the Irish,” for instance, as the former groups were imagined to 
be industrious, “of the Protestant faith, and racially white” (Pierce 155, 154). It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that the whiteness of Cather’s Scandinavian heroine in O Pioneers! 
inspires occasional narrative commentary. Alexandra’s skin, we are told, “is of such 
smoothness and whiteness as none but Swedish women ever possess; skin with the 
freshness of the snow itself” (45). At another point, the narrator, in language reminding 
us, perhaps, of her Protestant discipline, describes Alexandra “prosecut[ing] her bath with 
vigor,” pouring cold water over her “gleaming white body” (106). 
 Explicit comments about whiteness, to be clear, are not a frequent part of O 
Pioneers! or any of Cather’s other frontier fictions, but they should still be taken 
seriously as indicators of a pervasive, underlying racial consciousness informing her 
fictional production and nonfiction criticism. Race may not have been the dominant lens 
through which Cather viewed her pioneer characters or her contemporary, Philistine 
compatriots, but it was certainly not irrelevant. The narrow focus, throughout Cather’s 
nonfiction, on the tastes and habits only of Americans living in material prosperity 
reveals the extent to which her cultural criticisms were informed by an economic 
background shaped by her own whiteness. And if, as I have argued, Cather’s fictional 
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preoccupation with hardy, austere pioneers was an escapist reaction to the nonfiction 
spectacle of modern America’s restless, spoiled, Philistine bourgeoisie, then the explicit 
attention called to the whiteness of a character like Alexandra should clue us into the fact 
that Cather’s judgments about the aesthetic degeneracy of America’s great prosperous 
middle class are constantly limned with a diagnosis of racial degeneracy as well. The nail 
in the coffin of any race-neutral reading of Cather’s nonfiction commentary or her 
pioneer novels appears in her reflections on Death Comes for the Archbishop. Writing of 
the first Bishop of New Mexico, Jean-Baptiste Lamy, on whom the novel’s protagonist is 
based, Cather recalled the experience of seeing a great statue of Lamy outside the 
Cathedral in Santa Fe: “I never passed that life-size bronze of him … without wishing 
that I could learn more about a pioneer churchman who looked so well-bred and 
distinguished. In his pictures one felt the same thing, something fearless and fine and 
very, very well-bred—something that spoke of race” (OW 7, emphasis added). One 
cannot possibly read this comment without concluding that the pioneer qualities of 
humility, patience, and austere perseverance embodied by Archbishop’s Lamy-inspired 
protagonist, Jean-Marie Latour, are likewise meant to speak of race, and my contention 
here is that Cather’s remarks about Latour (by way of Lamy) exemplify a structure of 
feeling that resonates across her frontier narratives. From O Pioneers! and A Lost Lady to 
Archbishop and Shadows on the Rock, Cather’s pioneers’ displays of austere endurance, 
anti-materialistic idealism, and artistic sensitivity comprise a set of tacitly racialized 
qualities: memories of what whiteness in the New World once was, conjured up as a 




II. Whiteness and Settler Moves to Innocence in Cather’s Pioneer Fiction 
With a fuller sense of Cather’s nonfiction criticisms and their tacit racial 
dimensions in place, we can now turn to her literary portrayals of pioneer life and discern 
the extent to which these are, indeed, racially charged, despite the overall lack of explicit 
references to race and whiteness in her texts. What does whiteness look like in Cather’s 
novels of frontier life, and how do its manifestations function as settler moves to 
innocence? 
In one of the most crucial scenes of Cather’s 1923 novel A Lost Lady, Captain 
Daniel Forrester, an aging railroad magnate and a pioneering founder of the small 
Midwestern town of Sweet Water, returns home from a business trip announcing to his 
wife and friends that he is a “‘a poor man’” (73).6 The Captain had been the chief officer 
of a bank in Denver, “one which paid good interest on small deposits” and whose 
depositors were predominantly “railroad employés, mechanics, and day labourers, many 
of whom had at some time worked for [him]” (LL 74). The bank had begun to fail, and 
the Captain had gone to see what could be done: 
His was the only well-known name among the bank officers, it was the name 
which promised security and fair treatment to his old workmen and their friends. 
The other directors were promising young business men [sic] with many irons in 
the fire. But … they had refused to come up to the scratch and pay their losses 
like gentlemen. They claimed that the bank was insolvent, not through unwise 
investments or mismanagement, but because of a nation-wide financial panic …. 
They argued that the fair thing was to share the loss with the depositors …. 
 Captain Forrester had stood firm that not one of the depositors should lose 
a dollar. The promising young business men had listened to him respectfully, but 
finally told him they would settle only on their own terms; any additional 
refunding must be his affair. He sent to the vault for his private steel box, opened 
it in their presence, and sorted the contents on the table. The government bonds he 
 
6 All quotations from this novel hereafter cited, in-text, with the abbreviation “LL.” 
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turned in at once. Judge Pommeroy was sent to sell the mining stocks and other 
securities in the open market. (LL 74-75) 
 
This dramatic display of noblesse oblige cuts to the heart of A Lost Lady’s principal 
theme: the vanishing of a noble generation of pioneers, replete with moral integrity and a 
communal spirit, displaced by a rising class of unscrupulously profiteering modern 
“business men.” Contrary to the petty materialism of the restlessly acquisitive modern 
bourgeoisie, Cather defines her pioneer hero in terms of a marked disregard for the 
accumulation and retention of wealth, a willingness to sacrifice profit for the sake of 
unprofitable ideals, however old-fashioned. In this respect, the episode of the bank failure 
simply dramatizes, to spectacular extremes, a trait of our pioneer hero already signaled in 
the novel’s opening pages, when Cather’s narrator describes the condition of the 
Forrester estate: “Any one but Captain Forrester would have drained the bottom land and 
made it into highly productive fields. But he had selected this place long ago because it 
looked beautiful to him, and he happened to like the way the creek wound through his 
pasture” (LL 5). In both cases, the Captain, guided by his non-acquisitive disposition, 
embodies that essential aesthetic quality celebrated by Cather as the antithesis of modern 
bourgeois restlessness: repose. What we are supposed to find beautiful about the 
Forrester grounds is not the picturesqueness of the pristine landscape itself but the 
steadfastness of character to which that landscape attests, the beauty of the Captain’s 
refusal to follow the rush of a Philistine modernity that defaces anyone and anything for 
the sake of profit. The same disregard for material wealth allows him to act with repose 
during the bank failure: “He sent to the vault for his private steel box, opened it in their 
presence, and sorted the contents on the table.” We have here the human equivalent of a 
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time-worn, rain-battered lighthouse. Through figures like the Captain, Cather aims to 
captivate readers with an aesthetics of weathered sturdiness. We are being sensitized to 
the beauty of a shape, of a certain posture or silhouette (one rarely seen, Cather suggests, 
in twentieth-century America): that of a man standing up for a non-materialistic ideal, for 
something other than money, whether it be the beauty of nature or the idea that men 
should “pay their losses like gentlemen.” 
 This non- or anti-materialism is linked throughout Cather’s fiction to a graceful 
capacity to endure the reality (or prospect) of loss, a spiritual and mental fortitude 
diametrically opposed to the modern inability to endure even the inconvenience of 
boredom. The Captain’s unflustered self-bankruptcy is a narrative device cut from the 
same cloth as Alexandra’s exquisitely resigned admission, at the end of O Pioneers!, that 
“‘the land belongs to the future’” and she “‘might as well try to will the sunset … to [her] 
brother’s children’” (158).7 Both moments dramatize a pioneer ethos defined by the way 
one carries oneself in the face of adverse circumstances, actual or imminent. Perhaps 
nowhere is this criterion of moral and aesthetic judgment so starkly and concisely 
advanced as in O Pioneers!, when Cather’s omniscient narrator declares with maxim-like 
pithiness: “A pioneer should have imagination, should be able to enjoy the idea of things 
more than the things themselves” (25). A consummate idealist, in other words, a pioneer 
should be able to endure the unideal, to persevere through unideal conditions so long as 
he or she has an ideal to cling to. This is precisely what Captain Forrester does in his 
noblesse-oblige handling of the bank failure, and many of the early chapters in O 
Pioneers! highlight Alexandra’s multi-year labor of convincing her brothers to remain on 
 
7 All quotations from this novel hereafter cited, in-text, with the abbreviation “OP.” 
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their farmland despite its seeming unprofitability. “‘But how do you know that land is 
going to go up enough to pay the mortgages,’” her brother Lou asks when she proposes a 
second mortgage on the homestead (OP 34, original emphasis). “‘I can’t explain that, 
Lou,’” Alexandra replies, “‘I know, that’s all. When you drive about over the country you 
can feel it coming’” (34, original emphasis). Continuing to have faith in the land is a tall 
order when everyone else seems inclined to abandon it, but as Alexandra tells her friend 
Carl, “‘I have to keep telling myself what is going to happen’”: I have to be able to enjoy 
the idea of what the land will become, regardless of what it is now (OP 28, emphasis 
added). Across these sketches, Cather routinely foregrounds the beauty of Alexandra’s 
embattled resilience. This is often, again, a matter of posing, of capturing her heroine in 
postures of exquisite resignation and stalwart pensiveness. The day after a heated 
argument with her brother Oscar about selling the farm, Alexandra is described sitting in 
a rocking chair with the Bible open on her knees: “but she was not reading. She was 
looking thoughtfully away at the point where the upland road disappeared over the rim of 
the prairie. Her body was in attitude of perfect repose, such as it was apt to take when she 
was thinking earnestly” (OP 31). 
 Nowhere is Cather’s aesthetic fixation on stoical idealism more evident, however, 
than in Shadows on the Rock, her fictionalization of the lives of French colonists living in 
barely settled, seventeenth-century Quebec. Topically and stylistically, Shadows is a 
sister novel to O Pioneers! Both texts lack a steadily elaborated plot and revolve, instead, 
around discontinuous snapshots of white pioneers enduring hardships and deprivation to 
establish homey footholds in a new world. In the novel’s opening scene, “the last of the 
summer ships from France” are departing down the St. Lawrence in October, meaning 
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that it will be nearly a year before Quebec’s residents receive either provisions or news 
again from the Old World (Shadows on the Rock 3).8 The colonists look down from the 
cape, watching until the receding sails disappear from view, at which point, “they went 
back to their shops and their kitchens to face the stern realities of life. Now for eight 
months the French colony on this rock in the North would be entirely cut off from 
Europe, from the world. … No supplies; not a cask of wine or a sack of flour …. Not a 
letter, even—no news of what went on at home” (SR 3). The atmosphere of hardship that 
forms the quintessential backdrop to any of Cather’s pioneer novels is thus established in 
the first few pages, and just as O Pioneers! opens with visions of the ominously untamed 
landscaped, the wilderness looms large in the opening pages of Shadows, too, threatening 
(as Cather put it in O Pioneers!) “to overwhelm the little beginnings of human society 
that struggled in its sombre wastes” (OP 8). “[J]ust across from the proud rock of 
Quebec, the black pine forest came down to the water’s edge … [and] stretched no living 
man knew how far. …The forest was suffocation, annihilation; there European man was 
quickly swallowed up in silence” (SR 5-6). 
Despite this ominous opening, however, what follows in the next 200 pages are 
glimpses of Quebec’s colonists not just surviving but surviving with a spirit that manages 
to find comfort and even beauty amidst inhospitable circumstances. True to Catherian 
form, nothing testifies to the pioneers’ graceful resilience so much as an artfully civilized 
domestic interior: the specter of the suffocating wilderness is quickly eclipsed by images 
of a cozy home, as apothecary Euclide Auclair, one of the novel’s main protagonists, 





door, Cather’s narrator embarks on a glowing description of the domestic scene: a living 
room decorously shut off from the shopfront “by a partition made of shelves and 
cabinets,” “a fire burn[ing] in the fireplace,” a “dining-table … set with a white cloth, 
silver candlesticks, glasses, and two clear decanters, one of red wine and one of white” 
(7). From the kitchen at the back of the house, “two pleasant emanations greeted the 
chemist: the rich odour of roasting fowl, and a child’s voice, singing. When he closed the 
heavy wooden door behind him, the voice called: ‘Is it you, Papa?’” (8). Twelve-year-old 
Cécile, Euclide’s daughter, has been preparing her father’s dinner, knowing that it is his 
custom to dine “at six o’ clock in winter and seven in summer, … as he was used to do in 
Paris” (8). Indeed, “his dinner Auclair regarded as the thing that kept him a civilized man 
and a Frenchman” (14). Shadows thus clearly reprises a theme that Cather was already 
elaborating 18 years earlier in O Pioneers!: the epic feat of establishing on foreign soil a 
“civilized” order that preserves a sense of the cultural traditions and national identity of 
the country from which pioneer settlers have come. The homey domestic order of the 
Auclair household provides a clear fictional instantiation of Cather’s maxim that 
restlessness does not make for beauty: “[o]ther things must come first: good cookery, 
cottages that are homes, not playthings; … repose” (WCIP 71). 
As with Alexandra or Captain Forrester, however, we fail to see the full beauty of 
the Auclairs’ repose if all we see is the beauty of comfort—the pleasure created by 
Cécile doing her homemaking and “doing it well.” In order for repose, in a Catherian 
context, to be appealing, it cannot inhere merely in conditions or postures of ease, making 
repose synonymous with luxury (with life giving these characters “wages for their toil 
and a bonus besides”). It must inhere, rather, in conditions or postures of ease in the midst 
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of deprivation and hardship, making repose synonymous with fortitude (with “fac[ing] 
the stern realities of life” [SR 3]). It is unsurprising, then, that soon after the narrator’s 
description of the Auclair household, Cather provides readers with a bit of backstory that 
cuts the aura of cozy contentment with a dose of hardy austerity. This is accomplished by 
inserting into the narrative, from beyond the grave, the voice of the deceased Madame 
Auclair, Euclide’s late wife and Cécile’s mother, who died two years before the story’s 
start. Cécile recalls her mother’s admonishments about housework in the final years of 
her life: 
“After a while, when I am too ill to help you, you will perhaps find it 
fatiguing to do all these things alone, over and over. But in time you will come to 
love your duties, as I do. You will see that your father’s whole happiness depends 
on order and regularity, and you will come to feel a pride in it. Without order our 
lives would be disgusting, like those of the poor savages. At home, in France, we 
have learned to do all these things in the best way, and we are conscientious, and 
that is why we are called the most civilized people in Europe and other nations 
envy us.” 
… 
During the last winter of her illness [Madame Auclair] lay much of the 
time on her red sofa, that had come so far out to this rock in the wilderness. … 
[S]he would think fearfully of how much she was entrusting to [Cécile’s] little 
shingled head; something so precious, so intangible; a feeling about life that had 
come down to her through so many centuries and that she had brought with her 
across the wastes of obliterating, brutal ocean. The sense of “our way”—that was 
what she longed to leave with her daughter. … The individuality, the character, of 
M. Auclair’s house, though it appeared to be made up of wood and cloth and glass 
and a little silver, was really made of very fine moral qualities in two women: the 
mother’s unswerving fidelity to certain traditions, and the daughter’s loyalty to 
her mother’s wish. (SR 20-21) 
 
Cather fills out the image of the Auclairs’ reposeful home by clarifying its beauty as a 
product of discipline. The emphasis on disconnection and severance from the Old World 
(on the “wastes of the obliterating, brutal ocean”) frames the Auclairs’ domesticity as a 
precarious and imperiled aesthetic achievement, replacing any misreading of the 
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household’s candlestick, tablecloth, and decanter finery as signs of an indulgent 
materialism with an appreciation of such artful domestic order as evidence, rather, of a 
principled idealism—of staunch “fidelity” to French “traditions.” As Cather wrote of 
these colonists in her letter about Shadows, “Those people brought a kind of French 
culture there and somehow kept it alive on that rock, sheltered it and on occasion died for 
it, as if it really were a sacred fire” (OW 16). Beyond simply praising this pioneer 
endurance, the sheer extent of Cather’s obliviously settler-colonial outlook becomes 
especially clear when she asserts, in the same letter, that such artful, disciplined 
domesticity was actually more essential to the process of frontier settlement than the 
elimination of indigenous people: “An orderly little French household that went on trying 
to live decently … interests me more than Indian raids or the wild life in the forests. … 
[O]nce having taken your seat in the close air by the apothecary’s fire, you can’t explode 
into military glory …. And really, a new society begins with the salad dressing more than 
with the destruction of Indian villages” (OW 16). 
 The destruction of indigenous life and the military glory of white settlers are 
likewise eclipsed by the quiet wonders of settler endurance in Death Comes for the 
Archbishop, Cather’s 1927 novel about French-Catholic missionaries spreading their faith 
in the recently annexed American territory of 1850s New Mexico. Like O Pioneers!, 
Archbishop is comprised of a series of chronologically discontinuous vignettes 
constituting a tableau of its settler protagonist’s trials and tribulations. The story of 
Bishop Jean-Marie Latour founding the first archdiocese in New Mexico includes 
glimpses of his initial, perilous journey to his desert bishopric, his attempts to corral 
disobedient, sinful, and power-hungry Mexican priests, his (failed) efforts at converting 
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local indigenous peoples, and narrowly escaped run-ins with murderous white outlaws. 
The tonal atmosphere of constantly besetting, ambient hardship that we expect from a 
Catherian frontier narrative is quickly established in the novel’s opening pages, as Latour 
traverses the harsh desert alone to reach his diocese. “The difficulty,” Cather’s narrator 
observes, “was that the country in which he found himself was so featureless”: riding 
through “thirty miles of conical red hills, … he seemed to be wandering in some 
geometrical nightmare” (17). The Bishop appears lost; his mule is wearied, and he is out 
of water. But just as O Pioneers! opens with vivid descriptions of a harsh and untamed 
landscape that in fact help to highlight Alexandra’s principled endurance, so does 
Archbishop’s opening scene of lethal adversity serve as a contrastive backdrop for Father 
Latour’s humble yet steadfast resilience. Where Alexandra weathers the frontier’s harsh 
material  circumstances through the idealism of her faith in the land, Father Latour 
weathers them through his faith in God, a faith that Cather encodes as an aesthetic 
sensitivity to signs from the Divine: “When he opened his eyes again, his glance 
immediately fell upon one juniper which differed in shape from the others. It was not a 
thick-growing cone, but a naked, twisted trunk, … and at the top it parted into two lateral, 
flat-lying branches. … Living vegetation could not present more faithfully the form of the 
Cross” (18). The Bishop then stops for devotions in the middle of the desert, devotions 
that “lasted perhaps half an hour, and when he rose he looked refreshed” (19). While 
pushing on he wonders whether the mere trip to his diocese alone might claim his life, 
but the mental discipline and spiritual fortitude of his faith gives him the strength he 
needs, again, to pull through: “He reminded himself of that cry, wrung from his Savior on 
the Cross, ‘J’ai soif!’ Of all our Lord’s physical suffering, only one, ‘I thirst,’ rose to His 
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lips. Empowered by long training, the young priest blotted himself out of his own 
consciousness and meditated upon the anguish of his Lord.  The Passion of Jesus became 
for him the only reality; the need of his own body was but a part of that conception” (20). 
 Cather thus sets the stage and the tone for the rest of her novel with this opening 
sketch of Latour’s austere, self-abnegating resilience. As novel unfolds, she continues to 
present Latour in situations and postures that highlight his embattledness and exquisite 
resignation to the realities and challenges of frontier-based missionary life. Unlike O 
Pioneers! and Shadows on the Rock, which revolve entirely around scenes and 
interactions that take place between white people, Archbishop is more frequently 
structured around interracial encounters, since Latour’s work is to bring the Catholic faith 
to those in his diocese, especially Mexican and indigenous people. These interracial 
encounters are still worth discussing, however, as they are a key part of how Cather 
illustrates her pioneer protagonist’s humble endurance, and like the moment in Good 
Morning, Midnight where Rhys highlights Sasha’s “Angliche,” unemotional response to 
Serge’s story of the struggling Martiniquan woman, Latour’s encounters with indigenous 
people are not scenes where the text suddenly “becomes” racial for a moment but scenes 
where qualities that are in fact racialized throughout the novel become more overtly 
racialized because of an interracial context. In Book of Three of the novel, Latour sets out 
on a mission to hold a mass at Ácoma Pueblo, an indigenous community cut off from 
frequent ecclesiastical guidance by its location at the top of an isolated, formidably high 
mesa. Chronically severed from contact with the Church, the Ácoma people appear to 
Latour, upon his arrival, as especially impenetrable to Christianization, and Cather’s 
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portrayal of his visit highlights the feelings of embattled dismay that overwhelm him in 
the moment: 
[H]e had never found it so hard to go through the ceremony of the Mass. Before 
him, on the grey floor, in the grey light, a group of bright shawls and blankets, 
some fifty or sixty silent faces; above and beyond them the grey walls. He felt as 
if he were celebrating Mass at the bottom of the sea, for antediluvian creatures; 
for types of life so old, so hardened, so shut within their shells, that the sacrifice 
on Calvary could hardly reach back so far. … When he blessed them and sent 
them away, it was with a sense of inadequacy and spiritual defeat. (100) 
 
These are the kinds of situations and affects that Cather’s pioneer aesthetics enshrine: the 
image, the vision, of a pioneer churchman beset by the monumentality of his own 
evangelical task and fighting to maintain his resolve. All the mention of lighting, of the 
staging of the scene as a scene (“Before him, … in the grey light … beyond them they 
grey walls”), illustrates how much these novels function almost like literary photography, 
with Cather taking snapshots of pioneers poised in just the right situations to capture their 
exquisite resilience, their ability to bend and not break in the face of conditions 
unimaginable to modern bourgeois Americans whose greatest problem is boredom. “He 
was on a naked rock in the desert, in the stone age,” Cather’s narrator remarks, putting 
the scale of Latour’s adversities into perspective by narrating them as if Latour himself 
were looking down on the scene and witnessing his own smallness, “a prey to 
homesickness for his own kind, his own epoch, for European man and his glorious 
history of desire and dreams” (103). That Latour ultimately overcomes this sense of 
“spiritual defeat” is never said in so many words so much as simply implied by the fact 
that the narrative continues. Right after the lofty, dramatic lines describing Latour 
stranded “on a naked rock … in stone age,” Cather ends the section by tacking on a 
jarringly mundane, concluding paragraph: “On his homeward way the Bishop spent 
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another night with Father Jesus, the good priest at Isleta, who talked with him much of 
the Moqui country and of those very old rock-set pueblos still farther to the west” (103). 
The apparent need not to make a big deal, narratively speaking, over how or when Latour 
brought himself out of his Ácoma-induced dismay lends an air of understated epic-ness to 
this pioneer protagonist’s endurance. It suggests that such formidable experiences and the 
mental, spiritual, and physical fortitude they demand were such routine parts of Latour’s 
life on the frontier as to be almost narratively unremarkable. The stoic reserve with which 
Cather’s narrative touches on Latour’s flash of existential dread then quickly moves on 
reflects the calm stolidity with which the stalwart Latour would have quietly metabolized 
and overcome this setback. 
 Let me stop to reiterate, at this point, that everything I have been describing here 
should be understood as a set of tropes and storylines racially charged with a tacit 
nostalgia for forms of whiteness morally and aesthetically superior to that of America’s 
restless, Philistine, modernized bourgeoisie. Whether we are talking about Captain 
Forrester, Alexandra, Cécile, Euclide, and Madame Auclair, or Archbishop Jean-Marie 
Latour, the set of fine moral qualities these pioneers exhibit—hardiness, austerity, 
discipline, idealism—is, for Cather, something that spoke of race. We know this not from 
overt references to these characters’ whiteness within the novels but from what we have 
seen earlier in the discussion of Cather’s nonfiction. Her interviews, speeches, and letters 
identify America’s “prosperous middle class” rather than “white people” as the explicit 
targets of her cultural criticism, but this does not mean, of course, that whiteness is 
irrelevant to an analysis of her cultural anxieties and the literary reflexes they inspired. 
Both the societal problems Cather was identifying and the escapist literary solutions she 
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provided center on white people, and her pioneer fictions ensure, however unwittingly, 
that when faced with industrial capitalism’s moral and cultural ramifications, the people 
and lives we imagine as exemplars of a different and better way of living, of alternative 
and superior values, practices, and mentalities, are still white people—are the “good” 
white people rife with courage and honesty and resilience before modernity hit and 
whiteness “went bad.” Cather’s portrayal of these pioneers should also be understood as 
what Tuck and Yang call settler moves to innocence: as (aesthetic) positionings of white 
settlers in situations and postures that depict frontier settlement as a process that white 
people endured. Cather, again, was not writing about the frontier out of a conscious 
desire to reckon with and pardon white people’s participation in indigenous dispossession 
and genocide, but settler moves to innocence can be made unwittingly as often as 
deliberately, and Cather’s fictions effectively rescript the history of frontier settlement by 
displacing the systemic realities of violent white acquisitiveness with individualistic 
portraits of noble white embattledness. This representational maneuver inevitably makes 
her fiction well-poised to alleviate any sense of responsibility or guilt on the part of white 
readers for acts and histories of settler colonization. Such settler-colonial dynamics and 
assumptions are the foundation for the cultural work done on whiteness by Cather’s 
fiction: the act of settlement—of establishing residence and some form of European-
derived civilizational order on what is imagined as untamed, unowned, and order-less 
land—is the stage on which these white, pioneer virtues play out. 
 I want to reiterate one other important pattern (or rather tension, as we will see) in 
the way Cather portrays her white settlers at the level of novelistic content. As my 
readings of A Lost Lady, Shadows on the Rock, O Pioneers!, and Archbishop suggest, 
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Cather’s novels consistently avoid representing her pioneer characters in any kind of 
materially acquisitive act. The military invasions and treaty betrayals through which 
French and American whites first gained access to the indigenous lands that eventually 
became Quebec or Nebraska or New Mexico are not a part of Cather’s historical fiction 
for frank reasons of personal aesthetic philosophy that we have seen (“[R]eally, a new 
society begins with the salad dressing more than with the destruction of Indian villages”). 
These larger acts of historical violence and dispossession aside, Cather’s pioneers as 
individuals are also never depicted in the business of property accumulation. Euclide 
Auclair in Shadows comes to Quebec with a modicum of wealth already in hand, as the 
French Count who serves as the administrative and military leader of the colony was 
already a longtime patron of the Auclair family back in France. The apothecary makes a 
quiet, simple living throughout novel purveying salves and tinctures to Quebec’s ailing 
residents; desires for more personal property, a bigger home, or the expansion of the 
colony are topics foreign to his mind. Bishop Latour, as a man of God, is unsurprisingly 
disinterested in worldly goods, and the cupidity and miserliness of some of the Mexican 
priests in his diocese are actually presented as some of major irritants in his efforts to 
gain moral and ecclesiastical control of his frontier bishopric. We know, simply from 
being told at the level of narration, that Alexandra is a savvy businesswoman with a head 
for figures, but while Cather alludes to her financial acumen being a saving grace for the 
family farm, there are never any moments where Alexandra is shown, for instance, 
negotiating a land deal. Quite literally, as discussed in this chapter’s opening, we see her 
in Book One struggling to keep the property bequeathed to her by her parents, and then, 
all of a sudden, at the start of Book Two, the novel jumps forward 16 years, and she has 
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“one of the richest farms on the Divide” (OP 43). When Alexandra’s friend Carl returns 
to Hanover and asks her how she came into such prosperity, Alexandra’s self-effacing, 
anti-entrepreneurial response provides another clear (and suspiciously sentimental) 
example of the exquisite spirit of pioneer humility that Cather wants readers to take away 
from her text: “‘We had n’t any of us much to do with it, Carl. The land did it. … It 
pretended to be poor because nobody knew how to work it right; and then, all at once, it 
worked itself. It woke up out of its sleep and stretched itself, and it was so big, so rich, 
that we suddenly found we were rich, just from sitting still” (OP 59). Indeed, Cather not 
only carefully avoids showing her pioneers in any situations that might make them appear 
materialistic; she even, as we have seen, goes out of her way to write scenes and dialogue 
that showcase their anti-materialistic tendencies. Captain Forrester’s unwavering 
willingness to bankrupt himself in order to save his laboring depositors from the greed of 
up-and-coming young businessmen is the most dramatic example of this. The exquisitely 
resigned, anti-proprietary humility of Alexandra’s claim, at the end of O Pioneers!, that 
“‘[t]he land belongs to the future,’” and “‘the people who love it and understand it are the 
people who own it—for a little while,’” is another (OP 158). 
 As I stipulated at the outset of this chapter, however, Cather’s pioneers, though 
not materialistic, are also not poor, a fact which we have seen now in everything from 
Alexandra’s big farmhouse to the Forrester estate to the Auclair’s cozy home, complete 
with candlesticks, tablecloths, and decanters. Cather’s representations of the pioneers are 
thus riven, at the level of content, with a constant, ongoing tension. She has to make clear 
that their values and habits are clearly distinguishable from those of the modern 
bourgeoisie, and she thus minimizes the extent to which they are depicted in acts of land 
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and wealth accumulation and highlights their readiness to lose assets for the sake of 
principle ideals. As a consummately bourgeois artist, however—one whose gripe with the 
modern bourgeoisie is not so much their wealth as their Philistinism—she also cannot 
imagine poverty as an environment hospitable to art and thus has to balance a mood or 
spirit of ascetic idealism with some degree of material comfort. The ascetic idealism I 
hope, by now, to have illustrated. I want to wrap up this discussion of Cather’s novelistic 
content by illustrating the opposing class conservatism that permeates her texts, her 
inability to imagine moral uprightness and aesthetic beauty outside the material 
parameters of bourgeois domesticity. Any of the previously discussed novels could serve 
this purpose. We have witnessed the loving attention Cather bestows to Alexandra’s big 
farmhouse. Captain Forrester, humble and generous as he is, is wealthy enough to have a 
sprawling estate that one enters through a tree-lined “private lane” leading to the moat-
like feature of a creek, covered by a “stout wooden road-bridge” and winding around the 
“foot of the hill on which the house sat” (LL 4-5, 4, 5). Even Archbishop includes, 
alongside its myriad scenes of harrowing journeys up cragged mesas and down steep 
arroyos, a whole section devoted to depicting Bishop Latour and his vicar Father Joseph 
Vaillant sitting down, in the Bishop’s lodgings on Christmas Day, peppered with details 
that hint at the tiny bubble of decorum and civility that these pioneer churchmen have 
managed to preserve in a desert frontier: there are “candlesticks over the fireplace”; 
Father Joseph “had tucked a napkin over the front of his cassock”; there is even a bottle 
of red wine that the vicar had noticed and “‘begged’” from a “‘hacienda’” where he was 
performing a baptism (though it seems there is a “‘slight taste of cork’” because the 
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Mexican parishioners, Father Joseph observes, “‘do not know how to keep [wine] 
properly’”) (38, 40). 
The most vivid examples of Cather’s enduringly bourgeois leanings, however, 
appear in Shadows on the Rock. One of the book’s minor characters is an intrepid 
frontiersman named Pierre Charron, a “hero of the fur trade,” who spends much of his 
time in the woods (SR 137). “[Q]uick as an otter,” bedecked in “buckskins, with a quick 
swinging step,” Charron comes close to a Catherian version of James Fenimore Cooper’s 
Natty Bumpo: “To both Auclair and [the late] Madame Auclair, Pierre Charron had 
seemed the type they had come so far to find; more than anyone else he realized the 
romantic picture of the free Frenchman of the great forests” (SR 139). Yet unlike 
Cooper’s Leatherstocking, who has essentially abandoned civilized society for a nomadic 
existence with the last of the Mohicans, Cather’s frontiersman maintains close ties to 
Quebec society, which he considers home, and has not so thoroughly shed his European 
features: “He had the good manners of the Old World, the dash and daring of the New” 
(SR 139). Charron is a close friend of the Auclair family, and on one of his returns to the 
colony from the woods, he drops in to see Euclide and Cécile. He also has business 
visiting a friend named Jean-Baptiste Harnois nearby on the Île d’Orléans, and since 
Cécile had always dreamed of going to that island in the St. Lawrence, Charron agrees to 
take her with him for his three-day visit. Everything goes well at first. Cécile revels in the 
fields, “pick[ing] wild strawberries” and enjoying the sight of “daisies” and “marshy 
hollows” “thatched over buttercups” (SR 153). But the mood of the visit shifts when night 
falls, and it is time to head indoors. The Harnois family, it turns out, are poor farmers 
living in a cramped, dirty home with no decorum or manners. When showing Cécile their 
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pigs and geese, the family’s four young daughters “kept telling her about peculiarities of 
animal behaviour which she thought it better taste to ignore” (SR 154). “[T]he kitchen 
where they ate was hot and very close,” and worst of all was bedtime, for Cécile finds out 
that she must share the same bed in which all four Harnois daughters sleep (SR 154). 
“When they kicked off their moccasins, they did not stop to wash their legs, which were 
splashed with the mud of the marsh and bloody from mosquito bites. One candle did not 
give much light, but Cécile saw that they must have gone to bed unwashed for many 
nights in these same sheets” (SR 154). As Cécile tries, unsuccessfully to fall asleep, she 
remembers, unsurprisingly, “how her mother had always made everything at home 
beautiful, just as here everything about cooking, eating, sleeping, [and] living, seemed 
repulsive” (SR 155). Cécile lies awake all night, and the visit is cut short when she 
privately begs Charron to take her home the next day. 
There is nothing in the narrator’s commentary during or after this episode that 
suggests readers should be in any way critical of Cécile’s discretely expressed yet 
unambiguous class disgust. Her instinctive revulsion from people and places that lack the 
order and resources for proper repose mark her as a typical Cather focalizer, and Cather 
minimizes the potentially off-putting effects of her protagonist’s class condescension by 
including various examples, from the start of the novel, of how the Auclairs try to spread 
their wealth by using their own resources to tend to the less fortunate. Euclide and Cécile 
often take care, for instance, of a disabled pauper named Blinker who is ostracized by 
other members of the colony due to his physical deformities but whom the apothecary 
and his daughter offer food and occasional shelter in exchange for menial labor around 
their house. They also take care of a young boy named Jacques Gaux, whose mother 
 
 321 
works in an inn that is clearly implied to be a brothel and who has neither the time nor the 
motherly instincts to look after her son. Jacques and Cécile, being of similar ages, are 
close friends, and Cather devotes Book Three of the novel to fleshing out their 
relationship, one in which the Auclair’s property plays a crucial part, specifically a single 
piece of dishware: 
[Cécile] had a silver cup with a handle; on the front was engraved a little wreath 
of roses, and inside that wreath was the name, “Cécile,” cut in the silver. Her 
Aunt Clothilde had given it to her [back in France] when she was but a tiny baby, 
so it had been hers all her life. That was what seemed so wonderful to Jacques. 
His clothes had always belonged to somebody else before they were made over 
for him; he slept wherever there was room for him, sometimes with his mother, 
sometimes on a bench. He had never had anything of his own […]. But to have a 
little cup, with your name on it … even if you died, it would still be there, with 
your name. 
 More than the shop with all the white jars and mysterious implements, 
more than the carpet and curtains and the red sofa, that cup fixed Cécile as born to 
security and privileges. He regarded it with respectful, wistful admiration. … [H]e 
liked to hold it and trace with his finger-tips the letters that made it so peculiarly 
and almost sacredly hers. Since his attention was evidently fixed upon her cup, 
more than once Cécile had suggested that he drink his chocolate from it, and she 
would use another. But he shook his head, unable to explain. That was not at all 
what her cup meant to him. Indeed, Cécile could not know what it meant to him; 
she was too fortunate. (SR 70) 
 
This is one of the most vivid examples of Cather, class-wise, trying to have her cake and 
eat it, too. On the one hand, she acknowledges that Cécile is a “fortunate” child, enjoying 
“securit[ies] and privileges” hardly typical of life on the frontier. Jacques’ field of vision 
thus includes “the carpet and curtains and red sofa” that attest to a well-off home. On the 
other hand, in addition to warding off any critique or resentment of the Auclair’s 
“privileges” by showing how they use their resources to care for others, Cather also 
manages to blot out most of our vision of Euclide and Cécile’s material comforts by 
whittling down our focus to one object: a cup—a nice cup, but a cup nonetheless. By 
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dipping momentarily into Jacques’ perspective, Cather imbues the passage with an air of 
humble appreciation for the small things. Though Jacques is not the main focalizer of the 
text, we know that Cécile does appreciate the cozy home she enjoys based on her reaction 
to the Harnois family’s sordid living conditions, so Jacques’ near-religious reverence for 
her cup reads, tonally, as a part of the overarching spirit of pioneer humility the novel 
aims to convey to modern American readers, a capacity to find contentment and beauty in 
the grip of environments and circumstances unimaginable to the modern bourgeoisie. The 
passage reveals how much that vision of “[a]n orderly little French household that went 
on trying to live decently” in the midst of the wilderness (the vision that interested Cather 
“more than Indian raids or the wild life in the forests”) revolves around the assumption of 
some property, some nice property, even if the vision as a whole militates against 
excessive property accumulation and valorizes principled idealism over petty 
materialism. 
 We have taken a thorough look, by now, at the affective and ideological 
dimensions of how Cather represents her pioneers at the level of narrative content. I now 
want to call attention to Cather’s narrative form and consider how her stylistic maneuvers 
enhance the racially charged portrayals of white settlers within her fiction. There are a 
few different ways in which Cather’s literary form works to buttress her texts’ 
atmosphere of nostalgic escape to exquisitely resilient, spartan forms of whiteness. The 
first of these pertains to the fragmentary, discontinuous nature of her storytelling. As I 
have already noted a few times over the course of this chapter, Cather often uses sudden 
jump cuts to move from one section of a novel to the next, transitions that often skip over 
large chunks of time in the turning of a page. O Pioneers!, for example, is broken into 
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five Parts, and Cather’s formal techniques are most evident in each Part’s opening 
paragraph. We have already seen the first lines of Part I: “One January day, thirty years 
ago, the little town of Hanover, anchored on a windy Nebraska tableland, was trying to 
not to be blown away” (OP 3). Cather introduces the novel’s main characters and then 
describes the conditions of the Bergson household during Alexandra’s childhood, 
particularly her father’s failing health. Even within Part I, however, Cather already begins 
to employ time-skipping jumps. Each of the novel’s five Parts is further subdivided into 
separately numbered sections. Section II of Part I is where Cather first describes 
Alexandra’s ailing father and sketches his background. Two pages later, Section III of 
Part I suddenly begins with the sentence, “One Sunday afternoon in July, six months after 
John Bergson’s death, Carl was sitting in the doorway of the Linstrum kitchen” (17). A 
few more pages later, Section IV begins, “For the first three years after John Bergson’s 
death, the affairs of his family prospered. Then came the hard times that brought every 
one on the Divide to the brink of despair” (25). This pattern of chronological 
leapfrogging continues throughout the novel and finds its most extreme manifestation in 
the opening lines of Part II: “It is sixteen years since John Bergson died. His wife now 
lies beside him, and the white shaft that marks their graves gleams across the wheat-
fields” (39). The narrative fast forwards over a decade, and perhaps because of the 
extremity of this particular jump, the narrator calls more attention to it than usual via the 
temporary shift to the present tense. Cather’s style signals a conscious, meta-fictional 
awareness of the reader’s positioning outside the story: no effort is made to hide the fact 
that the listening audience needs to be caught up on events that have since been glossed 
over. After arresting the narrative pace to resituate readers within this new time frame, 
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Part II goes on to introduce more characters, walk us through Alexandra’s big farmhouse, 
and hint at Emil and Marie’s burgeoning romance, before Cather pulls us out of the story 
once again and launches us even further into the future with the opening lines of Part III: 
“Winter has settled down over the Divide again; the season in which Nature recuperates, 
in which she sinks to sleep between the fruitfulness of autumn and the passion of spring” 
(OP 97). 
 The different parts of the novel are thus separated by significant chronological 
gaps, ones that Cather bridges with very simple, one might even say understated or 
unbothered jump cuts, occasionally followed by a zoomed-out repositioning of the 
reader’s eye. Though especially prominent in O Pioneers! and Death Comes for the 
Archbishop, this elliptical structure holds true across Cather’s frontier narratives, and 
critics have identified the narrative gaps that appear throughout Cather’s novels as key 
elements of her modernist style. Jo Ann Middleton calls them “vacuoles,” borrowing a 
term from cell biology, where it describes empty spaces within a cell that are in fact 
crucial to maintaining the cell’s structure and performing certain life-sustaining 
functions. In the case of Cather’s fiction, these vacuoles could be “a thirteen-year space 
between parts of a work,” like the giant gap of space between Parts I and II of O 
Pioneers!, or just “an unexpected space between scenes,” like the description of Latour’s 
epic feelings of failure and existential dread after his mass at Ácoma suddenly followed 
by Cather concluding the section by telling us that, on the way home, Latour visited a 
local priest who told him about another area of the nearby country (Middleton 56). In 
each case, Cather’s vacuoles are “structural absences that, in fact, allow for a fuller story 
than should be technically possible” (Middleton 55). This is because one of their 
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predominant functions, in Middleton’s reading, is to elicit reader response and emotional 
investment. These narrative gaps beckon to be filled by the reader’s imagination, whether 
this means envisioning scenes of life that would have transpired in the 16 years glossed 
over in one of Cather’s narrative transitions or conjecturing about the details of a scene 
whose contents are clearly crucial to the plot but that Cather has elected not depict (e.g., 
what character x said to or did with character y that has led to a change we are now seeing 
in the next part of the story Cather has represented). By filling the vacuoles with their 
own visions and interpretations, “readers are drawn into the poetic creation” (Middleton 
60). Middleton bases this argument on the very correct observation that literary style, for 
Cather, was always a matter of a) emotional effect and b) simplification—the latter being 
crucial to the former. “The higher processes of art,” Cather wrote in “The Novel 
Démeublé,” “are all processes of simplification” (49). “Whatever is felt upon the page 
without being specifically named there – that, one might say, is created. It is the 
inexplicable presence of the thing not named, of the overtone divined by the ear but not 
heard by it, … the emotional aura of the fact or the thing or the deed, that gives high 
quality to the novel or the drama, as well as to poetry itself” (Cather, “The Novel 
Démeublé” 50). 
 Middleton’s claims about the imagination-sparking role of Cather’s vacuoles are 
thus well-founded and an excellent way of describing the aesthetic purpose and effect of 
Cather’s narrative gaps. I would argue, though, that as regards her novels of frontier life 
and the capacity of her pioneer characters to read as foils to America’s restless and 
spoiled modern bourgeoisie, Cather’s discontinuous, elliptical narrative form serves 
another, more important effect. By frequently jumping forward months, years, or even 
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decades into a pioneer character’s life and by enacting these narrative jumps with 
minimal narrative commentary, Cather adopts a novelistic form maximally suited to 
highlighting the pioneers’ defining trait of steadfast endurance. To some extent, this a 
very straightforward claim: if you want to portray a set of characters in a way that 
foregrounds and valorizes their indefatigable mettle and resilience, pick an economical 
form that allows you to telescope large swatches of historical time and lived experience 
into a small amount of narrative space, to maximize the amount of stuff you can show 
your characters enduring. The time-lapse, collage-like nature of Cather’s pioneer 
fictions—their juxtaposition of various snapshots of adversity taken at disparate moments 
over the course of a character’s life—facilitates a very holistic reading experience: what 
ultimately stands out is not the content of any individual episode so much as the overall 
fact of the pioneer hero or heroine’s having abided through them all.  
In addition, however, to this very straightforward technique of telescoping 
decades’ or even a lifetime’s worth of challenges into what are in fact rather short novels, 
Cather’s elliptical narrative form also highlights the pioneers’ spartan austerity and 
fortitude in a more nuanced, tone-based way. By enacting her elliptical transitions in 
ways that offer minimal commentary on the events we are leaving behind—ways that do 
not dwell on whatever hardship may have just been depicted—Cather exudes, at the level 
of form, the kind of phlegmatic, resilient stolidity being celebrated as a character trait at 
the level of content. I am thinking here particularly of the passage briefly discussed 
above, describing Bishop Latour after his failed mass at Ácoma. I will reproduce it here, 
as a reminder, in full: 
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He was on a naked rock in the desert, in the stone age, a prey to homesickness for 
his own kind, his own epoch, for European man and his glorious history of desire 
and dreams. Through all the centuries that his own part of the world had been 
changing like the sky at daybreak, this people had been fixed, increasing neither 
in number nor desires, rock-turtles on their rock. Something reptilian he felt here, 
something that had endured by immobility, a kind of life out of reach, like the 
crustaceans in their armor. 
 On his homeward way the Bishop spent another night with Father Jesus, 
the good priest at Isleta, who talked with him much of the Moqui country and of 
those very old rock-set pueblos still farther to the west. (103) 
 
That is the end of Section III of Book Three of the novel. Cather’s almost immediate, 
unfazed transition from Latour’s epic feelings of loneliness and dread to a concluding 
paragraph that essentially reads, “And then he went home and heard about x along the 
way,” performs, at the level of prose style, a striking capacity to metabolize extreme 
adversity, one that speaks to and reinforces our sense of this virtue as a quality in our 
protagonist. Cather was in fact quite explicit about this aspect of her narrative form. In 
the same letter to The Commonweal magazine where Cather identified Latour’s “well-
bred and distinguished” disposition as “something that spoke of race,” she also explained 
the reasoning and motivations behind Archbishop’s form (OW 9). 
I had all my life wanted to do something in the style of a legend, which is 
absolutely the reverse of dramatic treatment. … In the Golden Legend [a 
collection of medieval hagiographies by Jacobus de Varagine] the martyrdoms of 
the saints are no more dwelt upon than are the trivial incidents of their lives; it is 
as though all human experiences, measured against one supreme spiritual 
experience, were of about the same importance. The essence of such writing is not 
to hold the note, not to use an incident for all there is in it – but to touch and pass 
on. I felt that such writing would be a kind of discipline in these days when the 
“situation” is made to count for so much … , when the general tendency is to 
force things up. In this kind of writing the mood is the thing …. What I got from 
Father Machebeuf’s letters [the French Catholic missionary who served as the 
inspiration for Latour’s vicar, Father Joseph Vaillant] was the mood, the spirit in 
which they accepted the accidents and hardships of a desert country, the joyful 
energy that kept them going. (OW 9-10) 
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“[T]o touch and pass on”—that is the stylistic technique on display in sudden transitions 
like the one between Latour’s moment of agony about the evangelistically impenetrable 
Ácoma “rock-turtles” and the info he then hears from another priest “[o]n his homeward 
way”—or in the serial visions of agricultural and financial hardship that Cather provides 
in the first fifty or so pages of O Pioneers!, strung along with the help of time-lapse 
jumps of six months or three or sixteen years. It is a formal technique specifically 
designed, as she attests, to convey “the mood”—the exquisitely resigned “spirit”—in 
which these pioneers “accepted the accidents and hardships” of frontier life. Cather’s use 
of the word “discipline” in describing these stylistic maneuvers is of course telling, as is 
her use of that term as a point of contrast for aesthetics tastes and tendencies “these days” 
in the early twentieth century. The discipline of her restrained style—necessitated by the 
mood or spirit of disciplined hardihood she is attempting to capture—serves as a foil to 
the forms of writing popular in her own moment, where the tendency “is to force things 
up” in a way that caters (I would argue, based on Cather’s other nonfiction comments) to 
the tastes of a modern American bourgeoisie seeking immediate gratification and 
alleviation of boredom. 
There are two other aspects of Cather’s literary form that warrant commentary 
here. The first of these pertains to the aura of unbridgeable historical distance in which 
Cather shrouds her pioneer characters. Consider the following passage from A Lost Lady, 
where Captain Forrester, at the request of a guest at one of his dinner parties, tells us 
about his backstory. I want to call attention in particular, here, to Cather’s use of direct 
versus indirect discourse: 
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[H]e came West a young boy … and took a job as driver for a freighting company 
that carried supplies across the plains from Nebraska City to Cherry Creek, as 
Denver was then called. The freighters, after embarking in that sea of grass six 
hundred miles in width, lost all count of the days of the week and the month. One 
day was like another, and all were glorious; good hunting, plenty of antelope and 
buffalo …. 
 “An ideal life for a young man,” the Captain pronounced. Once, when he 
was driven out of the trail by a wash-out, he rode south on his horse to explore, 
and found an Indian encampment near the Sweet Water, on this very hill where 
his house now stood. He was, he said, “greatly taken with the location,” and made 
up his mind that he would one day have a house there. … He went away and did 
not come back for many years; he was helping to lay the first railroad across the 
plains. 
 “There were those that were dependent on me,” he said. “I had sickness to 
contend with, and responsibilities. But in all those years I expect there was hardly 
a day passed that I did not remember the Sweet Water and this hill. When I came 
here a young man, I had planned it in my mind, pretty much as it is today; where I 
would dig my well, and where I would plant my grove and my orchard. … 
 “When things looked most discouraging,” he went on, “I came back here 
[at] once and bought the place from the railroad company.” (LL 42-43) 
 
Let me insert a few brief notes about this passage’s content before discussing its formal 
features. In concert with the racially charged class representations of the pioneer’s 
elucidated throughout this chapter, the Captain’s backstory, first, noticeably dissociates 
him from the vulgar pursuit of material profit by implying that he worked for the railroad 
on the frontier not with an intent to get rich but simply out of a need for honest work and 
an intrepid love for the great outdoors. In addition to this maneuver, the passage stands as 
a perfect example and reminder of how Cather’s pioneer fictions deploy unwitting and 
white settler moves to innocence. Life on the barely settled frontier of the American 
Midwest is made into the nostalgic theater for the expression of Captain Forrester’s 
pioneer virtues: the patient endurance and ascetic idealism with which he weathered 
“‘sickness’” and “‘responsibilities’” and deferred but never gave up on his dream of a 
home on Sweet Water hill. The condition of possibility for painting Captain Forrester in 
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this noble light is the taking for granted of settler access to the land on which he worked 
and lives: what happened to the “Indian encampment” that was present when the Captain 
first arrived as well as how the railroad company came to possess that land over time are 
never addressed in the text. Indeed, Cather’s moves to innocence not only erase local 
histories of indigenous dispossession but even figure her robust, non-materialistic pioneer 
settler as the one who was really dispossessed by the ravages of settler-colonial, capitalist 
modernization. Here are the final lines of the Captain’s backstory: “‘We dreamed the 
railroad across the mountains, just as I dreamed my place on the Sweet Water. All these 
things will be everyday facts to the coming generation, but to us—’ Captain Forrester 
ended with a sort of grunt. Something foreboding had come into his voice, the lonely, 
defiant note that is so often heard in the voices of old Indians” (LL 45). Cather draws on 
the trope of the vanishing Indian only to transmute it into the trope of the vanishing 
pioneer, the noble frontiersman whose austere, disciplined idealism was once the sine qua 
non of whiteness but has since been eclipsed by “the coming generation” of restless, 
spoiled bourgeois Americans. 
 Returning to the point at hand: the passage’s formal structure—as well as that of 
the “vanishing pioneer” coda just cited—is marked by a careful interplay between direct 
and indirect discourse, one that keeps the Captain and his voice irreducibly removed from 
us. Starting from “[H]e came West as a young boy,” we are clearly supposed to read the 
ensuing paragraphs as if the Captain was telling us all of this himself—and we have, in 
our minds, a dinner-party scene in which he is saying these words to his guests. But 
rather than Cather quoting the Captain directly, maximizing his voice within the narrative 
fabric, she shrouds him in an aura of unapproachable distance or inaccessibility by 
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repackaging his words and relaying them to the reader through the interceding medium of 
her omniscient narrator’s indirect discourse. The entire first paragraph is told without 
direct speech from the Captain. In the second paragraph, Cather includes two brief 
snatches of his voice (“‘An ideal life for a young man’” and “‘greatly taken with the 
location’”) amongst what remains a paragraph overwhelming delivered through her 
narrator’s indirect speech. Eventually, Cather gives us a paragraph fully composed of the 
Captain’s direct speech, but by then, the first two paragraphs have already established a 
highly nostalgic and wistful tone, one that underscores the Captain’s distance from us as 
modern readers by minimizing the extent to which we can hear his voice in the prose. 
Cather’s stylistic techniques, in other words, literally foreground our reliance on the 
devices of fiction for access to the Captain as a historical figure (and thus how lost to us, 
in reality, he really is). It is almost as if he is not really or fully there, as if, despite being 
physically present in the scene, he is fading from view, receding from earshot, because he 
literally belongs to a different time, a point affirmed by the vanishing-pioneer coda, 
comprised of an incomplete fragment of speech from the Captain swallowed up by the 
redface vision of him as a “lonely … old Indian[]”—The Last of the Pioneers. 
 I emphasize the aura of historical distance in which Cather shrouds her pioneer 
settlers because I would argue that this is a formal and stylistic feature of her writing that 
enhances the self-avowedly escapist effect of her texts. This is a somewhat counter-
intuitive claim. One might argue that a work of historical fiction provides more of an 
escape for modern readers the more deeply and consistently it immerses them in the lives 
and voices of its bygone or vanishing characters. Perhaps this is true, and we would do 
well to remember that significant portions of Cather’s pioneer novels do work in this 
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way, setting us down in the day-to-day lives of the white missionaries, homesteaders, and 
colonists she depicts. But I would argue that the escapist effect of such fictions is further 
enhanced rather than undercut by aesthetic maneuvers that routinely refuse or limit our 
access to the characters being depicted, because this sense of unbridgeable distance 
between reader and characters serves to remind us how distant from our own present the 
content of the story really is—so distant as to be, in some respect, irretrievable, 
unrepresentable in full. Visiting a complete replica of some ancient structure or person 
would certainly allow a modern-day tourist to feel transported to a distant past, to feel 
removed from the present. But so would standing amongst ruins: knowing that you are in 
the presence of something so foreign and lost to the contemporary moment that you can 
only experience it now in fragments. 
And speaking of fragments, it is not just through carefully managed proportions 
of direct and indirect speech that Cather manages to veil her pioneers in an aura of 
unbridgeable distance: the discontinuous, elliptical form of her narratives described 
above also contributes to this effect. The jumpy, time-lapse transitions she builds into her 
novels along with their accompanying shifts in narrative tense and scale routinely work to 
jar readers out of the realm of the everyday lives of her characters. Yes: when we are in 
the thick of a certain Part or Book in one of her fictions, we are generally immersed in the 
day-to-day lives of her pioneer characters. We see Bishop Latour and Father Vaillant 
traveling throughout the diocese, Alexandra visiting the farms of her friends or vice-
versa, Cécile playing with Jacques or practicing her arts of domestic economy. But as I 
have shown, Cather’s works are often punctuated by jarring, inter-Part or inter-Book 
transitions that zoom out considerably from the level of everyday life and sometimes 
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even drop the default storytelling past tense for present-tense narration that places readers 
in a different time-space (“Winter has settled down over the Divide again; the season in 
which Nature recuperates …” [OP 97]). These moments constantly remind us of our 
remove from Cather’s pioneers. They create the impression that our default positioning as 
readers is not that of being on the ground, constantly right next to these characters, so 
much as that of time-traveling tourists: we hover over this panorama of pioneer life, 
flown in for a closer look here and there by a ghost-of-frontier’s-past narratorial guide 
(“If you go up the hill and enter Alexandra Bergson’s big house, you will find that it is 
curiously unfinished and uneven in comfort”). This narrative structure interrupts any 
sustained sense of immediate proximity to the pioneers being depicted, creating a sense 
of the past so foreign to modern America that it cannot be communicated through a 
continuous narrative form and has to be rendered, instead, through the literary version of 
an epic frieze—a succession of juxtaposed vignettes capturing these historical figures in 
positions and postures that speak to the “hardihood of spirit” of a bygone era (“something 
that spoke of race”) (OW 10, 7). “It is hard to state that feeling in language,” Cather 
noted, speaking of the spirit of “pious resignation” she imagined “among the country 
people and the nuns” in Shadows: “it was more like an old song, incomplete but 
uncorrupted …. I took the incomplete air and … tried to develop it into a prose 
composition not too conclusive, not too definite: a series of pictures remembered rather 
than experienced” (OW 15). 
 I have pointed out throughout this chapter that Cather’s pioneer fictions 
meticulously avoid depicting white settlers in concrete acts of capital accumulation, a 
crucial representational pattern that helps to construct her pioneers as anti-materialistic 
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figures whose lack of attachment to wealth and prosperity distinguishes them from the 
contemporary American bourgeoisie. We might note, as a final formal feature of Cather’s 
texts, that the discontinuous, elliptical structure of her novels also serves to reflect, at the 
level of form, the anti-acquisitiveness or highly limited acquisitiveness that is such an 
important part of her stories’ content. We have heard the extent to which Cather viewed 
the mass consumerism of early-twentieth-century America as a moral and aesthetic 
problem. I have also pointed out, however, that Cather cannot imagine aesthetically and 
morally appealing lives without a certain minimum of material, domestic comfort. The 
pioneers idolized in her fiction are definitely not subsistence farmers. Whether it is a big 
farmhouse or a nice silver cup, some degree of accumulated property is a prerequisite for 
being enshrined in her fiction because the anti-Philistine yet enduringly bourgeois Cather 
wants to escape to memories of white people who display both a set of rustic, 
economically coded virtues such as disciplined austerity and the capacity to endure 
hardship and a certain level of highly classed orderliness and decorum that marks them as 
being “civilized” despite living on the edges of white civilization. In order to tell the story 
of these limitedly accumulative pioneers, Cather adopts a literary form that reflects the 
desire for a middle ground between no accumulation and too much accumulation: her 
stories progress, but only so much.9 History goes forward in inconsistent lurches, but the 
material circumstances of characters like the Auclairs or Bishop Latour do not really 
change. The biggest exception to this rule is Alexandra, who experiences considerable 
upward mobility over the course of O Pioneers! However, that upward mobility is 
qualified, as I pointed out, by numerous details suggesting that Alexandra herself has not 
 
9 I am indebted to Jed Esty for calling my attention to this feature of Cather’s form. 
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changed despite the prosperity she has come to enjoy. The rooms of her house are 
unevenly furnished, as if she does not know what to do with all the space, and by the end 
of the novel, she is diminishing her own proprietorship by insisting that “‘[t]he land 
belongs to the future’” and that individual settlers only ever own it “‘for a little while’” 
(OP 158). Any sense of Alexandra undergoing a consistent developmental arc over the 
course of the story is also severely undercut by the fact that Cather places her heroine’s 
entrance into prosperity very early in the text. Alexandra comes into possession of her big 
farmhouse at the beginning of Part II of a five-Part novel, meaning that nearly four-fifths 
of the book revolves around depictions not of her accumulating property so much as 
merely maintaining the property she already has. As stated at the outset of this chapter, in 
Cather’s novels, we do not find white settlers who explore and conquer or claim and 
enclose. Rather, we find passive pioneers, who simply abide over the course of narratives 
that depict many a trial and tribulation without really “going” anywhere. This is an ideal, 
reposeful narrative form for conveying a historical mood or spirit of sparingly 
accumulative austerity, which functions as a key contrast point, for Cather, to modern 
America’s spoiled, restless, mass-consumer bourgeoisie. 
 To be sure, this argument relies on a willingness to read Cather’s form 
metaphorically, since it transposes two different registers of “accumulation.” The 
pioneers’ austere, ascetically idealistic disinterestedness in property accumulation is 
reflected by a form that lacks any steady accumulation of causally linked narrative 
events—a form without a clear trajectory of plot development. The minimal narrative 
development occurring at the level of form thus mirrors the minimal economic 
development occurring at the level of content. To phrase this link between narrative, 
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history, and economics a little differently, we might say, finally, that Cather’s barely 
progressing storylines serve to narrate whiteness in a way that stops before the twentieth 
century, before the austere, hardy, principled whiteness of the pioneers developed, 
economically, into the restless, trifling, materialistically Philistine whiteness of 
America’s modern bourgeoisie.10 This is true on a literal level, given that O Pioneers!, A 
Lost Lady, and Death Comes for the Archbishop are all set in the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century, and Shadows on the Rock is set in 1697. But beyond simply setting these novels 
far enough back in the past, Cather also structures them in ways that limit how far 
forward, toward the twentieth century, they advance.11 
In all of these ways, the formal qualities of Cather’s novels work to enhance the 
racially charged, affective and ideological dimensions of her nostalgic representations of 
white pioneers. Her discontinuous, elliptical narrative form telescopes as many visions of 
adversity and exquisite resignation into her short texts as possible; shrouds her noble 
pioneers in a mystical, alluring aura of irreducible distance; and minimizes the extent to 
which accumulation, narrative or economic, features prominently within her texts. These 
techniques allow each novel to function like a kind of secular Stations of the Cross, a 
Pioneer’s Via Crucis, stringing together various glimpses of endured losses and hardships 
meant, collectively, to inspire respect and fondness for a spirit of non-acquisitive 
hardihood that had disappeared, in Cather’s eyes, from the cultural wasteland of 
commercialized, late-industrial, twentieth-century America. In wistfully highlighting the 
austere moral and economic virtues of bygone white pioneers, Cather’s frontier fictions 
 
10 I am indebted, again, to Jed Esty for the phrasing of this point. 
11 If one were looking for an example of Cather narrating whiteness into its moral and aesthetic degradation 
in the early twentieth century, the best example would be the character of Rosamond Marsellus (née St. 
Peter) in The Professor’s House (1925). 
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provided a racial escape from the disheartening spectacle of modern American bourgeois 
whiteness. This escape takes for granted and reifies the settler-colonial dispossession of 
indigenous people, the long-gone or rapidly vanishing “Indians” who occasionally pop up 
in Cather’s texts in the politically defanged form of an unearthed pottery shard or as an 
impenetrable wall of primitivist paganism whose main narrative purpose is to exemplify 
the kinds of difficulties faced by a white pioneer missionary. The land violently wrested 
from indigenous people is the literal ground on which Cather’s virtuous, innocent, white 
pioneer figures stand out. This settler-colonially grounded form of white racial discourse 
has yet to be fully registered in discussions of her work. 
 
III 
“We provide this framework,” write Tuck and Yang of settler moves to 
innocence, “so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept 
gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence” (10). 
I hope this chapter’s reading of Cather helps to shift scholarly conversations about her 
work at least somewhat in this direction, illuminating and unsettling the not only settler 
but white settler moves to innocence that haunt her pioneer aesthetics. This has always 
been an urgent critical task, and it remains so today, for Cather’s readers—both scholarly 
and non-scholarly—continue to write about her work in ways that obscure its implication 
in forms of both settler colonialism and white racial identity in order to memorialize her 
status as the literary chronicler of an inspiringly humble, rustic, multicultural America. I 
want to conclude by providing two brief, contemporary examples of discussions or 
memorializations of Cather fiction that this chapter works against, discussions of her 
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work and legacy that read her novels (however unconsciously) as relatively or completely 
innocent of settler-colonial dynamics and racial conservatism. 
In September of 2017, an article appeared in The New Yorker about the opening 
of the National Willa Cather Center in Red Cloud, Nebraska, “a seven-million-dollar 
facility with a climate-controlled archive, apartments for scholars, museum exhibits, and 
a bookstore,” designed to complement the “six-hundred-acre parcel of land called the 
Willa Cather Memorial Prairie” (Ross). The article describes Cather as a writer with 
“enormous empathy for the natural world” and “a complex understanding of American 
identity,” one whose “symphonic landscapes are inflected with myriad accents, cultures, 
[and] personal narratives” and whose West is a place where “women achieve 
independence from restrictive roles; people of many countries coexist; and violence is 
futile, with guns most often fired in suicidal despair” (Ross). Violence, of course, was not 
futile, at least insofar as the dispossession of indigenous people is concerned, and as I 
have pointed out in this chapter, Cather scholars have routinely noted that the people of 
“many countries” coexisting in her fiction are mostly just white people of a few 
Northern- and Western- European ethnicities. Toward the end of article, there is one 
paragraph that makes what Tuck and Yang might call a “half-step” toward unsettling the 
innocence of Cather’s fiction: “One troubling aspect of Cather’s prairie narratives,” the 
author concedes, “is that Native Americans scarcely appear in them,” an erasure that “is, 
on reflection, outrageous” (Ross). This admission, however, is immediately followed by 
what would seem to be intended as an attenuating counterexample: “In ‘Archbishop,’ 
however, reverence for the land predates the white invaders. Cather comments that 
Indians have no desire to master nature, instead ‘accommodating themselves to the scene 
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in which they found themselves.’” The reductive representation of indigenous people as 
passive, ecological stewards thus supposedly balances out their erasure in other 
narratives.12 The same paragraph ends with a description of the Navajo character of 
Eusabio in Archbishop, who visits Latour on his deathbed in a scene at the end of the 
novel glossed, in The New Yorker article, as Eusabio taking on “the aspect of the figure of 
Death” and coming “to take the Bishop away—not in retribution but in reconciliation” 
(Ross). The loving, interracial friendship between a Native American leader and a white 
missionary settler is exactly the type of aesthetic trope that, for non-indigenous readers, 
“relieve[s] … feelings of guilt or responsibility [for settler colonialism] without giving up 
land or power or privilege” (Tuck and Yang 10). 
What this New Yorker article really captures, I would argue, is the famously 
tranquil, I would even say tranquilizing nature of Cather’s fiction, its proficiency at 
evoking transcendently placid, oceanic feelings: “When you walk the Cather Prairie, you 
move not only backward in time but also out into symbolic terrain, one in which the self 
becomes a ‘something,’ in which a moment of supreme bliss is indistinguishable from 
death” (Ross). Especially though not solely for twenty-first-century readers who have 
lived modernized, fast-paced, over-stimulated lives, Cather’s fiction can feel like a much-
needed sensory deprivation tank, stripping away the morass of the urban rat race and 
steeping one in visions of life more contented with bare essentials. Her novels often 
exude a calming, therapeutic atmosphere, somewhat sad in its spirit of resignation to 
 
12 Knee-jerk, stereotyped understandings of indigenous people as ecological stewards (an aestheticization 
that often denies various modern and economic dimensions of their identity) have been a key part of how 
settler colonialism operates under contemporary, environmentally conscious yet still capitalist 
neoliberalism. See, for example, Colville Confederated Tribes scholar Dina Gilio-Whitaker’s “The Problem 
With The Ecological Indian Stereotype” and Zapotec scholar Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez’s Indigenous 
Encounters with Neoliberalism: Place, Women, and the Environment in Canada and Mexico. 
 
 340 
harsh circumstances yet also peacefully reassuring in the same vein. Her scenes of rustic, 
simpler times, of sturdiness and moral integrity, generate feelings and images that many 
of us would love to be able to associate with the landscapes, origins, and forebearers of 
our nation. The problem occurs when getting lost in such feelings and in the gorgeously 
simple, pared-back language used to express them, reifies settler presence and 
dispossessive violence. Thus, in The New Yorker article: “Cather can get dangerously 
close to blood-and-soil lingo, as when Ántonia’s strapping sons are compared to ‘the 
founders of early races.’ But her conviction that the land belongs to no one—‘We come 
and go, but the land is always here,’ Alexandra says—undercuts any tendency toward 
nationalism and tribalism” (Ross). That Alexandra’s conviction undercuts tendencies 
toward white nationalism is heartening; that its sentimentalized notions of belonging and 
land ownership simultaneously undercut indigenous nationalisms should give us pause. 
 This smitten piece of reportage about a new development in the academic and 
touristic Cather industry is actually less distressing than one of the recent pieces of 
scholarship published on her work. In a 2016 article titled “Suffering with Willa Cather,” 
William E. Cain sets out on the (somewhat belletristic) mission to identify “what it is in 
her writing that makes Cather special and that leads readers to respond to her with such a 
heartfelt sense of connection and esteem” (289). As his title suggests, Cain ultimately 
argues that the root of Cather’s wide appeal is her writing’s central focus on “suffering—
the disappointment, hurt, and sorrow in the soul, and the imperative for men and women 
to make the most of life despite suffering’s abiding presence in it” (289). Cain takes this 
argument one step further by suggesting that “Cather is not only an exceptional writer but 
also a major blues artist,” backing this claim by simply juxtaposing quotes from Cather’s 
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novels with statements by various blues musicians (almost all African Americans) 
describing the blues as an art form that emphasizes survival through hardship (290). On 
the one hand, Cain’s essay provides a clear literary-critical precedent for viewing 
suffering (or rather the endurance of suffering) as an essential theme in Cather’s work. 
On the other hand, his reading of Cather as a “blues artist” gives no consideration to the 
racial specificity of the suffering that generated the blues as an art form. This is not to 
suggest that only African Americans can relate to the blues but that not all suffering is the 
same and that there are historical and socioeconomic stipulations that need to be made in 
order to argue Cather’s status as a blues artist in a nuanced, responsible way. While Cain 
is correct, then, in observing that suffering and endurance are key themes in Cather’s 
work, in accounting for the appeal of these themes through a universalizing, abstract 
framework, his essay exemplifies a kind of colorblind (and settler-colonialism-blind) 
criticism that we can and should be more impatient with. We need critical frameworks 
that confront rather than obscure the politics of bourgeois whiteness and its settler-
colonial contours as we read the themes of suffering and endurance in Cather’s writing. 
What I have tried to suggest in this chapter is that contemporary, white, middle-class 
readers of Cather’s work are likely to respond to her with a “heartfelt sense of connection 
and esteem” precisely because her novels—without taking this as their explicit agenda—
make frontier settlement into a showcase of steadfast humility rather than a series of 
violently dispossessive invasions and suggest, in the process, that “all lives suffer” (to put 
it idiomatically, for 2020): that white people suffer, too, and have prospered over time 
because of their disciplined capacity to endure hardship.  
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I want to reiterate, lastly, the importance of seemingly race-neutral, economically 
coded virtues to this reading of Cather’s fiction. On the one hand, I have suggested, very 
broadly, that the more or less complete erasure of histories of indigenous dispossession is 
one way—the most straightforward way—in which Cather’s texts enact settler moves to 
innocence, mitigating any sense of guilt or responsibility for settler-colonial violence. On 
the other hand, I have argued more specifically that Cather’s moves to innocence go one 
step further in turning the frontier into a theater for the display, by white people, of 
economic and moral virtues like principled idealism, the capacity to endure hardship, and 
an anti-materialistic disinterestedness in the accumulation of property and capital. 
Cather’s emphasis on these moral and economic virtues and her recourse to them as 
criteria for drawing implicit contrasts between different classes of “good” and “bad” 
white people are the basis of this chapter’s connection to those that have preceded it and 
to this entire project’s larger relevance to the racial politics of our contemporary moment. 
As I noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, the chapters of this project differ in the 
extent to which the stakes of their literary analyses can be exemplified in a discrete 
institution or discourse operative under neoliberalism, and while this discussion of Cather 
is the weakest in this regard, I do want to end by gesturing toward one way in which the 
racial and settler-colonial dynamics identified in Cather’s work seem to be echoing 
throughout the landscape of contemporary politics. 
Unlike the cases of Rhys, Faulkner, and Fitzgerald, where discussions of work-
enforcing welfare reforms, contemporary invocations of white debt, and notions of 
professionalism served to illustrate the stakes of the readings at hand, I would argue that 
the neoliberal connection, in Cather’s case, is best demonstrated not through the example 
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of a particular neoliberal discourse but through the discourses arising from America’s 
progressive, Democratic left as responses to neoliberalism. In the lead-up to the 2020 
presidential primaries, progressive candidates in the Democratic Party like Bernie 
Sanders and Elizabeth Warren pitched themselves as warriors against plutocracy, people 
who are going to take on corruption in “Washington” and “Wall Street” and make this 
country work for everyone and not just the rich. Oftentimes, such rhetoric includes 
explicit contrasts between the urban corruption of Washington or Wall Street and the 
forgotten laborers and small-business owners of America’s heartland. A 2019 policy 
statement posted online by Elizabeth Warren’s campaign begins with the sentence, “For 
generations, America’s family farmers have passed down a tradition of hard work and 
independence” (Team Warren, “Leveling the Playing Field for America’s Family 
Farmers”). “Today a farmer can work hard, do everything right,” the statement proceeds, 
“and still not make it. It’s not because farmers today are any less resilient, enterprising, or 
committed than their parents or grandparents were. It’s because bad decisions in 
Washington have consistently favored the interests of multinational corporations and big 
business lobbyists over the interests of family farmers” (original emphasis). The claims 
being made here are of course true, yet the danger of this rhetoric is its construction of 
America’s farmers as the only or the chief victims of the political and economic decisions 
of a U.S. government controlled by the wealthy. In this staging of the conflict between 
Washington and family farms, the question of how America’s farming families came to 
own their land in the first place is a non-factor. One is reminded of Tuck and Yang’s own 
example of settler moves to innocence from the Democratic far left, where the Occupy 
Movement’s calls for a redistribution of wealth do not entail a redistribution of land (23-
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26). There is also, within these lines from the Warren campaign, a good deal of virtue 
signaling, specifically regarding virtues that echo those we have seen as markers of 
whiteness in this chapter and in others throughout this dissertation (“resilien[ce],” 
commitment, “hard work and independence”). Obviously, family farmers in America are 
not exclusively white, but the patriotically charged heartland of the rural Midwest, where 
many of these family farms are located, is an extremely white region, and there is thus 
something in the Warren campaign lines that romanticizes the rustic resilience of “good” 
white farmers in contrast to the corruption and greed of “bad” white, Trump-led 
Washington. Again, this connection need not be pressed too far. The racial work Cather 
manages to accomplish through her emphasis on the pioneers’ striking array of seemingly 
race-neutral economic virtues (“something that spoke of race”) is evidence enough, I 
believe, of the relevance of this chapter’s readings to the colorblind dynamics of 
neoliberal white supremacy. But I hope this glimpse into some of the predominant 
discourses being marshaled against neoliberalism today—along with the examples of 
contemporary academic and non-academic writing about Cather’s oeuvre and legacy—
helps to reinforce the importance and timeliness of reading the intra-racially expressed 




 The preceding four chapters have sought to illuminate entirely new racial 
dimensions of white-authored texts that appear, on the surface, racially unremarkable. I 
want to bring this dissertation to a close by reflecting on what the fields of modernist 
literary studies and critical whiteness studies might look like after metabolizing the 
interventions I have offered in this project. In regard to whiteness studies, these 
reflections are fairly brief. I simply want to reiterate that I hope this dissertation 
encourages a sharper awareness of whiteness’ less spectacular, more intra-racial forms, 
its diffuse, quotidian manifestations in the behaviors and habits of mind that inform white 
people’s self-perception and social bearing even when people of color are absent and race 
is not a topic of thought or conversation. I hope that scholars across the disciplines in 
whiteness studies will supplement (but not replace) analyses of white supremacy’s more 
stark and direct manifestations with consideration of its subtler, more oblique forms, 
registering its myriad gradations and leaving it nowhere to hide. 
 In terms of what “Scattered Supremacies” means for reading literary modernism, I 
hope this dissertation spurs more treatments of race in modernist writing that reflect the 
insights and imperatives of our historical moment. This need not mean, to be clear, more 
scholarship that connects the cultural and economic discourses informing modernist 
literary production to those of neoliberalism, specifically, nor does it necessarily mean 
being more “presentist” in the way we read literature, generally (always making the 
upshot of one’s discussion about how a text can speak to our contemporary present). 
What it means is making consistent efforts to incorporate into our literary criticism the 
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lessons we have learned in the past few decades about how white supremacy relies upon 
whiteness’ ability to remain an unmarked, invisible racial category. Scholarship does not 
happen in a historical vacuum. People are talking about whiteness in America now more 
than ever, insisting upon the end of its status as an uninterrogated norm. To reflect that 
historical development within our scholarship means keeping whiteness perpetually on 
the table as a pertinent topic of consideration—especially in those texts where it is least 
apparent: texts by and about white people whose plotlines and themes do not themselves 
call attention to questions of racial identity. One could certainly do this in a way that 
stays entirely within the historical realm of the text in question, leaving aside arguments 
about parallels or resonances between the forms and contexts of whiteness in the early 
twentieth century and the early twenty-first. What is important is not the discovery of 
such presentist connections but the inculcation of a new racial sensorium, one in which 
literary scholars are always inquisitive and wary about whiteness’ historically specific 
and often ambient, ghostly operations, regardless of the period or type of literature being 
studied. 
 Over the course of this dissertation, I found myself wondering many times: am I 
making these texts about something they are not? If I am, where does this method of 
reading race stop? Is “Scattered Supremacies” suggesting that any reading of a white-
authored literary text focusing on white characters that does not substantially discuss the 
text’s whiteness is an irresponsible, “bad” reading? The answer to the first of these 
questions is yes, and it would be dishonest and self-defeating for me to claim otherwise. 
The whole point of my archival selections was that the texts I have written about are not 
“about” whiteness or race in any prominent, straightforward sense. But just because The 
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Mansion or Tender is the Night or Shadows on the Rock was not designed as a cultural 
commentary on white identity does not mean it is ever untouched by the racial biases of 
its author. I have made these texts “about” whiteness in the sense, merely, of bringing 
something out that was always already there, not of imposing upon them a rubric or 
category that is foreign and irrelevant to them. 
 The second question brings us to matters of vagueness and specificity. Where 
does this approach to race stop? When is it not very helpful to make whiteness the focus 
of analysis when discussing a racially un-self-conscious, white-authored text about white 
characters? I think the question here becomes, in turn, whether an analysis can glean from 
the text an understanding of whiteness more specific than simply saying, “These 
characters are ‘privileged.’ They have the luxury of not having to think about race as a 
factor in their lives because it does not affect them negatively in any way.” This is an 
entirely accurate description and fair critique of a lot of white characters in a lot of texts, 
but it is also, of course, like shooting fish in barrel. It is such a broad condemnation that it 
does not invite follow-up conversation so much as shut conversation down. What I have 
tried to do throughout “Scattered Supremacies” is generate readings of whiteness that are 
textured and specific, readings that go beyond fair but uninformative call outs of general 
“ignorance” or “privilege” and call fellow scholars in to conversations about specific 
behavioral tendencies, structures of feeling, vocabularies, and habits of mind that serve as 
underexamined vehicles of (often unwitting) white supremacy. I have tried, that is, to 
avoid vilifying these texts and authors and to find value in them, instead, because 
(whether they intended to or not) they help to break whiteness down in revealing ways 
and visualize its component parts. 
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 And the answer to the last question, then, is no: this dissertation does not mean to 
suggest that any reading of a white-authored literary text lacking a robust discussion of 
whiteness is bad or problematic. Sometimes a white-populated text just does not give one 
much to chew on, race-wise, other than the fact that its characters are white and living 
their privileged, (at least racially) carefree lives—one cannot figure out, that is, anything 
coherent and specific to say about how the plot lines, themes, or stylistic features of the 
text amount to a more nuanced, sustained white racial discourse. That is fine (and if one 
critic cannot find anything of that sort, maybe someone else, coming at the text from a 
different angle, will). Race does not need to be a major topic of analysis in every good 
reading of a white-authored literary text. Whatever the major topics of their reading are, 
however, I do hope that “Scattered Supremacies” will encourage literary critics working 
on white-authored, white-centered texts to always ask themselves, at some point in their 
analysis, how whiteness might inform the discourses and textual dynamics on which they 
are focusing, “especially in situations where ‘race’ is not ostensibly present” (Hartigan, 
Racial Situations 286). Asking this question may lead only to a footnote or possibly even 
to nothing, but having the diligence always at least to ask it (particularly in the case of 
texts devoid of interracial conflict, troubling depictions of people of color, and other 
forms of starkly racial content that usually prompt us to think about the whiteness of a 
character or author) does not seem like a very large ask for literary critics. It is a big part, 
I think, of what it would mean for modernist studies and literary studies more generally to 
metabolize this dissertation’s insights. 
 Regarding those insights, I want to add two clarifications about this project’s 
more theoretical contributions to the study not just of whiteness but of race in general. I 
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have talked, throughout “Scattered Supremacies,” about reading whiteness in texts where 
race appears to be absent. Obviously, each chapter of the dissertation has shown that race 
is not in fact absent from any of these texts, for whiteness courses through them like 
blood, even if it is hidden beneath the surface. It is also not really true, however, that 
blackness (or Asian-ness or indigeneity) is absent from these texts either. Race is 
relational. So long as racial differences are used to perpetuate and justify hierarchical 
social structures, whiteness will always be inconceivable without blackness, Asian-ness, 
Latinx-ness, “Indian”-ness—all the things it is not. It is thus not quite right to say that 
blackness is “absent” in Good Morning, Midnight or The Mansion. We would do better to 
say that blackness, in these texts, is a ghostly presence: it haunts the margins, always 
implied (however tacitly) where the white bourgeoisie affirms its own immaculate 
discipline and work ethic. As I pointed out occasionally—through references, say, to the 
story of the Martiniquan woman in Midnight or the figure of Old Het in The Mansion—
there are fleeting passages when blackness explicitly appears in these texts, yet this does 
not mean that the texts only “become” racial in those brief moments. The texts are always 
racialized, through the economically coded operations and performances of whiteness 
that pervade them. What I am trying to clarify here is that it is not even so much 
blackness that is absent from the text so much as characters of color, for everywhere that 
whiteness is present, blackness is insinuated. It is important to point this out because so 
much of what “Scattered Supremacies” aims to do is tear down the ideological veil that 
makes whiteness seem like an innocent, self-enclosed, universal trait: like something that 
does not always exist in hierarchical relation to other racial identities. In illuminating how 
whiteness can manifest in seemingly non-racial forms and situations, “Scattered 
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Supremacies” does not argue that whiteness is non-relational, that it can have meaning 
without understandings of blackness or Asian-ness or “Indian”-ness. It argues, rather, that 
whiteness’ relationality does not always take the form of overt juxtaposition, of being 
explicitly set against non-white bodies or against objects, practices, or aesthetic forms 
from non-European cultures.1 
 In addition to this clarification about the relationality of race and whiteness, I also 
want to note the emphasis that “Scattered Supremacies” places on race’s intersections 
with other axes of identity. In most societies, and certainly within the United States, race 
shapes all of our social relationships and positionings. To analyze whiteness in the way 
this dissertation has analyzed it is to remind ourselves that other aspects of identity, such 
as class, gender, and nationality, are incompletely addressed insofar as we do not 
consider how they are always racialized.2 This is worth underscoring as a theoretical 
takeaway given how much of the existing scholarship on the authors in this study 
overlooks the racialization of white gender and class identities: the way that race is 
thoroughly discussed in criticism on Wide Sargasso Sea but not After Leaving Mr. 
Mackenzie or Good Morning, Midnight, the way it is addressed in readings of Light in 
August and Absalom! Absalom! but not the Snopes Trilogy. 
Without it devolving into a kind of whiteness witch hunt—where critics put on 
trial every white author in the canon and churn out condemnatory accounts of their texts’ 
racial biases—a thorough uptake of this dissertation’s interventions could result in 
something like a series of “inventories” being taken of various, canonical white writers, 
 
1 I am indebted to Ania Loomba for bringing this clarification about the dissertation’s argument to my 
attention. In a revised version of this project, this insight would be threaded back into the Introduction and 
individual chapters rather than just added in here as a coda. 
2 Again, I am indebted to Ania Loomba for identifying and helping me to phrase this point. 
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where scholars revisit some of the authors or texts that no one has ever really talked about 
in terms of race (because there was not anything obviously racial to talk about) and 
reconsider, in light of studies like this one, whether there are in fact dimensions of this or 
that novel or story that are more racialized than scholars have previously acknowledged. 
Part of what makes the thought of such “inventories” so exciting is that they could lead to 
discoveries that are especially fruitful for teaching. Indeed, the classroom is another area, 
aside from the academic press, that I hope “Scattered Supremacies” is able to touch. The 
very first draft of this dissertation’s Introduction began with an anecdote about how I was 
able to go through four years of literary studies to get a Bachelor’s degree in English at 
an Ivy League institution and can only remember having one conversation, in all four of 
those years, about race in a text that was not authored by a person of color. Certainly, 
there were plenty of classes where race would have been a more constant topic of 
analysis, and I do wish, now, that I had taken more courses, say, in African American or 
Asian American literature. But the very fact that I had to have taken those courses for 
race to be placed on my literary radar is a symptom of the blinkered racial optics this 
dissertation seeks to address. In broadening the way that fellow scholars think about 
whiteness in literature, I hope that “Scattered Supremacies” helps to make it impossible 
for future generations of undergraduates to have the same experience (or non-experience) 
of racially minded literary analysis that I had. 
Indeed, the insights of this dissertation are especially valuable to contemporary 
efforts at creating more equitable and inclusive classrooms. I think there is a lot of 
consternation about what calls for diversifying syllabi mean for the long-standing canon 
of proverbial “dead white men.” The canonical clout of these authors (along with just the 
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realpolitik of social change and educational reform) means that they are unlikely to 
disappear from the classroom completely, but what “Scattered Supremacies” makes clear 
is that there are ways of engaging with Cather or Fitzgerald that do not have to mean 
avoiding discussions of race (which seems, to me, like one of the main, tacit misgivings 
about teaching the dead white canon). In fact, however, bringing race to the forefront of 
classroom conversations about seemingly race-neutral, white-authored texts is a key part 
of enacting our pedagogical commitments to inclusion and diversity. It is absolutely 
crucial that we diversify our syllabi by including more writers of color, but the racial 
biases of the status quo will still haunt the classroom if our discussions of race are 
confined to the days or weeks we are teaching a black- or Asian- or Latinx- or 
indigenous-authored text then drop out of the picture when we turn to white writing. The 
insights and methods of this dissertation can help to chip away at these ingrained 
patterns. 
 This project leaves behind so much unfinished business. The readings in some of 
these chapters (particularly those on Faulkner and Fitzgerald) could have delved a bit 
more deeply into the how the formal mechanics of some of these novels structure the 
manifestations of whiteness being uncovered. There is more to be said, too, about the 
national contours of “American” versus “British” whiteness as these categories are 
exhibited in geographically disparate modernist texts. It is also especially interesting to 
think about how movements and time periods of literature other than modernism have 
internalized and refracted the cultural scripts of whiteness dominant in their time. What 
might a Romantic novel by Nathaniel Hawthorne or a Naturalist one by Frank Norris 
show us about whiteness (in the mid or late nineteenth century, if also, possibly, the early 
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twenty-first) that a modernist novel does not? Ultimately, what I find the most exciting 
about this project (and what I hope readers find exciting about it as well) is that thinking 
about whiteness in this more expansive way has the potential to defamiliarize entire 
swathes of the Anglo-American literary canon, to make entirely new archives out of long-
standing literary texts. The prospect of discovering unrecognized racial dimensions to 
their content and form is exciting in itself, but as I have tried to suggest in this 
dissertation’s occasional nods to colorblind white supremacy under neoliberalism, this 
expanded eye and ear for whiteness’ less flagrant, direct manifestations is not just 
intellectually exciting but politically critical. As I noted in the Introduction, the influence 
of the Trump administration does not mean the end of more subtle, indirect, “colorblind” 
forms of white racial dominance but merely the resurgence of older, more blunt types of 
white supremacy alongside these ongoing, more insidious forms. The past few months of 
2020, particularly since the murder of George Floyd, have witnessed a heartening 
upsurge of protests against anti-blackness in the United States. Unfortunately, they have 
also witnessed an upsurge of emotional and educational labor on behalf of black people 
trying to explain and correct the problematic forms of allyship to which they are being 
exposed as more and more white people try (well-meaningly but clumsily) to understand 
and do something about their own whiteness. The situation is only exacerbated by the 
fact that President Trump and his supporters have given “good” white liberals an easy 
scapegoat of “bad” white racists to point to as the real problem. The time for white 
people to become better, more thorough critics of themselves, in other words, is now. 
Hopefully, in making us better critics of whiteness in literature, “Scattered Supremacies” 
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